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PART II.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

TURKISH WAR.

November 1912.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Turkish War.

Part II.

[46256] No. 1.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 1.)

TEVFIK PACHA présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey, et a l'honneur d'informer son Excellence de la constitution du nouveau Cabinet ottoman, sous la présidence de son Altesse Kiamil Pacha, Grand Vizir:—

Nazim Pacha, Ministre de la Guerre.
Réchid Bey, Ministre de l'Intérieur.
Gabriel Effendi Nouradounghian, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
Arif Hikmet Pacha, Ministre de la Justice et Président du Conseil d'État *ad interim*.
Réchid Pacha, Ministre du Commerce et de l'Agriculture.
Zia Bey, Ministre des Travaux publics.
Salih Pacha, Ministre de la Marine *ad interim*.
Damad Chérif Pacha, Ministre de l'Instruction publique.
Zia Pacha, Ministre de l'Évkaf (Fondations pieuses).
Musurus Bey, Ministre des Postes et Télégraphes.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 31 *octobre*, 1912.

[46302] No. 2.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 1.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November* 1, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a cypher telegram which has been to-day dispatched to the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, in consequence of verbal communications which have passed between the two departments.

2. I am at the same time to ask whether the Secretary of State considers it any longer necessary to keep a British man-of-war in Cretan waters, in view of the present situation there.

I am, &c.
O. MURRAY.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, November* 1, 1912.

IN view of possible danger to British lives and property at Constantinople, one or more war-ships may perhaps be wanted there; for which Foreign Office would get, if desirable, Sublime Porte's consent.

You should accordingly order "Hampshire" from Salonica to Besika Bay on arrival of relief, to be ready to proceed, on receipt of orders, to Constantinople.

To relieve "Hampshire" at Salonica, send "Diana" from Crete, unless you can order "Barham" or "Medea" there, either of whom would suit. "Diana" would have to be replaced as soon as possible by another ship. "Cumberland" is due to arrive to-day at Naples; you may use her temporarily for station duties, if you see fit, taking her under your orders.

Report your action by telegram.

[46182] No. 3.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 559.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 31, 1912.

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, dated 26th October:—

"Uskub evacuated night of 25th October. Ferisovitch occupied by Servians, Ishtip by Bulgarians. Several thousand fugitive soldiers already in Salonica. Commander-in-chief of Turkish western army left for Monastir. Rolling-stock on both Uskub and Monastir lines being withdrawn to Salonica."

[46183] No. 4.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 560.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 31, 1912.

FOLLOWING received from consul-general at Salonica to-day:—

"Last stand Kara Mak Toptchin; fighting expected to-morrow; little hope entertained of successful resistance."

[46184] No. 5.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 561.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November* 1, 1912.

AT a meeting of all the representatives to-night it was unanimously decided that, in view of the possibility of serious state of affairs being brought about by another defeat of Turkish troops and then likely invasion of Constantinople by hungry, fanatical, and disorganised soldiers, attention of Turkish Government should be called to the necessity of taking urgent measures to protect as far as possible foreign missions, banks, hospitals, schools, &c., and Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, as doyen, was charged with duty of pointing out to Porte measures which were considered desirable and urgent.

Meeting was also unanimously of opinion that with resources at our disposal we should be unable to do anything effective to protect our respective communities, and that it was essential that one or more war-ships should be sent here by each Power able to do so.

Consent of Porte would of course be asked, and it was not thought that any opposition would be made.

It was considered that at any moment this step might become urgent, and that if Powers agreed measures should be taken at once to prepare for this possible eventuality.

My French, German, and Austro-Hungarian colleagues have arranged with respective steam-ship companies to have a steamer ready to take off their communities in case of necessity.

I have asked our consul-general to try and make a similar arrangement with Khedivial Line.

[46185] No. 6.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 562.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 31, 1912.

I HEAR on good authority that Turkish Government are endeavouring to purchase two battle-ships building in America for Argentine Government, and have stated that they are prepared to pay 2,000,000*l.* in cash.

[46313] No. 7.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 563.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 1, 1912.

KHEDIVIAL Line is unable to guarantee presence here of one of its ships.

Could arrangements be made in London to secure that one should always be here on condition of payment of indemnity?

There is one other English ship, "City of Chios," owners Papyani, Liverpool, available here, which would be utilised for safety of colony.

Am I authorised to charter her? Probable cost about 40*l.* a-day.

One steamer, in case of great emergency, could take all of British colony who might want to go on board, and two would be amply sufficient.

English community 900, Maltese 1,500.

[46315] No. 8.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 565.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November* 1, 1912.

OFFICIAL statement published to-night that Turks have driven Bulgarians out of Bunarhissar and captured a quantity of artillery, ammunition, &c.

Greek torpedo-boat has destroyed in Salonica port the Turkish man-of-war "Feti Bulend."

[46308] No. 9.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 120. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November* 1, 1912.

FRENCH Ambassador told me last night that he had invited Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to adhere to a protocol of "désintéressement" with regard to the Balkans. His Excellency told me that Minister for Foreign Affairs had declined to do so, using the words that as an honest man he could not commit himself to signing such a paper under present circumstances.

This step has, I gather, been undertaken at instigation of Russia: it was bound to fail. To expect Austria to disinterest herself—territorially or otherwise—in the Balkans, if the *status quo* cannot be maintained, is as hopeless as it would be to expect Russia, at the instigation of Powers interested in China, to disinterest herself in Mongolia.

Confidence is felt here that Austria can adjust her interests in the Balkans by direct negotiations with the Balkan States, and a direct arrangement with Servia is thought possible if Russia does not use her influence at Belgrade to raise Servian aspirations and demands. Here they desire to be most conciliatory in dealing with Balkan problem, but they will never admit that Russia shall score some diplomatic success which can be interpreted as a recognition that Russia has a right to play the rôle of protector of Slav rights and ambitions in the Balkans. Austria considers that she possesses special claims and interests there, as she claims to be a Balkan State herself through the possession of Bosnia, and any attempt which may be made to coerce her, where defending what she considers to be her vital interests, will only tend to increase the strain already existing between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, and perhaps lead to war.

[46323] No. 10.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 186. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 1, 1912.*

PRESIDENT of Council sent for me this morning. He informed me of the communications which he made to you yesterday in regard to the attitude of Austria on subject of French proposals of mediation between Turkey and Balkan States, and for a conference.

His Excellency is greatly preoccupied at Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs' refusal to be a party to a declaration of territorial disinterestedness. He considers this refusal and the desire of the German Government to avoid or postpone a conference are indications that Austria, supported by Germany, intends to negotiate with Servia and Bulgaria, putting her own pressure on Servia, using that of Roumania on Bulgaria to gain her own ends in the matter of territorial acquisitions, and then to present other Great Powers with a *fait accompli* as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

President of the Council says that if Austria obtains territory other Great Powers may require territorial compensations.

[46324] No. 11

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 187.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, November 1, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 628 of 28th October (Constantinople telegram No. 529 of 25th October).

There being no time to come to an agreement of separate compensations to be demanded in return for consent to proposed customs surtax, French Government consider that British, French, and Russian Ambassadors at Constantinople should at once protest against proposed imposition by Porte of increase of customs duties without previously coming to an understanding with Powers, and that they should at the same time make every reservation in case of their protest being disregarded.

In this way, even if surtax be decreed and put in force by the Porte, the three Powers will still be in a position to claim legitimate compensation in return for subsequent consent.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs will be glad to learn that instructions in the above sense have been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

His Excellency's note, which contains other observations, forwarded to you by post to-day.

[46320] No. 12.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 1, 1912.*

I FIND from a conversation which I have just had with Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that information given me by my Austrian colleague concerning ideas of Balkan States on eventual division of Turkey (see my telegram No. 43 of 27th October) is practically correct. In addition, however, he told me that both the Servian and Bulgarian idea is to hand over Salonica, and quite a considerable area surrounding it, to Great Britain, and to neutralise both Constantinople and Dardanelles.

Speaking of the sanjak, he said that if Austria showed a disposition to live amicably with Servia an arrangement could no doubt be made about the sanjak itself, and she would find the Servians glad to be good friends, but Austria must once and for all give up the idea of getting to Salonica or preventing Servia from having a port on the Adriatic. If Austria showed herself to be aggressive, she would be resisted to the last drop of Servian blood, and he had little doubt that Bulgaria would fight by their side.

[46321] No. 13.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 1, 1912.*

UNDER-SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that certain suspicious preparations are in progress in Austria and Roumania, namely, rolling-stock is being detained, large quantities of rations are being stopped at various points on the railways, houses suitable for hospitals are being registered, lists of officers with a knowledge of the Servian language and of Servia are being made, time-expired men are being retained, and officers of reserve and in retirement are being notified where to report. He says that great care is being taken not to attract attention.

(Sent to Vienna and Bucharest.)

[46274] No. 14.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 112. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 1, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 31st October.

Head-quarter staff telegraphed here last night that they consider late battle to have been a crushing blow for Ottoman forces.

They believe they met the flower of the Turkish army, and that only remaining first-class troops are shut up in Adrianople. They will endeavour to make light of the late victory, but in reality they consider it as the most important in the campaign.

Previous to this battle they anticipated losing 30,000 men before reaching the capital; now, however, they expect to be faced with a demoralised army largely supplied with Martini rifles. Servian troops continue to be hurried to the front.

Head-quarter staff express confidence now both as to fall of Adrianople and result of the coming action at Chatalja. It is their determined intention to march into Constantinople.

[46186] No. 15.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Athens, November 1, 1912.*

GREEK fleet reports occupation of Thasos and Imbros and impending occupation of Strati.

[46295] No. 16.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 97.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, November 1, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 636 of 30th October to Paris.

I see signs that dispatch of British men-of-war to Salonica may be misinterpreted here. It would be advisable to recall them as soon as safety of British subjects is assured by Greek army of occupation.

[46318] No. 17.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 401.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, November 1, 1912.*

I WAS informed yesterday by M. Sazanof that it would be necessary to take the Treaty of San Stefano of 1877 as the basis of any future settlement in the event of the battle then proceeding resulting in a victory for Bulgaria. As regards the Adrianople vilayet, however, Russia could not give her consent to the cession to Bulgaria of any portion of it beyond the limits allotted by virtue of treaty to Bulgaria, and the effective sovereignty of Turkey must be maintained in all the remaining part of it, including Adrianople itself. His Excellency at the same time expressed the hope that this would be made clear to Bulgaria by the French and His Majesty's Government, in view of the fact that it would not be easy for Russia to take initiative in such a step at Sophia.

A copy of Serbo-Bulgarian agreement recognising their respective spheres of influence in Macedonia is being sent to Russian Ambassador in London. The cession to Servia of Uskub and a line to Lake Ochrida would not, M. Sazonof said, be opposed by Bulgarian Government. His Excellency thought, however, that we ought to take into consideration the question of obtaining the consent of Austrian Government both to this and to the cession to Servia of an outlet to the Adriatic by means of a slip of territory running through Albania.

[46322] No. 18.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, November 1, 1912.*

MONTENEGRINS have occupied Ipek, and are said to be preparing movement towards Djakova. They took Pelerbare in the sanjak some days ago. They are meeting with considerable resistance at Scutari.

[46426] No. 19.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 650.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 1, 1912.*

FRENCH chargé d'affaires has communicated following proposal from French Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

"1. Les Puissances interviendront collectivement auprès des États belligérants afin qu'ils suspendent les hostilités.

"2. La souveraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan sera intégralement maintenue à Constantinople et aux environs.

"3. Pour les autres parties de la Turquie d'Europe, le statut national, politique ou administratif sera modifié, selon les régions, et de telle sorte que les intérêts de tous les États en cause soient impartialement équilibrés.

"4. Afin de régler, dans un esprit de parfaite entente, ces diverses questions, les Puissances se réuniront sans retard dans une conférence où seront également conviés les États belligérants et la Roumanie."

I am replying that I raise no objection to the Powers being consulted, but that, though Powers may all accept this proposal to-morrow, events move so rapidly that views expressed one day have to be modified the next. It will be very important to have some idea of Austrian and Russian views before any conference meets.

[46303] No. 20.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 319.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 1, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 116 of 26th October: Balkan War.

Naval attaché should remain in Vienna for the present, using his own discretion as to visiting other places from which information may be obtained.

[46428] No. 21.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 321.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 1, 1912.*

MY telegram to Rome No. 467 of 1st November is for your own information only.

[46428] No. 22.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 467.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 1, 1912.*

ITALIAN Ambassador informed me that he heard from a source on the continent that there was some loose talk of notifying Austria that there must be no interference with certain points, such as the acquisition by Servia of territory across the sanjak to a port on the Adriatic. He said that to lecture Austria in this manner would make things impossible.

I said that such a method of approaching Austria would be criminal. I hoped Austria would make as few reserves as possible respecting the gains of the Balkan States, but it ought to be made easy for her to be moderate.

Balkan States had apparently conquered all Macedonia, and Bulgaria was at the gates of Constantinople.

Question now was should any limits be set to the territory to be acquired by them, and, if so, what limits? A change of ownership of Constantinople was a large European question, but except as regards that, public opinion here would make no reserves, and would be against any attempt to deprive Balkan States of fruits of victory.

Russia, I thought, would be ready to state what reserves she had to make. It was very important that Austria should do the same, and make her reserves as small as possible—economic reserves would probably be easy to agree upon. If Germany could ascertain from Austria what reserves she wished to make, so that friendly Powers could know both the Russian and Austrian views, we should have a little ground to work upon.

Italian Ambassador informed me that Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs was going to Berlin to-morrow, and he would telegraph to him what I had said.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 321; Paris, No. 651; St. Petersburgh, No. 1151; and Vienna, No. 320.)

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

[46184] No. 23.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 908.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 1, 1912.

ADMIRALTY will arrange to send a ship to Besika Bay to be ready for emergencies, but it is very desirable that if anything further has to be done to protect European communities other European Powers equally interested should also take similar steps, and they should be limited to this purpose.

You should make what arrangements are possible for steamer to take off British subjects in case of need.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 318; Paris, No. 647; Rome, No. 464; Vienna, No. 316; St. Petersburgh, No. 1148.)

[46425] No. 24.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 914.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 1, 1912.

TURKISH Ambassador has communicated a telegram from his Government urging that His Majesty's Government should give their consent to an increase of the Turkish customs from 11 to 15 per cent. His Excellency asked that our answer should be given through you.

Your Excellency should intimate that, while we do not wish to add to the embarrassment of Turkey, it would, we are advised, hardly be consistent with neutrality for a foreign Government to take special action to furnish funds to a belligerent while war is in progress. The case would be essentially different from the provisions of funds by private individuals.

Moreover, the Turkish Government will recollect that, apart from the other questions which were to be settled before our consent was given, our agreement to the increase was naturally conditional on that of all the Powers, and, according to our information, not all the Powers are prepared to consent.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 320; Paris, No. 649; Rome, No. 466; St. Petersburgh, No. 1150; and Vienna, No. 318.)

[46295] No. 25.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 269.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 1, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 97 of 1st November.

Our vessels are sent to Salonica in response to urgent appeals from consul-general and British colony, in order to afford them protection. When all danger to British subjects is removed, vessels will not be kept there.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 648; Berlin, No. 319; St. Petersburgh, No. 1149; Vienna, No. 317; Constantinople, No. 913; and Rome, No. 465.)

[46428] No. 26.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**

(No. 322.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 1, 1912.

MY telegram to Rome No. 467 of to-day.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of my views.

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* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 652) and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 1152).

[46286] No. 27.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 365.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 1, 1912.

COUNT BENCKENDORFF discussed the Balkan situation with me on 30th October. He said that if the Balkan States were completely victorious Russia could not adhere to the preservation of the territorial *status quo*.

I observed that public opinion here would not side with any attempt to turn the Balkan States by force out of what they had conquered.

Count Benckendorff agreed with me that if the Turks were victorious in the war the settlement would have to be the territorial *status quo*, with thoroughgoing reforms for Macedonia. He said that if the Balkan States were completely victorious, M. Sazonof would make no reservations as to what they should obtain in Macedonia, except that there should be some balance between the gains of Servia and of Bulgaria; otherwise one of them would be very discontented, and would be thrown into the arms of some one else. M. Sazonof also stipulated that the part of Thrace bounded by the River Maritza must be left to the Sultan to enable him to retain possession in security of Constantinople. In addition, M. Sazonof wished that there should be a declaration of disinterestedness on the part of the Great Powers.

I said that everything must depend on the result of the war; but, if the Balkan States were successful, I saw no reason why we should not support such a settlement as M. Sazonof proposed. We had no reason for making reservations, and the only criticism which I made on what Count Benckendorff had suggested was that some reforms to secure the position of the Christian population might be necessary in the part of Thrace left to Turkey. I wished, therefore, to leave this point open.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[46232] No. 28.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 23.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 1, 1912.

THE Servian chargé d'affaires informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 30th October that his Government had reports that, beyond the measures of actual mobilisation taken by Austria-Hungary and which he recently communicated to me, preparations were being made for further immediate mobilisation if such a measure were decided upon; also that Roumania, though not actually mobilising, was making preparations for doing so. M. Grouitch again alluded to the sanjak. He said that civil administration had been established in the Prishtina district, and was already in working order. A similar measure had not been taken in the sanjak, firstly, he presumed, for the purpose of not offending Austria-Hungary unnecessarily, and, secondly, because, perhaps, the sanjak might eventually go to Montenegro.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[46298] No. 29.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 1, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state that, in consequence of the situation which has arisen in the Near East, he considers it desirable that the 3rd Battle Squadron should at once proceed to the Eastern Mediterranean in case their services may be required for the protection of British lives and properties in Ottoman ports.

I am to request that the views of the Secretary of State may be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty at the earliest possible moment.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[46149] No. 30.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 1, 1912.

WITH reference to previous correspondence respecting the dispatch of His Majesty's ships to Salonica, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the accompanying copies of telegrams No. 555 from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and No. 903 to his Excellency, both dated the 31st October.*

I am to request, if the Lords Commissioners see no objection, that instructions may be issued in the sense indicated to the commander of His Majesty's ship "Hampshire."

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[46351] No. 31.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 333.)
Sir, *Rome, October* 26, 1911.

I HAD a visit yesterday from the Servian chargé d'affaires, who informed me, as I have had the honour to report by telegraph, that his Government had received information that the Austro-Hungarian Government were mobilising the XVth and XVIth Army Corps, the latter of which had its head-quarters at Ragusa. He was somewhat disconcerted by this report as well as by the information that the Dalmatian seamen were being transferred to Budapest in large numbers to equip a Danube flotilla. He told me that Servia had accumulated a certain reserve as a war chest, and that the Government could dispose of about 5,000,000*l.*, which would last them for a month or so, and that their hope was that the campaign would proceed with such rapidity that active hostilities would be over before their resources were exhausted. If this were not so, he admitted they would be in a difficult position.

He, as well as the Bulgarian Minister whom I met about the same time, were much concerned to know whether Italy would hand over to Turkey the capitalised sum representing the annuities she was undertaking to pay under the Treaty of Lausanne. I understand that Turkey is making efforts to secure the early liquidation of this debt, a considerable portion of which will, however, have to be handed to the Commission of the Public Debt.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[46357] No. 32.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 340. Confidential.)
Sir, *Rome, October* 27, 1912.

THE Bulgarian Minister in this capital, M. Rizof, a Macedonian by birth, is a man of some ability, and many observations which I have heard him make during the last year or two have been justified by events. It may therefore be not inopportune to record the views which he has recently expressed to one of my colleagues. He says that it is the intention of the Bulgarians to press on, if possible, rapidly to Constantinople, not because they contemplate remaining there, but because from there their voice will make itself heard with more authority. They are not, in their present

* Part I, Nos. 893 and 904.

humour, disposed quietly to accept dictation, and, should Austria-Hungary intervene in a manner opposed to what they consider their legitimate claims, the Balkan States will be prepared to fight in defence of them. The position of Austria-Hungary would not be altogether a satisfactory one. She would have to employ eight of her fifteen army corps to deal with the Balkan States and probable risings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while she could not leave less than two to watch the Italian frontier. This would only leave five to oppose to Russia, if the latter should be forced by public opinion to support the cause of the Balkan peoples. Under these circumstances he is disposed to think that Austria-Hungary would reflect seriously before intervening.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[46359] No. 33.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 342. Confidential.)
Sir, *Rome, October* 27, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that I paid a visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon, and, promising that I came quite unofficially and on my own account, explained that it would be very interesting to me to learn anything he might have to tell me after having considered the events of the last few days in the Balkans, especially as he had been so lately in contact with the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Marquis di San Giuliano said he felt that at the actual moment it would be premature to hazard an estimate as to the ultimate lines a settlement would have to take. He had held, as was expressed in the communiqué summing up the results of his interview with Count Berchtold, that if possible the *status quo* had been the object to aim at, inasmuch as its maintenance obviated inevitable difficulties and constituted the line of least resistance for the Great Powers to follow. But he must frankly admit that the experience of the last few days made him inclined to think that it would no longer be possible to insist on such a simple solution, for which events had proved too strong. The next week or so, or even the next few days, would probably be decisive for the issue of the war. Hitherto the small Balkan States had been numerically superior to the enemy they had attacked, and it yet remained to be seen what would be the result when they came face to face with the Turkish concentration.

I asked him whether from recent conversation with Count Berchtold he had reason to believe Austria was genuinely anxious not to intervene, and he replied that that conversation had been confined to generalities, but that he had convinced himself that she would refrain from doing so unless her interests were prejudicially involved. I observed that the question which interested me was what those interests were. That, his Excellency replied, Austria had never clearly revealed, but it was possible to form one's own assumptions. I asked him whether he thought an attempt on the part of Servia to gain access to the sea would be regarded as a case in point. He said he thought that it would inevitably entail the invasion of Servia. It was difficult to see how Servia could find access to the sea except through Albanian territory, and, in his opinion, any appropriation by Servia of a portion of Northern Albania would be vetoed by Austria-Hungary. With Southern Albania, which was much more Greek in character, it might be different, and an accession to the territories of the Hellenic Kingdom through Epirus might not call for Austrian intervention. It was, however, also his personal opinion that Austria would insist on the evacuation of the sanjak of Novi-Bazar.

Eventually, he added, no doubt a conference of the Great Powers would become inevitable, but he did not think the moment was yet ripe for it. All we could do was to watch events and to keep in continual touch with one another.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[40401] No. 31.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 906.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 28, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy reporting further on the Turkish military preparations.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 31.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 82.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 23, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to submit a further report on the progress of the Turkish military preparations.

The salient facts which now emerge are that the troop transport did not begin in earnest till the 7th instant; that everything was sent up by rail; even the cavalry and artillery; and that nearly all the arrivals from Asia up to about the 20th were for the army of the east.

It would have been better in every way to have made the cavalry and artillery march up, and even the nizam infantry units which were already at hand, while keeping the railway more or less free from the beginning for the forwarding of supplies and equipment, and then for the infantry arriving from Asia.

The reason why this system was not adopted is characteristic, and probably foreshadows what may happen during the war. It was because no food supplies had been arranged *en route*, and men and horses could not have been fed on the march, which argues also that arrangements for the transport of food for troops on the move, even after their arrival at the points of concentration, do not yet exist.

Great confusion must result from the splitting up of units, but this is an almost inevitable consequence of the state of dislocation in which the army found itself even at the moment when war became inevitable. It was no doubt intended to fill the gaps in various divisions by redif battalions from Asia, but there has not been time to await their arrival. The Asiatic divisions which are arriving are all destined for the army of the east. So far there has been practically no through traffic from Constantinople on the junction line, and it is practically impossible that any men can yet have been transported direct to Salonica by sea. So that up to the present Macedonia and Albania have had to rely on their own resources.

An unfortunate feature is the unnecessary shifting and counter-marching of units. This is more noticeable in the western theatre, and, from some of the notices of movements which we have received from Salonica and Monastir, point to the fact that obstacles have arisen which were not foreseen in the original scheme or not properly appreciated. It is also due to the fact that the Servians and Greeks have shown themselves more prompt and more formidable than the Turks had reckoned on, and that the preparations of the latter were already influenced and dominated by the movements of the former, even before a blow was struck.

Another feature of the Turkish preparations is the formation of volunteer corps. It is strange that so much time and energy should be devoted to these when the one thing which the Turkish army is not deficient in is men. Having organised their army as far as was possible on approved modern principles, precisely with a view to the contingency which has now arisen, *i.e.*, a war in Europe, one would have thought that every effort would have been directed to expanding the peace framework to the shape it was destined to assume in war. For this there still remained much to be done in the provision of war material, and the Turks had not yet had long enough time to complete even the peace preparation of the army. Still the framework existed, and the deficiency likely to be most felt was in officers, the one thing not wanting being men. Yet all over the country they are forming volunteer battalions and regiments which are completely outside the mobilisation scheme and which will absorb officers, of which they are short everywhere. The truth is that, in spite of the graft of modern ideas, the Turk tends to revert to his original ideals. The formation of

irregular hordes is in his blood, and the half of the volunteers and Mustaphiz corps which are now springing up like mushrooms are simply our old friends the Bashi-Bozuks under a new name. The natural tendency of the Moslem population to take up arms in what has the character of a religious war also accounts for this movement, but it is strange to see the military authorities encouraging, rather than checking, it.

The other day I was watching a parade of a battalion of these volunteers from a window in the Ministry of War. Beside me was Nazim Pasha's chief aide-de-camp, a staff officer of modern training. I suggested to him that as they had lots of men already, it was a pity to see officers wasting their time inculcating elementary drill on the barrack square now that war had already broken out. He replied that these men were patriots and heroes, and that he would rather command a battalion of them than any regular battalion, for it was the spirit that counted, not training and instruction. I mention this as an indication of the fact that the Turkish army is entering on this war in a spirit of days gone by, and has not yet grasped the supreme importance of preparation and forethought to modern war.

Army of the East.

The composition of the army is roughly as shown on the table annexed to this despatch.

From the 12th to the 18th, inclusive, 26,000 men from Asia were landed at San Stefano. These were all ihtiyats, unincorporated redifs for cavalry, artillery, &c., and reservists of sorts. The redif battalions are forwarded either from Constantinople or Rodosto.

During the four days, 15th to 18th, at least forty-five trains passed San Stefano, carrying about 55,000 men described as infantry. (This figure includes the men entrained at San Stefano.) A small number of these may have passed on to Salonica.

Abdullah Pasha has wired repeatedly for bread, saying that he needs this more than men.

In this connection I may mention a characteristic incident. An order for 168 field ovens has been on the tapis for a long time. The ovens of a British firm (Blake, of Gosport) having proved the most successful in the trials, the Government has kept it waiting without a definite order or contract for more than two years while various intrigues were going on in the interests of a German competitor. Now, after war has been declared, Blake's agent has been asked by the head-quarters staff to supply immediately the 168 field ovens, as if they were articles always kept on stock and capable of being forwarded by parcel post. I know this because the agent came to ask me to speak to the Minister of War about the preliminary partial payment. I did so, and, to Nazim's credit, be it said, he was unaware of the *démarche* of his staff, and refused to make any order on the grounds that it was now too late to serve any useful purpose.

Army of the West.

The Kala Sultanieh Redif Division (2nd class—eight battalions) was shipped from Dardanelles for Rodosto on the 16th and 18th, destination said to be Salonica. There remained at the Dardanelles only the Edremid Redif Division (same composition as above), but it is reported that the men were so "disappointed" at being again called under arms without the prospect of fighting that they too were to go to the front, and two battalions left for Rodosto on the 20th. Asiatic divisions of the 1st class destined for this theatre are probably Smyrna, Aidin, Denizli, Adalia. These will probably go viâ Rodosto, but are waiting till the transport of the divisions for the army of the east has been completed by that route. One Black Sea division, Samsun, has passed Constantinople in ships for Rodosto. Ultimate destination uncertain.

As said before, Macedonia and Albania have hitherto been left to their own resources. On paper there should be some 120 redif battalions, and it is stated that these were all embodied by the 6th October, as well as over 100,000 Mustaphiz. Beyond liberally discounting these figures, it is impossible to say much about them one way or the other. For many of these redif formations have not yet got beyond the experimental stage, having been established in countries where military service cannot be said yet to exist.

Also one does not know how many of the arms depôts were rifled during the recent insurrection in Albania, nor to what extent they may have been depleted in order to re-arm the Albanians after the Government had made terms with them. On

the other hand, the Albanians are now probably out *en masse* to assist the Turks, but a large proportion must be so merely as men with rifles, and not as soldiers incorporated in battalions.

The above remarks apply to all the northern part of Albania, and instead of counting so many redif battalions as available with such and such an army or group, it would doubtless be nearer the mark to estimate so many Albanians as auxiliary to the nizam units.

Army of the Vardar.

There is little fresh to be said about this.

Owing to the dislocations reported in my No. 81, the 17th and 18th Divisions should only be counted as one, only mustering some ten battalions available between them.

The 20th and 21st Divisions may be taken as absorbed by the operations against the Montenegrins and in the sanjak.

Ferik Mahmoud Haidar Pasha (lately redif inspector at Erzinjan), a very old man of Albanian origin, left Constantinople on the 12th to assume command on the Montenegrin frontier, which he is supposed to know well, having been employed on a delimitation there when he was a young staff officer. He proposed to travel viâ Ipek, and doubted if he would get further than that place.

Greek Frontier.

With the exception of some small moves to Karaferia, nothing appears to have been sent to the Greek frontier till the 14th, when the moves to Sorovich began (see my No. 79).

The indifference to this frontier is the more surprising when it is remembered that the greater part of the Elbassan Redif Division is already occupied in Mirditia and Scutari, so that against Greece there are only available the 22nd (Kozani) and 23rd (Yanina) Nizam Divisions, and the Yanina and Naslich Redif Divisions, eked out by volunteers and Mustaphiz, on which they seem to be counting a good deal in Macedonia, Albania, and Epirus.

The general direction of the forces on the Greek frontier is entrusted to Hassan Tahsin Pasha, Vali of Yanina. This man is an Albanian of humble origin, who is said not to be able to read or write. He began life as a zaptieh, attracted the attention of some superior by his culinary skill, and having once become an officer rose rapidly, partly through favour, and partly no doubt owing to native intelligence, in a way that was not altogether unprecedented for an Albanian under the old régime. He was Vali of the Yemen a few years ago, and on the reorganisation of the army last year he became, through the influence of the Chief of the General Staff, Izzet Pasha, who is a compatriot of his, commander of the Vth Army Corps, only to be removed on the outbreak of the Italian war, and in the absence of Izzet Pasha, on the ground that he was not fit for such a post at such a time. After the fall of the Committee Cabinet last summer he was appointed Vali of Yanina.

The 13th Nizam Division and the Salonica Redif Division might also have been available for the Greek frontier, but the railway reports would seem to show that these have been sent up to Kenprulu to join the army of the Vardar. In fact, Salonica, where there were left only seven battalions, must have been denuded of its garrison. All the artillery seem to have gone up to Kenprulu too.

Army of the Struma.

Liva Ali Nadir Pasha has been appointed to command the army of the Struma, which probably consists of one army corps of three divisions. The 15th Division being wanted on the flank of the Vardar army, there remain the 14th Nizam Division and the redif divisions of Serres and Drama. Of the last-named, two battalions have been sent to Monastir.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 34.

STATEMENT respecting Army of the East.

—	Army Corps.	Commander.	Divisions. Nizam.	Divisions. Redif.	Remarks.
Adrianople ..	XV	Shukri	1	3	
Kirjali ..	..	Yavver	..	1	And one Mustaphiz.
Main army	I	Ibar Yavver ..	3	..	
	II	Shevket Torghoud ..	2	1	At any rate till 6th Division arrives from Smyrna.
	III	Mahmoud Mukhtar ..	3	..	
	IV	Ahmed Abuk ..	2	1	
	XVI	Hakki	..	3	To be formed out of the divisions arriving from Asia.
	XVII	Mahmoud	..	3	
	XVIII	Hamdi	..	3	

Probably, allowing for the arrival of the 6th Division, the main army will thus contain eleven nizam and ten redif divisions. Of the latter, two (Brussa and Ismid) should now be on the spot and incorporated. There remain eight to complete. These are probably the divisions of Eregli, Kastamuni, Yozgat, Afiun Kara Hissar, Kaisarieh, Angora, Konia, and Yshak. Battalions of all of these have passed through, but I doubt if any of these divisions is actually at the front complete. A week ago the commander of the Afiun Kara Hissar Division told me that half his battalions had passed through, and only to-day I watched three of the Angora battalions entraining.

[46402] No. 35.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 907.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 28, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, reporting on the landing of Turkish troops on the Black Sea coast.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 35.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 83.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I have been informed that the Turks are disembarking troops at Midia on the Black Sea coast. Though I have been unable to get any definite confirmation of this, nor actually to trace any moves, there would seem to be little doubt but that something is intended in this direction.

It was probably felt at first that a force was necessary to protect the extreme right of the concentration in Thrace, and to preclude the possibility of a Bulgarian raid east of the Istranja Balkan, which might have threatened the railway line between the main army and Constantinople.

As the mobilisation progressed the declaration of war was delayed, and the Turks gained confidence and began to talk of taking the offensive. I think that it became the idea to make an offensive movement east of the Istranja Balkan with a comparatively small force—about one army corps—to threaten Burgas in co-operation with the fleet; this preparatory to the general offensive, which it was hoped that the main army would shortly take. Apart from the fact that it would be desirable to secure the frontier passes before the main army could advance towards Philippopoli, it was certainly rather a tempting scheme for a Power which has for the first time the command of the sea, and which is longing to use its navy against something inferior, added to which

is the probability that the Bulgarians have taken away every man they can spare for their main advance.

A successful invasion, even on a small scale, would also raise the prestige of the Government, and might have some influence on the operations of the main Bulgarian army.

It is probably in connection with this scheme that orders have been given to mobilise and transport to Europe a Nizam army corps from the 3rd Army Inspection (Kurdistan). This army corps is apparently to be composed of the 29th, 31st, and 32nd divisions from Erzeroum, Erzinjan, and Kharput respectively.

The only movement yet reported is the departure of a part of the 29th division from Erzeroum for Trebizond. The delay in the embarkation of these troops is said to be due to an unexpected slowness in the mobilisation of this division, on account of which its commander has been recalled.

The Trebizond Redif division may be already at Midia.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL,
Military Attaché.

[48403] No. 36.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November 2.*)

(No. 903.)
Constantinople, October 28, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, reporting on the general military situation since the 18th October, and particularly on the operations in the eastern theatre, and the alleged rout of the Turkish army at Kirk Kilisse.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 36.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 85.)
Constantinople, October 26, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith a few remarks on the military operations which were commenced simultaneously against Turkey on the 18th instant by Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece.

Such news as one has at this early stage is naturally somewhat unreliable, and as it has been reported by telegram as it comes in, I propose to confine myself to a general view of the military situation, and to points which have not been mentioned in the telegrams.

The Montenegrins appear to have three armies: one advancing on Scutari on both sides of the lake, one operating in the region of Gussinye, and one in the sanjak, which last is by now in touch with a Servian army, a fact which must render very precarious the positions of the scattered garrisons which the Turks appear to have been ill-advised enough to leave at Tashlija and Novi Bazar. The Servians also have an army which, coming crossing the frontier at Prepolach and advancing by Prishtina, is now reported to be threatening Perisovich; and another which is advancing along the line of the railway from Zibefcho to Uskub. Having beaten the Turks at the frontier—probably a small affair—this army is reported to have occupied Preshovo. A Bulgarian army advancing from Kustendil viâ Egri Palanka is reported to have reached Stratzin, so that the position of the Turkish force which has been concentrating at Kumanovo, threatened in rear by the advance of the Servian central army, would appear to be untenable, and it looks as if Uskub would shortly be occupied by the allies. The Bulgarians have occupied Jumaa Bala, at the head of the Kresna defile, at the other end of which the Turks have the army of the Struma. Though I doubt if the Bulgarians have anything but small forces operating in this region, it is probable that incursions will be made at many points from here to Kirjali, the inhabitants of the country being for the most part sympathetic, and the line of the junction railway offering a tempting bait. The preservation of this railway is of immense importance

to the Turks, for, with sea transport impracticable, it is the only line by which reinforcements from Asia can reach the western army.

In the eastern theatre, the Bulgarians did what they were expected to. That is, advancing on a wide front, they rapidly drove in the Turkish advanced troops, and on the 23rd were in a position to contain the Adrianople garrison. The question for Abdullah Pasha was whether the mass of the Bulgarian army would try to get round Adrianople by Ortakeui, threatening the Dedeagach railway and his left, or whether it would come down from the north. His first move was on the 19th to send the 11th Division from Demotika and three redif battalions from Adrianople to Ortakeui. Meanwhile, the original plan of keeping a division or so in observation at Kirk Kilisse having been abandoned in favour of an offensive movement by his right two army corps had been collected at that place, and he eventually seems to have located the enemy's main force in that direction, for the force dispatched to Ortakeui was recalled, and all available troops were hurried eastwards. The 11th Division, passing through Adrianople, reached Havsa on the 21st, and the 5th Division, which arrived at Adrianople by rail on the 22nd, was immediately moved out on the Kirk Kilisse road with two regiments and two Howitzer batteries from Adrianople. The Turkish front during the fight which took place on the 23rd must have been roughly along the Adrianople–Kirk Kilisse road. It was reported that the result of this battle was disastrous for the Turks, who had abandoned Kirk Kilisse and were in full retreat. But it now appears that these reports were somewhat exaggerated. It seems to be generally agreed that the 2nd Division came in for some rough handling and was routed, that the men of this division arrived on the Kirk Kilisse–Baba Eski railway in a state of panic, and boarded empty trains in order to get away, &c. This incident is probably responsible for the report that the whole army was in full and disorderly retreat and for some of the lurid tales of what is happening on the railway. It is too early to say what is the truth, but from what I have heard to-day, and from the fact that Nazim Pasha and his staff appeared quite undisturbed when they left for the front yesterday, I imagine that the position is not so bad as it seemed. (I am told that he gave orders for the start of the foreign military attachés to be delayed till Monday, saying, "I shall then be able to show them something good when they arrive.")

The Turks say that the position is already re-established, and that the gap caused by the defeat of the 2nd Division has been filled by the advance of the Ismid Redif Division. At any rate, the Bulgars seem to have made no further advance.

The troops taking part were probably the 1st and 3rd Army Corps at Kirk Kilisse, the 4th Army Corps on the left, and a division or two of the 2nd Army Corps in reserve.

On the same day the Bulgarians attacked the western front of the Adrianople fortifications. If this was merely with the object of keeping the garrison employed and preventing their participation in the fight on the other side it is comprehensible. But the attack seems to have been of a serious nature; 14,000 men took part in it, and it was repulsed. It seems to me to be a great mistake for the Bulgarians to knock their heads against Adrianople in this way. The place is strongly garrisoned and well fortified, and the Bulgarians cannot afford to throw away men, which the Turks can.

In the last three days about 16,000 men have been sent up from here to Lule Burgas, but all the trains which left to-day were for Cherkess Keui, which may indicate that Nazim contemplates a big turning movement by Vize while holding the Bulgarians in front. This may bear another interpretation, viz., that he has decided to retire his line, and I am informed that head-quarters are being transferred from Lule Burgas to Chorlu. As this would mean definitely abandoning Adrianople to a siege, and leaving open the Dedeagach railway, with all the consequences of the final separation of the eastern and western theatres, I am inclined to doubt it as yet.

An army of the reserve is being formed, under the command of Ferik Khurshid Pasha. It is to contain the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th Army Corps. This was probably intended from the beginning.

I think there is a tendency to be too much impressed by the unfavourable opening of the campaign, especially as the uninstructed Turks were unduly confident to start with. The Turkish armies are simply suffering from the logical consequences of a faulty initial distribution, and of being everywhere further forward than the state of their preparations admitted. We see also the usual effects of subordinating military to political considerations. This accounts for the isolated detachments in the sanjak

and for the unfavourable position at Kumanovo. The loss of political prestige by abandoning Uskub and all Northern Albania before the war began was perhaps too great to be faced, but the whole strength of the Turkish army in that theatre should have been concentrated on the Kemprulu–Ishtip position to start with.

These mistakes will be remedied in time, men are still going up fast, redifs have begun to go to Salonica since the 15th instant, and, provided the *moral* of the Turkish army is what it was (many are inclined to doubt whether a constitutional form of Government and the progress of modern political notions have not seriously injured it), there is no reason why the position should get any worse. The chief difficulty will be the question of supply, and there is good reason to believe that the army has already suffered, and will continue to suffer, from the want even of bread.

It is instructive to notice the attitude of various foreigners towards the news which comes from the seat of war. The Austrians and Germans are all for the Turks, and put the best construction on everything, while the most pessimistic reports emanate from the Russians.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL,
Military Attaché.

[46404] No. 37.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 909.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 28, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy giving further information as to Turkish military movements.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 37.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 86.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 28, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report, in continuation of my No. 77, that from information which I have just received of the railway traffic from Constantinople and San Stefano between the 15th and 25th instants (eleven days), seventy troop trains have been forwarded, containing 85,860 men, chiefly redif infantry, of which 17,500 were for Salonica and 1,800 for Xanthi. There were also ten trains which conveyed nothing but supplies, of which some carried only bread for distribution to troops along the line.

In the troop trains were also conveyed: three aeroplanes for Lule Burgas, eight projectors for Adrianople (those which had been taken from that place for the defence of the Dardanelles), twelve field-guns, and eighteen machine-guns.

I regret to say that we have no figures of the important traffic in redifs which arrive by sea from Rodosto. Many thousands have been landed there.

The port of debarkation of these has now just been changed from Rodosto to Eregli.

The through moves to Salonica took place from the 15th to the 19th.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

[46576] No. 38.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 910.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 28, 1912.*

SINCE the date of my despatch No. 882 of the 20th instant, the further news which has reached me from the provinces as to the attitude of the general public towards the war continues to be of the same negative character. There seems to be little interest or excitement.

At Erzeroum a meeting was held on the 6th October under the auspices of the local leaders of the Union and Progress party, and was attended by large crowds of

Moslems and many Armenians. The speeches were on the usual committee lines, and reference was made to the alleged massacres of Moslems in Bulgaria, but His Majesty's consul reports that on the whole the demonstration was unimpressive.

From Jerusalem Mr. McGregor reports that there have been patriotic demonstrations on a small scale, but that the Christians and Jews held aloof, and adds that, though speculation as to the future course of events is rife, there cannot be said to be much enthusiasm for the Ottoman cause.

At Jaffa proceedings have been somewhat more lively. A large body of Bedouin sheikhs entered the town in order to make a patriotic demonstration, shots were fired in the air, and there was considerable alarm among the Christian population. Thanks to the prompt and energetic action of the kaimakam, who posted pickets on the road to prevent more armed Bedouins from coming in, and himself interrupted a band of fanatics who were shouting "down with the unbelievers," and beat the leaders with his walking stick, there were no serious developments. I have caused an expression of my appreciation of the kaimakam's conduct on this occasion to be conveyed unofficially to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In the district of Monastir, as might be expected, the situation is practically one of universal guerilla warfare. In a despatch dated the 16th October, His Majesty's vice-consul reported that many Bulgarian bands were on the war-path, that feeling against the Bulgarians ran very high among the Moslems, and that bodies of volunteers and redifs were terrorising and pillaging, and that utter anarchy reigned from Gorcha to Berat.

At Trebizond the Greek consul on the 20th October had still received no orders to leave his post, though his Minister had left Constantinople on the 18th instant. The vali accordingly requested him to haul down his flag. He protested that he was unable to do so without instructions, and the vali accordingly sent and had the flag hauled down. Meanwhile a large crowd had collected in front of the consulate, but the incident passed off without any disturbance.

In Constantinople itself, apart from the bustle of troops and of the passage of large numbers of Anatolian redifs and the commandeering of all sorts of transport, including all the horses of the tramway company, things are still very quiet. There have been no further demonstrations. The general public is kept in ignorance as to the real state of affairs at the front, and the threatened scarcity of some of the necessaries of life, such as flour and coal, does not yet seem to have had any appreciable effect on the ordinary life of the people.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[46405] No. 39.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 913.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 28, 1912.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that the appointment of Hussein Hilmi Pasha as Ottoman Ambassador at Vienna had been confirmed, and his Highness will probably leave here on Saturday, the 2nd November, to take up his duties.

The Minister said that the appointment had been considered very appropriate, as Hussein Hilmi Pasha had a very intimate and unique knowledge of Macedonia, which could not fail to be useful in the final settlement of the question.

I subsequently saw Hussein Hilmi Pasha, from whom I gathered that it was unlikely that his mission would be a permanent one. His Highness has always been credited with pro-Austrian sympathies, and it is possible that his present mission may have some special object in view.

In the course of conversation with him, his Highness said that he had seen a friend who had just returned from Roumania, where he had seen the King. The latter had told him that war between Russia and Austria was inevitable, that Roumania would certainly take up arms with Austria, but His Majesty had expressed the view that Germany would not be drawn into the conflict.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Vienna.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[46406] No. 40.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 914: Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 28, 1912.*

I SPOKE to the Grand Vizier to-day about the general military situation. He gave me to understand that in Western Turkey the situation was very precarious. He had never anticipated any good results there at the beginning of the war, as it was necessary for the Turks to throw the bulk of their troops against the Bulgarian advance towards Adrianople. But in the latter district they had met with a serious reverse, as they had attacked with 40,000 men against what they believed to be an army of 100,000 Bulgarians and Servians. Unfortunately the result had been very discouraging and a blow to the *moral* of the Turkish army, but he hoped that the immediate measures that had been taken would restore confidence. His son, Mahmoud Mukhtar, had been obliged to have some of those who led the panic shot, but it had been most distressing that this panic should have gained ground. I asked his Highness how it was that Turkish troops which had the reputation of obeying blindly any call to face the enemy should have apparently have been found wanting on this occasion.

His Highness entered at great length into what he believed to be the reasons for this apparent change in the *moral* of the troops.

Briefly, they were as follows:—

The mistake had been made of placing Christians in the front line of battle presumably with the idea that they would find it more difficult to refuse to face the enemy. In the event their disinclination to hold their ground in the face of superior numbers soon became infectious. Further, the instruction of the army by German officers had, in his opinion, been disastrous. In the old days the officers of the regiments occupied themselves with the technical and manœuvring portions of their duties, and the sergeants and corporals, who were regarded in the regiments as the "fathers," were in close touch with the men, who held them in profound respect, and were ready to follow them anywhere.

The German system had had the effect of diminishing almost to vanishing point the influence of these non-commissioned officers.

Again, since the constitutional régime a system had been adopted, very much against his advice, of diminishing in many cases by two-thirds the number of officers in a regiment, and in the event of a panic this absence of authority to keep men together could not but bring about disaster. His Highness was very severe on the result of Mahmoud Shevket's administration of the War Office during the last few years. The financial strain on the country had been great, and yet it now appeared that everything was deficient. His son, Mahmoud Mukhtar, had telegraphed that the greater part of his army were without uniforms, and his Highness was bound to admit that from all he heard it appeared that the commissariat department was sadly deficient. Men could not be expected to fight on empty stomachs, and although everything was being done to supply the deficiency, the whole organisation was incomplete. Moreover, Turkish soldiers, his Highness added somewhat naïvely, when fighting in their own country did so with much less enthusiasm than if they were invading their neighbour's country, and the war having come upon Turkey unawares, this latter contingency had been impossible of realisation. His Highness said he proposed to give fuller powers to the courts-martial. There were endless agents actively employed in endeavouring here and elsewhere to persuade men called to the colours to desert. He did not precise whether these agents were the employés of the enemies abroad or at home.

His Highness complained bitterly of the brutal methods of rape and murder employed by the Bulgarians on Moslems on their advance to Adrianople, which he averred he could substantiate. One case of which he expressed himself as sure was that of a family of ten, eight of whom had been murdered, and two had arrived here to tell the tale.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[46409] No. 41.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 188.)

Sir, *Vienna, October 29, 1912.*

THE astonishment aroused in Austria by the uninterrupted successes of the armies of the Balkan Confederacy is now giving place to the conviction that the cause of Turkey is irretrievably lost; that to talk of the maintenance of the "territorial *status quo*" in the Balkans is a mere repetition of an outworn and now meaningless formula; and that Austria-Hungary will do well to recognise the new state of things and to adapt her attitude to it.

A notable instance of this fundamental change of view is afforded by a leading article which appeared in yesterday's issue of the "Neue Freie Presse," a journal whose Jewish character has made it hitherto one of the stanchest, though occasionally critical, supporters of the Young Turk régime. It now appears to have come to the conclusion that any further support in this direction would be merely to champion a lost cause.

The collapse of the Turkish army must result, the "Neue Freie Presse" observes, in the practical disappearance of the military importance of the Ottoman Empire—a fact which must make it impossible to maintain conditions which obtained when Turkey counted as a strong military Power in the Balkans. The Power to be reckoned with now is the Balkan Confederacy—a league disposing of 700,000 armed men, which has already upset the political traditions of the Great Powers.

After ridiculing the latter's present attitude of unpreparedness and helpless expectancy, the "Neue Freie Presse" declares that the moment has now come to decide whether the interests of the Dual Monarchy do not demand that she should adopt an independent attitude instead of following the Great Powers. The question which presents itself to the "Neue Freie Presse" is whether Austria-Hungary shall act with or against the Balkan League—a question which it answers unhesitatingly. The Balkan League contains, it observes, two States—Bulgaria and Greece—whose relations with Austria-Hungary have always been of a friendly character, and whose progress cannot be detrimental to her interests; and if the league were composed of these two States alone there could not be the slightest doubt that the Dual Monarchy would take its side. The one difficult point is Servia, and the whole matter therefore resolves itself into the question: Can Austria-Hungary live in friendship—both political and commercial—with Belgrade? This, declares the "Neue Freie Presse," is the object to be aimed at, which would at once put an end to the crisis and make the assistance of the Great Powers unnecessary.

The article concludes with an appeal to Austria-Hungary not to miss the golden opportunity of joining in the great economic and commercial progress which will doubtless be made by the Balkan States as a result of their victories. "Whatever remnants of her shattered possessions Turkey may still retain, the 'Near East' will now mean the Balkan League. The Dual Monarchy can win no commercial victories against the will of the league: she will be compelled to live on good terms with it. The wisest policy is to accept the inevitable with good-will and a definite purpose."

I have reason to believe that the view here outlined by the "Neue Freie Presse" is being more and more widely held in this country. The press is almost unanimously anti-Turkish, from the "Reichspost" (whose pro-Christian character has gained it the privilege of receiving its war news direct from a Bulgarian general) to the Socialist "Arbeiter-Zeitung"; while in the debates which followed the Prime Minister's statement (reported in my immediately preceding despatch) the opinion made itself clearly felt that the formula of the maintenance of the *status quo* has become meaningless and no longer corresponds to the real facts of the situation.

The article in the "Neue Freie Presse" has been warmly welcomed by the representatives of the various Balkan States here as indicating that Austrian public opinion is now completely in their favour.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[46408] No. 42.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 465.)
Sir, *Paris, November* 1, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 187 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the reply, which reached me to-day, to the communication addressed by me to M. Poincaré on the 28th ultimo asking for the views of the French Government with regard to the proposed provisional 4 per cent. increase of the Turkish customs duty.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 42.

Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Poincaré.

PAR une note en date du 28 de ce mois, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu exprimer le désir de connaître les vues du Gouvernement de la république sur le projet prêté à la Turquie d'établir, à titre provisoire, une taxe additionnelle de 4 pour cent aux droits de douane. Ce projet tendrait à créer à la Turquie les ressources financières qui lui font défaut dans la crise actuelle.

A première vue, il paraît difficile que des Puissances qui viennent de proclamer leur neutralité s'empressent de consentir au régime douanier, existant entre elles et le Gouvernement ottoman, une modification qui ne peut avoir d'autre but ni d'autre effet que d'accroître les moyens d'action de l'un des belligérants.

On doit remarquer, d'autre part, que la France et l'Angleterre se sont depuis 1909 constamment refusées à accorder à la Turquie cette surtaxe douanière sans avoir au préalable obtenu satisfaction sur certaines questions, soit d'un intérêt général, comme la réorganisation du service des douanes ottomanes, la revision de la législation ottomane sur la propriété industrielle, soit des avantages particuliers de nature à compenser ceux qu'ont obtenus l'Autriche-Hongrie, l'Allemagne et aujourd'hui l'Italie, en échange de leur adhésion de principe à une élévation des droits de douane.

Sur le premier point, il est certain que la Turquie peut objecter que n'ayant pas de tarifs conventionnels avec les États étrangers, l'agrément donné à la mesure qu'elle prendrait *proprio motu* ne saurait être assimilée à un accord modifiant un régime douanier préalablement établi par contrat. Il suffirait, en effet, que les Puissances ne fissent pas d'objections à la perception de la surtaxe qui serait édictée par iradé Impérial. Sur le second point, les Gouvernements anglais, russe et français ne pourraient donner leur agrément qu'en échange de l'engagement ferme, que prendrait le Gouvernement ottoman, de donner satisfaction dans le plus bref délai possible aux desiderata de ces Puissances.

Comme il paraît impossible dans les circonstances actuelles d'arriver sur ces points à un accord dans un délai suffisamment court, le Gouvernement de la république est d'avis que les Ambassadeurs des trois Puissances devraient d'ores et déjà protester auprès de la Porte contre le projet d'augmentation des droits de douane préalablement à toute entente avec les Puissances, et faire toutes leurs réserves pour le cas où il serait passé outre à leur protestation.

De cette façon, même dans le cas où la Porte édicterait et mettrait en vigueur cette augmentation des droits de douane, les trois Puissances conserveraient la faculté de réclamer, pour leur accession ultérieure à cette mesure, des compensations légitimes.

M. Poincaré serait heureux d'apprendre que des instructions dans ce sens sont adressées à l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique à Constantinople.

Paris, le 29 octobre, 1912.

[46344] No. 43.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 1 3.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November* 1, 1912.

SIR E. GOSCHEN'S telegram No. 136 of 30th October.

Prime Minister called on me to-day, and I touched on Roumanian question. His Excellency was quite frank; he [group omitted; ? asserted that] no arrangement whatever had been made with Roumania, and that he did not consider that present was a good time for entering into negotiations.

I pointed out to him that his friend M. Jonesco was now in the Cabinet, and that he had told me in April last (see my despatch No. 39) that a change in Bulgarian policy towards Roumania might be expected on succession of this statesman to office. He answered that his friend was not yet head of the Cabinet.

His Excellency is evidently anxious as to Roumania's intentions, but he will not commence pourparlers until conclusion of the war.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[46345] No. 44.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 114. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November* 1, 1912.

THE Prime Minister informed me to-day that Austrian Minister had suggested to him unofficially that his Government would be very pleased to come to an arrangement with them [three groups undecypherable].

Prime Minister had answered that he could give no reply until he had discussed question with his Servian ally; that up to the present the two Governments had not touched upon the subject, as they were so fully occupied with the war.

The Prime Minister gathered that Austrian Minister in Belgrade had taken similar action to his colleague in this capital.

(Sent to Vienna and Belgrade.)

[46316] No. 45.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 566.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November* 1, 1912.

CONSUL-GENERAL at Salonica reports "Hampshire" arrived. Apprehension somewhat allayed. Thasos occupied yesterday. Greek squadron expected Cavalla to-day. Probable Greek attack deferred.

[46317] No. 46.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 567.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November* 1, 1912.

SOPHIA telegram No. 112 of 1st November.

Major Cunliffe Owen gives it as his opinion that, though Turks were defeated in recent battle, they appear to have retired in more or less good order. He still thinks that retirement on Tchatalja is not imminent, and that Turks have considerable first line of fighting force to be disposed of before further retirement is forced on them.

[46475] No. 47.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 568.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 2, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 534 of 27th October.

Ex-Sultan arrived this morning in German stationnaire, and has been lodged in the palace on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus.

[46562] No. 48.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 569.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 2, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's consul at Salonica to-day :—

"Turks yesterday repulsed attack at Kirjala, capturing eight guns and some prisoners. Town quiet."

[46528] No. 49.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 570.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 2, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 918 of 2nd November : Salonica.

I have repeated substance of my telegram No. 571 of 2nd November to Salonica, *en clair*. It is useless to telegraph any more to consulates in European Turkey in cypher (see my telegram No. 553 of 31st October).

[46529] No. 50.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 571.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 2, 1912.*

FOLLOWING for Director of Military Operations :—

"To-day Turks seem fully confident of maintaining their present positions north and south-west of Tchorkeskeui, but some dispatch of troops and material for Chatalja is reported. Three trains left on 30th October, and four trains on 31st, each with eighteen guns for Chatalja ; also troops by march.

"Other trains which left Constantinople or San Stefano since the 29th are : one with provisions for Chorlu, and two with provisions and three with stores for Tchorkeskeui. Latter included three aeroplanes.

"In same space of time 7,000 wounded are reported to have come down the line. No connection by wire with Seidler or Muradli* since yesterday afternoon.

"Redifs continue to arrive here and also leave for the front, presumably by the march."

[46563] No. 51.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 572.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 2, 1912.*

IT is reported to-night that Turkish forces are being withdrawn from Chorlu.

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* These places are on the railway to the west of Chorlu.

[46530] No. 52.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 574.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 2, 1912.*

NEWS that reaches here to-day is to the effect that Turkish army is retreating on the lines of Tchatalja, and situation is considered very serious.

On the invitation of the Austrian Ambassador as doyen, the Ambassadors have just met and decided that the doyen should immediately apply to the Porte for authorisation for one man-of-war of each Power to pass the Dardanelles, and, in the case of Russia, the Bosphorus.

French, German, and Russian Ambassadors said that they had each a ship within easy reach. Austrian Ambassador had no news of one coming.

It was suggested by some of my colleagues that the Turkish Government might possibly decline to give the necessary permission on the ground that the situation was not so serious as it appears to us.

[46556] No. 53.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 188. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 2, 1912.*

BALKANS.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I have seen this afternoon, concurs in views which you expressed to the French chargé d'affaires as recorded in your telegram No. 650 of last night.

At the instance of Russian Government his Excellency has substituted "rayon" in the "environs" round Constantinople within which the sovereignty of Sultan is to be maintained (see No. 2 of his proposals).

His Excellency has not been able to elicit at Vienna anything definite as to views of Austrian Government, but the Austrian Ambassador informed political director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to-day that Austria has no territorial designs in Balkan Peninsula, and Russia has declared that she has none.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs had suspected negotiations between Austria and Servia and made enquiry of the Servian Minister here. On 30th October M. Vesnitch said that, so far as he was aware, no such negotiations were taking place. To-day he assured French Minister for Foreign Affairs by order of Servian Government that they had not negotiated with Austrian Government and would not settle anything with Austria without consulting Russia, France, and England. Servian Minister added in reply to an enquiry by French Minister for Foreign Affairs that he felt sure that there had not been any negotiations between Bulgaria and Austria.

[46557] No. 54.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 189. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 2, 1912.*

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day of the proposal made by Russian Government that the French and British Governments should join them in a warning to Bulgarian Government that Bulgaria would not be allowed permanently to retain Adrianople.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs had, he told me, pointed out to the Russian Ambassador that the Bulgarian Government were at present well disposed towards Russia, France, and England, and to make such a communication to them as was suggested would be calculated to change their sentiments, and might not be listened to, and he asked how such a warning was to be enforced.

M. Isvolsky said that he entirely concurred in French Minister for Foreign Affairs' opinion, which he would report to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs gave Russian Ambassador to understand that French Government could not join in making to Bulgarian Government the communication suggested.

[46540] No. 55.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 190. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 2, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 652 of last night.

I have this afternoon informed French Minister for Foreign Affairs of your conversation with Italian Ambassador recorded in your telegram No. 467 to Rome of yesterday.

His Excellency concurs in your views as therein stated.

With regard to acquisition by Servia of a port on the Adriatic, French Minister for Foreign Affairs suspects that Italian Government are the objectors quite as much as, if not more than, Austrian Government, for the Italian Ambassador here has advocated to his Excellency the desirability of Servia having territory accessible to the Ægean Sea, which, French Minister for Foreign Affairs takes it, was with a view to diverting Servia from the Adriatic. French Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested to Italian Ambassador that such a claim on the part of Servia would create difficulties for her with Bulgaria.

[46567] No. 56.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, November 2, 1912.*

YESTERDAY the Prime Minister called on me at the legation by appointment. The friendly dispositions which his Excellency entertains towards England are well known to you from my previous communications, and the good-will of His Majesty's Government at the present time would be highly appreciated by him. He led me to infer that the policy to be pursued in the event of the Bulgarians being victorious at Chataldja had been the subject of discussion between the Cabinet and the chiefs of the army. I am of opinion that his influence will be exerted to prevent the occupation of the Ottoman capital by the forces of the allies; but the present temper of the army, and the far-reaching aspirations of his Sovereign, may well prove obstacles beyond his power to surmount.

His Excellency appeared somewhat disinclined to discuss the question of the settlement which is to follow the war. Three points, however, seemed to me to be clearly established. First, that in face of the Turkish Government and of the Great Powers, the allies are resolved to speak and act as one united nation. Second, that they are determined that the last vestige of Ottoman suzerainty in Europe shall finally disappear, though the Turks will still be permitted to rule over a small remnant of territory in the immediate vicinity of Constantinople. And thirdly, that a permanent occupation of the Ottoman capital and its vilayet is not contemplated by them.

The Prime Minister then touched of his own accord on the question of a possible European conference, only to declare that the allies, even if invited, would decline to take part in it. It would be for the Powers to deliberate on the situation when the programme of the allies was before them. When this programme has taken shape I hope to be able to give you further details. I understand that it will be definitely settled when the Greek Government has been consulted.

I was careful not to commit myself during the course of this friendly and intimate conversation, but confined myself to observing that I knew how much he desired to see the end of this sanguinary conflict.

[46535] No. 57.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, November 2, 1912.*

KING of the Bulgarians has telegraphed to a mutual friend that Adrianople has fallen.

[46536] No. 58.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 118.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 2, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 112 of 1st November.

Vice-consul at Philippopoli confirms information previously sent that Servian troops are being hurried up to the front line.

This year's reservists and all Macedonians have now left Sophia. Next year's recruits, youths of 16 and 17, have just been called out.

[46560] No. 59.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 121.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November 2, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 467 of 1st November to Rome.

I have seen Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and have tried to sound him as to Austria's views with regard to sanjak. He was very reserved on the subject, but by pressing him I obtained from him the admission that he was not pessimistic with regard to this question, and that "il y avait des accommodements possibles." He spoke in laudatory terms of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and minimised danger of a conflict between Russia and Austria.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs' language regarding Albania leads me to believe that Austria will not admit any appreciable alteration in the *status quo* on the Adriatic coast. His Excellency said to me that Albania (with perhaps slight cessions of territory to Greece and Montenegro) must remain more or less intact as a principality, either independent or under the suzerainty of the Porte. He thought that a Turkish or Egyptian Prince might be selected as ruler.

With regard to Salonica, he hinted to me that it would be difficult to conceive its being allowed to fall to Greece.

I enquired of the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether at the Delegations next week he intended so throw light on the Austrian views with regard to present crisis He replied he intended to say as little at possible, and that he was making efforts to stifle discussion, as in his opinion a debate on so delicate a political problem was inexpedient.

He thought that the sittings of the Delegations would be over in a very short time.

[46546] No. 60.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 2, 1912.*

MILITARY attaché reports rumour that on 31st October cypher telegrams were sent from the Foreign Office to Lemberg and Temesvar, and that, in view of general situation, there is reason to suspect that these were connected with preparations for possible eventuality of mobilisation. In the 1st (Cracow), 10th (Przemysl) and 11th (Lemberg) corps districts constant reports of preparations are being received, and frequent cases of reservists having been warned to hold themselves ready at shortest notice

have been reported and confirmed. No open steps have so far been taken, but military attaché's information generally agrees with that contained in Belgrade telegram No. 46 of 1st November, except that no information about accumulation of rations or other stores has been received. One battalion of the 60th regiment, from Vienna, has been sent to Agram.

[46561] No. 61.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 123.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 2, 1912.*

AUSTRIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that information he had received tended to show that the Bulgarian losses were very heavy, and that Bulgarians were trying to hide them. He also told me that he was informed that Bulgarian Government were beginning to feel the effects of financial straits. His Excellency further told me that Bulgarian Government seemed to show a disposition to bring about a settlement as rapidly as possible, but that he did not think they could resist public demand that peace should be signed at Constantinople. The information received by Minister for Foreign Affairs from Turkish military sources was that the Turks believed they could defend Constantinople for an indefinite time.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the King of Montenegro was in financial difficulties, and that he had complained to the Austrian Minister at Cettinjé of the lukewarm attitude of Malissoris.

[46532] No. 62.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 406.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, November 2, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 908 of 1st November to Constantinople.

Russian Admiralty are arranging for ships to be in readiness to leave Sevastopol at the shortest notice.

[46558] No. 63.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 139. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, November 2, 1912.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 321 and 322 of 1st November.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that he knows the reserves contemplated by Austria-Hungary, but that he does not feel authorised to communicate them. He will, however, move Austro-Hungarian Government to inform you of them directly. I could, in the meantime, tell you confidentially that they are surprisingly moderate and almost entirely of an economic character. Austria had no objection to an enlarged Servia so long as guarantees were given that Austria's commercial interest should not suffer thereby.

His Excellency thought it extremely important at the close of the war that Servia should address herself directly to Austria without any intermediary, and he seemed to think that it would be useful if His Majesty's Government could give a hint to Servian Government that if they do, and approach Austria in a conciliatory and moderate manner, they will be met in a very friendly spirit.

His Excellency asked me to thank you for your communication.

[46541] No. 64.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 140.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, November 2, 1912.*

YOUR telegram to Constantinople No. 908 of 1st November.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs asked me to-day what His Majesty's Government proposed to do with regard to desire of Ambassadors in Constantinople that ships of war should be sent there to protect foreign communities. I said that it was arranged that a ship should go to Besika Bay to be ready for emergencies. His Excellency thought it an excellent plan, and said that they would take similar step. He suggested that when ships were there commanding officers should put themselves in communication with Ambassadors in Constantinople, and ask them to obtain permission from Ottoman Government for ships to go to Constantinople if necessary.

My French colleague has also telegraphed this suggestion to French Government.

[46559] No. 65.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 141.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, November 2, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 138 of 31st October.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed French Ambassador to-day that he could not give reply respecting declaration proposed by French Government until Monday.

[46524] No. 66.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 99. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, November 2, 1912.*

PREVESA has been taken, but the news will not be published for the present. I believe Salonica also captured.

[46768] No. 67.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 139.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 2, 1912.*

A COMMUNIQUÉ having appeared in the "Times" that Bulgaria would have no intention of retaining Constantinople, I have observed to the Bulgarian Minister that, if that was the opinion of his Government, it would be well for them to reassure the Russian Government on this point. I knew that Russia desired to support Bulgaria, and the possession of Constantinople seemed to be the one point that would make a difficulty between them.

Bulgarian Minister said that communiqué represented his personal opinion; he held strongly that Bulgaria should not retain Constantinople. As to settlement generally, he asked whether Bulgaria had our sympathy. I said public opinion here would not side with any attempt to deprive Balkan States of fruits of victory, but would resent it. I was speaking to him as a friend confidentially, who desired to see Bulgaria have as little difficulty as possible in securing a settlement after her victorious campaign.

Bulgarian Minister expressed satisfaction. You may inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[46302] No. 68.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. Lowther.

(No. 918.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 2, 1912.*

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Mediterranean, has been sent the following instructions:—

"It may become necessary to send one or more men-of-war up to Constantinople to protect British lives and property. Consent of Turkish Government would be obtained by Foreign Office if desirable. Send a vessel to Salonica at once to relieve 'Hampshire,' and order 'Hampshire' on relief to proceed to Besika Bay and be prepared, if ordered, to go up to Constantinople. If you think desirable you may take 'Cumberland,' due Naples 1st November, under you orders, and employ her for station duties temporarily."

[46324] No. 69.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 655.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 2, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 187 of 1st November: Proposed customs increase.

Your Excellency should communicate to the French Government the substance of my telegram No. 914 of 1st November to Constantinople.

You should say that in my opinion it would be less galling to Turkey if a joint protest were not made, each Power addressing the Porte on the subject; this course is the more expedient since Sir C. Lowther will probably have taken action already on his instructions.

You should add, however, that if the Turkish Government disregard the protests, then I should be prepared to join with France and Russia in a common protest making reservations proposed.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 329.; Constantinople, No. 929; Rome, No. 472; St. Petersburgh, No. 1157; and Vienna, No. 326.)

[46302] No. 70.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Lamb.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 2, 1912.*

A VESSEL is being sent to Salonica to relieve "Hampshire" at once. You should make arrangements with local authorities for entry of relieving ship and departure of "Hampshire," and you should acknowledge receipt of this by telegraph.

[46988] No. 71.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rumbold.

(No. 181.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 2, 1912.*

I TOLD the Japanese Ambassador to-day in general terms what the European situation was. I added that it did not seem likely that the troubles would spread to Asia.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[46929] No. 72.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 368.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 2, 1912.*

THE Russian Ambassador pressed me very earnestly again to-day to say something in Sophia to dissuade the Bulgarians from going to Constantinople.

I urged that military reasons might make it essential for the Bulgarians to prevent the Turkish army from reforming at Tchataldja and to push on to Constantinople.

As the Ambassador still pressed me to say something, I said that I would see the Bulgarian Minister this afternoon, and would sound him as to whether Bulgaria had any idea of retaining Constantinople.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[46930] No. 73.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 274.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 2, 1912.*

I TOLD Herr von Kühlmann to-day that there had been two things in yesterday's news that had rather disquieted me. One, which I had heard through the Italian Ambassador, was to the effect that there was some loose talk on the continent—in, I thought, not very responsible quarters, and I was sure that it did not represent the feeling of the Russian Government—that Austria should be told definitely that Bulgaria must have this and Servia must have that, as if Austria was to have no say in the matter at all. If this reached the ears of Austria, it would be very unfortunate. The other thing which disquieted me was an impression left by news from Vienna that Austria was making up her mind to settle with Servia and Bulgaria direct and might take the line that a settlement with them was something in which no one else should have any say. Of course, an amicable agreement between Austria, Servia, and Bulgaria would not endanger peace; but what I feared was that Austria might apply some pressure, perhaps using Roumania also for this purpose. Bulgaria and Servia would then appeal to Russia, and we should be confronted, perhaps suddenly, with a situation in which Austria was the declared opponent and Russia the protector of the Balkan States. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's desire that Austria and Russia should lead the concert, a desire which I shared, would then be blown to the winds.

Herr von Kühlmann said that the concert would in fact have disappeared.

I then urged the importance of ascertaining what the Austrian views were, and what reserves Austria was likely to make. I thought that it was possible to ascertain what the intentions of Russia were. If the views of the two countries were divergent, we could at least gain time while we tried to prevent the views from being publicly contrasted and endeavoured to find some means of reconciling them. If, on the other hand, there was not much difference between them, we should know where we were and have good ground to work upon. I repeated what I had said so often about the feeling of British public opinion being against any attempt to deprive the Balkan States of the fruits of victory. I could, however, imagine reserves which Austria might wish to make and which would be quite reasonable, such as economic conditions and the preservation of Albania as a separate principality. The desire to preserve the peace of Europe was my motive in speaking.

Herr von Kühlmann said he thought Austria could hardly have pledged herself to "désintéressement," and I observed that to ask her to state her reserves was a different matter.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[46931] No. 74.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 38.)
Foreign Office, November 2, 1912.

Sir,

I SAW the Bulgarian Minister this afternoon and, on my observing that the Bulgarian army had done very splendidly, he recalled that at the outbreak of the war he had said to me that the cause of Bulgaria was just.

I replied that I remembered saying to him that Bulgaria had taken matters out of the hands of the Powers, and into her own. She had certainly proved that her own hands were sufficiently strong. I then asked him about the communiqué in the "Times" of to-day.

He said that it was absolutely essential for the Bulgarians to enter Constantinople. They must have the moral effect of complete and crushing victory.

I did not demur to anything which he said on this point, but asked him whether the statement in the communiqué that Bulgaria had no intention of retaining Constantinople was authoritative.

He answered that he himself had communicated this, and it was his own opinion. He held very strongly that Constantinople would be too large a thing for Bulgaria to take into her mouth, and it would cause difficulties with other Powers.

I said that I knew it would cause difficulties with Russia, though Russia was anxious to support Bulgaria, as Russian feeling was all on the side of the Balkan States. The possession of Constantinople was the one thing which might make difficulties between Bulgaria and Russia. If the Bulgarian Minister's opinion was also that of his Government, it would be well to reassure Russia on this point.

The Bulgarian Minister reaffirmed his own opinion, and said that he would tell M. Gueshof confidentially what I had said. He hoped that Bulgaria would have our sympathy generally.

I replied that public opinion here would not side with any attempt to deprive the Balkan States of the fruits of victory, and would, indeed, resent such an attempt. In saying what I had about Constantinople I was therefore speaking, not from the point of view of British interests, but as a friend who wished to see Bulgaria have as little difficulty as possible in coming to a settlement. We did not yet know what reserves Austria might have to make. I was anxious to see the peace of Europe preserved, and I was sure he would feel that it would not be wise for Bulgaria to quarrel with Russia at the outset.

The Bulgarian Minister entirely agreed. In the course of our conversation he had expressed great satisfaction at what I had said to him about our sympathy, as well as at the general attitude of the press in this country.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[46302] No. 75.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Foreign Office, November 2, 1912.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your Confidential letter of the 1st instant, respecting naval dispositions in the Mediterranean.

The substance of the enclosure in your letter has been telegraphed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and to His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica.

With reference to the second paragraph of your letter, I am to state that if a real danger arises elsewhere Sir E. Grey would have no objection to the withdrawal of His Majesty's ship from Cretan waters, on the understanding that she is replaced there as soon as circumstances permit.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[46565] No. 76.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 405.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 2, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 467 of 1st November to Rome.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that he had formulated following reserves with regard to any changes in the territorial *status quo*:—

Turkey must retain possession of Constantinople and of territory to the east of the River Maritza, comprised in a line drawn from that river somewhat to the north of Adrianople, and running to a point on the Black Sea, namely, neighbourhood of Media. He added that Russia might possibly consent to Bulgaria retaining Adrianople if fortifications were razed.

As, however, there was considerable Greek and Bulgarian population in this territory, the Powers must see that reforms were introduced into it.

Peninsula of Mount Athos, which is exclusively a monastery settlement, in which all Orthodox churches are represented, must be made neutral and independent. Administration to be left in the hands of the monks, who might employ small force of gendarmerie to maintain order.

As regards Macedonia, his Excellency thought that Servia and Bulgaria might be left to delimit their respective claims. Greeks would receive Crete, Epirus, and Thessaly. Austria, he had heard, would consent to cession of sanjak to Montenegro. Albania should become autonomous Turkish province, but it should be confined as far as possible to the coastal districts and should not have an extensive hinterland. As Italy and Austria were the Powers most directly interested in Albania, they might consult together to effect settlement on the lines of their agreement of 1901; but neither of them must establish anything in the shape of a protectorate over it.

His Excellency still holds that Servia must be given access to the Adriatic at San Juan di Medua.

If Austria will not consent to this, the only alternative would be that she should be allowed to reach that sea more to the south at Valona. This would, however, render the configuration of her territory most unsatisfactory, and he could only accept this alternative if Servia accepted it.

With regard to Salonica, he said that he thought that it ought to be made a neutral free port. He did not suppose that we should require to see it a possession of Austria, and Russia certainly [group omitted] would not agree] to this. His Excellency also did not seem to wish to see Bulgaria established there, though he raised less objections to it becoming Greek.

With regard to step taken by French Ambassador at Vienna, reported in Berlin telegram No. 120 of 1st November, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Ambassador ought to have made it clear that all that was asked was a declaration of territorial "désintéressement." Russia was asking for nothing for herself, and the sooner that the Powers all declared their complete territorial disinterestedness the better, as then Austria would be left alone if she declined to do the same. He had no wish whatever to adopt a domineering attitude towards Austria. He had in conversation with Austrian Ambassador said that Austria ought to treat Servia "en bon prince," and had impressed on him the importance of our effecting a final settlement of the Balkan question which would leave no friction or bitterness behind it, as the Berlin Congress had done, so that Powers should not every spring have to ask themselves whether war was imminent. He would be grateful if you would use somewhat similar language to Austrian Ambassador in London. His Excellency further said that if Austria could come to a direct understanding with Balkan States he would make no objection, but he added that if Austria tried to bully Servia the consequences might be very serious.

Minister for Foreign Affairs had heard from Berlin that German Government were using all their influence at Vienna to bring about a peaceful settlement, and that they were ready to consent to a conference, but also to admit participation of Balkan States at it.

With regard to latest French mediation proposals, his Excellency had proposed to substitute "rayon" for "district round Constantinople," and had expressed opinion that presence of Balkan States at conference would complicate matters.

He told me Roumania was mobilising, but said that he was convinced that Bulgaria and she would come to terms, and that former would consent to small cession of territory. I remarked that if his expectation was disappointed and if Roumania adopted a menacing attitude towards Bulgaria, Russian public opinion might force the Government to take action. His Excellency admitted that this was not impossible.

[46543] No. 77.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 151.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, November 3, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 467 of 1st November.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs read to me Italian Ambassador's telegraphic report of his conversation with you. Though very long and verbose, it seemed to me to have failed to make clear really important points of the record telegraphed to me. I therefore repeated to him substance of your telegram, which he took down and will telegraph to Verona to-night to intercept Minister for Foreign Affairs on the way to Berlin.

Italian attitude, so far as it is yet developed, seems to be "désintéressement" of all Great Powers as the desideratum, and, failing this, that any Power reserving special interests should make her views known, and that the others should co-operate in endeavouring to reconcile reserves with aims of Balkan States.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that Austria may not now seek to exclude Servia from sanjak, but will adhere to objection to her obtaining Adriatic port. Question might be solved by Balkan Customs Union giving Servia free access to Salonica as common Mediterranean outlet, or by Austria consenting to Servian Adriatic port under guarantees that it should not be fortified.

Public opinion here seems to favour according Balkan States full benefit of their victories.

[46544] No. 78.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, November 3, 1912.*

BULGARIAN Minister has told me that though Balkan States have entered on campaign with autonomy of Macedonia as avowed aim, he realised that under the circumstances and in view of results obtained they would not now be satisfied with that result. In reply to suggestion that there might be conflicting territorial ambitions, he said he thought that there was an understanding between them as to division of areas in case result of campaign should make retention of territories possible.

Bulgarian ambitions never contemplated Constantinople, though they would seek to impose peace from there. A Balkan Customs Union was contemplated.

[46545] No. 79.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 153.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, November 3, 1912.*

SIR F. CARTWRIGHT'S telegram No. 120 of 1st November.

A similar question was addressed by French Ambassador to Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who replied that, as far as he was concerned, he was quite ready to adhere to "désintéressement" proposal, but that before answering he would have to consult allies; and he did not apprehend that Austria would view proposal with favour.

[46527] No. 80.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 3.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 3, 1912.*

REUTER telegram from London published here yesterday states that an exchange of telegrams has taken place between this embassy and the Foreign Office concerning British subjects at Constantinople, and that measures have been taken to intervene in case of necessity for their protection.

Capital is being made out of this in an anti-British sense by representing that British Embassy and community alone fear massacre, whereas in point of fact this embassy has been perhaps the least alarmist.

It would be interesting to know source of Reuter's news.

[46547] No. 81.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 124.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 3, 1912.*

AUSTRIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs, in speaking to me yesterday on the the subject of mediation, said he would be reluctant to take part in any scheme for that purpose unless the Powers were first invited to mediate by one or both of the belligerents. At one moment in the conversation his Excellency went so far as to say that he would have nothing to do with any scheme for mediation unless it were asked for by Turkey or the Balkan States.

[46568] No. 82.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 119. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 3, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 113 of 1st November.

Roumanian Minister called on me yesterday. He was agitated and excited. He had evidently received information that the situation in Roumania had suddenly altered for the worse.

Roumanian Minister did not hide from me that great pressure was being brought to bear on Roumanian Cabinet to mobilise. He quite realises that Roumanian mobilisation would very likely be followed by a similar measure on the part of Russia, perhaps of Austria.

On my asking him whether the Cabinet was being influenced solely by public opinion, he stated that they had consulted present Roumanian Minister at Rome (his predecessor here), who is now on leave, and he had advised his Government to enter into negotiations with the Bulgarian Government in the sense of Berlin telegram No. 136 of 30th October to you. Roumanian Minister feared that they intended to negotiate with a revolver on the table, by which he meant when mobilisation had become an accomplished fact. He will, I think, endeavour to persuade Bucharest to discuss matters with the Bulgarian Government without having recourse to mobilisation. It is important that no reference to this conversation should be made at Bucharest.

I hear that "Times" correspondent here has been urgently asked by M. Jonesco to go at once to Bucharest; he cannot, as he is ill.

From various signs I gather that Roumanian mobilisation may come on the Powers suddenly.

[46537] No. 83.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 120.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 3, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 139 of 2nd November.

Prime Minister has asked me to thank you warmly for words you spoke to Bulgarian representative. He begs me to assure you that Bulgaria has no intention whatever of retaining Constantinople, and he is instructing Bulgarian representative at St. Petersburgh by telegram to speak to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs in this sense.

[46538] No. 84.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 121.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 3, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 118 of 2nd November.

Demotica is now definitely occupied by Bulgarian troops. Hard fighting is still going on south of Sarai with débris of Nazim Pasha's army.

[46533] No. 85.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, November 3, 1912.*

BELGRADE telegram No. 46 of 1st November.

Manager of tramway company tells me that a number of company's horses which had been requisitioned by military authorities have now been returned to him, and there are other signs of a relaxation of military preparations.

(Repeated to Belgrade and Sophia.)

[46771] No. 86.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 930.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 3, 1912.*

FOLLOWING instructions are being sent to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean:—

"Senior officer at Besika is to put himself in communication with Ambassador at Constantinople, and be ready to go there if the Ambassador so desires and obtains permission from Turkish Government.

"He should inform commanding officers of ships of France, Germany, Austria, Italy, or Russia, who may have ships at Besika, what his instructions are. On arrival at Constantinople he would be informed by Ambassador what necessities of the case were."

Object of sending ships would be only to protect lives of British and European community and their embarkation in case of need. It would be undesirable to land a landing party from ship unless absolutely necessary.

[46769] No. 87.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 657.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 3, 1912.*

FRENCH chargé d'affaires informs me that, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs having now deprecated mediation unless belligerent asks for it, French Minister for Foreign Affairs drops his proposals to Powers, but suggests that France and England should let Austria know that economic guarantees, and even some special conditions about the sanjak, when transferred to Servia would be easily agreed to, but that in our opinion it would be very undesirable for any Great Power to acquire new territories.

I said I would reflect on this proposal, but that *prima facie* it seemed to me that it would lead to much the same reply as Austria had given about "désintéressement," and a second refusal might make things worse instead of better. I suggested that we might await result of communication I had made at Berlin as to importance of knowing Austrian views.

[46557] No. 88.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 658.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 3, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 189 of 2nd November.

I concur in view of French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and spoke in similar sense to Russian Ambassador here, who asked me to urge Bulgarian Government not to attack Chatalja. Bulgarian Minister here, having spontaneously made a communiqué to press that Bulgaria would not retain Constantinople, I suggested in course of very friendly conversation with him that if that was view of his Government they might reassure Russian Government on this point.

I regard it as impossible to expect, and very undesirable to suggest, that Bulgarian Government should not press home military success, while war is proceeding, to the utmost of her power.

[46770] No. 89.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 659.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, November 3, 1912.*

THE reports in the press as to any mobilisation of British ships is without foundation.

The report arose solely from the press misconstructing an order to certain ships to coal and provision in the usual way.

No movement of ships in home waters is in contemplation.

[46772] No. 90.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 660.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 3, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 188 of 2nd November.

Servian chargé d'affaires came to Foreign Office yesterday to inform us officially that reports of Servia negotiating with Austria separately were unfounded, and that they were probably circulated to create impression that alliance of four belligerents could be broken up. This alliance, he said, was absolutely solid, and they all intended to maintain it unimpaired. Servian demands were whole of vilayet of Kossovo, sanjak, and access to Adriatic. Information from Sophia confirms view that four allies intend to act as one nation.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 1159, and Berlin, No. 332.)

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* Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 330), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 327), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 1158), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 479).

[46558] No. 91.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 329.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 3, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 139 of 2nd November.

Information as to views of Austrian Government is a great relief and most hopeful. You should thank Minister for Foreign Affairs, and say that, as it is given confidentially, I am not communicating it, but that the sooner Russian and French Governments know it the better. Suspicion will thereby be disarmed, and undesirable language or manœuvres in press and elsewhere avoided.

(Private.)

I am telegraphing separately about Servian views.

[46541] No. 92.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 331.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 3, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 140 of 2nd November.

I agree with suggestion of Minister for Foreign Affairs, and British commanding officer will be instructed accordingly.

[46772] No. 93.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 333.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 3, 1912.*

MY telegram to Paris, No. 660 of to-day.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs, and say that in view of this it seems useless to ask Servia to approach Austria directly and alone.

The moral seems to be that Great Powers should also have solidarity; and after your telegram No. 139 of 2nd November I am hopeful that this may be brought about.

[46567] No. 94.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 140.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 3, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 116 of 2nd November.

You should thank Prime Minister for his communication, which is very welcome.

[46730] No. 95.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 80.)
Sir, *Canea, Crete, October 24, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 147 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to report that my colleagues and myself have received no further expressions of anxiety from Mussulmans in Crete.

The departure of the militia and of a large number of bad characters who have left the island with a view to indulging their taste for bloodshed and pillage in Macedonia under the cloak of patriotism should to a considerable extent relieve apprehension on account of the Mussulmans. The Government may, I think, be trusted to do its best for their protection, and should succeed in its task, unless, perhaps, the Greek army is defeated or massacres of Greeks in Turkey take place. In either of these cases great

excitement would be caused in Crete which the authorities might be powerless to prevent being turned against the Mussulmans. At present no animosity is shown towards the latter, who do not seem unduly alarmed, though they express gratification at the presence of so many foreign ships of war.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[46696] No. 96.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 165.)
Sir, *Athens, October 28, 1912.*

HIS Majesty the King arrived at Kozani yesterday, and dispatched the following telegram to the Prime Minister:—

"I send you greetings from Kozani. I am proud of my brave army, which, under the successful leadership of my dearest son the Crown Prince, has shown itself worthy of the expectations of the beloved Fatherland, and which advances full of enthusiasm whither honour and duty call."

M. Venizelos sent a reply to-day expressing the hope that the army will continue its glorious march and join hands with the armies of the allies, "so that finally, overcoming all resistance on the part of the enemy, they may succeed in effecting the regeneration of the Christian East, not only for the sake of the populations inhabiting it, but also in the more general interest of European order and civilisation."

M. Argyropoulos, hitherto prefect of Larissa, has been appointed prefect of Kozani, and civilian officials have been sent to take in hand the administration of the newly-occupied territory.

I have the honour to enclose a translation of a proclamation issued by the Crown Prince to the population of Macedonia and Epirus.*

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[46697] No. 97.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 166.)
Sir, *Athens, October 28, 1912.*

THE number of Cretans, whether belonging to the militia or not, who have come here to take part in the war has been variously estimated at from 2,000 to 6,000, but is probably nearer the latter than the former figure. Of a part of them a strong regiment has been formed, to whom M. Venizelos yesterday presented colours, addressing them as follows:—

"Cretans!

"In handing you this national flag I am certain that I am entrusting it to good hands, and that you will strive to restore freedom to our other enslaved brethren. I do not doubt that you are all resolved to shed the last drop of your blood, and that you will be transformed into heroes. I am certain that the Cretan regiment will be behind none of those who have come from the ends of the national earth to join in the struggle. I pray that this flag may return honoured and glorious."

Colonel Synaniotis, commanding the regiment, replied:—

"M. le Ministre,

"On behalf of the regiment I thank you for the honour you have done us in handing us the flag. Be assured that we will keep this flag in honour and pride wherever our country sends us, and that we will return it, riddled with bullets, to be deposited some day in the national museum."

The regiment left the same evening for the front, presenting a remarkably smart and soldier-like appearance.

* Not printed.

The same may be said of the first batch of the contingent of Greek volunteers from America, who are sent out ready equipped with arms and uniforms. It is one of the remarkable phenomena connected with this war that the American Legation was in complete ignorance of the efficient military organisation maintained by the Greeks in the United States.

A naval brigade, composed of reservists and said to be 800 strong, left yesterday under the command of Lieutenant-Commander K. Melas.

I am informed by a colleague that 70,000 Mannlicher-Schönauer rifles are expected shortly from Austria.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[46580] No. 98.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 916.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 29, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir, reporting wholesale arrests by the authorities in that district of persons suspected of being in touch with Bulgarian bands. The report of the arming of the Moslem population is ominous, and it is noticeable that Niazi Bey, referred to in the last paragraph of Mr. Vice-Consul Greig's despatch, is himself a Pomak, or Bulgarian Moslem. It will be remembered that Niazi Bey was one of the leading spirits in the Young Turk march on Constantinople, and he is an active force in the Committee of Union and Progress.

Mr. Greig's information is confirmed in a despatch which I have since received from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, who says that the Bulgarian notables have apparently been arrested in every place where the Bulgarian element is of any importance, and that a considerable number of them have been brought into Salonica. He adds that the Bulgarian villages of Bansko and Griva are reported to have been destroyed by the troops for having harboured Bulgarian bands.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 98.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 73. Confidential.)
Sir, *Monastir, October 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the authorities are endeavouring to curtail the resources of the Bulgarian organisation in this district by wholesale arrests of persons supposed to be in touch with the bands. Since the 17th instant fifty-nine Bulgarians, including many notables of the community, have been apprehended here, and reports of similar arrests are coming in from villages throughout the Bulgarian districts. It is impossible accurately to ascertain the number of arrests made in the outlying parts of the vilayet. The following details have, however, been received:—

Round Sorovitch (kaza of Florina), 80 arrests.
Round Florina town, 30 arrests.
Round Ochrida, 20 arrests.
At Serpsi and Lagouardi (kaza of Monastir), 45 arrests.
Round Krushevo and Ressna, large numbers.

It is proposed to detain all these persons, some of whom are priests and schoolmasters, until the end of the present hostilities as a measure of precaution justified by martial law.

As reported in my despatch No. 70 of the 16th instant, parties of volunteers have been formed to counteract the anticipated activity of the bands, and it is known that arms have been distributed to the Moslem population in several districts. Several cartloads of rifles and revolvers were conveyed on the 18th instant from one of the depôts in this town to the gendarmerie head-quarters, and it is believed that a number of weapons has there been given to Moslem applicants. These arms appear to be

mainly of old pattern—probably weapons confiscated from the Albanians. There is every reason to suppose that the Moslems in this town are well armed. Boys, apparently not more than 15 to 16 years old, carrying rifles, are an everyday sight.

The most conspicuous of the Bulgarians arrested is Michail Tatarcheff, cousin of the better-known Dr. Christo Tatarcheff, a native of Ressna. He has long been on bad terms with Niazi Bey, whose hostility has compelled him to leave Ressna and live here. Unlike the other arrested persons, there is a definite charge against him. It is based on information laid by Niazi himself, who accuses him of procuring and arming two Bulgarians to murder him. To send Tatarcheff to answer such a charge at Ressna, where the Unionists are all powerful, is tantamount to condemnation without trial.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

[46583] No. 99.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 919.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 30, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 834 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a paragraph in the *Procès-verbal* No. 21 of the Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane of Thursday's meeting, the 27th October (10th November), relative to the alleged right of the Government to lay hands on the revenue of the Debt.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 99.

Extract from Procès-verbal No. 21.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT signale au conseil un article paru dans le numéro du 21 septembre (4 octobre) courant de l'"Ikdam" et d'après lequel un "haut fonctionnaire du Ministère des Finances," parlant à un rédacteur de ce journal de la situation financière actuelle de la Turquie et des charges qu'entraînerait une guerre avec les États balkaniques, aurait déclaré qu'en cas de besoin le Gouvernement pourrait, "suivant le décret de Mouharrem, mettre la main sur les revenus de la Dette publique."

M. de la Boulinière ajoute qu'ayant attiré l'attention du Malié sur la singularité de cette interview, ledit Ministère a fait publier dans les journaux de la capitale un démenti ainsi libellé:—

"Dans son numéro du 21 septembre, 1328, l'"Ikdam,' a publié un entrefilet reproduisant l'entrevue d'un de ses reporters avec un fonctionnaire supérieur du Ministère des Finances au sujet des fonds destinés à la guerre. Il y était dit, entre autres, que le Gouvernement Impérial peut, en vertu du décret de Mouharrem, saisir les revenus de la Dette publique ottomane. Or, le Ministère des Finances a déclaré qu'aucun de ses fonctionnaires supérieurs n'a eu entrevue pareille et que la publication faite à ce sujet est contraire à la vérité.

"En conséquence, la nouvelle susvisée est démentie."

Le conseil prend note de ces informations.

[46613] No. 100.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 322.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, October 30, 1912.*

WITH the single exception of the "Retch," the organ of the Kadet party, which, since an interview that its editor, M. Miliukof, recently had with M. Sazonof, has joined hands with the Paris "Temps" in protesting against the inflammatory language of the "Novoe Vremya," the tone of the Russian press has undergone but little change

during the past fortnight. The French press is still being taken severely to task for the views to which it has given expression on the Balkan crisis, while the attitude of journals of all shades of political opinion is still distinctly unfriendly to France and England. They are, however, now more inclined to admit that the Governments of those two countries are not so directly responsible for the present situation as is Russian diplomacy, and they consequently throw the chief blame on M. Sazonof for having failed to bring home to those Governments the true nature of the Russian interests which are at stake.

In the account published in the "Daily Telegraph" of a conversation which Dr. Dillon recently had with M. Sazonof, the latter is represented as having spoken of the identity of views that existed between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburgh, and having expressed the determination to uphold the territorial *status quo* in the Balkans. Suspicion of Austria is so deep-rooted in the minds of all Russian journalists that these two statements have been received with a chorus of disapproval by the press in general. The satisfaction which they have caused at Vienna is, according to the "Novoe Vremya," to be explained by the fact that M. Sazonof will only guarantee the execution of reforms for the southern Slavs on the condition that the existing political frontiers in the Balkans remain unaltered. Austria, the "Novoe Vremya" declares, is determined to prevent the territorial junction of the branches of the Servian race, in order that she may move more freely along the intervening passage to the Ægean, and by cutting off Servia from the Adriatic continue to play with her as a cat with a mouse. In conclusion, the "Novoe Vremya" asks where is the iron hand that will preserve the territorial *status quo* if the Slavs and the Greeks prove victorious, and that will snatch from them the fruits of the victories which they will have purchased with their blood?

Mr. A. P. Stolypin, the well-known publicist, writing in the same paper, says that to talk of the maintenance of the *status quo* is unthinkable, and that any proposal to that effect would be a direct act of hostility towards the Slavs. The same note is struck in other papers.

The "Golos Moskvy," M. Gutchkof's organ, declares that, as the Franco-Russian alliance is solely directed against Germany, with whom Russia can easily come to terms, that alliance is perfectly useless for Russia, and that, as the latter cannot count on either French or British support, she is entirely isolated in the present crisis.

While the attacks thus levied against M. Sazonof continue unabated, the reports which were persistently circulated a fortnight ago of his approaching resignation have, since he was received by the Emperor at Spala, entirely ceased. In a conversation which I had with him on the 22nd instant, the day on which he returned to St. Petersburgh, his Excellency gave me to understand that he had every reason to be satisfied with the reception accorded to him by His Majesty; and there can, I think, be no doubt but that his policy of keeping in close contact with Austria and the other Powers for the purpose, first, of averting and then of localising the war met with His Majesty's full approval. The orders which, as his Excellency told me, he had received from the Emperor were to give the Balkan Slavs all the assistance in his power, without involving Russia in any serious entanglements. What struck me most in the course of this conversation was the despondent view which his Excellency took of the future. M. Bobtcheff, the newly-arrived Bulgarian Minister, had apparently been pressing him in such urgent terms to bring about an intervention of the Powers at the first possible moment, that M. Sazonof was under the impression that the Bulgarian Government had discovered some grave defect in their military preparations, and that their army would in consequence suffer serious reverses. Should, he said, this prove to be the case, Russia might find herself forced to mobilise; and he was therefore most anxious to seize the first favourable opportunity that offered for mediation. He expressed the earnest hope that His Majesty's Government would support him when that moment came, and dwelt on the serious consequences that might ensue were England and France to fail Russia in the crisis, with which she was being confronted. The assurances which I was authorised to give him by your private telegram of the 23rd instant caused his Excellency the greatest satisfaction.

That the Bulgarian Government, at one moment after the outbreak of war, entertained misgivings as to possessing the staying power necessary to bring it to a successful termination is also apparent from the appeals which M. Bobtcheff more than once made to me to use my influence with His Majesty's Government with a view to inducing them to propose mediation without delay. Even on the day on which he received the news of the fall of Kirk Kilisse, he urged that the time had come for putting a stop to a carnage in which the flower of Bulgarian manhood was gradually

perishing. The conditions of peace which he then put forward were the creation of three autonomous vilayets, of which one was to comprise Old Servia, between the sanjak and the Shar mountains; another Epirus and Turkish Thessaly; and the third the rest of Macedonia from Lake Ochrida to the river Mesta. With regard to the Adrianople vilayet, all that his Government would ask would be that something should be done to render the lives of the Christian population more tolerable than they are at present.

The programme of the reforms to be eventually introduced into Turkey in Europe, which M. Sazonof drew up and telegraphed to London and Paris as a basis of discussion between the Powers, did not go nearly as far as this, as its underlying principle was self-government by sanjaks instead of autonomy by vilayets. Now, however, that, in consequence of their victories, the Bulgarians have declared that they cannot return home empty-handed, and that there must be a modification of the territorial *status quo*, M. Sazonof has been quick to recognise that his reform proposals are already out of date, and that they can, at the most, be applied to those districts where the Christian population is in the majority, which will remain Turkish after the war. Though his Excellency has not yet put forward any fresh proposals to meet the altered situation created by the war, he has given me to understand that, unless the Turks are able to retrieve their fallen fortunes, Bulgaria will reject any offer of mediation except on the understanding that she is to receive the accession of territory contemplated in the treaty of San Stefano. She would, however, have to satisfy the claims which the Servians are sure to advance in the Kossovo vilayet; and it remains to be seen whether she will be prepared to abide by the delimitations of the respective spheres of influence that is said to have followed the conclusion of the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance. The line of delimitation then agreed upon was, I believe, to run from some point on the Servian frontier through Kumanovo and Uskub to Lake Ochrida; while, from what M. Bobtcheff told me, the Bulgarian Government would now like to restrict these claims to Old Servia and to fix the future Serbo-Bulgarian frontier at the Shar mountains. When, therefore, the day of settlement arrives, this question is not unlikely to prove a serious bone of contention between the two allied States.

Then there is a further claim that Servia seems determined to put forward, to which M. Sazonof has more than once called my attention, and that is, her desire to obtain access to the Adriatic by acquiring a strip of Albanian territory, which would enable her to build a railway to San Juan di Medua.

M. Sazonof told me that he had warned M. Bobtcheff that all these claims to territorial aggrandisement on the part of the allies would inevitably give rise to counter-claims for compensation on the part of Austria and Roumania, and that he had enquired how Bulgaria proposed to compensate the latter. M. Bobtcheff had replied that Bulgaria might perhaps cede Silistria, and that this would probably satisfy Roumania. I reminded M. Sazonof that when, some years ago, Roumania had suspected Bulgaria of contemplating an attack on Turkey, she had let it be known that any expansion of the former on the side of Macedonia would have to be paid for by the cession of a slice of Bulgarian territory, bordering on the Dobrudscha, and that two lines had then been spoken of—one running from Rustchuk to Varna and the other from Silistria to Baltjik. His Excellency, in reply, said that he doubted very much whether Bulgaria would entertain even the lesser of these two alternatives.

The position in which M. Sazonof now finds himself placed is not a very enviable one, and will hardly enhance his reputation for diplomatic foresight. He has announced to the world, through Dr. Dillon, that he is entirely at one with Austria, and that he is determined to maintain the principle of the territorial *status quo*. He has accepted unreservedly the explicit assurances, given him by the Bulgarian Minister, that there were to be no territorial changes after the war, and he has more than once hinted that he did not wish to see the Bulgarian arms achieve too decisive a victory. He has told me from the first that were the Bulgarian army to threaten Constantinople, Russia would have to cry "Hands off!" and he encouraged the conclusion of peace between Turkey and Italy, not only because he feared that a continuance of the war might entail the closing of the Straits, but also because he was afraid that Bulgaria might get out of hand. It would almost appear as if he belonged to the school of politicians that holds that the Balkan States must be kept in Russia's leading strings; that they must hope for no benefits, save those which she is pleased to bestow on them; and that they must wait for the fulfilment of their national aspirations till Russia tells them that the hour to strike has arrived. Circumstances have now proved too strong for him. After treating the Slavist propaganda carried on in the press as a purely personal attack against himself he has now made a complete *volte-face*, and has, at the eleventh hour,

adopted the policy of his critics. Not only has he abandoned all idea of maintaining the principle of the *status quo*, but he will probably find himself forced to support the extreme territorial claims of the Balkan States before Europe. He is, moreover, so impressed by the anti-Austrian utterances of the press that, while anxious to keep in close contact with Vienna, and to come to a friendly understanding with Austria as regards the eventual settlement of the Balkan question, he declines to be seen keeping company with her in public, and prefers that France, and not Austria and Russia, should lead the European concert.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[46614] No. 101.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 323.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, October 30, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a recent article in the "Reichspost" has been discussed at some length by the Russian press. The article in question declared that the *status quo* in the Balkans was dead and that no diplomatic skill could call it to life again. At the same time, it was stated that it was possible to reconcile the vital interests of Austria with the hopes and expectations of the Balkan States. It would be easy to satisfy the desires of Servia and Montenegro for expansion, and Austria could therefore come forward as the benevolent protector of the Balkan States and unite her interests with theirs.

The "Novoe Vremya" comments on this new departure of Austrian policy as compared with the statement made in the "Daily Telegraph" as to Russian and Austrian solidarity, and their intention to maintain the *status quo* unaltered (see my despatch No. 322 of to-day). The "Novoe Vremya" reminds its readers of the attitude adopted by the Austrian Government previous to the war in detaining military stores destined for Servia and Bulgaria, in encouraging Italy to make peace with Turkey, and in declaring that it would not admit of any disturbance of existing boundaries. This attitude has been entirely changed by the victories of the Slav troops.

The "Novoe Vremya" describes this *volte-face* as another proof of the flexibility of Austrian diplomacy. So long as she considered the Balkan States as negligible quantities she attempted to place her heel on their necks. As soon as they give proof of their unexpected strength she proposes to unite her vital interests with those of southern Slavdom. At the same time, the "Novoe Vremya" comments on the discipline of the Triple Alliance. Count Berchtold and the Marquis di San Giuliano have already prepared their programme in the event of the final defeat of Turkey. Italy now talks of the Balkans for the Balkan peoples, and the German press describes the *status quo* as an old woman's fairy tale. And all this while Sazonof is still in the midst of pourparlers with M. Poincaré for its maintenance.

The "Novoe Vremya" concludes by declaring that Austrian diplomacy is now working for the creation of an Austro-Byzantine alliance, and that it is the duty of Russian diplomacy to see that the Balkan league is formed under Russia's ægis and not under that of Austria.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[46657] No. 102.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 82.)
Sir, *Bucharest, October 30, 1912.*

THE news which reaches Bucharest from the different centres of the war, and more especially from Thrace, is far from welcome to this country, for, though contradictory in character, it admits of no doubt but that so far the allied armies have been victorious, and it is felt that the restoration of the territorial *status quo* will be more difficult if Turkey is beaten than if she wins. Roumania naturally dreads any change in the *status quo* which would strengthen Bulgaria. At an

[46658] No. 102.A.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 83.)

Sir, *Bucharest, October* 31, 1912.

I HAD the honour to report the reconstruction of the Cabinet in my telegram No. 10 of the 28th instant.

The following is the composition of the new Cabinet:—

Conservatives.

M. Majorescu, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs (unchanged).
M. Marghiloman, Minister of Finance (Minister of Interior in M. Carp's Cabinet).
M. Filipescu, Minister of Agriculture and of the Domains (Minister of War in M. Carp's Cabinet).
M. Michel Cantacuzino, Minister of Justice (unchanged).

Conservative Democrats.

M. Take Ionescu, Minister of Interior (leader of Conservative Democrats).
M. Dissescu, Minister of Public Instruction (formerly a Liberal, late Minister of Justice in M. Cantacuzino's Cabinet of 1907–8).
M. Badareu, Minister of Public Works (Minister of Justice in the Cantacuzino Cabinet).
M. Nenöpol, Minister of Industry and Commerce (has not previously held a portfolio.

Neutral.

General Herjeu, Minister of War.

The negotiations which I have reported as proceeding for the fusion of the two branches of the Conservative party have not proved altogether successful, and the present Cabinet represents a coalition of the two branches rather than a fusion. The Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that the arrangement for complete fusion would have occupied a long period, and it was therefore decided, as the critical international situation made urgently necessary a Cabinet based on wider support than could be commanded by the late Ministry, to postpone the idea of fusion for the moment and to be content with coalition in which each branch was equally represented in the Cabinet and administration, the two branches retaining each its own party organisation, its clubs, and its press. It is hoped that the coalition will in time lead to the complete fusion of the two branches of the party.

I understand that at the last moment the negotiations for the formation of the new Cabinet threatened to break down owing to disagreement between M. Majorescu, the Prime Minister, and M. Take Ionescu, Minister of Interior and leader of the Conservative Democrats, as to the appointment to the Ministry of War, but, owing the intervention of the King, a compromise was effected by the selection of a general who has not hitherto mixed in politics—General Herjeu.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

audience, which King Charles was graciously pleased to grant to-day to Sir Percy Sanderson, who is staying for a few days in Bucharest, His Majesty said that, if Bulgaria were to obtain any large accession of territory, this would be a menace to Roumania, which she would have to take measures to counteract. In other words, Roumania must, in this eventuality, obtain a rectification of the unnatural frontier fixed by the Treaty of Berlin. With her present frontier it is felt that Roumania would be at the mercy of a strengthened Bulgaria. Roumania does not fear Bulgaria as at present constituted, but the case would be different if the latter obtained any large increase of territory and were thus able to raise a considerably larger army. In this case, Roumania would assuredly use every effort to obtain—not, perhaps, the famous quadrilateral of Rustchuk, Shumla, Silistraia, and Varna, for that presumably could only be obtained by a successful war—but at least such rectification of the frontier as would render the Dobrudsha less open to attack from the south.

Roumanians feel that, in abstaining during this crisis from an active policy which would increase the danger of a general conflagration, this country is deserving well of Europe, and at the next general settlement they will expect to be treated less shabbily than was the case at the congress of Berlin.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[46659] No. 103.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 84.)

Sir, *Bucharest, October* 31, 1912.

AT the beginning of the week a most circumstantial report was current in Bucharest that mobilisation was imminent. The report seemed all the more credible from the stories which reached me from various quarters pointing to unusual military activity, and, when calling on a prominent member of the Liberal party on Monday, I was told by him positively that the new Cabinet which had met that morning had decided upon partial mobilisation. I saw the secretary-general for Foreign Affairs later in the day, and enquired of him whether it was true, as stated by the Roumanian Minister at Sophia (see Sir H. Bax-Ironside's telegram No. 102), that all goods traffic had been stopped. As reported in my telegram No. 11, the secretary-general declared that he knew of no such measure. At the same time, in answer to my enquiries as to the prospect of mobilisation, I found him by no means so emphatic in his denial of the Government's intention to mobilise as I had always found the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He said that Roumania had not mobilised, but that this might happen, and when I reminded him of M. Majorescu's repeated assertions to me, he replied that circumstances might change. His manner, indeed, left me with the impression that mobilisation might be impending at any moment. He had probably not yet heard that the Cabinet had decided against such a step. Whether immediate mobilisation was really contemplated or not is now unimportant in view of the Cabinet's decision, but both the secretary-general's manner, when I saw him on Monday afternoon, and the fact that the Cabinet thought fit to announce this decision in a communiqué to the press, warrant in some measure the inference that the question was for a time in the balance.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[46586] No. 104.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 922.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 31, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch regarding the general military situation for the last few days, which has kindly been furnished to me by Major Cunliffe-Owen, in the absence at the front of the military attaché to this embassy.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 104.

Major Cunliffe-Owen to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 87.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 31, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that since the last despatch of the military attaché, No. 28 of the 26th October, the information as to the situation in both the Eastern and Western theatres is so unreliable as to make it extremely difficult to form any estimate of the true state of affairs.

Three colourless official bulletins have appeared; such other reports as arrive are in many cases absolutely conflicting.

1. *Eastern Theatre.*—There seems little doubt but that the Turkish 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Army Corps, or at any rate the 3rd and part of the 1st, suffered a decided reverse, if not a complete disaster, on the 22nd–23rd October. These corps were around and to the front of Kirk Kilisse, the 3rd on the right, the 1st in the centre, and the 2nd on the left; the centre and left of the 3rd corps and the right of the 1st were, it is said, driven back in great confusion from the neighbourhood of Petra through Kirk Kilisse, thence to Baba Eski; trains were seized and boarded and the railway service became entirely disorganised. The right of the 3rd corps (7th division) retired in good order towards Vize.

It seems that after the fighting on the 22nd the Bulgarians surprised the 3rd corps in the early morning of the 23rd, the situation being complicated by the 1st division (1st Army Corps) attacking, by mistake after a night march, the left division of the 3rd corps. Whether Kirk Kilisse was afterwards captured by the Bulgarians is not clear, but the whole front appears to have been withdrawn to the line Baba Eski–Vize.

On this line the main concentration was to await the arrival of Nazim Pasha and the remainder of the Asiatic redifs arriving from the south, and also by sea on the east coast.

Subsequent reports affirm that either Kirk Kilisse was not abandoned or that it has been recaptured, but about the 26th a rumour was current of a fresh retreat in some confusion from Baba Eski, and of the line being withdrawn to Lule Bourgas.

Latest reports of the 31st mention a partial forward movement.

The attack on Adrianople was repulsed, but it is not known where the 4th corps are, or how far the Bulgarian advance has penetrated into the Maritza valley. In any case, whether or not the Bulgarians have actually seized Kulule Bourgas, the use of the junction line from there to Salonica appears to be denied to the Turks.

Meanwhile it is probably the case that all those Asiatic redif divisions destined for the Eastern theatre (see military attaché's No. 82 of the 23rd instant) are now available at the front, as also two or three of the 3rd inspection redif divisions from the Black Sea coast. It is not known to what extent these troops have been sent from the south, either to Midia or to some port lower down on the European Black Sea coast.

Further west, the Bulgarian forces would appear to be making for Cumuljina, in order to break off all connection whatever with Salonica.

2. *Western Theatre.*—Fethi Pasha, G.O.C., of the 7th Army Corps, after a temporary success at Kumanova, was pushed back from that place, and Said Pasha, G.O.C., 5th Army Corps, from Kochana on the 23rd.

The 6th corps first of all removed to Said's support and then diverted their march towards Fethi Pasha, with the result that the Turks were beaten in detail.

The retirement has, it is said, now proceeded south of the line Koupreulu–Ishtip, which would have been the better position in the first instance.

Few reinforcements can have arrived for this Vardar army, and probably none of the Asiatic redif divisions alluded to in the military attaché's despatch No. 82, while Salonica itself is apparently denuded of troops.

In the Struma valley Nadir Ali has had some success and may have reoccupied Petchao and Djuma Bola.

In the south, Serfidje and Kozani were occupied by the Greeks on the 25th, and it seems likely that the position in the west will be difficult to re-establish owing to the fact that few additional troops can be got there.

3. The 29th Nizam division of the 3rd inspection has already left for Trebizond, to be followed by the 30th, while redif battalions from North Syria are on the Anatolian railway, with Nizam troops following from Aleppo.

4. In general, as already remarked, the issue in the west appears now difficult of rectification for the Turks.

In the east, much will depend upon the personality of Nazim Pasha as commander-in-chief. If he can remedy the initial defects of unmethodical concentration and hasty pushing forward of troops regardless of method, he has, and will continue to have, ample forces at his disposal to turn the scale. It must be recollected, however, that the train service has now got into considerable confusion, and the question of supply is still carried out in a haphazard fashion. Probably the redifs, though good fighting material, have not the training necessary for manœuvre, nor have the commanders experience of the higher leading of large bodies of troops. There seems no reason why the initial movements were made in the direction of Adrianople; this place is an extremely strong entrenched camp, and could well have been left as an obstacle on the Bulgarian line of communication, while the concentration of the main army preceded behind the line Kulule Bourgas–Baba Eski or Lule Bourgas–Vize as is, in effect, now happening. Behind this line the Nizam divisions, available from the first, could, in well-chosen positions, have awaited attack, and the concentration and grouping of redifs proceeded concurrently with a proper establishment of a service of supply. As it is, the hasty methods adopted have led to loss and capture, which may now be difficult to remedy.

I have, &c.

F. CUNLIFFE-OWEN, *Major.*

[40719] No. 105.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 189.)

Sir, *Vienna, October 31, 1912.*

THIS morning's issue of the semi-official "Fremdenblatt" contains a leading article which appears to me of interest as showing clearly the present attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government towards Servia.

The tone of the article is decidedly friendly towards the neighbouring State. It observes that the successes of the Balkan States have resulted not only in a justifiable feeling of national pride, but also in a determination on their part to arrive at a clear conception of the character of the future relations between themselves and the Great Powers. In the discussion of this matter, the Servian press has, observes the "Fremdenblatt," adopted a most moderate and satisfactory attitude towards the Dual Monarchy, differing very widely from recent utterances. The just and tranquil tone of the Austro-Hungarian press has been gratefully recognised in Belgrade, and a return is now being made in the promise that the Balkan States will do their utmost to meet the interests of the foreign Powers. This attitude is welcome as the only one which can free the Balkan situation from the dangers threatening it. The adoption of this attitude by the Servian press and politicians may be interpreted as an appeal to the Dual Monarchy to support Servia's aims in an effective manner, as the commercial progress now opening before the latter cannot fail to be in harmony with Austria-Hungary's economic interests.

While welcoming this complete change of tone on the Servian side, the "Fremdenblatt" is careful to observe that there is no occasion to speak of a change in Austrian public opinion. Austria has, declares the "Fremdenblatt," ever been anxious to remain on good terms with her neighbour. In answer to Servia's appeal, Austria-Hungary can only reply that, in her opinion, their exist no hindrances to the restoration of Austro-Servian relations to their original friendly footing. Austria-Hungary has always been inspired by good-will towards the Balkan States, as is shown by the increase in friendship between her and Bulgaria. As for Servia, the favourable intentions of Austria have always been, and are now, assured to her. The "Fremdenblatt" concludes by expressing the conviction that the same comprehension of Austrian interests prevails in Servia, and will, if necessary, find expression in actual facts.

I have, &c.

FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[46597] No. 106.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 465.)
Sir, *Berlin, November* 1, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that yesterday, the 31st ultimo, my French colleague, acting on instructions from his Government, submitted to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the following form of declaration to be made by the Great Powers:—

"Les Puissances reconnaissant que l'heure approche où elles pourront exercer leur médiation entre les belligérants de la Péninsule balkanique, et continuant de placer au premier rang de leurs préoccupations le maintien de la paix européenne, déclarent qu'elles s'appliqueront à leur œuvre commune dans un esprit d'absolu désintéressement."

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made, I understand, no comment on the proposed declaration, only saying that it was a matter that required careful consideration, and that he would furnish M. Cambon with the reply of the Imperial Government as soon as possible, probably to-day or to-morrow.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[46600] No. 107.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 468.)
Sir, *Berlin, November* 1, 1912.

IMMEDIATELY on receipt of your telegram No. 312 of the 30th ultimo I called upon Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, and informed his Excellency that, in consequence of the disquieting reports which you had received from Salonica, His Majesty's Government had decided to send one or more of His Majesty's ships to that port for the protection of British subjects in case of any dangerous disturbances.

His Excellency said that he also had received similar reports, but that, unfortunately, they had no cruisers to send there. The only vessels available being a gun-boat that was on its way somewhere—he did not quite know where—but which was too small to be of any use, and the German stationnaire "Loreley," which happened to be at Salonica itself for the purpose of bringing the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid to Constantinople. I notice, however, that, according to newspaper reports, that vessel has already left Salonica.

In speaking of the war, he said it seemed to be all up with the Turks, and that the Powers would, therefore, shortly be face to face with an exceedingly difficult and complicated situation. The maintenance of the exact territorial *status quo* seemed, after the wonderfully successful campaign of the four Balkan States, to be out of the question, and the victorious States might be somewhat difficult to deal with. He had been in close communication with Vienna during the last few days, and he was glad to say that the Austro-Hungarian Government seemed to be peaceably inclined and disposed to deal with Servia—so long as the latter was reasonable—in a conciliatory spirit. That was to say, that they would not object to a larger Servia, so long as the Servian Government showed a disposition to be friendly both in commercial and other matters. In answer to a question from me, Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter said that he was under the impression that the Austro-Hungarian Government would prefer to see the Servians in the sanjak than to see them on the Adriatic or stretching in a southerly direction.

His Excellency expressed the hope that a conference would be avoided or, at all events, postponed as long as possible. The Balkan States could, under present circumstances, hardly be excluded, and it would be a great anomaly if, owing to the Great Powers not having had time to come to a unanimous decision, the smaller States would be, with their four solid votes, in a position to exercise a disproportionate influence.

In conclusion, his Excellency stated that events were marching very rapidly, and

that he thought that if the Turks lost the battle which now appeared to be in progress, the Ottoman Government could easily be persuaded to demand the mediation of the Great Powers. In this case he thought that the latter should propose an armistice, during which the Balkan States could be sounded separately as to their demands.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[46843] No. 108.

Papers communicated by Tewfik Pasha, November 4, 1912.

(1.)

Son Excellence Gabriel Effendi à Son Altesse Tewfik Pacha.

(No. 385.)
(Dépêche télégraphique.) *Sublime Porte, le 3 novembre*, 1912.

LES Ambassadeurs des Grandes Puissances ayant dans leurs entretiens avec son Altesse le Grand Vizir et moi demandé quelle est la pensée du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman à la suite des difficultés militaires que nous avons rencontrées dans la défense du pays et du revirement qui tend à se produire dans l'opinion publique en Europe en faveur des États balkaniques, voici en résumé la réponse que nous avons cru devoir leur faire après mûres délibérations de notre conseil des Ministres.

Sans vouloir pour le moment rechercher les causes qui ont exposé les armées ottomanes à des échecs sur plusieurs points, on s'explique aisément que malgré les admirables qualités de nos soldats et leur héroïsme traditionnel, nos troupes n'aient pu jusqu'ici que retarder ou entraver la marche en avant de l'ennemi. Tandis que nos adversaires avaient sur nous l'avantage d'une mobilisation rapide préparée depuis longtemps et facilement réalisable par suite de la situation topographique et du peu d'étendue du territoire des États coalisés comparativement à l'Empire ottoman, nous avions contre nous d'abord le fait que jusqu'au dernier moment nous pensions que la guerre pouvait être conjurée et que nous avions même dans cet espoir pris garde d'éviter tout ce qui aurait pu être interprété comme une sorte de provocation. En outre, une fois donné l'ordre de mobilisation, nous nous trouvions en présence de difficultés de plusieurs genres résultant à la fois de l'étendue du champ d'opération, de l'insuffisance du service d'approvisionnement causée par la soudaineté de la déclaration de guerre et de l'impossibilité où nous étions d'opérer les transports de nos troupes et des munitions par voie de mer. La paix avec l'Italie n'était pas encore faite, et depuis l'archipel se trouve sillonnée par les navires de l'un de nos adversaires. Toutes ces circonstances réunies nous ont créé pour le moment une situation embarrassée, mais non point absolument décourageante. Nous avons, au contraire, toute raison d'être persuadés que si nous nous en tenons aux moyens défensifs de nos retranchements, une prolongation de la lutte ne pourrait que tourner à notre avantage en épuisant les forces limitées de nos ennemis, tandis que nous pourrons disposer d'importantes réserves. Cependant, si nous considérons les sacrifices de tous genres que cette prolongation de la guerre coûterait aux partis engagés et pertes incalculables qui en résulteraient pour le monde en général, ainsi que résultat négatif au point de vue d'une extension territoriale prévue, proclamée et notifiée par les Puissances aux États balkaniques en cas de succès de leurs armes, nous estimons comme notre devoir de faciliter, pour autant que cela dépend de nous, la tâche de l'Europe en vue du rétablissement de la paix. A cette fin il importe d'aviser tout d'abord aux moyens d'arriver à la suspension immédiate des hostilités et de préparer ensuite le terrain pour une discussion aussi prompte que possible des conditions d'une paix désirable telles qu'elles seraient proposées par le concert européen aux belligérants sur ces bases invariables de l'intégrité de l'Empire et de la souveraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan.

Veuillez donner lecture de ce qui précède à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, en ajoutant que nous aimons à espérer que son Gouvernement appréciera l'intention conciliante qui nous dicte ces considérations dans la situation actuelle de cette guerre, dont les conséquences menacent de devenir de plus en plus déplorables.

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(2.)

Gabriel Effendi to Tewfik Pacha.

(Circulaire.)
(Grande Urgence.) *Constantinople, le 3 novembre*, 1912.
(Dépêche télégraphique.) (10h. 45 *de l'après-midi.*)

SUITE, télégramme No. 385.

Je tiens informer très confidentiellement votre Altesse que la situation de notre armée, qui se replie depuis hier vers Tchataldja, est très compromise. Plusieurs bataillons sont en déroute et il est à craindre que la défense même de cette ligne ne soit difficile, sinon impossible, à moins de pouvoir y transférer de nos troupes d'Asie. Dans ces conditions, il importe d'aviser aux moyens politiques pour qu'il soit interdit à l'armée bulgare d'entrer à Constantinople, comme il a été fait en 1876 à l'armée russe à San Stéfano sous la pression des Puissances et spécialement sur l'injonction de l'Angleterre. Nous sommes pressés d'obtenir sans aucun retard l'appui et l'intervention des Puissances à l'effet de faire arrêter tout d'abord la marche en avant des troupes bulgares, faire cesser les hostilités et entamer ensuite les négociations en vue de la paix à conclure. Nous croyons préférable ne pas faire la proposition d'une armistice, parce que cela nécessiterait un acte entre les commandants respectifs et pourrait faire perdre un temps précieux, car nul ne peut mesurer entre temps les conséquences d'une occupation par l'ennemi de notre capitale, d'où les autorités devraient dans ce cas s'éloigner et donnerait lieu à une anarchie déplorable à plusieurs points de vue.

Veuillez donc déployer tous vos efforts pour provoquer et hâter la décision des Puissances à cet égard et nous tenir au courant de tout ce qui sera arrêté entre elles.

Sur la demande des Ambassadeurs, nous venons d'autoriser l'admission au Bosphore des bâtiments de guerre à raison d'un pour chaque Puissance destiné à rassurer leur colonie.

[46853] No. 109.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 4.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November 4, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated to-day, which has been sent to the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 109.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, November 4, 1912.*

KEEP "Medea" Salonica and order "Hampshire" Besika Bay.

[46570] No. 110.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Salonica, November 2, 1912.*

YOUR telegrams of 30th and 31st October only received this morning.

"Hampshire" arrived yesterday; "Medea" due to-morrow. Effect excellent.

[46564] No. 111.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 576.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 3, 1912.*

FRENCH Ambassador informs me that Minister for Foreign Affairs has just been to him to say that Turkish Government consider that moment is now opportune for the intervention and mediation of the Powers.

[46654] No. 112.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 577.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 4, 1912.*

AN official communication has been given out to-day to effect that, while army has defended itself successfully in the neighbourhood of Yanina and Scutari, the eastern army near Vize and Lulo Bourgas has been obliged to retreat to Tchataldja in order to facilitate and carry out successfully the necessary defence.

[46632] No. 113.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 578.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 4, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from Salonica, dated 2nd November :—

"Yesterday's reported success ephemeral. Rapid developments anticipated."

[46854] No. 114.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 579. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, November 4, 1912.*

I HAVE just seen Minister for Foreign Affairs, who appeared to be somewhat under the influence of information which had just been given him by my German and Austrian colleagues. I have, indeed, noticed on more than one occasion that Marquis Pallavicini's news is apt to be more prematurely alarmist than that from other quarters, and, although he tells me that he has himself given a hint to his colony to proceed on board an Austrian ship, I feel it would be more expedient to await further developments and advice from the Minister for Foreign Affairs before taking a similar course and thus risking the outbreak of a panic before the real necessity arises.

The two Ambassadors, it appears, had told Gabriel Effendi that from their information the Turkish army to the east near Vizé had been cut off and surrendered, that Nazim Pasha's corps had been broken up and the general himself taken prisoner, and that, consequently there could be no defence of the Chatalja lines, and the Bulgarians would find their way open to the capital. His Excellency added that his own news had not been nearly so pessimistic, but that if this later information was correct disaster was impending and inevitable. He trusted, however, that the Chatalja lines would in any case be capable of offering a stout resistance, and that events would not be precipitated for three to four days.

His Excellency then turned to the course which, he said, would be forced upon the Porte if the Bulgarians carried out their alleged intention of entering Constantinople. The Porte and Court would in this case be forced to leave the capital, possibly for Broussa, and the city would thus be left in a state of absolute anarchy. The effect on the Moslem softa clergy of a foreign army entering the centre of the Caliphate, and its mosques, tombs, and other objects of tradition and veneration falling into the hands of the infidel would be incalculable. Some interval would have to elapse between the departure of the Government and the entry of the Bulgarians, and these fanatical elements would find only too ready helpers among the boatmen, &c., of the lower classes to use this interval to make a second Moscow of the situation, and to perpetrate

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a complete massacre of the Christians, and pillage and burn the city. King Ferdinand's proclamation of war between Cross and Crescent would not tend to diminish this fanaticism or its results, and the extreme revolutionaries among the committee, whose motto is: "The committee shall succeed or destroy everything," would probably be the prime movers in the disturbances.

Gabriel Effendi stated, however, that if King Ferdinand could be induced (for example, by the Russian Government) to stop at San Stefano a catastrophe might be averted. If this is impossible, and if the German and Austrian information turns out to have been a correct estimate of the danger, it would seem imperative that the Bulgarian army should arrange, if possible, not only to push on as fast as possible after the final defeat of the Turks, but to enter the town by the Pera side, where the embassies, &c., are situated. The interval of anarchy might thus be shortened, and the graver consequences of the Government's departure (the avoidance of which consequence may actually be a matter of hours) be averted.

I told Minister for Foreign Affairs that if the Government saw itself forced to leave for Broussa or elsewhere, it should without delay communicate this decision to the various missions, and thus give them time to provide as far as possible for the safety of their colonies. His Excellency promised to do so.

Such departure would of course raise several difficult questions, *e.g.*, whether the foreign representatives should follow the Government, or remain here, or proceed on their stationnaires. The Russian Black Sea fleet would moreover, in this case, be the quickest to reach Constantinople, and perhaps would ignore the principle of the passage of the straits. In this last connection, however, the Austro-German idea is apparently to internationalise the situation in preference to leaving it to Russia and the Balkan States.

As regards the protection of the colonies in the last resort of the abandonment of the capital by the Turkish authorities, it might, perhaps, be possible for the foreign ships to partially isolate Pera by destroying the bridges connecting it with Stamboul and thus mitigate the untoward situation. Minister for Foreign Affairs gave as his personal view that each Power should send up a second ship and will submit question of the firman to the Cabinet to-night.

[46865] No. 115.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 125.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 328 of to-day.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has just left for Budapest to attend opening of Delegations to-morrow. I have asked Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to let me know, as soon as possible, Minister for Foreign Affairs' views with regard to mediation.

Turkish demand for mediation has apparently not yet reached Austro-Hungarian Government. Hilmi Pasha is expected to arrive here to-morrow morning.

[46866] No. 116.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 126.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 4, 1912.*

RUSSIAN military attaché told military attaché to-day that he had trustworthy information that the number of battalions in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been increased by fifteen from various regiments in Austria and Hungary, making eighty-four in the two provinces now. As yet no information in corroboration of this has been received.

Military attaché learns that editor of "Reichspost" stated no steps for augmentation had taken place along southern border, but that battalion and other units in 1st Cracow, 10th Przemysl, and 11th Lemberg Corps had been brought up to full peace establishment and reserve officers, and under-officers are warned to hold themselves available at shortest notice. Further, that some units in those corps had been moved up close to the Russian frontier.

[46867] No. 117.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 127.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 4, 1912.*

NAVAL attaché reports that Austro-Hungarian squadron, consisting of battle-ships "Franz Ferdinand," "Radetzky," "Zrinyi," and cruiser "Admiral Spaun," and torpedo-boat destroyers "Scharfschütze" and "Uskoke," have been ordered to leave Pola to-night for the Levant to protect Austro-Hungarian subjects.

[46767] No. 118.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 142.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, November 4, 1912.*

GERMAN ships "Goeben" and "Breslau" are being ordered to Mediterranean. Training-ships "Hertha" and "Vineta" and small cruiser "Geier" are already in Mediterranean.

[46862] No. 119.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 143.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, November 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 334 of to-day.

Opinion of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is that Great Powers should inform belligerent Balkan States of Turkish appeal and enquire their views. He thinks that any idea of pressure must be carefully avoided, and that therefore, if Powers should decide on above step, their communication should not be made collectively, but as nearly simultaneously as possible.

He would be glad if you would let him know whether His Majesty's Government and the other Powers agree in the course suggested.

[46863] No. 120.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, November 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 333 of 3rd November.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs agrees that it would be useless to advise Servian Government to treat separately with Austria-Hungary, and that only thing to be done is to try and persuade them to avoid anything which may give Austria impression that her commercial interests may suffer. As regards Servian demand, his personal opinion is that it would be ill-advised to oppose any territorial arrangements contemplated by victorious States unless the Powers were prepared to enforce their opposition by arms, and that he was certain no Power wished to do. Possession of Constantinople was, of course, question apart.

He still thought it preferable that Servia should have access to the Ægean Sea rather than through Albania to Adriatic, as it would suit Austria-Hungary better. He had telegraphed to Vienna to advise Austro-Hungarian Government to communicate its reserves to you as soon as possible.

[46841] No. 121.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 4, 1912.*

BULGARIAN head-quarters have been moved to Kizi Agatch. Vice-consul at Philippopoli telegraphs allied forces are within sight of Tchataldja.

[46859] No. 122.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November 4, 1912.*

BULGARIAN Minister came to see me yesterday, and speaking of the sanjak said that this would not be a question between Austria and Servia alone, but between Austria and the Balkan Alliance. The allies were determined to retain the territory they had taken and only force would dislodge them. If the Powers combined to compel evacuation it would cause implacable resentment and continued unrest. He admitted the difficulty of Austria's position, but said that unless she intended to bring about an European war her ambitions in Albania and in the direction of Salonica would have to be abandoned. As regards the probability of a Pan-Serb movement resulting from the growth of Servia, Austria could do much to avoid this danger by according to the Serbs in her dominions proper treatment. Moreover, Bulgaria would see to it that Servia should not by agitation endanger the peace, and Austria could look to Bulgaria to be a counterpoise to any Pan-Slavist schemes.

M. Toshef seemed particularly anxious to find out what would be the attitude of England now, and laid stress on the fact that Austrian policy and public opinion are looking for an indication as to what line we shall take towards Servia's claim to retain the sanjak and the pretensions of the allies generally, and will be influenced accordingly.

My impression is that it was specially to say this that the Bulgarian Minister came to see me.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[46864] No. 123.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 191.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, November 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 661 of to-day.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs has replied to Turkish Government that to take action as they desired, namely, to impose an armistice on Bulgaria, would be to overstep the rights of a neutral Power. Should a formal demand for friendly mediation be made by the Porte matter would appear in different light.

[46856] No. 124.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 408.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 4, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 405 of 2nd November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that the question of Adrianople had been discussed yesterday at a meeting in which he, President of the Council, and Ministers of War and Marine had taken part. Minister of War had said that in opinion of his military advisers war had shown, owing to its geographical position, that fortress did not command the road to Constantinople, as it could easily be turned. Russian Government, Minister for Foreign Affairs stated, would therefore reserve their decision, and might eventually consent to it being retained as fortress by Bulgarians. In that case frontier line would be drawn to the south instead of to the north of Adrianople.

Orders, his Excellency said, had been sent to Sebastopol for a ship to proceed to Constantinople as soon as Sultan's iradé had been obtained.

I asked whether he thought that, if Powers accede at once to Turkey's request for mediation, it would be possible to stop further advance of Bulgarian army were the Powers to guarantee execution of Treaty of San Stefano.

His Excellency replied that though such a declaration might satisfy Bulgaria it would not content other allies, who could claim nothing under that treaty, and we could not at present say what Servia was to have. Bulgarian occupation of Constantinople caused him much preoccupation, as a theatrical Sovereign like King of Bulgarians might insist on placing the cross on St. Sophia, and the Turks might then blow up the mosque as they had threatened to do in 1877.

Minister for Foreign Affairs was also afraid that Austria would refuse French proposal for a conference and for participation of Balkan States. He himself did not see how we could dispense with conference, as we could not allow Balkan States to settle whole question direct with Turkey. Though he thought that presence of former at conference would complicate matters, he would not oppose it. Austria, he said, had during the last few days gone back on her attitude. Austrian Ambassador had at first talked of nothing but her commercial interests, and now great stress was being laid on her political interests. He did not know whether she had had her eye on Albania, the sanjak, or Salonica. Russian public opinion would not tolerate even the acquisition of the sanjak, and if she claimed Salonica Russia would have to demand Constantinople.

I remarked that Austria might say that, as Russia even formulated reserves with regard to Adrianople vilayet, she was entitled to do the same with regard to territory in which she was interested. His Excellency, however, would not admit this, and insisted that Russia was asking for nothing for herself.

Though I did not mention it to his Excellency, I think that Russia might argue that Austria had acquired Bosnia and Herzegovina as a consequence of Russo-Turkish war, and that she cannot now expect to obtain further territory as the result of a settlement of Balkan question, under which Russia will obtain no territorial expansion. If Austria tries to do so situation will, I fear, become acute.

His Excellency told me that the Emperor, when he returns to St. Petersburgh in a fortnight's time, will send a Grand Duke to Bucharest to present King Charles with the baton of Russian field-marshal. His Excellency has suggested that His Imperial Majesty should send Grand Duke at once. He is also urging Bulgarian Government to come to terms with Roumania.

[46857] No. 125.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 409.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *St. Petersburgh, November 4, 1912.*

AS reported mobilisation of British ships had caused alarm on Bourse, I authorised Minister for Foreign Affairs, at his Excellency's request, to publish denial in terms of your telegram yesterday.

[46797] No. 126.

Sir C. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, November 4, 1912.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 119 of 3rd November.

I see no signs of situation having suddenly altered for the worse. On the contrary (see my telegram No. 19 of 3rd November), King left for Sinaia, which he would hardly have done while pressure was being brought to bear on the Cabinet to mobilise. There may have been a moment's indecision last week on the part of the Cabinet, but I am now inclined to doubt it, and it is a surprise to me to learn that great pressure for mobilisation was at any time exercised.

At any rate, there is no sign now of strong public opinion in favour of mobilisation, and, though the leader of the Liberal party is said to have been for it as a means of strengthening conversations with Bulgaria, which he wished to see opened at once, criticisms in the Liberal press of attitude of the Government have as yet no ring of sincerity.

(Very Confidential.)

M. Take Jonesco, whom I saw last night, denied absolutely that mobilisation had been ever imminent, though he said that army was so ready that it could be mobilised in a week, and he implied that mobilisation might occur if conversations with Bulgaria, for which time had not yet come, were not successful.

(Secret.)

His telegram asking "Times" correspondent at Sophia to come at once to Bucharest spoke of a great service the "Times" correspondent could do him, and latter's reply stated that he would be glad to co-operate. Possibly this had reference to eventual conversations with Bulgaria.

(Repeated to Sophia.)

[47142] No. 127.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1172.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 405 of 2nd November.

Russian Ambassador has made similar but less full communication to me. He added, however, that Bulgaria would have to go to Constantinople unless she got some pledge of what Powers would do for Balkan States, and that M. Sazonof's proposals might be sufficient in this respect.

I said that when Turkey asked Powers to intervene to suspend hostilities I felt it would be impossible to do more than ask Bulgaria on what terms she would suspend them, though pending opinion of other Powers I had not yet expressed any view.

I had no objection to raise to M. Sazonof's proposals. I suggested that M. Sazonof should ascertain through whatever channel he thought most favourable whether Austrian views differed from his. If, as M. Sazonof said, Austria was prepared to let Montenegro have sanjak the only doubtful points appeared to be whether Austria would object to Servian port on the Adriatic, and whether Bulgaria would make difficulties about Adrianople.

Suggestion of making Salonica a free port was, of course, agreeable to our commercial interests.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 669.)

[47002] No. 128.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 943.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 4, 1912.*

HIS Majesty's ship "Weymouth" is at Besika Bay, and the "Hampshire" is proceeding from Salonica to be there also. You should communicate with senior naval officer.

[46564] No. 129.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 661.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 4, 1912.*

YOU should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs his view of Turkish appeal for intervention of the Powers to bring about cessation of hostilities, and avert the consequences that would follow from entry of Bulgarians into Constantinople and abandonment of the capital by the Central Government.

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* Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 334), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 328), Sir R. Rodd (No. 474), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 1161).

[47311] No. 130.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 338.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 4, 1912.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador having come to the Foreign Office to-day, I observed that, as his Government gave him no instructions to tell me their views or ask for mine, I thought they might perhaps not wish to be sounded. I therefore left it to his discretion whether to report anything I said to his Government, and I observed that if it were known what reserves Austria and Russia had to make we should have some ground upon which to go. Ambassador could only discuss matter on his own personal opinion, but thought there would be difficulty in giving Servia San Juan di Medua—the country behind was too hilly for a railway, and part of it was Mahommedan. I observed that the first objection was the risk of Servia alone. Ambassador thought there would be no difficulty in Servia having outlet through a Montenegrin port. I observed that this would involve question of the sanjak. Ambassador said it was a barren place, and he did not think there would be difficulty on this point.

I urged upon Ambassador that there was opportunity for a great settlement of Balkan question that would secure peace there for generations; that difficulty appeared to be how to secure for Servia an outlet to Adriatic, and that it was worth some effort to overcome this difficulty.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 1174.)

[47141] No. 131.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 339.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 4, 1912.*

I REMARKED to Austrian Ambassador to-day that Turkish request for intervention made it more than ever necessary to have some idea of what settlement was to be.

Ambassador said he thought Austria would wish to know terms of Balkan States before expressing her own views. I replied that utmost I personally thought Powers could do on Turkish request was to ask Bulgaria on what terms she would suspend hostilities. She could hardly suspend hostilities without being sure that the Powers would support terms that were satisfactory to Balkan States.

[46655] No. 132.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 367.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 4, 1912.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF informed me on the 1st November that M. Suzonof had given friendly but earnest advice in Sophia that the Bulgarians should not attack Tchataldja. He had urged that they would meet with a fierce resistance there. They might cause an upset in Constantinople with disastrous consequences, under which the Powers most interested financially and economically there could not remain passive; and by pressing on to Constantinople the Bulgarians might cause a movement in Roumania. He had added that Russia felt that Bulgaria must have substantial acquisitions, and if Bulgaria accepted her advice Russia would support her in acquiring these. Count Benckendorff asked me whether we and France would also say something in Sophia. He wished that we should speak, not together, but separately, and that we should do so quite independently of Russia.

I told Count Benckendorff that I would reflect upon this suggestion.

Later in the evening I wrote to him to say that since he had been here I had had further information from Sophia, from which I gathered that the Bulgarians were pressing on, and had made up their minds that they could not stop their advance;

They might very likely have military reasons for not giving the Turkish army time to collect itself at Tchataldja. Also, I had received proposals from M. Poincaré, including one for collective intervention by the Powers to suspend hostilities. In these circumstances, I thought that it was too late to give further advice in Sophia.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[45808] No. 133.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 534.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 4, 1912.*

THE French Ambassador read to Sir A. Nicolson on 25th October a telegram from M. Bompard, saying that, in view of the penury of the Turkish Treasury, he understood that it was in contemplation to lay hands on the reserves of the Dette publique, to take the dimes which were affected to guarantees of the railways, and to raise the customs duties. M. Poincaré wished to have our views. Sir A. Nicolson told M. Cambon that Tewfik Pasha had mentioned that day the rumour that the surtax on the customs revenues was to be levied, and that His Highness had had an idea of telegraphing to his Government deprecating such a measure as being one that could not be taken without the consent of the Powers, and that I had fully agreed with the view of Tewfik Pasha.

M. Cambon said that Germany, Austria, and Italy had given their consent already to the surtax provided all the Powers assented. M. Cambon mentioned further that of late Germany had been an active purchaser of Turkish bonds in the Paris market.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[46656] No. 134.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 24.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 4, 1912.*

THE Servian chargé d'affaires stated on the 2nd November, by instruction from his Government, that there was absolutely no truth in the reports that any negotiations were proceeding between Austria-Hungary and Servia. Such reports were circulated (from Vienna he asserted) in order to weaken or disrupt the Balkan alliance. But his Government wished to give the most positive denial to these reports, and to say that the alliance remained one and indivisible. Furthermore, his Government trusted that the demands of Servia would be found reasonable by the Powers of the Triple *Entente*. Asked what the demands were, his Excellency said the whole of the Kossovo vilayet, the sanjak, and an access to the sea. These territories Servia would not surrender to anyone, and would fight for them, and she had every reason to believe that she would be assisted by her allies.

Sir A. Nicolson asked if he had not noticed that the Austrian press of late had been quite conciliatory and amiable as to extensions of Servian territory. He replied that some papers had been, though the "Reichspost," the organ of the Heir-Apparent, which had been a few days ago ready to accept Servian expansion, had on the 1st November gone quite round again, and only wished to accord a small territorial increase. If Austria thought Servia would enter a Zollverein she was mistaken, as during the last ten or fifteen years the main efforts of Servia had been to emancipate herself from Austrian commercial toils, and she certainly would not let herself in again. On this point M. Grouitch said he was giving his own opinions. As to what he had said on other points, he was speaking under instructions.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[46313] No. 135.

Foreign Office to Khedivial Mail Steam-ship and Graving Dock Company.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 4, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state, for the confidential and urgent information of your directors, that a telegram has been received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople respecting the situation which may arise in that city in the event of a fanatical outbreak.

I am to state that it is considered necessary that adequate arrangements should be made with the utmost expedition, in order to embark such members of the British community as may desire to leave Constantinople in case of necessity.

His Majesty's Ambassador has already been authorised to charter steam-ship "City of Chios," owned by Messrs. Papyani, of Liverpool; but His Majesty's Government wish to secure that one of your company's ships should always be at Constantinople, until further notice, on condition of the payment of an adequate indemnity. I am accordingly to express Sir E. Grey's hope that you will be so good as to issue instructions to this effect by telegraph.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[46883] No. 136.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 120. Confidential.)
Sir, *Sophia, October 29, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 119 of the 23rd instant, I had the honour to report to you on the following day that, after desperate fighting, Kirk Kilissé had fallen into the hands of the Bulgarians. A battery of quick-firing guns, together with ammunition and sixteen caissons, was also captured by the victors. I heard from the same source that Moukhtar Pasha, with the Egyptian Prince Abdul Halim, had escaped from the town at the head of a column of 2,000 men, the *élite* of the defenders' troops. The town was not completely surrounded, and there seems but little doubt that some 5,000 other troops escaped to Adrianople. From the same source (*c.f.* my telegram No. 97) I gathered that the station of Adrianople, which is 6 kilom. distant from the town, had been won by the Bulgarian forces and that endeavours were being made to encircle the fortress. I reported on the 26th instant that two Turkish colours were captured at Kirk Kilissé as well as the personal luggage of Moukhtar Pasha. The Bulgarian losses were slight, not amounting, I believe, to more than 6,000 killed and wounded.

The result of the successful battle waged at Koumanovo by the Servian army created great satisfaction at Sophia. The Krupp shells fired by the Turks continually failed to explode, whereas the Creusot guns did enormous execution.

On the following day I was able to announce the fall of Uskub.

The "Times" and the "Neue Freie Presse" are both endeavouring to show that a good deal of jealousy exists both in Sophia and Belgrade as regards the victories at Kirk Kilissé and Koumanovo. In so far as I am able to judge, no such jealousy exists in Sophia respecting the success of the Servian arms; only satisfaction is expressed at the downfall of a common enemy. As long as this war continues it must be borne in mind that the rôle of a large section of the press—especially of the Austrian press—will endeavour to create dissention amongst the allies.

On the same day I heard from Roustchuk that a vessel had arrived there from Russia, carrying 900 Bulgarian reservists, several officers on the active list of the Russian army, and eight aeroplanes. This information was confirmed at a later date.

On the 27th instant I reported that the chief reason for the defeat of the Ottoman troops up to date had been the failure of the artillery.

I hear that one-fourth of the guns used up to the present time by the Turks have fallen into the hands of the enemy. This fact may partially be accounted for on the ground that as their fire was so ineffective no great efforts were made to save the guns.

I hear from two sources, one of which is Austrian, that after the Turkish war-ships had left Kavarna—a small defenceless town which they bombarded on the 21st instant—over fifty Turkish shells were picked up, all of which had failed to explode.

I further had the honour to state on the 27th instant that the plan of the Bulgarian army, after encircling Adrianople, was to proceed southward to the junction of the railway. This plan they have consistently carried out. Baba Eski was captured on the night of the 27th instant and Lule Burgas was occupied by the Bulgarian cavalry on the 28th instant.

Meanwhile, the victory at Koumanovo, the capture of Uskub, and the evacuation of Ishtib and Kiuprulu practically freed the Servian army. A division was at once hurried up to Mustapha Pasha, and at the time of writing is being rapidly entrained to join the Bulgarian troops at the front.

Other portions of the Servian army will be told off to support the Greek and Montenegrin forces. It will be noted that the allies are consistently acting in conjunction, and that they will endeavour to fight together. Both the Bulgarian and the Servian forces consider that course of action of great importance and as likely to firmly cement their present friendship on the field of battle.

Meanwhile, the news of the arrival of the Bulgarian troops at Nevrokop and Drama showed that the march to the south-west was progressing with rapid strides; it is understood that the troops will proceed as far as Cavalla and that, if necessary, steps will be taken by the Bulgarian and Servian forces combined, holding the Nevrokop–Drama–Cavalla geographical line, to prevent any Turkish force now engaged west of that line from proceeding east.

As regards the march of the allied army south, I had the honour to report yesterday that they proposed to attack the Tchataldja lines and that they did not expect to meet with any serious resistance between that place and Lule Burgas. Certain people here whose opinions have some weight believe, however, that the Ottoman army will meet with as much difficulty in deploying their forces on the Tchataldja line that they will decide to defend Tchorlu, but the adjutant-general here considers that the Ottoman army is so demoralised that they will not again willingly engage the allied troops until they are driven to their last defences.

I received information yesterday that the port of Bourgas had been mined, and that it has been consequently closed for the present; also that the Servian and Montenegrin armies had effected a junction in the sanjak, to the south of Novi Bazar.

I telegraphed yesterday that a rumour had reached me from a source in which I have confidence, that the Roumanian Government were discussing the question of ordering a partial mobilisation. This information I reported to His Majesty's Minister at Bucharest.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[46910] No. 137.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 77.)

Sir, *Belgrade, October 30, 1912.*

PROBABLY no one has been more surprised than the Servians themselves at the turn events have taken during the last fortnight. Although of course the military party and a certain number of chauvinists were loud in their clamour for war, the Servian nation taken as a whole unquestionably looked upon the prospect with considerable diffidence. Even after the issue of the mobilisation decree there were unmistakable signs that the Servian Government would have welcomed any excuse sufficient to extricate them from the position into which Bulgaria had manœuvred them. This diffidence resulted partly from the fear of the superiority of the fighting qualities of the Turkish army, partly from apprehension lest, even should the Servian army be fortunate enough to gain a few successes, Servia would in the end be deprived of the fruits of her victories by Austrian jealousy. To find the Servian army in possession of Uskub, and masters within a few days after crossing the frontier of all the territory which has formed the object of Servian aspirations for years past, is an event which rational Servians scarcely contemplated. This event has indeed come about in the only manner possible, but in a manner which it was difficult to conceive, namely, by the retreat of the Turkish army practically without a blow being struck. So far as can be gathered from reports which have reached Belgrade, the only place where the Servian army was confronted by Turkish regulars in any numbers was at Kumanovo, on which occasion about 30,000 Turks opposed some 80,000 Servians. Except in this battle, resistance against the advance of the Servian columns was conducted by Albanians alone, and although the latter operate merely as untrained

bands and have no artillery, the Servian troops, judging by their losses, appear to have found the task of overcoming them none too easy. It is not, therefore, unreasonable to suppose that had Turkish regulars co-operated in any degree with the Albanians, the Servian army might have fared very differently.

That Servians should entirely lose sight of this fact and should attribute their success to military superiority and prowess alone is not perhaps not unnatural, but it is a circumstance liable to be unfortunate in its effect, and to render them intractable when the moment arrives for deciding upon future territorial arrangements in the Balkan Peninsula.

I had the honour in my telegram No. 43 of the 27th instant to report information given me by the Austrian Minister, according to which the Balkan States already regard the wholesale partition of European Turkey between them as a certainty. Servia's share is to be the whole of the sanjak, Old Servia (a somewhat indefinite designation comprising the whole of the vilayet of Kossovo and probably parts of Monastir) and the port of San Giovanni di Medua on the Adriatic. Though M. d'Ugron assured me that this information came from an absolutely reliable source, I am unable to say whether these extreme views are really those of the Government, but when I recently spoke to M. Pashitch concerning the territory which had been occupied, his tone was decidedly uncompromising, and it is impossible not to be aware of the spirit of ambition and determination which is coming over the country, and which so far as Turkish territory is concerned appears to be limited only by the ambitions of the other Balkan States. It is now constantly conveyed to one in a variety of ways that Servia is prepared to fight no matter what odds for every inch of the territory she has now conquered.

From the Austrian point of view the unqualified success of the Servian arms has created a situation of exceeding perplexity. My Austrian colleague tells me he has no precise instructions from his Government as to the attitude he is to adopt. It is evident, he says, that they intend to make every possible effort to settle matters amicably, as the consequences of an attack on Servia would be incalculable; but Austria had also to consider her own immediate safety. The effect which the retention of the sanjak by Servia and her consequent junction with Montenegro would have upon the Austrian position in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the neighbouring provinces Croatia and Dalmatia was referred to in my despatch No. 72 of the 23rd instant, and there is some evidence that Austrian apprehensions are not unreasonable, inasmuch as the possibility of Bosnia and Herzegovina becoming a part of Servia at no very distant date is already openly discussed.

Austria is now placed before this dilemma: either she drives Servia out of the sanjak by force of arms, with practical certainty of Russia intervening, or she remains inactive, allowing Servia to enlarge herself at will, when Servia by Pan-Serb intrigues and propaganda will in time cause such unrest and ferment in the Austrian-Slav provinces, that Austria will be compelled to take energetic measures against Servia for her own protection, a proceeding which will again bring her into conflict with Russia.

Very probably, at the present moment, the Russian Government will give every assistance to Austria in the solution of this problem by giving counsels of moderation to the Servian Government, but it is open to doubt whether these will produce much effect. The Servians are fully alive to the strength of their present position. They were impelled to war by Pan-Slavist influences, they feel these at their back, and they mean to exploit the situation to its fullest extent. They know that the Russian Government dare not face the threat of Servia going over to Austria. Incidentally, I may mention that the fact of the Czar recently telegraphing his congratulations to King Peter on the success of the Servian arms is not likely to make the Servian Government more modest in their ideas.

The remarks which I have made above are not intended in any way as a forecast, but merely to delineate the position as, judging by appearances, it now presents itself between Austria and Servia. At any moment factors may arise to modify the present aspect. Possibly, when the first elation of success has passed, Servia may come to the conclusion that it is more politic to arrive at some *modus vivendi* with Austria than to drive her to extremes, possibly also although everything seems at present to be going smoothly between the allies, jealousies may later creep in, which will afford Austria an opportunity of readjusting a situation which just now is by no means in her favour.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[46911] No. 138.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 78.)
Sir, *Belgrade, November 2, 1912.*

IN the absence of M. Pashitch at Uskub, I yesterday saw M. Yovanovitch, the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and told him that according to despatches I had received the Servian chargé d'affaires in London appeared to be holding rather uncompromising language on the subject of the sanjak. I enquired whether M. Gronitch's language correctly reflected the sentiments of the Servian Government. The gist of M. Yovanovitch's reply was a follows :—

It is almost an absurdity now even to refer to the old *status quo*. The unqualified successes of the Servian army have introduced an entirely new order of things, and it would be well every one should realise this fact without delay. There is no reason why Austria and Servia should not be able to come to terms concerning the sanjak. Everything will depend upon the spirit in which Austria approaches the question. If Austria merely desires part of the sanjak, some arrangement could doubtless be found, as there would be no great objection to ceding a small piece of territory, but if she had ulterior aims, and Salonica is her objective, or she endeavours to prevent Servia from getting an outlet upon the Adriatic, Servia will take up arms and will shed the last drop of her blood in defending her rights. ("L'Autriche n'entrera au sandjak que par-dessus nos cadavres," is a phrase I recently heard more than once.)

I reminded M. Yovanovitch that, although he spoke thus airily of living in amity with Austria, a good deal of the trouble experienced in Croatia originated through Servian intrigue, and that Austria's position at the present moment was by no means easy. This he readily admitted, but said that the troubles in Croatia and other Serb provinces were due to Austria's aggressive policy against Servia.

I then asked what exactly was understood under the name "Old Servia," and said I should be glad to be enlightened more or less upon the subject of Servia's present territorial pretensions. Taking a map M. Yovanovitch traced a boundary rather vaguely, but running approximately from the present Servian-Bulgarian frontier in a south-westerly direction to Prilep, thence almost due west, taking in northerly end of Lake Ochrida to Durazzo on the Adriatic. This would give to Servia about 40 miles of coast, including the port of St. John of Medua.

I asked what, under the circumstances, the other Balkan States intended to claim. Montenegro, it appears, wants part of the sanjak, the town of Scutari, and a considerable extension of her frontier towards the east. Concerning Greek claims he was not very certain, but thought probably Greece would want Thessaly and Epirus. Greek wishes were, however, of minor importance. The Greeks had indicated that Salonica should by rights fall to them, but Bulgaria and Servia had in mind to hand over Salonica and the surrounding country to Great Britain. Bulgaria would take what remained of Macedonia up to the Servian frontier, and the whole of Roumelia, except a narrow strip comprising the Bosphorus, Constantinople, and the Dardanelles, which should be made neutral territory. I pointed out that, although the Balkan States for the moment did not seem to be afflicted with shyness, there still remained a considerable amount of territory between the Adriatic and Lake Ochrida, also further south, and I should be glad to know how that had been disposed of. M. Yovanovitch thought the Powers would probably find some use for this.

In making these statements to me M. Yovanovitch did not appear to feel that there was anything premature or uncommon about them; they were made quite simply, as though the partition of Turkey was the natural and only possible outcome of the war, and I have always found M. Yovanovitch exceptionally straightforward for a Servian.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[46912] No. 139.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 79.)
Sir, *Belgrade, November 2, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of a report addressed by Major Thomson, military attaché, to the War Office on the progress of the war.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 139.

Report by Major Thomson.

1.—*Battle of Kumanovo.*

IT is now possible to give a very general description of the battle of Kumanovo, from accounts of wounded officers in the hospitals at Belgrade.

The first army bore the brunt of the fighting, although valuable assistance was rendered at a critical moment by the artillery of the second army.

The Turkish army, estimated at four divisions or 40,000 troops of all arms, was in position immediately north and east of Kumanovo, their line being parallel to the railway. Galib Pasha was in command.

The first Servian army, as shown in the "ordre de bataille" and amended in the continuation of my first report, comprised three 1st Ban infantry divisions, one 1st Ban cavalry division, and one 2nd Ban infantry division, and may be taken as 80,000 troops of all arms.

This army reached the neighbourhood of Dl. Bukovce on the evening of the 22nd October, when its advanced troops were in touch with the Turks. On the morning of the 23rd October the Turks assumed the offensive and drove back the Servian advanced troops on to their main body which had continued its movement southwards towards Kumanovo.

For a time the Servians acted on the defensive, the Danube division (1st Ban) being the only portion of the army seriously engaged. Later in the day this division was reinforced on its left flank by the Morava and Drina 1st Ban divisions. Fighting now became general all along the front, numerous Turkish attacks were repulsed, local counter-attacks made, and the bayonet was frequently employed. A wounded Servian officer informed me that his regiment (the 18th infantry regiment) was on one occasion put to flight by the Turks, but was rallied by the officers and recaptured their former position at the point of the bayonet, losing two battalion commanders and many officers in the process. Fighting went on all through the night of the 23rd–24th. Early on the morning of the 24th the Timok division of the 2nd Ban reinforced the Servian right flank, but considerable confusion prevailed as the morning was misty. The 13th regiment, belonging to the reinforcing division, is said to have fired into the Servian troops already engaged, but atoned for this error later by making a bayonet charge which drove back the Turkish left. This example was followed by the other Servian troops, and finally at 3·30 P.M. on the 24th, after an obstinate resistance and much hand-to-hand fighting, the Turks abandoned their positions and retired in great disorder, some going in the direction of Uskub, but the majority towards Stip.

The Second Army.—A wounded Servian officer belonging to the second army gives the following account :—

Advanced troops of the second army had reached a point about 10 miles north-east of Kumanovo on the evening of the 22nd October; for some unexplained reason no attempt was made to join in the battle during the 23rd, but on the morning of the 24th General Stepanovitch sent forward most of his artillery, escorted by the 2nd Ban cavalry brigade; the artillery took up a position from which it could enfilade the Turkish front and inflicted heavy losses on the Turks, contributing largely to their final defeat. The cavalry of the second army took up the pursuit.

Effect of Servian Artillery Fire.—All reports corroborate the excellent work done by the Servian artillery, which gave good support to the infantry and played a useful part throughout the battle. The Turkish shells were well aimed, but the greater number failed to burst.

2. *Servian Casualties.*

Servian losses are kept secret; an official statement was issued to the effect that the casualties were 400 killed and 2,000 wounded; this is generally considered an underestimate made intentionally with a view to calming public opinion. The actual casualties may be between 6,000 and 8,000 killed and wounded, and, owing to the nature of the fighting, probably more than half of these are killed. Sixteen thousand wounded men have already arrived at Belgrade, and the hospitals at Nish and Vranya are full. The 7th infantry regiment is reported to have been almost annihilated. This regiment has its head-quarters in Belgrade, and it is significant that both reserve battalions have been sent to the front since the battle. The infantry suffered most, the cavalry and artillery lost very few men, but a fair number of horses.

3. *Turkish Casualties.*

The Turkish casualties must have been very large, the enfilade fire of the artillery of the second army did frightful execution on the dense masses of Turkish infantry; the dead are described as lying in heaps. There is no detailed information as regards prisoners, but the Servians captured 55 field and mountain guns, 6 machine-guns, 52 railway trucks (of which 38 were loaded with provisions and war stores), and 80 large tents.

4. *General Situation.*

The new advanced base is Uskub; Servian troops occupy Stip, Koprulu, and possibly Negotin (25 miles south-east of Koprulu).

The Ibar army is operating in the direction of Ipek.

Prizren has apparently not been taken, although a report to that effect has appeared in the press bureau bulletin; this may be explained by the fact that the third army from Prishtina is being absorbed into the first army, and consequently no troops are available.

It is difficult to find out anything definite about the second army; its conduct during the battle of Kumanovo was, to say the least, mysterious, as it might easily have taken part in the light on the 24th. One report says that the two Bulgarian divisions which formed part of this army originally have been sent back to Sophia, and are now in the train for Adrianople. This would leave one 1st Ban Servian division and a cavalry brigade with the second army, and, as stated in the continuation of my first report, these troops were accounted for at and near Uskub.

The Bulgarian divisions were last heard of at Kratovo (south-west of Agri Palanka) and it is quite possible that for political reasons Bulgarian troops took part in the first invasion of Macedonia, but have been withdrawn now to reinforce the army at Adrianople.

The original "ordre de bataille" should consequently be amended, and the distribution of the Servian troops at present is as follows:—

First army: Head-quarters, Uskub—
- Four 1st Ban divisions (Danube, Morava, Drina, and Timok).
- One 2nd Ban division (Danube).
- One 1st Ban cavalry division.
- One 2nd Ban cavalry brigade.

Third army: Moving along railway from Prishtina to join first army—
- One 1st Ban division (Shumadia).
- One 2nd Ban division (Morava).

Ibar army: Operating near Ipek—
- Three 2nd Ban divisions (Timok, Drina, and Shumadia).

5. *Bulgarian News.*

Thirty waggon loads of cement have been ordered from two factories in Servia by the Bulgarian Government. The destination of these waggons is Adrianople, where the cement will be used for the construction of a dam on the Maritza River with a view to inundating the town and defences.

C. W. THOMSON, *General Staff, Military Attaché.*

Belgrade, November 2, 1912.

[47376] No. 140.

Note communicated by Tewfik Pasha, November 5, 1912.

VOICI la formule textuelle de la demande de médiation transmise à M. Poincaré par le Gouvernement Impérial:—

"Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman demande aux Grandes Puissances leur médiation collective en vue de la cessation immédiate des hostilités et la fixation des conditions de paix."

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres, le 5 novembre, 1912.

[47044] No. 141.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 5.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 5, 1912.*

I AM commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, two copies of a telegram, dated to-day, which has been sent to the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 141.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *November 5, 1912.*

PROCEED in "Good Hope" to Salonica without delay, and order 1st Division 3rd battle squadron to proceed there immediately without stopping at Malta. Second Division to coal and wait orders at Malta. "Cumberland" can be sent Alexandria if Lord Kitchener requires a ship.

[47042] No. 142.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 5.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 5, 1912.*

I AM commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated 5th instant, relative to the movement of ships in the Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 142.

Admiralty to Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 5, 1912.

"BLACK PRINCE" to proceed to Malta without delay.

Enclosure 2 in No. 142.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 5, 1912.

ORDERS given for "Black Prince" to proceed to Malta without delay.

Enclosure 3 in No. 142.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 5, 1912.

SEND "Hampshire" to Besika Bay at once. Urgently needed there for Constantinople. Do not wait to relieve her, but replace her with another ship as soon as possible.

Enclosure 4 in No. 142.

Vice-Consul Roberts to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Barcelona, November* 5, 1912.

GERMAN ship "Hertha" left yesterday.

[47032] No. 143.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 5.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November* 5, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram dated 5th instant, from the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, relative to the situation at Salonica.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 143.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 5, 1912.

"HAMPSHIRE" reports Greeks expected to enter Salonica to-day. Turks defeated. Vali has asked for assistance to keep order. Consider it most inadvisable captain of "Bruix" should be left senior naval officer, and at urgent request of consul-general I propose not leaving till this afternoon, or possibly to-morrow.

67

[47027] No. 144.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 5.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November* 5, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram dated the 5th instant, from the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, relative to the disposition of His Majesty's ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 144.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 5, 1912.

FOLLOWING is present disposition of ships:—

"Diana," "Yarmouth," Suda Bay.
"Medea," Salonica.
"Barham," Cyprus.
"Weymouth," on passage from Besika to Constantinople.
"Hampshire," due Besika this afternoon.

Alexandretta and Tripoli are fanatical, and I urge strongly "Barham" and "Yarmouth" should be sent Syrian coast forthwith. "Hertha" leaves Malta for Mersina to-day, and I have asked her captain—subject to Admiralty approval—to undertake protection of British life and property there whilst "Barham" or "Yarmouth" will protect German interests at Alexandretta.

Submit "Dartmouth" may be sent Smyrna, "Hussar" Suda Bay, to await orders, "Diana" remaining where she is as wireless telegraphy repeating ship. If she moves, "Cumberland" to leave Malta and replace her at Suda Bay.

Strongly urge that one battle-ship should go to Alexandria.

[47025] No. 145.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 5.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November* 5, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 5th November, which has been sent in cypher to the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 145.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 5, 1912.

SEND "Hampshire" with all dispatch to Besika Bay, where she is to telegraph to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, informing him that she has arrived and will be ready to proceed to Constantinople, if he requires her, at shortest notice. She is to keep her fires banked ready.

[47004] No. 146.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 5.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, November 5, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated the 5th instant, from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, relative to the visit of a British man-of-war to Constantinople.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 146.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 5, 1912.*

"WEYMOUTH" left Malta for Constantinople. "Hussar" sailed and "Hertha" arrived.

[46908] No. 147.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 410.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 4, 1912.*

SINCE dispatching my telegram No. 408 of 4th November, I communicated contents of your urgent telegram No. 1161 of that date in a private letter to Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In a telephonic communication which I have since had with him, he said that he had told Turkish Ambassador that Turkey must place herself unreservedly in the hands of the Powers, and must be prepared to sacrifice greater part of her European territory. If Turkey consented to do this we might, he thought, communicate her decision to Balkan States, and say that Bulgaria would receive accession of territory on the lines of the Treaty of San Stefano, and that the other allies would also be granted territorial expansion on a proportionate scale. His Excellency has but slight hope that Balkan States will accept our intervention at present moment. Turkish Ambassador gave him to understand that after its recent defeat the Ottoman army would not be in a position to offer serious resistance behind the lines of Tchataldja, while he hears from another source that Bulgaria will not make peace till Adrianople has fallen.

[46881] No. 148.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

[By Post.]

(No. 192. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, November 4, 1912.*

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs has let the Roumanian Government know that he would favour the participation of Roumania in an eventual conference to settle Balkan affairs.

The French Government desired that any settlement of the kind should be arrived at by all the Powers interested, and that its proceedings should be absolutely clear and above-board, and all secret arrangements be eschewed.

[46882] No. 149.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

[By Post.]

(No. 193.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, November 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 659 of yesterday's date.

A telephone message was received early this morning from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the effect that anxiety had been caused at the Bourse by a report that the British fleet was being mobilised.

The contents of your telegram above mentioned were communicated to that department.

[46925] No. 150.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 145.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, November 4, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 141 of 2nd November.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs handed to-day to my French colleague answer of Imperial Government in regard to French proposed declaration. It expresses agreement with views of French Government respecting mediation, but makes no reference to "désintéressement."

[46958] No. 151.

Mr. Bryce to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 121.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Washington, November 4, 1912.*

SECOND Assistant Secretary of State, in the absence of higher officials, expressed to me privately and unofficially the hope that British man-of-war at Constantinople would give any needed protection to United States citizens there, as United States has no available ship of war which could be sent to Constantinople within a fortnight or more. He did not wish this to be regarded as a request of the United States Government, but only expressed his belief that His Majesty's Government would be disposed to give such protection, if necessary.

I told him that I was sure that this would be your wish.

[46939] No. 152.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 155.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, November 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 446 of 26th October.

Italian Government have instructed their representative in Crete to observe only unofficial relations with the new Government, and in no case to recognise the Governor-General. They are also of opinion that the German and Austrian Governments should be consulted, in view of the modifications of the international status.

[46895] No. 153.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 156.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, November 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 474 of 4th November: Turkish appeal for intervention.

Will endeavour to obtain view held here, but, as Minister for Foreign Affairs is in Berlin, suggest that he should be consulted there. Up to 5 o'clock this afternoon Italy had received no notice of Turkish appeal, owing no doubt to absence of representation in either capital.

(Repeated to Berlin.)

[47023] No. 154.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 157.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, November 5, 1912.*

PARIS telegram No. 190 of 2nd November.

Supposed Italian objection to Servian access to Adriatic.

Only anxiety I have detected here is lest Italian understanding with Austria for mutual disinterestedness in Albania should be compromised.

From conversations with Bulgarian and Servian representatives here, I gather that it may be contemplated that Salonica should become a sort of free port accessible to all Balkan States.

[47054] No. 155.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 158. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, November 5, 1912.*

BERLIN telegram No. 139 of 2nd November: Austrian reserves.

I gathered privately from the Italian Foreign Office that, besides economic conditions, they include veto on Servian access to the Adriatic and the creation of autonomous Albania.

[47055] No. 156.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 159.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, November 5, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 474 of 4th November: Turkish appeal for intervention.

View of Italian Foreign Office—which, in absence of Minister for Foreign Affairs, President of Council approves—is that the utmost Powers could do at present stage would be to inform the Balkan States of Turkish appeal, and sound them as to conditions on which they would be prepared to agree to a suspension of hostilities.

[47040] No. 157.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November 5, 1912.*

PARIS telegram No. 188 of 2nd November.

Roumanian Minister, who is usually well informed, told me yesterday that he heard negotiations were in progress between Austria and Servia at Vienna. I sounded Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who denied the report categorically. He said that in present circumstances it was not for the Servian Government to go to Austria, but for the Austrian Government to approach Servian Government first if they desired any arrangement, and this had not been done either through Austrian

Minister here or through the Servian Minister in Vienna. But he told me that a certain Dr. Redlich, professor at the Technical High School in Vienna, probably an emissary of Austro-Hungarian Government, had recently called on him and had mooted idea of a customs union, saying that if Servia would indicate her willingness to enter into such an arrangement, it would be possible to influence Austrian public opinion in favour of not interfering with the territorial changes resulting from the war.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had not yet had an opportunity of consulting Prime Minister, but did not seem at all well disposed towards the idea. He feared that in dealing with Austria an economic arrangement would develop into a political instrument. From an economic point of view also he thought that it would be to Servia's advantage to be free and not tied to Austria.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[47048] No. 158.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 411.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 5, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 338 of 4th November to Vienna.

Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language which you had held to the Austrian Ambassador, and expressed the hope that you would continue to speak in the same sense.

In conversation with the German Ambassador to-day he had urged that Servian port on the Adriatic could not in any way prejudice Austrian interests, as Servia would never become a naval State, while such a port would, in the event of Austro-Servian conflict, be at Austria's mercy.

His Excellency had received a telegram from Russian Ambassador at Vienna reporting that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs had advanced him most categorical assurances that Austria had no territorial ambitions. This has tranquillised his apprehensions on this point.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs does not deem it feasible to give Servia access to the Ægean instead of the Adriatic. (See Rome telegram No. 151 of 3rd November, and Paris telegram No. 190 of 2nd November.)

[47049] No. 159

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 412.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 5, 1912.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 120 of 3rd November.

Bulgarian Minister has given promised assurances about Constantinople, but has urged retention of a larger portion of Adrianople vilayet than was contemplated in the Treaty of San Stefano.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has consented to a frontier line drawn from Enos to the River Ergene, which, after following course of that river for some distance, will strike off in a north-easterly direction to a point on Black Sea near Media. Bulgarians will thus hold both banks of the River Maritza.

His Excellency had not heard Balkan States did not wish to partake in a conference, but he had told Bulgarian Minister that they ought to submit to the Powers as soon as possible a statement showing the manner in which they proposed partition among themselves of territory which they had conquered.

Bulgarian Minister had informed him that his Government would not make peace till Adrianople had fallen, and his Excellency fears that it will be impossible for Powers to mediate before Constantinople is occupied.

Bulgarian Minister had also told him that Bulgaria could not consent to any cession of territory to Roumania. Minister for Foreign Affairs reminded him that he had himself spoken of ceding Silistria, but Bulgarian Minister replied that in doing so he had only expressed his personal opinion.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs then urged very strongly the necessity of Bulgaria and Roumania coming to terms, saying that, in view of her large accession of territory in the south, Bulgaria could easily afford to make this small sacrifice. His Excellency would not, he said, suggest any particular line of territory to be ceded. Bulgaria

might make the best terms which she could get Roumania to accept, but it would be a fatal mistake for Bulgaria to come before the Powers with an acute conflict pending between her and Roumania.

His Excellency would be very grateful if you could see your way to giving similar advice to Bulgarian Minister in London.

[46855] No. 160.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 580.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, November 4, 1912.*

PLEASE refer to my telegram No. 579 of to-day.

I have just seen Russian Ambassador. He tells me Minister for Foreign Affairs is much exercised as to possibility of Bulgarians entering into Constantinople, and has begged him to make an appeal to the Czar to induce King Ferdinand not to do so. This would be very difficult, M. de Giers had replied, unless Ottoman Government were ready with a basis of conditions. Gabriel Effendi said that he would explain this to Cabinet immediately.

I am informed by Russian Ambassador that Russian Government are making efforts to induce King Ferdinand not to enter Constantinople, but King is, in his opinion, unlikely to be persuaded. If Bulgarians remained at San Stephano, King Ferdinand, M. de Giers feared, would not consider that he would have in hand sufficient guarantees for territorial acquisitions.

I pointed out that if it was impossible to prevent Bulgarian army entering, it was essential, in order to limit period of disorders, that they should do so quickly. M. de Giers thought Bulgarian Government had probably already considered this point. The smallest panic might, he thought, be the signal for the departure of Sultan and Government, which might therefore occur at any moment.

[47002] No. 161.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 581.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 5, 1912.*

HAVE communicated with His Majesty's ship "Weymouth." Expected here to-night.

[47037] No. 162.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 583.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 5, 1912.*

HEIR-APPARENT, accompanied by Sultan's sons and Marshal Fuad Pasha, of Shipka fame, have left for Chatalja, object being to encourage troops.

It is also stated that a party of Ulemas are also going with same object.

[47045] No. 163.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 584.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 5, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 576 of 3rd November.

French Ambassador to-day explained to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that it was useless for him simply to ask for intervention of the Powers. If Turkey desired peace she must ask the Powers for mediation and for a statement of the conditions which allies demanded.

Turkish Government have now telegraphed to the Turkish Ambassador at Paris instructing him to make a communication to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on those lines.

[47046] No. 164.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 585.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 5, 1912.*

"WEYMOUTH" arrived 4·30

[47030] No. 165.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 123.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 5, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 121 of 3rd November.

Bulgarian forces have taken Serres; the occupation of coast towns is being left to Greeks.

I hear that Turks offered to evacuate Adrianople on 1st November, hence telegram sent by His Majesty referred to in my telegram No. 117 of 2nd November.

At the last moment, however, they made a condition that on troops evacuating and laying down their arms they should be allowed to proceed to Constantinople, giving their parole not to take further part in the war. This condition was refused.

[47028] No. 166.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 146.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, November 5, 1912.*

I LEARN that Rear-Admiral Trummler will be in command of the German ships ordered to proceed to the Mediterranean.

[47053] No. 167.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, November 5, 1912.*

I SAW Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs for a few minutes to-day. He observed that he had gathered from conversation with German Minister for Foreign Affairs that the German Government desired that Balkan settlement after the war should be as radical as possible, in order that future trouble might be avoided. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs thought that matters would go smoothly if only Servia did not press for access to the Adriatic; on this point he did not think Austria would give way. He reiterated this several times, adding that there would not, in his opinion, be equal objections on the part of Austria to Servian access to the Ægean.

[46862] No. 168.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 343.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 5, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 143 of 4th November.

I think the utmost Powers could do would be to ask Balkan States on what terms they were prepared to suspend hostilities; I agree that there could be no pressure used. French Government have already replied in the negative to a somewhat different proposal made, apparently, to them only, and I have not heard views of other Powers. I do not see how Powers can stop march of events.

[46999] No. 169.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 945.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, November 5, 1912.*

KHEDIVIAL Mail Company's steamer "Tewfikieh" due to arrive Constantinople from Alexandria on Thursday. This vessel will be at your disposal until the "Abbassieh" of the same line arrives, probably on Monday. The "Abbassieh" will remain at your disposal as long as you require her.

Acknowledge receipt of this by telegraph and report immediately vessel arrives.

[47002] No. 170.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 947.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, November 5, 1912.*

"HAMPSHIRE" will arrive at Besika Bay immediately, where she is to remain with fires banked. If you require her you can request commander to come up at once, after making necessary arrangements with Turkish authorities.

[47312] No. 171.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 143.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 5, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 930 of 3rd November to Constantinople.

To contradict most mischievous and unfounded report from Vienna that British ships are intended as a warning to Bulgarian Government, you should communicate confidentially to Bulgarian Government the actual instructions.

[47169] No. 172.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 508.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 5, 1912.*

TEWFIK PASHA called on me to-day and asked Sir A. Nicolson if he had any news to give him. Sir A. Nicolson told his Highness Count Berchtold and the Marquis di San Giuliano were absent, and so we had nothing from Vienna and Rome. Tewfik Pasha knew the French reply, and Sir A. Nicolson told his Highness M. Sazonof had informed Turkhan Pasha that Turkey should place herself unreservedly in the hands of the Powers.

Tewfik Pasha said that in the war with Greece, when he was Foreign Minister, after the Turks had vanquished the Greeks, the Emperor of Russia had telegraphed to the Sultan asking the latter to stop the further advance of Turkish troops, as the Turkish Government had declared they desired no increase of territory. The Sultan had acceded, though the Turks could easily have walked into Athens. Why should no effort be made to prevent Bulgaria from entering Constantinople? Her entry would lead to great horrors—certainly in Asia, if not at the capital. What purpose could Bulgaria gain? She could not permanently remain at Stamboul. If he were at the head of affairs he would hold on to Tchataldja and let the Bulgars break their forces on it—but why prolong a useless struggle? The Turks were vanquished and they acknowledged it. Why not have a cessation of hostilities and prevent further bloodshed? It was a mistake to drive a race to desperation.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[47363] No. 173.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 371.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 5, 1912.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF informed me to-day of the views of M. Sazonof as to the reply to the Turkish request for intervention, as reported in your telegram No. 410, and said that M. Poincaré was being asked to take the initiative in saying this officially to the Porte and the other Powers. M. Sazonof maintained the opinion that mediation was possible only on the lines which he had laid down for a settlement; that it was possible to prevent the allies from occupying Constantinople only if the Powers were to declare at once to the allies that European Turkey would be open to division on the lines proposed, subject to the economic interests of Austria. M. Poincaré was being asked to approach the Powers in this sense. M. Sazonof believed that the key of the situation was in Berlin, and that everything depended upon the influence exercised by Berlin on Vienna. In order to avoid complications, it would be desirable for France to use all possible efforts in Berlin and Vienna. Count Benckendorff then asked me whether we would support the idea that M. Poincaré should make this proposal to the Powers.

I replied that I did not think that we could stop the march of events and the Bulgarian advance by making this proposal, but I would reflect upon it in the interval before I received it from M. Poincaré.

Count Benckendorff told me privately, on his own account, that he was sure his Government contemplated some serious step to prevent the Bulgarians from going into Constantinople.

I observed that it would be very serious to do anything which would throw Bulgaria into the arms of Austria.

Count Benckendorff admitted this, but adhered to his statement.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[47362] No. 174.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 84.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 5, 1912.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador informed me to-day that he was instructed to make the following communication to me, not as a cut-and-dried scheme, but as the general conditions necessary to secure Austro-Hungarian interests in a Balkan settlement. Austria-Hungary must fix certain points which, if a formal partition of European Turkey or an extension of neighbouring countries took place, must be the basis of future Austro-Hungarian policy, to safeguard the most vital interests of the monarchy:—

1. The assent of Austria-Hungary to the extension of the power and territory of a neighbouring State must be conditional upon guarantees that the State would not pursue a policy directly hostile to Austria-Hungary. Guarantees would be required that Servia would maintain friendly and neighbourly relations. Fine words and promises only would not be enough: there must be closer economic connection. This would bring many advantages to Servia, and would create a community of interests that would secure for a long time to come a peaceful existence side by side. The closer this connection was the more could Servia count upon Austro-Hungarian sympathy with plans of aggrandisement.

I observed that this suggested a reflection, which of course was not serious, that the closest connection of all was annexation, when both countries were aggrandised together.

Count Mensdorff replied that, of course, nothing of this sort was meant.

He added that the stipulations as to Montenegro were the same as those for Servia.

2. A Servian claim to the addition of territory as far as the Adriatic, and covering Albania proper, would have to be rejected *in limine*. Such a claim would be a proof that Servia did not contemplate relations of friendship and confidence with Austria-Hungary, and did not intend to avail herself of the latter's friendly dispositions in economic questions. If Servia based herself upon the principle of nationality she could have no right to take purely Albanian territory, and to do so would be an unjustified injury to legitimate Albanian claims.

3. Albania must be allowed to develop freely. This meant that there must be created an independent body large enough to live; if it was too small, it would have no safeguard for its continued existence.

4. Such desires of Roumania as were just must be satisfied.

5. The Austro-Hungarian frontier must be rectified, but only on a small scale. This, said Count Mensdorff, probably referred to some small rectification of the frontier on the sanjak.

6. Parts of Turkey in Europe that had up to now formed important markets for Austro-Hungarian industry must not be totally lost in a commercial sense when absorbed by one or other of the Balkan States.

7. There were also several other Austro-Hungarian economic interests in the Balkans that would have to be safeguarded, such as the importance of Salonica and of a railway line to this port. Austria-Hungary could view with equanimity the withdrawal of Turkish sovereignty from Salonica, and the passing of this port into other hands, only if Austro-Hungarian interests were fully secured; as might be done by making Salonica a free port, with sufficient safeguards for Austria-Hungary, besides giving by means of a convention a very complete safeguard for railway communication with that port.

I thanked Count Mensdorff cordially for this communication, and said that as it was confidential I supposed that I must not make any use of it with others.

He thought, though he was not sure, that the same communication was being made to other Powers. But I should soon be able to ascertain whether this was the case.

I said that, in any case, it was very useful to have the information which he had given me. Proposals were being made every day, and it was only by knowing what everyone wished that one could see where to steer with the best prospect of helping a solution.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[46958] No. 175.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Foreign Office, November 5, 1912.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, for the immediate information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the accompanying copy of a telegram, dated the 4th November, from His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington regarding the protection of United States citizens,* in so far as may be necessary and feasible, by His Majesty's ship at Constantinople.

Subject to the concurrence of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, Sir E. Grey is disposed to reply in the affirmative to Mr. Bryce, as he understands that the American colony at Constantinople is not a large one; but he proposes to stipulate that the protection shall be limited to *bonâ fide* United States citizens.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* No. 151.

[47144] No. 176.

Herr von Kühlmann to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(Confidential.)

HERR VON KÜHLMANN, who is absent at present, is instructed from Berlin to inform Sir Edward Grey with regard to the Balkan crisis that Berlin knows that Austria is pursuing no aggressive intentions whatever, but has in view the aim of looking after her commercial interests only.

Berlin has suggested to Vienna to confidentially communicate further details on this subject to London.

German Imperial Embassy, London,
November 5, 1912.

[47057] No. 177.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 6.)

THE Secretary of the Admiralty presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to state, with reference to his letter of to-day's date, that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty concur in the reply which Sir E. Grey proposes to send to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington relative to the protection of United States citizens at Constantinople by His Majesty's ships.

Admiralty, November 5, 1912.

[47114] No. 178.

Eastern Telegraph Company to Foreign Office.—(Received November 6.)

Electra House, Finsbury Pavement, London,
November 5, 1912.

Sir,

I AM in receipt of your letter of the 2nd instant, in which you inform us that His Majesty's Minister at Athens has received an official communication from the Greek Government to the effect that the Greek fleet has found a cable-ship of my company repairing the cable between Tenedos and Chios, and stating that, if this action is repeated, the vessel will be captured for affording assistance to the enemy.

For the information of the Secretary of State, I beg to state that we ordered our cable-ship, the "Levant II," to repair certain cables belonging to this company in the Ægean Sea which, from one cause or another, had become interrupted.

The vessel arrived at Chios on the 23rd October, and, by permission of the Ottoman Government, repaired a break in the Tenedos-Chios section close to Chios. On the 26th she repaired the Tchesme-Chios No. 1 cable, the end of which was found to be sealed and half a knot of shore end taken away. As the Turkish Government would not permit the ship to repair the Chios-Syra sections, she left for Tenedos to repair a further break in the Chios-Tenedos section close to Tenedos, but when close to that island was stopped by a Greek cruiser and ordered to proceed to the Greek base at Lemnos under escort of a destroyer. The ship was released on the 28th October on signing a promise not to repair any cables, after which she proceeded to Malta, where she now is.

On the 2nd instant our representative in Athens received an urgent request from the Greek Minister of Marine to repair, without delay, the cables between Syra and Salonica, especially the Lemnos-Salonica section. We instructed him yesterday that if it were possible to repair any interrupted cables belonging to this company he was to do so with the cable-repairing steamer "Levant I," at present stationed at Piræus.

I am, &c.
J. DENISON PENDER,
Vice-Chairman and Managing Director.

[47196] No. 179.

Sir H. Babington Smith to Mr. Maxwell.—(Received November 6.)

(Confidential.) *National Bank of Turkey, 50, Cornhill, London, November 6, 1912.*

Dear Mr. Maxwell,

AS I mentioned in my conversation with you on the 4th instant, it appears desirable that the Government should be informed of the results of a meeting held in Paris on the 28th October with reference to Turkish finance.

The meeting was held at the invitation of the Imperial Ottoman Bank. Baron Hottinguer took the chair, and representatives of the Imperial Ottoman Bank in Paris and of the London committee were present. I attended for the National Bank of Turkey. The Deutsche Bank was represented by Mr. Helferich, and there were also representatives of the Banque de Salonique.

The Ottoman Government are in urgent need of money, and have been applying in various quarters for advances. Further urgent demands will arise as soon as the war is over. Moreover, Treasury bills to the amount of nearly £ T. 9,000,000 will fall due in the next four to five months. The suggestion was made that these impending liabilities might be consolidated in a loan for five years, guaranteed by the revenues pledged for the Treasury bills, and that the amount of the loan should be such (say, £ T. 20,000,000 nominal) as to provide some money for the Ottoman Government at once, and more in the near future.

It was suggested that the groups represented by the Ottoman Bank, Deutsche Bank, and National Bank of Turkey respectively, should be responsible for that part of the loan which was required to repay the Treasury bonds they had issued, and that the remainder of the loan should be assigned in the proportion of 50 per cent. to the Ottoman Bank and 25 per cent. each to the Deutsche Bank and the National Bank of Turkey.

The discussion turned largely on the attitude likely to be assumed by the French, German, and British Governments. It was stated that the French Government would not authorise a quotation of a Turkish loan so long as the war lasted, since they would consider such action on their part to be a breach of neutrality, but that they might possibly shut their eyes to the placing of a loan without a formal quotation. Mr. Helferich stated that the German Government would probably not raise any objection if the French and British Governments assumed a favourable attitude. I said that the attitude of the British Government would, I believed, be one of neutrality. They would not encourage or discourage a loan, and would not consider the issue of a loan on the London market a breach of neutrality towards the belligerents, holding that any such operation would be at the risk of those taking part in it.

The general opinion was that, for several reasons, it would be inadvisable to proceed with any financial operation without the cognisance and approval of the three Governments. It was felt that, at a crisis such as that now existing, financial policy could not be separated from general policy. It seemed certain, moreover, that the Powers would be compelled to intervene in some form in the settlement of affairs after the war, and that such settlement must necessarily include financial questions, such as the responsibility to be assigned to territories ceasing to form part of Turkey for debt secured on revenues accruing in those territories.

It was concluded, therefore, that nothing should be done until a situation had arisen in which the Powers thought it expedient that Turkey's need for financial assistance should be met.

This being the general conclusion, it became unnecessary to consider the details of the suggested operation and of the participation of the various groups; but there was a general understanding that the interests represented at the meeting would co-operate should a financial operation become practicable.

Believe me, &c.

H. BABINGTON SMITH.

[47113] No. 180.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 6.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 6, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated the 6th instant, relative to the movements of His Majesty's ship "Hampshire."

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 180.

Senior Naval Officer, Crete, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 6, 1912.*

"HAMPSHIRE" left Salonica for Suda Bay.

[47101] No. 181.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 6.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 6, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs decypher of telegrams relative to movement of ships in the eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 181.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 5, 1912.*

YOUR No. 269.

"Hampshire" cannot leave Salonica until to-morrow morning; she was detained at consul-general's request. See my No. 584.

Request instructions observing "Yarmouth," arrives Besika early to-morrow.

Enclosure 2 in No. 181.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 5, 1912.*

"WEYMOUTH" arrived Constantinople.

Enclosure 3 in No. 181.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 5, 1912.*

CORRESPONDENT of "Morning Post" with Turkish troops informs "Hampshire" they will fall back to within 5 to 8 miles of Salonica. Anticipated Greeks will enter town to-morrow, or more probably Thursday. They are advancing rapidly, and are crossing the Vardar. "Hampshire" remains till further orders. "Yarmouth" and "Oleg" sailed for Crete.

Enclosure 4 in No. 181.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 5, 1912.
HAVE ordered "Hampshire" to Besika forthwith with all despatch.

Enclosure 5 in No. 181.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, at Malta.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 5, 1912.
"HAMPSHIRE'S" departure for Besika not to be delayed.

Enclosure 6 in No. 181.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 6, 1912.
LEAVING 6 A.M. for Salonica, and have ordered 1st Division, 3rd battle squadron, to proceed there direct. "Dartmouth" sailed 4 A.M. to sight and report movements of Austrian squadron. Mails ordered "Piræus" will be brought on by "Hussar," who will proceed there from Malta and wait orders.

Enclosure 7 in No. 181.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 6, 1912.
MY No. 583 re ship for Syrian coast.
Can reply be given?

Enclosure 8 in No. 181.

Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 6, 1912.
"MUTINE" left. "Black Prince" sailed 2 A.M.

Enclosure 9 in No. 181.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 5, 1912.
AUSTRIAN ships "Radetsky," "Zrinye," "Sankt Georg," and "Admiral Spaun" left Fiume yesterday for Salonica according to report from British consul there. It is desired that superior British squadron should be able to arrive Salonica at same time, or as soon as possible after Austrian ships, which is the reason for orders in preceding telegram. But if Austrians are diverted from Salonica you should proceed there alone, so as to be central, disposing of battleships according to circumstances: either keeping them at hand, or, when it is certain that Austrians are not going to Salonica, sending them to Besika. You may replace "Hampshire" before you arrive by any vessel convenient.

[47184] No. 182.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 6.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November* 6, 1912.
I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 6th instant, relative to the movements of His Majesty's ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 182.

Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 6, 1912.
YOUR No. 596.
"Barham" may be sent to Syrian coast.

Enclosure 2 in No. 182.

Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 6, 1912.
"YARMOUTH" is to be ready to proceed Constantinople on request of Ambassador at shortest notice, being relieved by "Hampshire" on arrival in duty of standing by. If "Hampshire" arrives before "Yarmouth" leaves Besika, "Hampshire" is to go to Constantinople and "Yarmouth" to remain standing by.

[47197] No. 183.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 6.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November* 6, 1912.
I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of two telegrams, dated the 6th instant, relative to the movements of His Majesty's ships, &c., in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 183.

Senior Naval Officer, Crete, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 6, 1912.
"YARMOUTH" arrived Besika Bay.

Enclosure 2 in No. 183.

Vice-Consul Palmer to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Dardanelles, November* 6, 1912.
"VINETA" (German) and "Léon Gambetta" (French) left north.

[47170] No. 184.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 587.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 5, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché, for Director of Military Operations :—

"The foreign military attachés, having been left at Tchorkesskeui nights of 3rd, 4th, and reached Hademkeui this morning, were then brought straight down to Constantinople, as there were no sidings available for their waggons and no place for them to remain in. They are to return in a couple of days, as the line is cleared, after passage of guns for Tchatalja.

"No official statement of the situation or events yet been given them. The following is as much as I have been able to discover: From 29th October to 1st November inclusive, Bulgarians attacked on the lines of Lule Burgas–Bunarhissar. Turks appear to have had from 100,000 to 120,000 on this line. Though they had local successes on the extreme right, the line was pierced about Kara Agatch, and when we left Viza on the 3rd the right was like the rest of the army, in full retreat.

"Nazim Pasha transferred head-quarters on 3rd from Tchorkesskeui to Hademkeui, where the whole army is being collected on the Tchatalja lines, whither all available guns are being sent up from Constantinople, and where it is his intention to make a firm stand. He told me that Anassia redif division had been already landed at Midia.

"The remainder of the army of the east is disorganised and demoralised, the consequence rather of successive retirements in bad weather over bad roads, which have necessitated abandonment of guns and other impedimenta and have led to complete disintegration of units, than of defeats. It is doubtful if this army is to be depended on to make a stand, but there is no military reason why the fresh troops arriving from Asia should not stem the tide and hold the lines successfully if the Bulgarians give time for the defence to be organised. So far the Bulgarian advance has been slower than it need have been, and they have not followed Turkish retreats closely.

"On the 3rd their cavalry was reported to be at Muradli."

[47130] No. 185.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 158 A.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, November 5, 1912.*

ST. PETERSBURGH telegram No. 405 of 2nd November : Suggestion that Servia might claim Valona.

I believe Italian view to be that Valona is Albanian, and would naturally go rather to an autonomous Albania than a Greek Epirus. But they prefer Greece to any Slav State at the nearest seaport to Italy.

Secondly : Rumoured Roumanian mobilisation.

Roumanian Minister, who has just come from Bucharest, tells me that the Roumanian Government have no special claims or reserves to make, but maintain an expectant attitude. Not being limitrophe with Turkey, Roumania had no reason to take part in the war. She greatly desired moderate rectification of her unsatisfactory south-eastern frontier with Bulgaria. If this were entertained, he led me to suppose that Roumanian sympathy would be all on the side of the Balkan League.

[47087] No. 186.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, November 5, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs in conversation with me to-day emphasised solidarity of Roumania with general European interests, as shown by her attitude in the present crisis.

He said that in her desire to do nothing tending to extension of war Roumania had remained quiet, and he hoped that "she would not be punished for it."

He realised that the *status quo* was now a thing of the past, but Roumania must not be subjected to any disadvantage. On two points she must obtain satisfaction—interests of Kutso-Vlachs must be safeguarded and Dobrudsha rectified. Roumania would wait to see whether her moderation received due reward. His Excellency was not precise as to what consequences would be if Roumanian hopes were disappointed, but he evidently wished me to understand that in that event Roumania would take measures to make her disappointment felt.

I asked his Excellency if he could tell me what were Roumania's requirements as regards frontier, but he did not wish to specify them. I asked if there had been any pourparlers with Bulgaria on the subject. He said that there had been none whatever.

I have reason to believe that desired rectification would not involve large accession of territory, and that they would be content with a line from Turtukai to some point on the Black Sea north of Varna.

[47204] No. 187.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 106.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, November 6, 1912.*

TENEDOS occupied.

[47167] No. 188.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 128.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November 6, 1912.*

FOLLOWING is summary of exposition of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Austrian Delegations yesterday :—

Minister for Foreign Affairs congratulated Italy on conclusion of peace and acquisition of Libya, and referred with satisfaction to the excellent Austro-Italian relations.

With regard to Balkan crisis, Austro-Hungarian Government had been constantly and still was in touch with all other Powers, as being the best means of bringing about the cessation of hostilities. Austria-Hungary has no expansive tendencies, and will endeavour to combine her desire for peace with due preservation of her interests. She is ready to recognise the new situation created by Balkan victories, and to enter into friendly relations with Balkan States, but she has a right to demand that her legitimate interests shall not suffer in the rearrangement, in which Austria hopes that geographical interests of Roumania will be considered.

Translation by post.

[47181] No. 189.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 129. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 6, 1912.*

I AM inclined to believe that real reason why the Austro-Hungarian Government declined to sign the "protocole de désintéressement" is that in military circles here the hope is held that in return for the recognition by Austria of Servian and Montenegrin territorial expansion at the close of war, Austria will obtain slight rectifications of her present frontier towards the [? sanjak] and Montenegro. The military party here have always desired, for strategical purposes, to push Austrian frontier to the crest of the mountains above Cattaro and at certain other points.

[47206] No. 190.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 6, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 125 of 4th November: Turkish mediation proposal.

In the absence of Minister for Foreign Affairs, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that, before answering, Austro-Hungarian Government will consult Berlin and Rome. In his own opinion, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said reference to peace terms in the Turkish proposal was too vague, and that it would be necessary to ask for further explanations. He thought that Turkey would have done better to have announced at once willingness to accept boundaries fixed by the Treaty of San Stefano as basis for peace negotiations. He told me that Austria-Hungary will do nothing which might be construed as a coercion on Balkan States.

[47207] No. 191.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 131. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 6, 1912.*

I ENQUIRED of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs this afternoon whether any confirmation had been received by the Austro-Hungarian Government of the reports current in the press in regard to an advance of Servian troops to Adriatic through Albania. He said that none had so far been received, on the contrary, there were indications that this idea was being deprecated by Servian Government.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs admitted that there was a possibility that a small body of Servian troops might undertake a raid to the sea in order to fly the Servian flag in some Adriatic port. Impression left on my mind by his language was that, although Austrian public opinion would become very much excited by such a raid, Austro-Hungarian Government would probably view it calmly and wait till peace was being negotiated to make Servia withdraw from the Adriatic.

On the other hand, if Servia sent a regular army into Albania situation might become very serious.

(Repeated to Belgrade.)

[47199] No. 192.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, November 6, 1912.*

SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs asked me to visit him to-day. He said that Austria was determined that Servia should not have access to the Adriatic, and that Germany could not do otherwise than support her ally in this matter. It was

evident that Bulgaria was pushing Servia in above direction, and he hoped very much that His Majesty's Government would do what they could at Sophia and Belgrade to dissuade those Governments from making demands to which Austria would never agree.

I reminded his Excellency of what you had said with regard to depriving the Balkan States of the fruits of victory. His Excellency replied that it was not likely that Servian troops would push to the Adriatic coast, and so there could be no question, in the case of the strip of land to the Adriatic, of any such deprivation. Servia might have the railway communication to the Adriatic she had always wished for and a port on the Ægean Sea, but not direct access to the Adriatic.

His Excellency added that if His Majesty's Government would do what they could to give the above advice at Sophia and Belgrade, the Imperial Government would, on their side, do their best to facilitate matters for Russia by dissuading Bulgarians from claiming Adrianople.

Bulgarian representative told me yesterday that it would derange their plans to give Servia access to port on the Ægean Sea, as it would entail cession on their part to Servia of more territory than was contemplated. He said that it was hoped that Austria would not object to Servia having a small strip of land leading to the Adriatic between Montenegro and Albania.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me that this was quite impossible.

[47185] No. 193.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 124.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 6, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 121 of 3rd November.

No official bulletins of any importance have been issued here for the last three days.

I learn from a good source that extremely heavy fighting has been going on and still continues on a crescent line extending from Chorlu to Sarai, and in the neighbourhood of Istranja.

Both sides are fighting desperately, and losses are said to amount already to double those at Kirk Kilisse.

Fifty thousand Servian troops have gone forward, and a last contingent of 8,000 Macedonian volunteers has been entraining in this capital during the last few days.

[47205] No. 194.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 125. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 6, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

Adjutant-general of the Bulgarian army has just called on me. He tells me confidentially that the Bulgarian forces have captured Istranja, which lies south of Sarai, and that Bulgarian cavalry have overrun eastern portion of the peninsula right up to Chatalja lines. On west they have definitely occupied Chorlu and Karevlio, and are marching straight on to Chatalja. Newspaper reports as to capture of above places were premature. He also does not anticipate any great obstruction, and he seems extraordinarily confident. He admits fighting has been heavy, but would not go into details as to killed and wounded. He states that Turkish forces cannot now be reinforced through Rodosto.

[47171] No. 195.

Viscount Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 74.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, November 6, 1912.*

THE Prime Minister last night read me a telegram from Egyptian agent at Constantinople, stating that Kiamil Pasha, after considering question of neutrality of Egypt, had given definite orders that relations with Greece must be broken off.

Grand Vizier also informed Khedive that Greek or Balkan States' subjects on whom suspicion fell should be expelled from Egypt.

No attention will be paid here to these orders.

[47201] No. 196.

Consul-General Bleck to Admiralty.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, November 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Port Said, November 6, 1912.*

"GEIER" (German) left for Haifa.

[46854] No. 197.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 951.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 6, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 579 of 4th November.

Turkish Ambassador here communicated yesterday morning proposals for intervention of Powers and an urgent appeal that Bulgarian troops should not enter Constantinople. I am in communication with the other Powers on the subject.

As to course to be adopted by you in the event of Ottoman Government leaving the capital, I think that you should remain unless danger to life makes it desirable for British community to be embarked, in which case I presume British ship of war would take embassy on board.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 346; Paris, No. 674; Rome, No. 485; St. Petersburgh, No. 1180; and Vienna, No. 343.)

[47057] No. 198.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 952.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 6, 1912.*

MR. BRYCE'S telegram No. 121 of 4th November.

Your Excellency should communicate substance to your United States colleague, and inform him that you are authorised to extend to *bonâ fide* United States citizens at Constantinople the same protection as to British subjects in so far as it may be feasible.

(Repeated to Washington, No. 204.)

[47964] No. 199.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 953.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 6, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No 586 of 5th November.

You are authorised, if you think it expedient or necessary, to detain "Papayanni" steamer as well as "Khedivial" steamer.

[46990] No. 200.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 675.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 6, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 951 of 6th November to Constantinople: Situation at Constantinople.

Inform Government to which you are accredited of last paragraph.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 955.)

[47316] No. 201.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 676.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 6, 1912.*

FRENCH Government have asked if we agree to join in an enquiry of the Balkan States whether, now that Turkey has asked for mediation, they would be disposed to accept it also. I have replied that I am ready to join provided all other Powers also agree in informing the Balkan States of the Turkish appeal, and whether they would be disposed to accept mediation, and, if so, on what terms. No semblance of pressure should be used.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 1185; Berlin, No. 349; Constantinople, No. 958; Vienna, No. 345; and Rome, No. 487.)

[47378] No. 202.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 541.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 6, 1912.*

M. DE FLEURIAU informed Sir A. Nicolson to-day that M. Sazonof had proposed to M. Poincaré that the latter should take the initiative in suggesting to the Powers a mediation on the basis of the Russian programme.

M. Poincaré thinks that it would be better if he confined himself to the proposal which he is at present circulating among the Powers, *i.e.*, to ask the Balkan States if they are disposed to accept mediation; and that it is rather for the Triple Alliance to propose a basis for a general settlement.

If, however, M. Sazonof still urged that M. Poincaré should take the initiative, as stated above, the latter considered that the initiative should not be left to France alone, but that Russia and Great Britain should associate themselves with her.

As to the Russian project or programme, M. Poincaré accepts it as a whole ("dans son ensemble"), but he thinks—

(*a.*) That Adrianople should be given to Bulgaria.

(*b.*) That the guarantees to be given to Austria-Hungary are too restricted, and put in a form which Austria-Hungary could not well accept.

(c.) That Mount Athos should be omitted from the programme.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. de Fleuriau that I agreed, provided other Powers agreed, that the Balkan States should be informed of the Turkish appeal, and that they should be asked whether they are prepared to accept mediation and on what terms, that I could not go further, and that no form of pressure should be exercised; further, that I doubted if Bulgaria would accept mediation until Adrianople and Constantinople had fallen.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 344), Sir E. Goschen (No. 348), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 1182), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 486).

[47560] No. 203.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 278.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 6, 1912.*

HERR VON KÜHLMANN informed me to-day that Herr von Kiderlen had received a Turkish appeal for mediation, but doubted whether any *démarche* to the Balkan States should be collective. Herr von Kiderlen would like to know my view.

I said that I had already had a request for my view from M. Poincaré, and had replied that I would agree, if the other Powers agreed, that the Balkan States should be informed of the Turkish appeal, and should be asked whether they were prepared to accept mediation, and if so, on what terms; but any semblance of pressure should be avoided. I gathered from what you had told me of Herr von Kiderlen's view of the first Turkish appeal, that his opinion was much the same.

Herr von Kühlmann confirmed this, and observed that the situation which I had contemplated some time ago, of Turkey putting herself unreservedly in the hands of the Powers, had now arisen.

I agreed, but said that, since I had first suggested that, the Balkan States had won a great many victories, and I doubted whether the Bulgarians would accept mediation until they had taken Adrianople, and had defeated the Turks at Tchataldja. The communication now suggested would, however, enable the Bulgarians to state their terms.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[47561] No. 204.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 279.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 6, 1912.*

I TOLD Herr von Kühlmann to-day that the Austrian Ambassador had communicated to me yesterday the terms of his Government with regard to a Balkan settlement.

Herr von Kühlmann said that he thought this communication had been a circular one. There had been an idea that Austria might make her views known through Germany; but this might not have been convenient, as Germany might not have wished to endorse all the Austrian views.

I remarked that it was a great relief to find that Austria was putting forward no territorial claims: this put one great difficulty out of the way. That Salonica should be a free port commended itself, I thought, to everyone. So far as I could see, the point on which there would be the greatest difficulty would be the determination of the limits of an autonomous Albania; or, to state this in another way, the question whether Servia should have access to the Adriatic. The Servian chargé d'affaires had just come to see me, and had said that this access was a matter of life and death to Servia. Nothing was worth anything to her without the economic independence for which a port on the Adriatic was essential, and the Servians would fight to the end to obtain such a port.

Herr von Kühlmann suggested that, if economic independence was what Servia wished to have, then surely, just as Austria desired to arrange for a railway to Salonica for her economic advantage, so a railway to the Adriatic might be arranged for Servia on economic terms.

I said that if, as seemed possible, this point turned out to be the only outstanding difficulty in the way of a Balkan settlement, then the fact that there was agreement as to the whole of the great field of European Turkey, except with regard to this one point, would be a great makeweight in favour of peace and of finding some solution of the difficulty.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[47559] No. 205.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 27.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 6, 1912.*

THE Servian chargé d'affaires informed me to-day that, as a result of the Balkan war, Servia would claim Old Servia, which included the vilayet of Kossovo, the sanjak of Novi-Bazar, and the north-west part of the vilayet of Scutari, including the Old Servian ports of Durazzo, San Juan di Medua, and Alecio. Servia, owing to her geographical position, could not escape, and did not wish to escape, special economic relations with Austria, but she could not submit to being made dependent upon Austria economically. During the past ten years Austria had, as a matter of fact, treated Servia much worse commercially than Servia had treated her. Servian exports to Austria, and even the transit of Servian produce through Austria, had sometimes been prohibited. Servia had had great difficulty in finding other markets at such times. A port on the Adriatic was therefore essential to her. Otherwise, she would be shut off from the sea and could have no economic independence. To suggest that she might have a port on the Ægean was only to try to make difficulties between her and other States, and she did not wish to have a port on the Ægean. It was alleged that there must be Albanian autonomy, because of Albanian national feeling. There was really no Albanian national feeling. There were Servians in the north of Albania; they had been oppressed before, and the danger of their being oppressed again was a reason against Albanian autonomy. The Albanians themselves were divided, especially in the northern part. Servia hoped that we would see that what she asked was just, and a matter of life and death to her. A port on the Adriatic meant to her all or nothing. She must make every effort and use all her force to secure it.

I asked what Montenegro was to have if Servia had all this which was claimed.

The Servian chargé d'affaires could not say exactly, but he was sure that the matter had been settled so that the Servian demands would not give rise to difficulties between Servia and Montenegro.

In reply to some questions as to Albanian nationality, he made it clear that his remarks on that point applied more especially to the northern part of Albania.

I told him that I was very glad to have the views of his Government. Our public opinion would not side with any attempt to deprive the victors of the fruits of their victories. We ourselves had no reserves to make, but we wished to promote a settlement peaceably. The settlement of practically the whole of the European dominions of Turkey was a very large affair. The first step was to learn the views of all the parties who were most interested. We could then see what divergencies there were between all the parties interested and how these could be reconciled.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[47272] No. 206.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 81.)
Sir, *Canea, Crete, October 29, 1912.*

THE appointment of M. Dragoumis as Governor-General of Crete came as a complete surprise to everybody here. M. Rangabe was only advised of it by telegraph on the night of the 24th instant, and communicated the news next morning to the Cretan Government, who had barely time to organise an official reception of sorts before the Greek steamer bringing the new Governor-General arrived. A considerable crowd assembled at the port to meet him, but there was hardly such a display of enthusiasm as might have been expected under the circumstances.

M. Dragoumis at once took over the administration of the island, and the three members of the Revolutionary Executive Committee retired. The public service has been divided into five sections, viz., Justice, Interior, Public Safety and Public Works, Church and Education, and Finance. They are for the present administered by the permanent officials.

On his arrival M. Dragoumis issued a "Manifesto to the Cretan people," in which he stated that he had come not only to make preparations for the election of deputies

to Parliament, but to secure the working of existing laws by means of the constituted authorities, and to ensure public order and equality between Christians and Mussulmans. No mention of the protecting Powers was made in the manifesto.

Law No. 4068, concerning a moratorium passed by the Greek Chamber on the 6th (19th) October, has been published in the Cretan "Official Gazette," and is presumably made applicable to this island.

It is obvious that the rights of foreign subjects in what is still technically a part of the Ottoman dominions may conceivably suffer under this law, but the whole situation in Crete is now so anomalous that it seems hopeless at the present moment to think of raising this or any other point concerning the status of Crete.

In general I think that the best course for my colleagues and myself to pursue will be to remain in a state of suspended animation so long as the war lasts, and to avoid so far as possible any action which can give rise to a conflict with the *de facto* Government. M. Dragoumis on his side will probably be equally anxious for a quiet life.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[47241] No. 207.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 23. Treaty.)
Sir, *Athens, October 31, 1912.*

YESTERDAY evening I received the enclosed note from the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that a cable-ship of the Eastern Telegraph Company had been caught repairing the cable between Tenedos and Chios (Scio); that as this operation amounted to assistance given to the enemy, it would have justified the capture of the vessel; that, to show the tenderness of the Greek Government towards neutral interests, no action was taken this time against the "delinquent," but that next time the company's ships will be proceeded against in accordance with the rules of international law.

I immediately went to the Ministry and protested to M. Coromilas against the proposition that the capture of the vessel would have been justified; the cable, I said, had not been cut by the Greeks, nor had they given any notice that they objected to its being repaired. His Excellency, however, thought that must be self-evident.

I have sent a copy of his note to the manager of the Eastern Telegraph Company's office at Athens.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 207.

M. Coromilas to Sir F. Elliot.

M. le Ministre, *Athènes, le 15 (28) octobre, 1912.*

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que, d'après une communication du Département Royal de la Marine, la flotte de la Mer Égée a surpris hier un bateau de la compagnie anglaise des câbles sous-marins à réparer le câble coupé de Ténédos-Chio. Cette opération constituant une assistance accordée par un neutre à l'ennemi, la flotte aurait été dans son droit en capturant le navire et en le faisant déclarer de bonne prise. Toutefois, afin de marquer le souci qu'a le Gouvernement Royal de ménager les intérêts des neutres, l'autorité navale s'est abstenue cette fois-ci de toute mesure contre le délinquent. Si pourtant le cas venait à se répéter, il serait procédé contre les bâtiments de ladite compagnie conformément aux règles du droit international relatives à l'assistance hostile.

Veuillez, &c.
L. A. COROMILAS.

[47250] No. 208.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 924.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 1, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna enclosing despatches from His Majesty's vice-consul at Rhodes on the subject of the attitude of the inhabitants of the Sporades with regard to the possible restoration of those islands to Turkey.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 208.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 131.)
Sir, *Smyrna, October 29, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of three despatches received from Sir A. Biliotti at Rhodes.

The first, dated the 22nd, and the third, dated the 25th instant, treat of the agitation of the Greek inhabitants of Rhodes and other islands in Italian occupation against reoccupation by the Turks.

The second, dated the 24th instant, reports the desire of native Mahommedans that the restoration of the islands to the Ottoman Government should not take place until the termination of the Balkan war.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 208.

Acting Vice-Consul Sir A. Biliotti to Consul-General Barnham.

Sir, *Rhodes, October 22, 1912.*

IN continuation of my two immediately preceding despatches Nos. 117 and 118, I have the honour to report that in the course of yesterday, General Ameglio sent for the Greek Archbishop, the mayor (a Greek), and some of the leading members of the Greek community and warned them that, by the signature of peace the Turks having become the friends of the Italians, all reprehensible speeches or actions against them on the part of their co-religionists would be severely punished. I am told that his Excellency also asked for six torpedo-boats to go round the Sporades Isles in order to maintain order and tranquillity.

It is rumoured that in consequence of the treaty of peace Rhodian peasants declare that they will rebel rather than accept again the Turkish yoke. I am convinced that there is not anything alarming in these declarations, so long as the Rhodians are left to themselves and are not excited by agitators and especially by armed bands from outside.

It is as well to point out that the Mussulmans, who form at most the fourth part of the population, have been all completely disarmed by the Italians, while the Greeks, who were fully provided with rifles and ammunition, have increased their stock by collecting part of the arms and cartridges thrown away by Rhodian redifs and volunteers who deserted from Psithos. This circumstance should be taken into consideration in case the Italian occupation cannot be prolonged until the definite fate of Rhodes is decided upon.

I have, &c.
ALFRED BILIOTTI.

Enclosure 3 in No. 208.

Acting Vice-Consul Sir A. Biliotti to Consul-General Barnham.

Sir, *Rhodes, October 24, 1912.*

NATIVE Mussulmans are very anxious that the Italian occupation should be continued until the conclusion of the Balkan war. They allege two principal reasons on their behalf:—

1. The modified feeling of the Italian authorities towards them, which is quite the reverse of what it was on their first arrival here, with regard to the two native races; and

2. The fear that on the departure of the Italians the Porte may call them for the third time to serve or to pay again exoneration tax.

Non-Mussulmans assure me that the contingent of 100 or 120 men levied in this island since the Italian war has broken out have had to disburse under this head no less than 10,000 Turkish liras. In order to provide that sum they have exhausted all their resources. They sold their wives' and daughters' modest gold ornaments, even everything they strictly could dispense with in their households. The situation of the Mussulmans in Cos, on whom I have no special information, appears to be identical.

In connection with the military service of Mussulmans in these two islands I beg to submit what follows:—

Ever since their settlement here they were only bound to keep guard as gunners in the castles built by the Knights of St. John in their islands. Towards the year 1865 they were nominally incorporated in the army, but continued as before their service as gunners in their native islands. The seat of the Governor-General of the Archipelago having been transferred for a few years to the Dardanelles, they had to serve for a time in the castle of that town. It is only since the constitution that they have been called to serve as soldiers out of their islands.

As a consequence of the Italo-Turkish treaty of peace, the privileges enjoyed *ab antiquo* by the islands occupied by Italian forces are to be not only maintained, but even extended, especially as regards, it is hoped, exemption from military service.

Rhodes and Cos, being in the number of occupied islands, being situated in the midst of the Sporades, and connected with them by administrative and other ties, could not make an exception. Native Mussulmans have enjoyed until four years ago a privilege concerning conscription which they have a right to revendicate, under present circumstances, and which cannot be denied to native Christians. Besides, Christian soldiers belonging to these islands would be a most dangerous element to introduce in the Turkish army.

It should not be forgotten that Castellorizo and Nikaria, although not being occupied by Italian forces, must follow the fate of the other ten Sporades Isles of which they form part.

I have, &c.
ALFRED BILIOTTI.

Enclosure 4 in No. 208.

Acting Vice-Consul Sir A. Biliotti to Consul-General Barnham.

Sir, *Rhodes, October 25, 1912.*

A GANG of eight or ten Rhodian Greeks are exciting since a few days their co-religionists in the town and in the villages to demonstrate in favour of union with Greece. The Greek consul-general, who, notwithstanding that his country is in war with Turkey, is still allowed to remain here, is naturally the soul of this movement. It would seem that these political agitators are indisposed against their Archbishop, whom they tried to induce to side with them, and who wisely replied that he could interfere in no way in matters decided between Sovereigns.

Useless to say that the same propaganda for union with Greece is carried on in the Sporades Isles, with less restraint and more energy.

General Ameglio has caused some of the leaders of this movement in the principal isles to be brought here in torpedo-boats, and has warned them that he would not

tolerate any hostile demonstration against Turkey as long as the isles were occupied by Italian forces. I learn that he has sent this morning one of his superior officers, a major of campaign artillery, on a mission to the island of Calymnos. Three or four Italian cruisers are cruising night and day among the isles of the Sporades; the "Garibaldi" has called in the course of last night at Rhodes.

I have, &c.
ALFRED BILIOTTI.

[47251] No. 209.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 925.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 1, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Adrianople, reporting on the military situation in that district.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 209.

Consul Samson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 64.)

Sir, *Adrianople, October 25, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of your Excellency, the following particulars of the military situation here since the date of my last despatch:—

The Bulgarian troops operating in this vilayet consist of four army corps, each of 30,000 men. They are the corps of Tunja, Philippopolis, Shumla, and (I believe) Jamboli, though I am not certain as to the name of the fourth corps. One of these corps crossed the frontier in the neighbourhood of Mustapha Pasha and Lefre, the remaining three crossing near Vaisal, the forward movement of the cavalry commencing on the 18th October. The corps crossing by the first two named localities detached, I am informed, half of its strength across the Tunja to join hands with the corps operating through Vaisal. The Bulgarian troops in the immediate vicinity of Adrianople consist of fourteen battalions of infantry, with cavalry and artillery, though I have at present no information as to the strength of the two latter arms.

On the 20th the Turkish advanced troops north and west of Adrianople were attacked, and fell back before the Bulgarian forces. The advance on Chermen and Kurt Keui of a portion of the latter appears to have created in the mind of the Turkish commander an idea that their objective was Demotika and the railway line. To oppose this move the 11th division from that town, with three redif battalions from Adrianople, were moved on Orta Keui on the 19th October. The Turkish troops defending Chermen, of whom a large proportion were redif battalions, appear to have suffered severely during the engagement which took place there on the 20th October, and retired on Adrianople, the Bulgarian force, after driving them in, proceeding along the railway line to Hadin Keui, which was occupied at noon on the 21st. It being now clear that the threatened advance on Demotika was not contemplated, the troops to the west and south-west of Adrianople were withdrawn and moved in a north-easterly direction, to fill the gap which there existed between the troops of the IVth Army Corps, whose head-quarters were at Havsa, and the Adrianople fortress. A redif division from the Adrianople garrison was also moved in the same direction, the whole force being under the command of Ferik Shukri Pasha, who directs operations in the Adrianople section of the theatre of war. On the morning of the 21st, four redif battalions and a machine-gun company from the Adrianople garrison were moved to Marash, where, at point 410 (see general staff map), were posted two batteries of artillery, one of 10·5 centim. and one of 8·5 centim., the latter having replaced a second battery of 10·5 centim., which had been moved near Marash fort.

Whilst these movements had been taking place on the ground between the Arda and Maritza, the Bulgarian forces between the latter river and the Tunja had driven back the outlying Turkish troops to the north of Adrianople. A battalion of the 29th infantry regiment occupying Has Keui was surprised early on the morning of

the 20th, and is said to have lost 300 men killed. It retired on the Kara Hamza Chiftlic, and subsequently on Adrianople. At noon on the 22nd the position of the Bulgarian troops in the area mentioned above was as follows:—

Buldur Keui and Kuyunli—
Eight infantry battalions.
Four batteries artillery.
One regiment (?) cavalry.
Vezgueh—
Three infantry battalions.
Near Deirmen Yeni Keui—
Three infantry battalions.

There was also a certain amount of artillery and cavalry between the two last-named villages, but I am unable to particularise the strength of either arm.

During the afternoon of the 22nd the Bulgarian force at Buldur Keui and Kuyunli attacked the position held by the infantry at Marash, and, after an engagement which lasted until darkness set in, the latter were compelled to retire, but held on to a position in rear until next morning, when they were replaced by fresh troops and the original position reoccupied. The guns, which were posted near point 451 (general staff map), locally known as Pa Pas Tepe, remained in position during the night. This action was noticeable for the extreme accuracy of the Bulgarian artillery fire, the batteries being posted on the spurs westward of Marash, and for a cavalry charge against a redif battalion on the plain north of Epcheli village, which was highly effective.

Whilst the operations detailed above had been proceeding, that portion of the Bulgarian corps which, as already mentioned, had crossed the Tunja had forced back the troops of the 10th division, which had been occupying positions on the Demir Keui–Vaisal line. Fighting took place at Karayusuf and Geehkunlu on the 21st and 22nd October, and further retirement was only checked by the arrival on the latter date of the troops under Shukri Pasha, referred to later.

Your Excellency is already aware that two attacks were delivered on the western face of the Adrianople defences during the night of the 23rd–24th instant. The first of these, which commenced at 8.15 P.M., was directed against Yassi and Yeshil Tepes, and Karaguez Tabia, and the second against the latter work, Marash, and Kazan Tepe.

The first attack did not get within striking distance, and was evidently intended as a feint. The second, however, was of a more serious nature, and was, I believe, undertaken in the hope of capturing the Papas Tepe at Marash. In this attack eight battalions were directed against Papas Tepe, three against Kazan Tepe, and three against Karaguez Tarla. Weather conditions favoured the attack, the night being dark and rainy after midnight. To-day a movement along the right bank of the Arda has been undertaken by the Turkish troops, with a view to compelling the retirement of the Bulgarians at Buldur Keui and Kuyunli. The increase in the strength of the main army has permitted the return of 10,000 of the troops of this garrison, which were moved eastward under Shukri Pasha on the 21st instant. The garrison is now 32,000 strong.

I learn on good authority that the left flank of the main Turkish army rests on Adrianople, and its right at or near Kirk Kilisse. It is stated here that the latter town has been occupied by the Bulgarian forces, and, though there is ground for believing this to be the case, I have considerable doubt as to whether it is so. No telegrams are accepted for Kirk Kilisse, and the vali, in reply to an enquiry as to whether it had been taken, did not deny the fact.

I understand that, up to yesterday at least, the Bulgarian force opposed to the main Turkish army was numerically superior to it. The redif regiments are admittedly not very efficient and are badly officered; the experience of the small actions which have taken place in this neighbourhood tends to prove that their military value is not a high one.

The attack of the 23rd–24th instant caused great alarm amongst the inhabitants of this town, in particular amongst the Moslem population, large numbers of whom have flocked to the railway station during the past three days.

A notice has been issued by the military authorities to the effect that all arms are to be given up, and foreign subjects are specially mentioned as not being exempt from this order, which has not been officially communicated to my colleagues or to myself. In the event of its being communicated, I propose to direct British subjects to bring any arms which they may possess to the consulate. The question of the requisition

of horses from foreign subjects has also been raised, but British subjects are not affected by it, since none of them own horses.

The civil authorities appear somewhat concerned by the possibility of internal disturbances in the town. A number of Bulgarians suspected of being comitajis were recently arrested those who resisted arrest being shot. Some 200 Bulgarians, Ottoman subjects, have been arrested and sent to Constantinople, their presence here being regarded as a danger to the town.

Conditions of life are not at present unduly difficult. The price of foodstuffs, although higher than at normal times, is not excessive in view of the present circumstances. The question of fuel, however, is likely to present considerable difficulties, there being a great shortage both of wood and coal.

I have, &c.
L. L. R. SAMSON.

[47252] No. 210.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 926.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 1, 1912*

THE true state of affairs is still not generally known here, but it is felt, among those who are better informed, that a further defeat of the Turkish troops in the near neighbourhood of Constantinople may bring about a very serious state of affairs and lead to the capital being invaded by a horde of hungry, fanatical, and disorganised soldiery.

In view of such a possibility the Austrian Ambassador, as doyen of the diplomatic corps, last night summoned a meeting at which all the foreign representatives were present and at which it was unanimously agreed that the attention of the Turkish Government should be called to the urgent necessity of taking prompt and efficient measures to afford all possible protection to foreign missions, hospitals, schools, banks, &c. At the same time the Austrian Ambassador was charged with the duty of indicating to the Porte the measures which the diplomatic body recommended as urgent and desirable.

These measures are the following:—

1. That the refugees now in Constantinople should be removed from the town and its immediate neighbourhood. (During the past week large numbers of starving Moslem refugees have been arriving from the theatre of war.)

2. That the necessary measures be taken for the protection of the Derkos water supply. (Derkos, which is the chief source of the city's water supply, lies near the shore of the Black Sea, about 15 miles from Pera.)

3. That a sufficient force of police and firemen be kept at Constantinople. (Since the outbreak of the war there has been a tendency to denude the police force in order to provide fighting men for the front. Of late the patrols which parade the streets, in view of the state of martial law, have been largely composed of mere boys drawn from the cadet corps.)

4. That measures be taken for guarding the diplomatic missions, consulates, banks, hospitals, and the principal schools. (These are mostly situated in a comparatively small area of Pera, though there are a good many schools and charitable institutions in the suburbs. The banks which have branches in Stamboul are in some anxiety as to the possible fate of these establishments, but it is said that the branches contain no very considerable amount of specie.)

5. That the Government make the necessary preparations for feeding the troops outside the city in case of a retreat on Constantinople.

The Austrian Ambassador to-day saw both the Grand Vizier and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and while they both declared that there was no likelihood of a dangerous situation arising, promised immediately to take in hand the measures suggested.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[47253] No. 211.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 927.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 31, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that in view of the state of war, and the fact that the provinces of Turkey in Europe are practically in hostile occupation, the elections for Parliament, which were to have taken place during October, have been postponed to an unfixed date.

The letter of the amended Ottoman constitution does not allow for such postponement, but, as faction feeling is very strong, holding elections at the present juncture would have meant adding internal strife to the existing foreign war complications, and the Cabinet has probably acted wisely in the matter, though it may be subsequently attacked on the point for its theoretically unconstitutional action.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[47254] No. 212.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 928.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 2, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a memorandum by Mr. Fitzmaurice, reporting a conversation with Kiamil Pasha concerning his acceptance of office. As stated in my telegram No. 542 of the 29th October, the members of the Imperial Family, in view of the increasing gravity of the military situation, induced the Sultan to virtually compel Kiamil Pasha to become Grand Vizier.

The Cabinet formed by him is practically the same as that of Sir Ghazi Mukhtar Pasha, the Sheikh-ul-Islam Jemaleddin Effendi, the Minister of War, Nazim Pasha, and Gabriel Effendi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, retaining their portfolios, while the only important change is in the Ministry of the Interior, to which Reshid Bey, Vali of Smyrna, has been appointed. The latter, in addition to other administrative posts, has been Mutessarif of Jerusalem and Vali of Aleppo. He is clever and energetic, but of distinctly anti-committee leanings.

Kiamil Pasha's acceptance of the Grand Vizierate at the present juncture, though an act of patriotism, is scarcely to be welcomed from a British point of view. His name has been identified with England on several occasions, and this point has been unduly exaggerated in the press. In the concluding paragraph of my despatch No. 875 of the 18th October I remarked that "it remains to be seen whether the present crisis may be tided over without loss of territory," and, as a serious defeat of the Turkish army under General Nazim Pasha may have even much graver consequences, it is difficult to conceive how the present Cabinet can survive successfully coming events, and without a consequent unfortunate effect on British prestige, linked up as it is with his name. The "Hakam," the anti-committee organ, in a leading article, seems to fancy that Kiamil Pasha can restore the days of the Crimean War and the Treaty of Berlin, and seems to ignore the altered relations of France and England toward Russia, and that a prominent British statesman has publicly alluded to the policy of 1865 and 1877 as putting money on the wrong horse. The ideas perhaps unconsciously fit in with those expressed in the committee organs, whose tendency and desire would seem to be to revive the old discords between England and Russia, and to see the latter isolated in the hope that England and France may combine with the central European Powers in preventing a radical solution of the Balkan and Cretan problems. In this connection I have the honour to enclose an article in the "Jeune Turc."*

The "Tanin" has violently assailed Kiamil Pasha's appointment as a direct challenge to the committee of which his Highness is credited with being the arch enemy. On the other hand, it will be welcome to the Arabs and to the Anatolian Turk, who will now be happier in his mind, and perhaps less inclined to start massacres of Armenians, should the Turkish arms meet with a crushing defeat at the

* Not printed.

hands of the Bulgarians. The latter eventuality might threaten the very existence of the Ottoman State and Turkish Caliphate, and his Highness's position is in any case far from enviable. He has no desire to crush the Balkan States, and would rather seem to be anxious to save what is possible of the threatened wreckage. He is quite aware that the crushing of Bulgaria would almost certainly entail the intervention of Russia, and the probable raising of at least the question of the Straits, while it would also, he believes, again excite the chauvinism of the junior officers, lead to a revival of the committee's influence, and the consequent further disintegration of the Empire.

The official news from the front yesterday and to-day is of a satisfactory nature from the Ottoman point of view, and consequently the rather weak nerves of this cosmopolitan capital, subject to rapid and extreme oscillations, are for the time reassured. They will probably remain so as long as the Turkish armies force the Bulgarians to retreat to their frontier. Should they later be driven back into Bulgaria, the chauvinist Moslem elements here may be inclined to create incidents.

Should the converse happen and the Bulgarians beat back Nazim Pasha's armies on to the lines of Chataldja or the capital, the possibility of serious disorder cannot be left out of account. If the Turks make a stand at Chataldja there will probably be time to deal with the situation, but the prospect of vast hordes of Anatolian troops half famished and reduced to the state of an undisciplined and officerless rabble being driven on to the narrow neck of land upon which Constantinople is situated is not pleasant. Should the Bulgarians deflect masses of them down on to the shores of the Marmara and, turning the Turkish right wing, follow past on their heels, there will probably be little interval left for untoward incidents. In the event of serious defeat the ordinary Moslem population will be completely cowed, and be likely to seek for foreign protection, while the retreating troops will probably be mainly intent on getting bread and on being transferred to the Asiatic shore. The danger would come from the Jacobin elements in the committee, who, thinking the end had come, might attempt to fire the city and start massacres. As reported in my telegram No. 561 of the 31st October, I have, in concert with my colleagues and on the invitation of the Austrian Ambassador, considered such eventualities with the result indicated in my despatch No. 926 of yesterday.

I have also had serious representations made privately to the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the other responsible Ministers and military authorities, to moderate politicians, and also to the Palace. I am convinced that the existing authorities realise the exceedingly grave consequences likely to be entailed by anything like massacre, and that they will do all in their power to prevent such a calamity to the Empire. Kiamil Pasha has taken the precaution of sleeping at the Sublime Porte, so as to be on the spot in the event of a serious internal crisis.

Should the Ottoman army meet with a crushing defeat, the Moslem clergy and population will attribute the ensuing disasters to what they believe to be the nefarious policy of the committee régime with which they are persuaded the British Government and this embassy have not been too closely identified. Kiamil Pasha's name and present position rightly or wrongly further reassures them on this point, so that no matter what the present crisis may have in store for Turkey as the centre of the Caliphate, the British position in the Turkish and Arabic world, if not in that of Islam in general, is likely to survive the present storm. After recent Turkish defeats it would appear that Kiamil Pasha, if he remains in power, will have to make up his mind at least to a cessation of direct Turkish rule in the Ottoman provinces in Europe, and the four centuries hegemony of Turkey in Islam will be rudely shaken.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 212.

Memorandum by Mr. Fitzmaurice.

I HAVE the honour to report that I yesterday privately communicated to Kiamil Pasha the substance of Foreign Office telegram No. 840 of the 22nd October. His Highness said that Sunday about midnight the Sultan sent for him after the extraordinary council at the Palace, and told him that while the military side of the Empire's present difficulties had been entrusted to General Nazim Pasha, His Majesty was anxious that he (Kiamil Pasha) should undertake the political and administrative

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branches connected with the office of Grand Vizierate. Kiamil Pasha replied that he was co-operating with Ghazi Sir Ahmed Muktar Pasha, the present Grand Vizier, and that a change of Cabinet just after the outbreak of the Balkan war seemed unadvisable and calculated to encourage the enemy. The Sultan had, however, insisted, and Kiamil Pasha had begged for a delay to discuss the matter with the Grand Vizier, and reflect on the matter in its different bearings.

He remarked to me that perhaps his name would enlist the sympathies of certain section of opinion in England and France, and that he trusted that the cordial relations existing between the two countries and Russia would enable them in certain eventualities to check any excessive Slav proclivities of the latter in the Balkan crisis. I told him that, as the present situation was distinctly serious, I would speak perfectly frankly to him; that, unfortunately, public opinion in England interested in Turkey had not been able to distinguish between the Committee of Union and Progress and Young Turks, with the consequence that the Turks generally were blamed for the errors of the committee, *e.g.*, the anti-Hellenic boycott, the ill-treatment of the Albanians, and the harsh methods of which the Bulgarians had been the victims; that, while liberal opinion in England and France might be favourably affected in view of his Highness's well-known liberal views, I was afraid that the action of the Bulgarian Generals Ivanof and Dimitrief facing Nazim Pasha would not be in the least affected by such considerations, and that the present fate of the Empire seemed to depend largely on the result of the impending contact between the masses of Ottoman and Bulgarian forces south of Adrianople; that, while the Governments of England and France would, no doubt, influence that of Russia in the general direction of peace, it was not difficult to conceive at least three situations where the peaceful intention of the Czar and his Government might be swept away by the tide of Slav feeling in Russia, just as the Gueshof Cabinet in Bulgaria and M. Venizelos in Greece had been obliged to yield to outbursts of national feeling, viz., (1) Serb victories at Uskub, &c., might engender a frame of mind leading them to take action in the sanjak of a nature to provoke Austrian intervention, (2) should Nazim Pasha achieve decisive victories over the Bulgarians, and look like crushing the latter in the vicinity of, or on the north side of, the Bulgarian frontier, or (3) should disorders accompanied by massacres of orthodox Christians take place in Constantinople. In any of these eventualities, I remarked, the Czar and M. Sazonof might, like the pebble before the torrent in the Turkish proverb, be carried away by a wave of Slav feeling.

His Highness then asked me whether I thought Sir E. Grey or your Excellency would be inclined to advise his acceptance of the Grand Vizierate. I replied that England was neutral in the present war, and, speaking without authority, it would seem to me improbable that any departure could be made from general British policy of not interfering in internal affairs such as appointments to the highest office of State.

His Highness finally stated that his general inclination was not to accept the Grand Vizierate unless General Nazim Pasha suffered a severe defeat, in which case patriotism would compel him to undertake greater responsibility.

G. H. FITZMAURICE.

[47261] No. 213.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 190.)

Sir, *Vienna, November 5, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that signs are not lacking which show that the triumphal advance of the Servian army towards Albania is causing considerable uneasiness in official circles here. The announcement in the "Fremdenblatt" on the 3rd November of the capture of Prizrend by the Servians was accompanied by a curious little notice to the following effect:—

"Should the news from Belgrade of the capture of Prizrend by the Servian troops be confirmed, it may be assumed that the latter have now reached the limit of their victorious operations towards the west. There exist neither military nor national motives for the penetration of the Servian army into the districts on the western side of Prizrend, which are inhabited exclusively by Albanians, and thus constitute the undisputed territory of another Balkan people."

This notice, which has been commented upon by the remaining Viennese journals as bearing a semi-official character, and hence being of special significance, is followed by a leading article in to-day's "Fremdenblatt," which remarks, for the benefit of Servia, that her troops have now reached a district entirely Albanian and non-Serb in character (there being, the article observes, no Serbs in the country stretching from Prizrend to San Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo), and warning her, in pursuance of her motto "The Balkans for the Balkan people," not to interfere with a people who have ever shown the greatest resolution in defence of their independence, even against the Turks. The article therefore urges the Servians to realise that they will do well to place a limit to their advance westwards now that they have obtained all that their ambition can reasonably desire.

This warning is contained in the end of the article, and whatever unpleasant sensations it may arouse in Servia are no doubt intended to be removed by the opening paragraph, which contains a glowing eulogy of the prowess of the Servian troops and of the eminently humane manner in which they have conducted the war. By these qualities Servia has, declares the "Fremdenblatt," won for herself the sympathy and esteem of Europe.

I have, &c.

FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[47375] No. 214.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 7.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 7, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 7th instant, relative to the movements of His Majesty's ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 214.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 7, 1912.*

THIRD battle squadron (2nd Division) complete and ready for sea at six hours' notice.

Enclosure 2 in No. 214.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 7, 1912.*

MESSAGE from commander-in-chief, Mediterranean:—

"Salonica. Consul-general reports that unless Turks capitulate final attack expected to-day. Greek army 5 miles off."

Enclosure 3 in No. 214.

His Majesty's Ship "Barham," at Famagusta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 7, 1912.*

"BARHAM" left Famagusta for Alexandretta to-day.

[47273] No. 215.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 7.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 7, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 7th instant, relative to the movements of His Majesty's ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 215.

Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, November 7, 1912.*

SENIOR naval officer, Port Said, has been instructed to proceed with "Prometheus" and "Pegasus," after necessary coaling, to Suda Bay, to await instructions. Refer to Admiralty before using them for station duties, except under urgent necessity.

Enclosure 2 in No. 215.

Admiralty to Senior Naval Officer, Port Said.

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, November 7, 1912.*

"PROMETHEUS" and "Pegasus" are to proceed, when they have coaled, to Suda Bay, and there await instructions.

[47280] No. 216.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 7.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 7, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 6th instant, relative to the movements of His Majesty's ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 216.

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

[Through Admiral Superintendent, Malta.]

(Telegraphic.) *November 6, 1912.*

"HAMPSHIRE" arrived Besika and "Yarmouth" left for Salonica.

Salonica quite quiet, but sudden flight of . . . . . might leave town at mercy of unruly inhabitants. Greeks can enter with but little resistance when they please, but are moving with caution.

Enclosure 2 in No. 216.

Senior Naval Officer, Crete, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 7, 1912.*

BESIKA BAY. "Yarmouth" arrived.

Enclosure 3 in No. 216.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

[Through Admiral Superintendent, Malta.]

(Telegraphic.) *November 6, 1912.*

AM informed Austrian ships left Fiume early Monday morning. If they go to Salonica they should arrive daylight to-morrow 24 hours ahead of British ships, which cannot arrive before Friday daylight.

Enclosure 4 in No. 216.

Senior Naval Officer, Crete, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 6, 1912.*

BESIKA BAY. "Hamphire" arrived and "Yarmouth" sailed for Salonica.

[47213] No. 217.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 128.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 6, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 143 of 5th November.

I have carried out your instructions. Prime Minister conveys his thanks, and, whilst expressing to me his gratitude for your explanations, added that he fully realised danger and purpose of such statements when they emanated from Vienna at this moment.

[47216] No. 218.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 129.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 6, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 125 of to-day.

Prime Minister informs me that Midia on the east coast and Rodosto have been both taken. Crown Prince has gone south to make joint entry with Crown Princes of Greece and Servia into Salonica.

[47401] No. 219.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 130.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 7, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of yesterday.

Head-quarter Staff have just published their account of last battle in neighbourhood of Lule Burgas.

They estimate total loss in killed and wounded on both sides at 55,000, and compare engagement to battle at Mukden.

Bulgarian army took forty-two quick-firing guns and 2,800 prisoners, besides large numbers of waggons and many stores

General situation remains unchanged: roads are now mere mud-tracks, and forward advance is correspondingly hindered.

[47202] No. 220.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 588.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 6, 1912.*

THERE appears to be a distinctly less alarmist atmosphere in the capital yesterday and to-day. Government are taking measures and have the situation in hand in case of all extreme eventualities. There is now talk of making a firm and perhaps prolonged stand at Chatalja for two months or more, in which they have been encouraged by German military attaché returned from the front. Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs state that the latter has given them as his opinion that army should be able to hold the lines of Chatalja. Military experts are by no means unanimous on this.

[47292] No. 221.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 589.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 7, 1912.*

WASHINGTON telegram No. 121 of 4th November and your telegram No. 952 of 6th November.

I have informed United States Ambassador, who replied that, should need occur, he will tell his people that they will be received on board British man-of-war. I have also warned the captain of the "Weymouth."

[47380] No. 222.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 591.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, November 7, 1912.*

FRENCH, German, and Russian ships, "Léon Gambetta," "Victa," and "Kagul," have now arrived.

[47385] No. 223.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 592.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 7, 1912.*

BEFORE issue of firman for the second man-of-war, the Porte requires Ambassadors to sign a statement that the ship will be withdrawn when necessity for its presence no longer exists.

I presume that I may do this.

[47396] No. 224.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 593.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 7, 1912.*

FOLLOWING is identic telegram which is being sent by Ambassadors of Austria, Great Britain, France, Russia, and Germany:—

Minister for Foreign Affairs, having invited Ambassadors of the five Powers to the Porte this morning, made following declaration:—

"Turkish Government is decided to defend lines of Chataldja up to the last extremity, and it hopes to do so successfully, but it must consider opposite eventuality.

In this case, situation would be one of extreme gravity if Bulgarian army did not stop at gates of the town, and if the King of the Bulgarians decided to enter the capital at head of his victorious troops. The King has declared present war to be a crusade. Bulgarian bands are massacring Moslems on their path; refugees who arrive here are relating heart-rending stories on this subject, and the population of Stamboul is showing signs of excitement. Now, Constantinople is the seat of Caliphate, and Mussulmans number 650000 against 350,000 non-Mussulmans; we are thus going straight towards a catastrophe.

"Council of Ministers deliberated at length yesterday; all suitable measures have been taken to ensure public order and protection of minority, but such arrangements will be unavailing should Bulgarian troops enter capital. On the other hand, the Sultan and the Imperial Princes have decided not to leave their palaces; Ministers will also remain in their departments, and we have all decided to die at our posts.

"We have thought it necessary that Europe should be informed of the actual situation and of our decisions. This is the object of our meeting. It is now for the Powers to take counsel, and, by stopping Bulgarian army, to avoid horrors which are imminent."

Grand Vizier then came in and confirmed Minister's declaration in more urgent and impressive manner: "I will await the enemy at the Sublime Porte at my post. I cannot be responsible for your lives or those of your communities no more than those of Christians; let Europe hasten; let her hold back Bulgaria; let her send her fleets, for which we will open Straits."

We replied that we would immediately inform our Governments of the above. (End of R.)

(K.) I gather from my colleagues that while making some little allowance for an element of bluff in their extreme desire to see the Bulgarians kept out, yet they generally regard the situation in eventualities foreshadowed as likely to be fraught with extreme danger, and for the most part they have no confidence in the Turks being able to resist at Chataldja despite German opinion to contrary, as reported in my telegram No. 588 of yesterday.

[47397] No. 225.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 595.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 7, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consular officer, Dardanelles, dated to-day:—

"Tenedos has been occupied by the Greeks."

[47411] No. 226.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 160. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, November 7, 1912.*

I LEARN that Italians have unofficially represented at Belgrade danger of Servia pressing for Adriatic port in view of determination of Austria to oppose its acquisition. Reply of Servian Government was firm. They could accept no dictation on this point, and were determined to have an Adriatic port. They would fight to maintain it, and their allies would stand by them.

Port contemplated is Durazzo; Medua being the port of Scutari, which is assigned in league programme to Montenegro.

From an observation made this morning by Prime Minister to French Ambassador that Servia should be content with free use of a Montenegrin port as outlet, I gather that Austria has bespoken united opposition of Triple Alliance to Servian ambitions.

[47407] No. 227.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 149.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, November 7, 1912.*

MOST of my colleagues and I were invited yesterday afternoon to meet the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Italian Embassy.

Following is a résumé of what his Excellency said to my French and Russian colleagues and myself in the presence of the Austrian Ambassador:—

He thought that only danger point in the settlement after the war was the question of Adriatic. Austria-Hungary could not yield to Servia's desire to have access to that sea because such an arrangement could only be made at the expense of Albania. The latter country was in no way Serb, and the only alternative to Turkish rule which afforded prospect of durable tranquillity in the Balkans was a settlement on the basis of nationality.

These were his general remarks. To my French colleague he mentioned a secret agreement between Austria and Italy dated 1901, according to which the two Powers bound themselves to keep Albania intact under Turkish flag, and in case of disappearance of that flag to maintain the independence of Albania, and to prevent its occupation by any other Power whatsoever. He added that if Servia obtains footing in Albania that agreement would fall to the ground, the balance of power on the Adriatic would be upset, and Austria and Italy would have to make other arrangements, of which it was impossible at this moment to foresee the consequences. It seemed to him that it was almost indispensable for the peace of Europe that Servia should abandon her desire to have access to the Adriatic.

My Italian colleague held much the same language to me.

[47408] No. 228.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 150. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, November 7, 1912.*

SERVIAN chargé d'affaires transmitted to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a message from his Government to the effect that a friendly Power had been advising them not to push their demand for access to the Adriatic, but that this demand was part of settlement determined upon by belligerent States and that they could not do otherwise than proceed with it.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs expressed his regret, as in this question Germany would have to support Austria.

Latter was most conciliating and had abandoned many of her former aspirations, her only reserve being this question of Servian access to the Adriatic. Secretary of State added that it was evident that Servian Government were urged on in this fatal course, as alone they would not hold such language.

Servian chargé d'affaires then asked whether Austria would have German military support. Secretary of State said that if Servia and her friends received military support from Russia Germany would march with her ally, otherwise not.

Secretary of State was then asked whether, in case of Russia not being joined by France, Germany would still feel called upon to move. Secretary of State replied, "Certainly." He also told Servian chargé d'affaires that Austria was working for an independent Albania, and in this she would also have German support.

[47409] No. 229.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 151.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, November 7, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sent for me this evening to tell me of his conversation with Servian chargé d'affaires. His account corresponded with that which I have already reported. He added, however, that on his explaining to Servian chargé d'affaires that both Austria and Italy were against Servian access to Adriatic because it would divide Albania, Servian chargé d'affaires had replied that Servia desired the whole of Albania. On the Secretary of State pointing out that this was mad, Servian chargé d'affaires replied that their plans for settlement had been submitted to Russia, who had approved them. Secretary of State said to me that he presumed that in this case "Russia" meant Russian representative at Belgrade. His Excellency added that this attitude on the part of Servia was bad, but that what disquieted him most was that Russian Ambassador in Paris had held somewhat similar language to that of the Servian chargé d'affaires to Baron Schoen at Paris, and had said that if Servia failed to get access to Adriatic owing to opposition of Austria it would mean fresh humiliation of Russia. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that he did not believe that Russian Ambassador was speaking in name of Russian Government, but it was very dangerous language, and he was instructing the German Ambassador to St. Petersburgh to report to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and ask him what were the real views of Russian Government. He was of opinion that if war was to be avoided it would be advisable for Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to instruct Russian representatives at Paris and Belgrade to moderate their tone. He intended to give Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs discreet hint to this effect, and thought it would be very useful if England and France could do the same, as the matter seemed really serious. He held similar language to my French colleague.

[47259] No. 230.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 7, 1912.*

SIR F. CARTWRIGHT'S telegram No. 131 of 6th November.

Military attaché informs me that third Servian army is moving towards Monastir by the road leading through Kalkandelen. It is rumoured that a column will be detached from the third army at Gostivar and sent to St. John of Medua.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[47400] No. 231.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 417.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 7, 1912.*

ASSISTANT Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he had received somewhat similar information to that contained in Constantinople telegram No. 579 of 4th November, but that Russian Ambassador apparently thought lives of those living in embassy at any rate would not be in danger, as he had asked for no instructions about leaving Constantinople should the Ottoman Government withdraw.

[47410] No. 232.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 132. Most Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 7, 1912.*

I LEARN from a confidential source in close contact with Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the Austro-Hungarian Government will abstain from making any declaration as to their reservations with regard to alterations of the *status quo* in the Balkans until the close of the war. It is thought here that to formulate reservations at present would be a breach of neutrality and an interference with the belligerents' rights of the Balkan States. When peace terms are being negotiated Austria will formulate her demands. With regard to these, I have obtained the following information:—

Austria's minimum demands will be that Albania shall remain an autonomous or independent State, and that no part of the Adriatic coast shall be held by Servia. Secondly, that the railway route to Salonica and the freedom of that port be secured to

Austria as a right for her trade; in other words, that the railway to Salonica shall be internationalised. A third condition, I am informed, will be put by Austria but will not be insisted upon absolutely. It is that Servia should give guarantees that she will live in future *en bon voisin* with Austria and pursue a reasonable commercial policy towards her.

I am informed that at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs they have the impression that Servia contemplates following the example of Italy and annexing by decree all the territory she has conquered and a strip of territory on the Adriatic. Should she do this, I am informed that it will have no effect in changing Austrian determination to prevent Servia from getting a foothold on the Adriatic.

[48386] No. 233.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1187.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 7, 1912.*

SERVIAN chargé d'affaires, in communicating to me Servian claims yesterday, said a port on the Adriatic was essential to Servian economic independence, and matter of life and death.

I said I was very glad to know Servian views, because it was only by having before us views of all Powers interested in the settlement that disinterested Powers could form an opinion as to what divergencies of view there were, and how they might be reconciled.

It is, however, clear to me that the question of a port on the Adriatic will be the subject of acute difficulty with Austria. I trust some means will eventually be found of reconciling Servia's very natural claim for an independent economic outlet with Austrian view of Austrian interests, but it would be well, if possible, to prevent this becoming subject of acute discussion by itself before whole settlement of European Turkey is under consideration. Apparently there is now probability of agreement between Russia and Bulgaria as to settlement, and the fact that Austria makes no territorial claims gives prospect of a very large measure of general agreement about settlement of European Turkey.

Roumanian claims and Servian port on Adriatic may thus turn out to be only difficulties, and, if that is so, it should not be impossible to find a fair and peaceable solution. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 678.)

[48386] No. 234.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 680.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 7, 1912.*

IN reply to enquiry by French Ambassador as to my views, I informed him of my telegram No. 1187 of to-day to Sir G. Buchanan.

I added that in my opinion it would be much better that Balkan States should formulate the general settlement than that a Russian settlement should be proposed to Austria. It would be easier for Russia and Powers generally to discuss amicably an Austrian objection to a settlement formulated by Balkan States and under common consideration by all of us.

If a port on the Adriatic is, then, the chief difficulty, we must consider motives of Austrian objection and Servian demand. Austrian objection may be due to fear of a naval base being established on Adriatic that may eventually come under the influence of a Great Power, either Russia or a powerful federated Balkan State.

Servian demand is probably not due to naval ambition, but to desire for independent economic outlet. If this analysis is correct, and Austrian objection and Servian demand are inspired by these motives alone, which are on each side simple and natural, it ought not to be impossible to find a solution that will dispel Austrian apprehension and secure to Servia in substance what she wants.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 1189, and Berlin, No. 354.)

[48386] No. 235.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1190.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 7, 1912.*

MY telegram to Paris No. 680 of to-day: Austria and Servia.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[47412] No. 236.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 964.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 7, 1912.*

SPANISH Government have requested that you will support request of their Minister for permission for Spanish war-ship to pass Dardanelles.

You should take such action as you properly can.

(Repeated to Madrid, No. 82.)

[47385] No. 237.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 965.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 592 of 7th November: Ship for Dardanelles.

Yes.

[47533] No. 238.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 351.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 148 of 6th November.

I do not anticipate that there will be difficulty between Russia and Bulgaria about Adrianople, and the fact that Austria makes no territorial claims makes it quite possible that over the whole field of European Turkey there may be no acute difficulty in final settlement except about Servian access to Adriatic. If this turns out to be so the very large measure of agreement will, when it becomes apparent, be a great make-weight on the side of a peaceable solution of the one outstanding acute difficulty. It would be well, therefore, to do all that is possible to prevent question of port on Adriatic becoming acute question of discussion by itself before whole settlement is under consideration.

When that time arrives I should hope some means might be found of reconciling Servian desire for an independent economic outlet with Austrian Government's view of Austrian interests. I propose, in discussions with other Powers, to advocate this view. I have not dealt with Roumanian claims, which, perhaps, may be settled by her alone with Bulgaria.

[48386] No. 239.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 355.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 7, 1912.*

MY telegram to Paris No. 680 of to-day: Austria and Servia.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of last two paragraphs only, beginning "If a port."

[47171] No. 240.

Sir Edward Grey to Viscount Kitchener.

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 74 of 6th November: Neutrality of Egypt.

I approve of your attitude as described in last sentence.

[47656] No. 241.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 542.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 7, 1912.*

M. CAMBON spoke to me to-day of the possibility that Russia might send a naval squadron to Constantinople, and asked what we should do in such circumstances.

I said that we had one ship already at Constantinople; we should probably send three to Besika Bay, and we should send on whatever number might be required to protect the British community against mobs and massacres in Constantinople; but we should not make a naval demonstration there.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[47664] No. 242.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 375.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 7, 1912.*

THE Russian Ambassador informed me to-day that Russia did not oppose a temporary occupation of Constantinople by the allies, but M. Sazonof drew attention to the difficulties of subsequent negotiations. The Turkish Government, once withdrawn into Asia, safe from attack, able to collect an army there, and having nothing more to lose, would be less conciliatory. The resources of the allies were limited, and the unanimity of the Powers was not yet sufficiently established. If the negotiations dragged, the first consideration would have disadvantages for the allies, and the second might become dangerous for the peace of Europe. It would be difficult to hope for an early conclusion of the negotiations. This would entail a prolonged occupation of Constantinople by the allies, and Russia would be obliged to send a naval squadron to Constantinople, to remain there as long as the allies were in occupation.

Count Benckendorff seemed to desire some observation from me as to a Russian squadron being sent to Constantinople, and said how vital it was that, if the Turks withdrew from Constantinople, Russia should not let it fall into the hands of someone else that might be a strong Power. He expressed a hope that we might side with Russia.

I said that the circumstances he contemplated had not yet arisen, but it seemed to me quite natural that, if they did arise, Russia should wish to send ships to protect her interests.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[47655] No. 243.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 376.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 7, 1912.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF informed me to-day that the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburgh had declared to M. Sazonof that Austria excluded for herself the idea of territorial compensation. On M. Sazonof asking why, then, she had refused to make a declaration of disinterestedness, the Ambassador had replied that it had not been understood that this disinterestedness was only territorial. Count Benckendorff mentioned that the French Government were to correct this misunderstanding in Vienna. M. Sazonof had urged that it was necessary to take into account the very serious claims of Servia to access to the Adriatic, and that it was in the interest of Austria not to oppose this. The Austrian Ambassador had promised to telegraph to his Government, but had said that they must take into consideration the public opinion of Austria, which was very adverse to a Servian port on the Adriatic. The Ambassador had also said that Austrian interests must be guaranteed by something more important than a commercial treaty. M. Sazonof had asked what could be better than a commercial treaty.

The impression left on M. Sazonof's mind by his interviews with the German Ambassador was that the German Government were inclined to influence the Austrian Government to be more conciliatory, and he hoped that British and French diplomacy might endeavour to influence Vienna in the same sense.

I told Count Benckendorff of my telegram No. 1187 to your Excellency, and said that I had already spoken in this sense in Berlin.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[47500] No. 244.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 30.)
Sir, *Odessa, November 4, 1912.*

CONSULAR officer at Rostov reports that considerable numbers of troops are being sent to Kars and Turkish frontier.

(Sent to Foreign Office, Constantinople, and St. Petersburgh.)

I have, &c.
(For consul-general),
FREDERICK WATSON.

[47487] No. 245.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 8.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 7, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 7th instant, relative to the movements of His Majesty's ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 245.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

November 7, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
"HUSSAR" left for Piraeus.

[PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON]

[47547] No. 246.

Council of Foreign Bondholders to Foreign Office.—(Received November 8.)

17, *Moorgate Street, London, November 7, 1912.*

Sir,

IN view of the alarming situation which prevails in the Ottoman Empire, the Council of Foreign Bondholders deem it their duty to request the protection of His Majesty's Government in the event of any attempt being made to interfere with the rights of the British holders of Turkish bonds.

I have, &c.

JAMES P. COOPER, *Secretary.*

[47575] No. 247.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 8.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, November 8, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 8th instant, relative to the movement of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 247.

Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

November 8, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

REPORT what foreign men-of-war are now at Salonica.

Enclosure 2 in No. 247.

Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

November 8, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

ORDERS have been given for "Prometheus" to proceed Beirout.

[47580] No. 248.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 8.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, November 8, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams, dated the 8th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 248.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

November 8, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

"BLACK PRINCE" arrived Malta.

Enclosure 2 in No. 248.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

November 8, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

"GOEBEN" and "Breslau" due Malta the 11th instant, according to German consul. They will take 3,000 tons coal by private contract.

Enclosure 3 in No. 248.

His Majesty's Consul at Larnaca to Admiralty.

November 8, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

ITALIAN ship "Cunfuda" left Limassol.

[47541] No. 249.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 8.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, November 8, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams, dated the 7th and 8th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 249.

Vice-Consul Lowdon to Admiralty.

Sevastopol, November 7, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

"PANTELEIMON" (Russian ship) left Sevastopol for Constantinople.

Enclosure 2 in No. 249.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

November 8, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

ARRIVED Salonica in "Good Hope." Turkish commander intends to fight, and has refused Greek terms of capitulation. "Dartmouth" arrived.

[47508] No. 250.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 8.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, November 8, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams dated the 7th and 8th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 250.

H.M.S. "Pegasus" at Port Said to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 7, 1912.*

LEAVE for Suda Bay to-morrow with "Prometheus."
Your telegram to-day received.

Enclosure 2 in No. 250.

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 7, 1912.*

"JOHN DUNCAN" proceeded from Suda to Port Cape Sigri, where I have ordered 1st Division, 3rd Battle Squadron, to proceed. Before they move elsewhere ships will require coal.

Enclosure 3 in No. 250.

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 7, 1912.*

YOUR No. 280.

Presence of a second small ship on Syrian coast, in my opinion, very necessary. Suda Bay too far away in case of emergency. Propose to put "Prometheus" under orders of "Barham" and send her to Beirout.

Enclosure 4 in No. 250.

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 8, 1912.*

COLLIER will coal battle-ships at both Salonica and Besika Bay.
Have received your No. 281.

Enclosure 5 in No. 250.

Senior Naval Officer, Crete, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 8, 1912.*

VICE-ADMIRAL commanding 3rd Battle Squadron reports Italian ship "Emanuele Filiberto" and Austrian ship "Aspan" proceeding to Constantinople.

[47593] No. 251.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Athens, November 6, 1912.*

CROWN PRINCE has entered Salonica.

[47427] No. 252.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 161.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, November 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 676 of 6th November to Paris.

View of Italian Foreign Office reported in my telegram No. 159 of 5th November was modified on receipt of instruction from Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs at Berlin, to the effect that Italy was prepared to inform the Balkan States of the Turkish appeal for mediation and to ask them what their views were. An answer to this effect, identical with German answer to French Government, has now been given to the French Ambassador.

[47442] No. 253.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, November 7, 1912.*

I COMMUNICATED to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs last paragraph of your telegram No. 348 of 6th November.

His Excellency was of opinion that, as soon as Sultan and Government leave Constantinople, Embassies and foreign communities should embark on men-of-war and vessels reserved for that purpose.

[47583] No. 254.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 154.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, November 8, 1912.*

TELEGRAM to Paris No. 680 of 7th November.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs generally shares your views. He passed lightly over the idea of naval base.

He is of opinion that, territorially speaking, a port for Servia on the Adriatic is not possible, but he thinks that lines on which we should work with a view to reconciling the Servian demands with Austrian apprehension are: Railway for Servia with every guarantee that commerce should have free access to the Adriatic, railway to be under Servian control, and perhaps port to which it would be run a free port. Latter would be a question for experts to decide, but he would be ready to advise Austria to take an arrangement somewhat on these lines into favourable consideration.

His Excellency still thinks that Servian access to the Ægean simplifies the solution, but he admits that Bulgaria and Greece would strongly object.

He stated again that Servia demands the whole of Albania, with the exception of small portion to the south, which was to go to Greece. This demand was of course out of the question.

[47585] No. 255.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 155.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, November 8, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 151 of 7th November.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that as he did not want to embitter the situation ("envenimer les choses"), he had confined himself to reporting M. Isvolsky's conversation with the German Ambassador at Paris to the German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, with instructions not to mention it to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs unless latter entered into question himself. He still hoped that you might see your way to hinting at St. Petersburgh that such language as that held by the Russian Ambassador at Paris was not calculated to render negotiations easier.

[47580] No. 256.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 421.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 8, 1912.*

THE "Times" correspondent here has informed military attaché that he hears on good authority that all time-expired reservists will be retained with the colours until the spring.

Military attaché enquired at General Staff as to the truth of this.

Officer whom he saw would not admit it officially, but said that he had heard rumour and thought it probable. He added that Austria had taken similar measures.

[47316] No. 257.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.**

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 8, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 676 of 6th November to Sir F. Bertie; Turkish request for mediation.

You should make communication in question to the Government to which you are accredited when your French, Russian, German, Austrian, and Italian colleagues have received similar instructions.

Turkish appeal for mediation is in following terms:—

"The Imperial Ottoman Government asks the Great Powers for their collective mediation with a view to the immediate cessation of hostilities and the settlement of conditions of peace."

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 359; Paris, No. 687; Rome, No. 493; St. Petersburgh, No. 1198; Constantinople, No. 976; and Vienna, No. 354.)

[48162] No. 258.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 360.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 8, 1912.*

GERMAN chargé d'affaires has given me from the Chancellor the same information as in your telegram No. 151 of 7th November, but added that Austria would be willing to see that Servia has the use of a railway and all possible guarantees for uninterrupted commercial outlet at any suitable port on the Adriatic.

I expressed my concern at the serious news in your telegrams. I said it was a great mischief that this question of a port on the Adriatic was being discussed at all at this moment. It ought never to have been discussed till the Balkan States formulated their terms of peace in common at the end of the war. If it was true that Russian Minister at Belgrade had been urging, and Italians, as I heard, had been deprecating a Belgrade, acquisition by Servia of an Adriatic port, it was a great pity that either had discussed it with Servian Government at all. The mere mention of it either way excited them at this moment. I urged very strongly that all that Servia did or said should be treated as part of the war with Turkey, and therefore provisional pending terms of peace; even if she entered Albania that might for the present be so treated, as Albania was still a province of Turkey. If Austria could be influenced to take this view it would be very desirable. It would be intolerable if rash action or provocative language on part of Servia in her excited state were to be allowed to provoke a war between any Great Powers on a point which I believed could be settled peaceably if only it could be dealt with as part of the whole terms of peace, when the war with Turkey was concluded instead of being brought up now by itself.

I said I would urge same point of view at St. Petersburgh, and ask Russian Government to use all their influence in same direction.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 689, and St. Petersburgh, No. 1200.)

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* Also to Sir F. Elliot (No. 271), Sir R. Paget (No. 87), and Count de Salis (No. 129).

[47375] No. 259*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 966.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 8, 1912.*

ON 7th November, consul-general, Salonica, reported through Admiralty that Greeks were 5 miles off, and that final attack was expected on that date unless Turkish forces capitulated.

[47541] No. 259†.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 971.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 8, 1912.*

SENIOR Naval Officer, Salonica, reported on 8th November that the Turkish Ambassador had refused Greek terms and intended to fight.

[48163] No. 259.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1201.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 8, 1912.*

SIR E. GOSCHEN'S telegrams Nos. 149, 150, and 151 of 7th November.

You should urge upon Minister for Foreign Affairs same view as is contained in my telegram No. 360 of to-day to Sir E. Goschen. You can point out that for Servia to claim the whole of Albania and annex Durazzo, as she has announced her intention of doing, goes beyond anything that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has contemplated in his communications hitherto. I fear harm has been done by talking at Belgrade, and probably no good can be done by lecturing Servia at this moment, but it would be very desirable if the allies would keep steadily to their original intention of formulating their whole terms of peace in common, and not begin now to state individually their separate claims. Perhaps Bulgaria could influence her allies to act on this view.

I propose to speak in this sense to Bulgarian Minister here.

Much of Sir E. Goschen's telegrams is not suitable for communication to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and you must therefore be very discreet in making use of their contents.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 690.)

[47396] No. 260.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 974.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 8, 1912.*

SOME more ships are on the way to Besika Bay, and, if further force is needed for protection of British community, you will of course ask for one or more ships to come up to Constantinople with Turkish Government's consent.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 685; Berlin, No. 358; Vienna, No. 352; Rome, No. 491; and St. Petersburgh, No. 1195.)

[47733] No. 261.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 510.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 8, 1912.*

THE Turkish Ambassador left with Sir A. Nicolson on the 8th November the circular telegram from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Ottoman representatives in Europe, copy of which I transmit herewith to your Excellency.

Sir A. Nicolson told his Highness that nearly all the Powers had now agreed to inform the Balkan allies of the request of the Porte for mediation, and to enquire of them whether they would also accept mediation, and if so on what terms.

Tewfik Pasha expressed the hope that this step would lead to satisfactory results.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 261.

Gabriel Effendi to Tewfik Pasha.

JE crois devoir vous signaler l'entretien que nous avons eu aujourd'hui, son Altesse le Grand Vizir et moi, avec les Ambassadeurs des Grandes Puissances sur la gravité d'une éventualité qui peut se produire, et dont le seul bruit déjà provoque une agitation dans les esprits de la capitale. On prête au Roi Ferdinand et à ses alliés

l'intention d'entrer à Constantinople, dans le cas où l'armée bulgare réussirait à franchir la ligne de défense de Tchataldja, et ce nonobstant les négociations qui seraient entamées en vue d'une armistice ou de la paix. Or, le seul fait que ce Roi, qui a osé à la face du monde entier proclamer la présente guerre comme une nouvelle croisade et opposer la chrétienté à l'islamisme, mettrait ainsi le comble à cette coupable imprudence, suffirait pour exciter et déchaîner les passions populaires que nous avons déjà peine à empêcher de se manifester. La calamité qui en serait la conséquence prendrait fatalement des proportions dont la pensée seule fait frémir. Elle serait d'autant plus grande que les nouvelles des massacres opérés par les bandes bulgares sur les musulmans de la Thrace et de la Macédoine et de l'exode qui s'en est suivi ont trouvé écho et retentissement dans toutes les couches sociales de l'Empire. Constantinople est, sinon un lieu unique de l'islam, du moins son centre politique universellement reconnu comme tel dans le monde musulman. Y entrer en conquérant, ce serait soulever l'islam sans même qu'il fût nécessaire au Calife de proclamer la guerre sainte. Qui pourrait alors empêcher des désordres épouvantables à Constantinople et dans le reste de l'Empire où des milliers de familles chrétiennes, ottomanes et européennes habitent mêlées aux musulmans? Tous les efforts du Gouvernement pour refréner l'indignation et la colère de ceux-ci se tourneraient contre lui, qu'on accuserait de trahison à la foi islamique. Des massacres s'ensuivraient jusque dans les parties les plus reculées de nos provinces et malgré toutes les diligences de notre part pour en prévenir ou empêcher l'éclosion. Il est à craindre de voir arriver en plein vingtième siècle le retour à des luttes sanglantes entre deux grandes portions de l'humanité. En présence donc d'un tel danger, qui peut éclater d'un moment à l'autre si par malheur les armées de l'ennemi sont victorieuses, il est de toute nécessité que les Gouvernements des Grandes Puissances fassent entendre d'avance au Roi Ferdinand qu'elles s'opposeront énergiquement à la réalisation du projet funeste qu'on lui attribue. Nul doute que nous opposerons à l'ennemi une défense énergique à Tchataldja, mais il est de notre devoir quand même d'envisager l'éventualité où ce rempart venait à céder.

Tel est notre préoccupation, que je vous prie également d'exposer à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Constantinople, le 8 *novembre*, 1912.

[46989] No. 262.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 511.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 8, 1912.

ON the 2nd November Tewfik Pasha warmly denied, in conversation with Sir A. Nicolson, the reports in the press as to the complete rout of the Turkish troops. His Highness said the real campaign was only just beginning, and he was sure that in a few days something decisive in favour of the Turks would occur. Nazim Pasha had been telegraphing quietly all day yesterday from his head-quarters. If he had been routed he would not be there, and if he were sending false news, as many averred, facts would soon betray him. Tewfik Pasha said reinforcements were continually arriving; the Turkish right wing was very successful, and fighting was still proceeding at Lake Bourgas.

Sir A. Nicolson did not discuss the matter.

His Highness asked Sir A. Nicolson if it were true M. Dragoumis has arrived in Crete as Governor-General. Sir A. Nicolson replied in the affirmative, but said no real change in the status of Crete could take place without the consent of the Powers. In any case, Crete was now a question of little importance and quite in the background. Tewfik Pasha agreed.

Sir A. Nicolson also told Tewfik Pasha we were unable to agree to the surtax, and that we had telegraphed to your Excellency in this sense.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[47734] No. 263.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 259.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 8, 1912.

THE following I understand to be the pith of instructions sent to the Italian chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburgh in regard to the Servian claim to a port (San Juan de Medua or Durazzo) on the Adriatic, which Austria-Hungary will not admit or permit:—

The Italian chargé d'affaires is to inform M. Sazonof that—

1. The claim of Servia violates the principle of nationalities on which a general Balkan settlement is to be based.

2. It impairs seriously the autonomy or independence of Albania, for the maintenance of which Austria-Hungary and Italy have engagements.

3. It would inflame the feelings of the Albanians, the enemies of the Serbs, and would provoke continual disturbances, revolutions, and be dangerous to peace.

4. Austria-Hungary has shown remarkable moderation in admitting other Servian claims.

5. Servia can find an outlet to the sea elsewhere than on the Adriatic.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[47633] No. 264.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 9.)

(No. 170.)

Sir, *Athens, November* 2, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 162 of the 25th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a continuation of the diary of the war, taken from the official bulletins, up to yesterday's date.

It will be seen that they are extremely meagre, and the reticence of the commander-in-chief during the last few days is giving rise to rumours that the Turks are showing unexpected resistence before Monastir. What is as probable is that the Greeks are marking time until the Servians come up from the north, so as to place the Turks between two fires. General Soutzo, commanding the cavalry division with the Crown Prince's army, has returned to Athens, and is leaving on a mission to the Servian army.

There appears to be reason to believe that both in the big battle at Sarantoporos and in the smaller engagements the Greeks losses have been heavier than the published casualty lists indicate. This is corroborated, not only by the enclosed despatch from His Majesty's consul at Volo, but by the impressions of Captain H. H. Kelly, R.E., for whom I obtained permission to proceed as far as Larissa.

Reports of cruelties committed by the Turks in Epirus are frequent, but have never been substantiated on first hand evidence by the general in command. It is probably true that many villages have been burnt. As I understand that 2,500 Cretans have been sent to reinforce General Sapountsakis, I fear that reprisals may take place.

As all military news is strictly censored, the statement of a paper that Greece has at this moment 174,000 men under arms and can if necessary furnish 50,000 more, may at least be regarded as credible.

The sinking of the "Fethi Bulend" appears to have been a creditable exploit, carried out in exact accordance with a pre-arranged plan. The ship might have proved herself of some value in the defence of Salonica against the Greek land forces.

His Majesty's consul at Piræus informs me that several hundred Greek irregulars have embarked for Katerina.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 264.

Diary of the War, October 25 to November 1, 1912.

List of Casualties.

	Killed.	Wounded.
At Sarantoporos, 22nd October—		
Officers	18	39
N.c.o's. and men	169	1,037
In Epirus up to 24th October—		
Officers	1	3
N.c.o's. and men	4	126

October 25.—The cavalry brigade advanced towards Kozani, and finding it had been evacuated by the enemy, occupied it. The enthusiasm of the inhabitants is indescribable.

Dated from Servia.

DANGLIS.

October 25.—To-day the enemy withdrew from Kinfa, a position on which a stubborn fight had been waged for three days, the enemy suffering severe losses. After a reconnaissance towards Philippiada, I ordered that town to be occupied by a suitable force this evening. To-day a detachment is descending from Grimbovo with the object of occupying Strevina; a reconnaissance is also being made towards the Koumoutsades village and defile.

(Continues with statements on hearsay of atrocities committed by order of the Turkish commander on the villagers of Koumoutsades).

Dated from Arta.

SAPOUNTSAKIS.

October 26.—Yesterday at 5·20 P.M. we occupied Philippiada, Louros, Elevtherokhori, and the Pantanassa Bridge, and at 7 P.M. Strevina. The enemy in retreating abandoned large quantities of ammunition, provisions, and other stores. Twelve prisoners (one officer) taken.

Dated from Arta.

SAPOUNTSAKIS.

October 27.—To-day our troops occupied the Koumoutsades–Ponte Pigadia defile and that of Louros.

October 27 (8 P.M.).—I arrived this afternoon at 4 and established my head-quarters here. Immense enthusiasm; *Te Deum*, &c.

Dated from Kozani.

CONSTANTINE.

October 27.—Army advancing to-day and occupied the environs of Kozani. Nothing new.

Dated from Kozani.

DANGLIS.

October 28.—To-day movements of troops and reconnaissances were made.

Dated from Arta.

SAPOUNTSAKIS.

October.—After a skirmish in the Tripotamo defile (on the road to Verria) the enemy retreated, abandoning five ammunition waggons. The army continued to advance.

Dated from Kozani.

DANGLIS.

October 29.—Our left wing drove back the enemy after a stubborn fight near Kailar, and occupied Nalbankiöi. The Turkish army, seized with panic, abandoned boxes of artillery ammunition and other matériel. Two standards were captured. The battle lasted until midday. Our casualties over 100.

Dated from Nalbankiöi.

(Unsigned.)

October 29.—Notice issued by the Ministry of War.

After three hours' fighting on the 27th, Katerina was occupied yesterday morning by our troops, which are pursuing the enemy.

October 29.—After the skirmish in the defile of Tripotamos and another at Xerolivadi, the enemy retreated in the night, abandoning Verria, which I entered to-day. The people received us with enthusiasm. The Mussulman inhabitants remained in the town, and the notables tendered their submission. Twelve casualties.

Dated from Kozani.

CONSTANTINE.

October 30.—Colonel Gennadis, with two battalions of evzones, occupied Grevena without resistance on the 27th.

Dated from Kozani.

DANGLIS.

October 31.—Yesterday a detachment of our troops occupied the village of Anogi, north-west of Ponte Pigadia. The village was on fire when our troops entered. Other detachments have advanced and are occupying important positions.

Dated from Arta.

SAPOUNTSAKIS.

November 1.—Skirmishes are taking place between detachments of our army and those of the enemy in the Anogi district and the surrounding positions, and the enemy has been dislodged.

Dated from Arta.

SAPOUNTSAKIS.

October 31.—Have occupied Thasos and Imbros and hoisted the Greek flag. The "Canaris" and a torpedo-boat have been sent this morning to occupy Strati. "Lion" and "Panther" (two of the new English-built destroyers) have joined.

Not dated.

KOUNDOURIOTIS,
Rear-Admiral.

November 1.—Notice issued by the Ministry of Marine.

Samothrace and Strati have been occupied by the fleet.

November 1.—Yesterday evening we successfully torpedoed the Turkish cruiser "Fethi Bulend" in Salonica harbour. The vessel heeled over to starboard and sank. Our vessel and crew untouched. Thence we proceeded to Katerina.

BOTSIS,
*Lieutenant in command of torpedo-boat No. 11.**

Enclosure 2 in No. 264.

Consul Merlin to Sir F. Elliot.

Sir, *Volo, October 30, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you I have just received information from Larissa that a trustworthy report is current there that the Greek losses at Verria were exceedingly heavy. The Crown Prince's army is said to number 70,000 men while the Turkish force is thought not to have exceeded 30,000, and may have been less. So far as is at present known there were few casualties on the Turkish side, whose troops

* One of the old German-built boats

evacuated Verria and will probably repeat the same tactics at some other place on the line of march, or may fall back on Salonica to join the forces there. Hitherto the Crown Prince's army has during the advance outnumbered the opposing forces by at least two to one, if the reports generally credited are true.

I have, &c.
A. A. C. E. MERLIN.

[47641] No. 265.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 191.)

Sir, *Vienna, November 6, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the *exposé* delivered by Count Berchtold yesterday before the Austrian Delegation at Budapest, of which I have already sent a short summary by telegraph. Appended to this translation is a résumé of the comments made by the Viennese press on his Excellency's speech.

For the first time in the history of the Austro-Hungarian Delegations the *exposé* of the Minister for Foreign Affairs has preceded the Speech from the Throne. It is understood that this unusual procedure was adopted in order to meet the general desire for an immediate statement of policy and also to curtail as much as possible the debates on foreign affairs in the Delegations. Count Berchtold made it clear, as you will observe, at the end of his speech that a detailed discussion of his *exposé* would be undesirable.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

Enclosure in No. 265.

Exposé by Count Berchtold.

(Translation.)

IN the short space of time which separates us from the last session of the Delegations, events have occurred in the sphere of international politics to which a far-reaching significance must be attached.

Before I devote my close attention to these events, I should wish to refer to an occurrence which possesses particular importance for us as regards our alliance.

By the peace of Lausanne the conflict between Italy and Turkey has been brought to a conclusion after a year's duration, and our ally has entered into the undisputed possession of an extensive territory on the northern coast of Africa. We contributed in facilitating the conclusion of peace, and immediately afterwards we recognised the sovereignty of Italy over Libya. I should wish to observe with sincere satisfaction that our ally has in this manner reached an object at which she has aimed for decades past, and has found an extensive field in which to plant the advanced culture of Italy in foreign soil.

The acceleration of an agreement between the two belligerents was not, indeed, able to stop the outbreak of the conflagration in the Balkans, but at the same time it prevented any further complication of an already serious situation. On this account as well we must therefore welcome the conclusion of the treaty of peace at Lausanne.

On the occasion of my recent visit to Italy I was able to convince myself that our attitude towards the war conducted by that kingdom with Turkey is fully appreciated not only by the Government, but also by the people of Italy. I should not wish to attribute to this circumstance alone the sympathetic reception accorded to me in the allied kingdom. The cordial echo aroused here by Italy's present attitude can at the same time serve as a guarantee for a new strengthening of our allied relations and also of the Triple Alliance.

The situation in the Near East, where all the Balkan States have taken up arms, has assumed a very grave character.

You are, gentlemen, aware that the diplomacy of the Great Powers has since the outbreak of hostilities used every endeavour, at the instance of M. Poincaré, to bring about by reciprocal discussion amongst the Powers the possibility of a mediatory intervention at a given moment, and thereby to curtail in some measure the horrors of war. We have, in the closest co-operation with our allies and in active agreement with Russia and England, taken part in this exchange of views, and we are at this

moment in contact with the Powers in the conviction that we are in this manner assisting in the fulfilment of the desire (so generally held in this country as well) that the conflagration may be extinguished as soon as practicable.

The course of the war so far has brought the Balkan States great successes—successes under the influence of which these States have made an essential alteration in the aims which they themselves chose. Whilst the demands of the Balkan States (expressed in their war manifestoes) originally consisted in the introduction of administrative reforms intended to ameliorate the conditions of life of their compatriots in the Ottoman Empire, the aspirations of the allies are now of a much more far-reaching character and are no longer compatible with the principle of the integrity of Turkey.

The only consideration which can effect our policy—influenced as it is by no tendencies towards expansion—is that of combining the necessity of maintaining peace with the duty (the highest that can be laid on us) of protecting the interests of the monarchy from every damage. Up till now our attitude towards the events of the war has preserved a character of restraint and moderation which has been appreciated in all quarters.

We propose to continue in the future also in this direction, being conscious of our own strength, which offers full security that we can make our voice heard. I do not doubt that we shall be able to do this without coming into conflict with the legitimate claims of others.

We are ready to take into full consideration ("in weitgehender Weise Rechnung zu tragen") the new situation created by the victories of the Balkan States, and in this manner to create the basis of a permanent friendly understanding with them.

On the other hand, we also have the right to demand that the legitimate interests of the monarchy shall suffer no injury as a result of the new arrangement of things.

The calm and moderate attitude of the Kingdom of Roumania, connected with us by ties of close friendship, has been of importance (which must not be underrated) for the course of events, and we hope that its particular interests, resting on the geographical situation, will find due consideration.

I have endeavoured, gentlemen, to give you, so far as this was possible for me in the actual circumstances, a clear view of the present situation; and I should only wish to request you to show your confidence in me (which you have displayed on previous occasions) at this serious moment by contenting yourselves with my brief remarks and by refraining from a discussion of them in detail—a proceeding which would not be calculated to lighten my task in view of the delicate character of the negotiations now in progress.

November 5, 1912.

[47642] No. 266.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 192.)

Sir, *Vienna, November 6, 1912.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to report that the Emperor this morning delivered an address (of which the following is a translation) to the Austrian and Hungarian Delegations at their reception by His Imperial Majesty in the Royal Palace at Budapest:—

"It is with sincere satisfaction and with the warmest thanks that I receive the assurance of your loyal attachment.

"Since the meeting of the last Delegations, grave hostile complications have broken out in the Balkan Peninsula which demand increased vigilance.

"In view of the fact that important interests of the monarchy may be affected by the conflict, the speedy return of tranquil political and commercial conditions in the Near East appears urgently desirable.

"My Government will be prepared, in agreement with the allied Cabinets, to take part at the appropriate moment in action by the Great Powers to bring about the restoration of peace.

"In the last session of the Delegations extraordinary credits for the army and navy were sanctioned in a most laudable spirit of self-sacrifice, by means of which credits the efficiency of our defences has been strengthened in a satisfactory degree.

"The current demands of my war administration are confined to normal limits.

"An increased sum has been demanded only for the solution of the non-commissioned officer question, which represents a necessary completion of the organisation of the army and navy laid down by the new system.

"Affairs in Bosnia-Herzegovina are progressing in calm and steady development, thanks to the loyal and patriotic attitude of the population. An extensive programme of legislative labours will give the Diet the opportunity of promoting the educational and commercial progress of the two provinces.

"In the conviction that you will proceed with sound discernment and conscientious zeal to the examination of the measures which will be submitted to you, I wish fruitful success to your labours and extend to you a hearty welcome."

The presidents of both the Austrian and Hungarian Delegations, in their addresses to the Emperor, gave expression to the earnest hope that peace might be preserved in Europe and soon restored in the Balkans, but that Austria-Hungary's interests might be defended with all the emphasis due to the position, prestige, and power of the Dual Monarchy.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[47612] No. 267.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 9.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 8, 1912.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 7th instant respecting the possibility of one of His Majesty's ships being required at Jeddah, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that His Majesty's ship "Talbot" should arrive at Perim homeward bound about the 15th instant, and His Majesty's ship "Gibraltar" should arrive at Suez about the 16th instant outward bound.

2. If, during the next few days, information is received that there is likely to be unrest at Jeddah, one or other of these ships might be ordered to call there if the Secretary of State considers it necessary.

I am, &c.
O. MURRAY.

[47658] No. 268.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 9.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 9, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 8th instant, relative to the movements of His Majesty's ships, &c., in the eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 268.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 8, 1912.*

BESIKA Bay.

Vice-Admiral, 3rd squadron, in "King Edward VII" arrived with "Hindustan"

Enclosure 2 in No. 268.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 8, 1912.*

"KING EDWARD VII" and "Hindustan" arrived Besika Bay; "Hampshire" and "Yarmouth" still there. "Asporn" (Austria) and "Emanuele Filiberto" (Italian) left Besika for Constantinople. "Zealandia" and "Africa" due Salonica this afternoon. Nothing officially known here as to any intention of sending Austrian squadron there. "Kaiserin u. Königin Maria Theresia" is there with "Medea" and "Ammiraglio di St. Bon" (Italy), "Oleg" (Russia), now on shore Vespasian Shoal, being assisted by "Bruix" and "Dartmouth."

Enclosure 3 in No. 268.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 8, 1912.*

REPORTED Austrian and German armoured ships being sent Smyrna. Submit orders may be given for "Black Prince" to proceed there for protection of British life and property.

Enclosure 4 in No. 268.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 8, 1912.*

SALONICA.

Turks capitulated.

Enclosure 5 in No. 268.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 8, 1912.*

YOUR No. 282.

"Bruix" "Kaiserin u. Königin Maria Theresia," "Ammiraglio di St. Bon," and "Oleg" constitute foreign men-of-war at Salonica. The last named was floated off Shoal to-day.

Enclosure 6 in No. 268.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *November 8, 1912.*

ORDER "Pegasus" back to England.

Enclosure 7 in No. 268.

Admiralty to Admiral Superintendent, Malta.

(Telegraphic.) *November 8, 1912.*

ORDER "Black Prince," "Cumberland," and ships of 3rd battle squadron now at Malta to proceed to Nauplia to-morrow at ordinary speed. They are to report midnight and noon positions *en route*. Inform commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

[47746] No. 269.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 9.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 9, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated the 9th instant, relative to the movements of His Majesty's ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 269.

Admiralty to Admiral Superintendent, Malta.

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, November 9, 1912.*

NOS. 278 and 279.

Inform commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, vice-admiral 3rd squadron, and rear-admiral 3rd battle squadron that "Dartmouth" or "Yarmouth" is to proceed with despatch to Smyrna, and 2nd division 3rd battle squadron with "Cumberland" and "Black Prince" are to proceed there also at ordinary speed.

[47753] No. 270.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 9.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 9, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated the 9th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 270.

Admiralty to Admiral Superintendent, Malta.

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, November 9, 1912.*

INFORM rear-admiral 3rd battle squadron by wireless telegraphy that navigation is prohibited by night in the narrow passage opposite the Sanjak Kale or outer fortress, Smyrna, in consequence of mines and sunken obstructions, and by day a Government pilot is compulsory. If rear-admiral already has this information by your knowledge it need not be repeated to him.

[47789] No. 271.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Uscub, le 7 novembre, 1912.*

LES consuls Autriche-Hongrie, France, Grande-Bretagne et Russie à Uscub ont décidé collectivement adresser à leurs Gouvernements télégramme suivant :—

"Autorités militaires serbes occupant vilayet Cossovo déclarent refuser appliquer Capitulations aux consuls et sujets respectifs et ne pas reconnaître *de jure* les consuls accrédités auprès des autorités ottomanes sur territoire occupé par forces serbes."

Sollicite instructions de votre Excellence.

[47713] No. 272.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 420.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 8, 1912.*

I COMMUNICATED to Minister for Foreign Affairs substance of your telegram No. 1187 of 7th November and of your telegram No. 680 of 7th November to Paris.

His Excellency said that he quite agreed with you that Balkan States should themselves formulate the scheme of general settlement, but that it was very difficult to find a solution acceptable to both Austria and Servia. He had spoken very seriously to Austrian and German Ambassadors as to necessity of final honest and straightforward settlement. Triple Alliance had now declared themselves against a Servian port on the Adriatic, and, if they had their way, they would leave door open to future conflicts. It was not fair to deny to Servia access to the sea, and Austria should remember that Servia, supported by Balkan confederation, was a factor that would have to be reckoned with, while her own position in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the large Servian population, was not all that could be desired. I observed that both Servia and Bulgaria, and more especially the latter, must be exhausted by the war, and would have quite enough to do restoring order and establishing themselves in the territories which they were respectively annexing. Bulgaria, moreover, had to settle matters with Roumania, and could not wish to quarrel with Austria as well. Servia had no right, on ethnographical grounds, to claim a slice of Albania, and I should have thought her economic interests would be sufficiently safeguarded by reviving the old idea of a trans-Balkan railway that was to have its terminus at a port on Adriatic, and by guaranteeing her commercial access to it in the same way as his Excellency had suggested that Austria should be guaranteed commercial access to the Ægean.

Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he had already thought of it, but that Servia would never consent. I repeated that she could not hope to impose her wishes on Austria, while were she to provoke Austria to war she could hardly expect Russia to support her by force of arms merely on account of desired port. His Excellency replied that public opinion in Russia might compel the Government to action.

His Excellency then said that plan of Triple Alliance evidently was to establish an Austro-Italian protectorate over Albania, under the guise of autonomous province, under a Turkish prince. Such a condominium would in the end lead to war between Italy and Austria. That was their affair, but the question was, were we bound to recognise such an arrangement if Austria refused to meet Servia's wishes? We might make our consent to it conditional on the consent of Austria to a Servian port on the Adriatic.

[48096] No. 273.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 598.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 8, 1912.*

FOLLOWING by wireless telegraphy :—

"Consul-general, Salonica, reports that Salonica capitulated, negotiations fallen through, and Turkish forces capitulated."

[47667] No. 274.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 599.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 9, 1912.*

AUSTRIAN and Italian ships "Aspern" and "Emmanuele Filiberti" arrived.

[47712] No. 275.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 600.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 9, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 852 of 24th October.
Major Cunliffe Owen has left for Athens.

[48047] No. 276.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No 601.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 9, 1912.*

REPORTS appearing in some English newspapers, notably "Daily Chronicle," of condition of affairs in Constantinople are grossly exaggerated. While there is a considerable feeling of nervousness, for which the Government are to some extent responsible, there have not been any untoward incidents.

Committee of Union and Progress, relying on version of your reply in the House of Commons to Mr. King, to the effect that the Balkan States can lay down conditions of peace, have approached the Sultan, declaring that the present Anglophil Grand Vizier cannot help the country and demanding that a Committee Cabinet under, for example, Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, be installed with the idea of fighting to a finish. Since yesterday there have been tendencies to shape Moslem opinion on religious lines by way of reply to Kind Ferdinand's proclamation.

[47760] No. 277.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 602.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 9, 1912.*

AUSTRIAN, French, Russian, and British consuls at Cavalla have telegraphed to their respective embassies that more than 20,000 refugees have arrived there, that there is no flour, that famine is imminent, and that the situation is grave. They ask that a man-of-war may be sent to protect lives and property of foreigners.

I am consulting my colleagues. In case that we should decide that it is advisable to send a ship there and it fall to us to provide one, am I authorised to ask senior naval officer at Besika Bay to send one? I understand that there are twelve British subjects at Cavalla.

[47761] No. 278.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 603.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 9, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 602 of to-day.
French Ambassador has directed a French man-of-war to proceed to Cavalla from Besika Bay.
This should be sufficient.
(Sent to Admiralty.)

[47762] No. 279.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 604.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Constantinople, November 9, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 969 of 8th November: Detention of ships.
Local agents have no power to fix terms. Please communicate with central offices of firms in England. I had thought from your telegram No. 945 of 5th November all arrangements with Khedivial had been made in London.
"Towfikieh" arrived.

[47763] No. 280.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 605.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 9, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"Bulgarians occupied Tchorkesskeui last night. Their advanced troops now probably on a line 20 miles west of Tchataldja lines. Mahmud Muktar was at Sinekli on 7th. This probably means that Turkish left wing is retiring from Sarai on Tchataldja, and should include six battalions of Anassia redifs which had been landed at Midia.

"Attempt to land at Midia two divisions from third army inspection (probably Trebizond redifs and 29th Nizam) failed, and they were disembarked at San Stefano on 4th and 5th. With these and 6th Nizam division, which was not here in time to participate in recent fighting, there should be some 30,000 fresh troops available for defence of the lines, but they seem very slow in moving out of San Stefano, and I hear ominous reports of discouragement of Turkish commanders at the front."

[48048] No. 281.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 194.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, November 9, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 675 of 6th November: Situation at Constantinople.
French Government have sent similar instructions to the French Ambassador at Constantinople.

[47657] No. 282.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 108.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, November 9, 1912.*

CAPTURE of Salonica, although announced officially yesterday, is not confirmed yet.

[47772] No. 283.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 156.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, November 9, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 360 of 8th November: Your conversation with German chargé d'affaires.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that it has been impossible to avoid some exchange of views on Adriatic question owing to communication of Servian Government to Powers; but he entirely shares your view that proper moment for its discussion is not during excitement caused by war, but after conditions of peace have been definitely formulated, when the Powers will naturally have to consider enormous changes which are in contemplation.

This was Austria's view also, and all she had said related to a definite occupation by Servia of any portion of Albania and not to a temporary inroad on her part during the war into that country, which, as you had rightly pointed out, was still a Turkish province. As he knew this to be the view of the Austro-Hungarian Government he did not think that it was necessary to approach them again on the subject. He still thinks, however, that it would be useful if the attention of the Russian Government could be called to danger of over-zealous Russian diplomatists speaking as if Russia made it a point of honour that Albania should be incorporated in the new Servia. He considers that, as Russia has attained her object by practically giving Slav nations the whole of

Turkey in Europe, including some portions which are only partially Slav, there remains for her no more necessity to support excessive demands in the case of a country like Albania, which has no Slav population whatever. His Excellency is informing German chargé d'affaires in London of these views, but wished me to telegraph them to you in the meantime.

[47774] No. 284.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 109.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, November 9, 1912.*

SALONICA surrendered yesterday evening—25,000 prisoners.

[47773] No. 285.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 157.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, November 9, 1912.*

YOUR circular telegram to Sophia, &c., of 8th November: Mediation.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that since appeal mentioned in your above-mentioned telegram, Ottoman Government seem to have made another appeal to the Powers to intervene and stop the advance of the Bulgarians in view of disorder and massacres which will probably occur should they enter Constantinople. His Excellency suggests that Ambassadors at Constantinople should ask Ottoman Government what they really want. If this prove to be an armistice on terms laid down in their first appeal, then Secretary of State proposes to instruct German representatives at the four Balkan capitals in the sense you have done. If, however, Ottoman Government say that they wish Powers to intervene to stop Bulgarian advance, he thinks that they should be told that it is impossible.

[47775] No. 286.

Mr. Bryce to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 124.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Washington, November 9, 1912.*

UNITED STATES have dispatched to Constantinople two cruisers; expected to arrive in a fortnight.

[47755] No. 287.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 162.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, November 9, 1912.*

ITALIAN Government have ordered a second ship to proceed from Stampalia to Constantinople with equipment of beds and supplies in consequence of alarmist telegram received from Italian consul, who apprehends that if mediation does not take place Turkish Government will have to yield to military view of resistance to the last, which would entail massacres.

[47752] No. 288.

Viscount Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, November 9, 1912.*

TOWN of Cavalla and the island of Thasos are claimed by the Khedive as the property of his family. His Highness hopes that this fact may be noted in any future arrangements. Egyptian Government propose, if you have no objection, to communicate this claim to the Greek representative here.

[47767] No. 289.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 131. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, November 9, 1912.*

WITH reference to telegram No. 160 from His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome, the Bulgarian Government, early in the week, dispatched M. Danef to Vienna in order to interview the Austrian Foreign Minister. His instructions were to inform the latter that Bulgaria intended to afford Servia their support in her intention to acquire a port on the Adriatic. King Ferdinand desired M. Danef to convey polite messages as a means of gilding the pill. M. Danef, who is President of the Sobranjé, is at present at Belgrade on his way back to Sophia.

San Giovanni di Medua has not yet been definitely assigned to Montenegro, and it is conceivable that Servia would content herself with that port failing some other solution of the question.

[47714] No. 290.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(Telegraphic.) *Beyrouth, November 9, 1912.*

YOUR telegram of 7th November.

In view of the angry mood of the Moslems against the Turkish Government on account of the humiliating reverses and the undisguised exultation of the Christians, disturbances may occur, and owing to the probable inability of the authorities to maintain order, presence of British men-of-war in these waters with discretionary power to land men for the protection of British lives and property at Aleppo and Damascus, as well as ports, would be advisable

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[48165] No. 291.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 358.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 9, 1912.*

AS the Austro-Hungarian (Italian) Ambassador spoke to me of the situation to-day, I expressed my views generally, as I had done yesterday in my telegrams No. 360 to Sir E. Goschen and No. 1201 to Sir G. Buchanan of 8th November.

[48293] No. 292.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 9, 1912.*

I SAID, speaking unofficially to the Bulgarian Minister to-day, that it was a great pity the Servian-Adriatic question was being discussed separately. It would be much better for the allies to formulate their terms of peace with Turkey as a whole. So far as I could see, unless there were difficulties with Roumania—a point of which I could not judge, and which Bulgaria no doubt had in mind—the question of Servian access to the Adriatic might be the only difficulty in the whole settlement. I believed, if dealt with later as part of the whole, it could be settled peaceably, but if Servia provoked a quarrel with Austria about it now, the whole settlement of European Turkey which the allies desired might be imperilled. Austria was now apparently prepared not to put forward any territorial claims of her own, but if she went to war

* Also to Sir R. Rodd (No. 497).

with Servia before the war of the allies with Turkey was over her attitude towards the whole settlement of European Turkey might be altered.

The Bulgarian Minister said he was entirely of my opinion. He deprecated the interview which M. Pashitch had published, and said he would tell M. Gueshof, who had influence with M. Pashitch, what I had said.

(Repeated to the five embassies.)

[47768] No. 293.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 9, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 147 of 8th November.

Finance Minister, whom I saw to-day, had already heard of the French proposal as to mediation. He said that if an enquiry were made by the Powers the Cabinet would urge their allies and the Bulgarian generals to agree to an armistice on the understanding that the Turks evacuated the Tchataldja lines and agreed to their programme. His Excellency seemed to doubt, however, if the Bulgarian generals would accept even these terms; he said that the whole army was determined to enter Constantinople. The King might perhaps endeavour to restrain them, but he would only do so at the risk of losing his present popularity.

[47770] No. 294.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 9, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 87 of 8th November, and Rome telegram No. 160 of 7th November.

Reuter's correspondent, who came to see me this morning, told me that the Prime Minister had recently declared that there could be no question of mediation until Servia had taken possession of a port on the Adriatic. This was confirmed to me this afternoon by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. On my referring to the tone of the Austrian press, he said that the Servian Government realised the situation was becoming very serious. He also told me confidentially that they had been warned by the French chargé d'affaires on behalf of Austria, and he thought, after consultation with Germany, that the occupation of an Adriatic port by Servia would not be tolerated, but Servia would not give way except to force, and Bulgaria would stand by Servia.

He asked me what the attitude of His Majesty's Government would be. I replied that I had no indication whatever. I asked why Servia could not be content with outlet for her commerce to the Ægean Sea. He gave as his reason that route to Ægean Sea would not lie wholly in Servian territory and Servia must have a port of her own in order to develop freely and satisfy her requirements; but the insistence of Servia of an Adriatic port is here attributed to Russian instigation.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[47787] No. 295.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 424.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 9, 1912.*

I HAVE spoken to the Minister for Foreign Affairs as in the terms of your telegram No. 1201 and of your telegram No. 360 to Berlin of 8th November.

He said that he quite agreed with you that we ought to try and prevent the question of port on the Adriatic being discussed separately, and to leave it to form part

of general settlement to be sanctioned at a conference after the war. He had never encouraged the Servians to put forward a claim for the whole of Albania, and, on Servian Minister speaking to him yesterday about Durazzo, he had told him that this was a matter on which Servia could not count on Russian support. The Russian Minister at Belgrade had received no instructions to urge Servia to demand even San Giovanni di Medua, though, as he was aware that the Russian Government were supporting the latter's claim, he may have said something which Servian Government may have regarded as an encouragement. His Excellency told me that the Austrian Ambassador had informed him some days ago that his Government desired to see a closer commercial connection established with Servia, and had at the same time enquired his views with regard to the proposed Adriatic port. His Excellency had replied that the Russian Government supported Servian claim to port and would raise no objections to an improvement of Austro-Servian commercial relations by means of new treaty, but that they could not consent to anything in the shape of a customs union. He had impressed on the Ambassador the necessity in Austria's own interests of having a contented Servia as a neighbour, which would not be the case were Servia refused access to the Adriatic. He had not seen either the Austrian or German Ambassador since.

I said that, if Russia were to let it be known that she was determined to support at all costs Servian claim she would expose herself to the danger of contributing to facilitate war with Austria, if not to other risks of fresh humiliations. I could not believe that the Emperor would allow himself to be dragged into war merely to give Servia a slice of Albanian territory, when Servia's economic interests might be safeguarded by a railway under proper guarantees. It would be, moreover, nullifying the [group omitted: ? efforts] which his Excellency had made during the Turco-Italian war to keep Italy as a counterpoise to Austria in the Balkans, as in Albanian question Austria and Italy were equally interested. If Bulgaria supported Servia in such a war Roumania would join in on other side and make good her pretensions to serious rectification of her frontier.

His Excellency replied that personally he would be quite satisfied were Servia to be given commercial access to the Adriatic in the same way as Austria to the Ægean Sea. Servia, however, would never accept this. Servians, he feared, were losing their heads and had told foreign consuls at Uskub that the Capitulations no longer existed. He trusted that His Majesty's representatives at Belgrade and Sophia would be instructed to speak in the same sense as you proposed speaking to the Bulgarian Minister in London. He had told the Servian Minister yesterday that Servia must not count on Russia's armed support; Russian public opinion, however, had to be reckoned with, and, had Austria to attack Servia in order to make her abandon her claim to the Adriatic port, nothing could prevent Russia taking part in the war.

His Excellency told me yesterday that the language which he had held to the Austrian and German Ambassadors was so serious that, had he said another word, it would have partaken of menace. I therefore thought it advisable to warn him of the grave consequences which might ensue.

Servian Minister, who has just been to see me, said that Austria was bluffing and forgot that Triple *Entente* was behind Servia. I replied that, speaking purely personally, Servia need not think that we were going to war on such a question and that if she provoked Austria she might risk losing the fruits of her victories. I impressed on him the necessity of leaving the question to be discussed with all the others after the war.

[47783] No. 296.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 425.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 10, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Sebastopol, 9th November:—

"'Tri Svyatitelya' sailed to Constantinople, and 'Cronstadt' with 50th infantry regiment leaving to-day; 49th infantry regiment will probably embark to-morrow."

[47764] No. 297.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 606.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 9, 1912.*

MINISTRY of War have asked Major Doughty-Wylie to send one unit from here to Scutari. Difficulties of getting there from here very great and journey very long. If there is another Red Cross unit available could one be sent from London viâ Montenegro after necessary arrangements with that Government?

[47769] No. 298.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 133.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 9, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 125 of 6th November.

All reports as to action against the Tchataldja lines are premature. A Minister informs me that transport difficulties are enormous owing to the constant rains.

It was particularly arduous work bringing up guns; he did not anticipate reliable news from the front for three days; he admitted that the allies were massing over 250,000 men for their final effort.

[47771] No. 299.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 162.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, November 9, 1912.*

FROM a conversation which I had this morning with the President of the Council I feel positive that Italy's support has been definitely secured to Austrian views regarding a Servian Adriatic port, and that the Triple Alliance is solid in opposing it. President argued that if the integrity of Albania was touched Austria would claim her share, and Italy could not afford to risk an Austrian extension in the Adriatic. His argument is, however, no doubt due to fear of opposition of Austria. He said that Austria would stand firm, and if Russia intervened to support Servia or the Balkan League the *casus fœderis* of the Triple Alliance would arise. It was not to be believed that Europe could be plunged into war on such an issue, and he felt that Servia must be content to have access to the Ægean Sea and an Adriatic outlet by using a Montenegrin port under a customs union. (End of R.)

Meanwhile the Russian Ambassador has received information that the Russian Government support Servian claim and said he would see President of the Council.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs returns to-night.

[47788] No. 300.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 133.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 10, 1912.*

ALBANIA.

Ismail Kemal, the Albanian chief, called on me to-day, and informed me that he was shortly going to Valona to attend a meeting of the Albanian chiefs, who intend to draw up a memorial of their wishes to be sent to the Powers. He told me that Albanians were determined to maintain the country, *i.e.*, district where their language is generally spoken, shall not be absorbed by any Balkan State. They would fight to the bitter end rather than allow their country to be dismembered. If Servia is allowed to absorb a large portion of Northern Albania it will be followed by continual state of unrest and insurrection until Austria and Italy are forced to intervene. He suggested that Albania might be divided into tribal cantons somewhat on the Swiss model, with a Prince at the head chosen by Europe.

(Very Confidential.)

I pressed Ismail Kemal to tell me what the views of the Albanian chiefs were with regard to what the future foreign policy of an independent Albania would be. He replied that the inevitable consequences of the new arrangement in the Balkans would be that Bulgaria would try and dominate the other States so that before long the Balkans would be divided into two groups, composed of Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro on the one side and Roumania, Albania, and Greece on the other. This would produce a balance of power in the Near East, and it may be one of the reasons why Austria is so determined to maintain independence of Albania.

[47784] No. 301.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 426.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 10, 1912.*

YOUR telegram to Sophia No. 148 of 9th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is very grateful for language which you held to the Bulgarian representative, as well as for what he had heard from the Russian Ambassador, that you had said to the Austrian Ambassador respecting the danger of Austria taking military action should Servia occupy an Adriatic port during the course of the war. He intends speaking in the same sense to the Austrian Ambassador here. He told me that since I saw him yesterday the German Ambassador had come and asked him whether Russia intended making this question a trial of strength. His Excellency had replied that both Russia and Germany had had experience of such trials of strength in 1909 and last year, and that if Germany were to have recourse to her Agadir policy in the present case it might have very serious consequences. This had, he said, made impression on the Ambassador, and his Excellency had then proceeded to say that it was absolutely necessary that Servia should be emancipated from her present dependence on the surrounding States, but that the question how this was to be effected, whether by a railway or otherwise, was one which ought to be left to be discussed by the Powers as a part of the whole settlement when the war was over.

The step reported to have been taken by the Triple Alliance at Belgrade has made a very bad impression here, and the tone of the press is very hostile to Austria. Should the latter resort to military pressure on Servia, Russian Government would be forced to take action.

Minister for Foreign Affairs had heard, presumably from the German Ambassador, that Servian representative at Berlin had stated that Servia would be supported by Russia as well as by the allies. He has caused the Servian Government to be informed that Russia has an Ambassador at Berlin through whom the Russian Government communicate with German Government, and that Servian representative had no business to speak as he did.

He is telling the Servian Minister that it is useless for his Government to count on the support of Bulgaria, as the latter has lost 50,000 killed and wounded and is incapable of taking part in a new war.

His Excellency hears from Minister of Finance that Bulgarian Government may consent to cede Silistria and a small strip of surrounding territory to Roumania and to guarantee that no fortifications shall be erected along the frontier.

His Excellency seemed less inclined to insist on a conference at the end of the war in view of the opposition of Balkan States.

[47790] No. 302.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, November 10, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from Consul at Spezia:—

"'Benedetto Brin' left for Constantinople at 5 A.M. to-day."

[47793] No. 303.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Beirout, November 10, 1912.*

YOUR telegram of yesterday.

"Barham" arrived.

Over 100 British subjects Beirout, and about 1,000 in my district, and those at Aleppo, Damascus.

Consuls of above-mentioned posts will be advised in the sense of your telegram.

[47815] No. 304.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 930.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 3, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, reporting on the progress of the operations of the Montenegrin army before Scutari up to the 13th October.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 304.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 141.)

Sir, *Salonica, October 22, 1912.*

I RECEIVED last night a telegram from Mr. Vice-Consul Summa, which appears to have taken eight days to reach me viâ the Dalmatian port of Castelnuovo, and of which I venture to submit the following paraphrase, rather for purposes of record than for its intrinsic interest, since I presume that the news contained in it has long since reached your Excellency by shorter routes:—

The Montenegrin troops succeeded in capturing Detchitch and Touzi after numerous assaults, in which they were supported by the Malissors of the neighbouring clans (Grouda and Hotti).

Continuing their march in strong force, they had, on the 13th October, pushed their advance as far as Vraka, Obotti, and Zogaj. (The first of these places is situated about 4 miles north of Scutari, on the eastern side of the lake, and the third at about the same distance along the western shore, whilst Obotti is a village on the right bank of the Boyana, about 8 miles below the town.) From Zogaj they had come almost as far as the Tarabosh (the heights dominating the city of Scutari), where there had been incessant fighting attended with severe loss on either side.

Mr. Summa adds that the Mussulman population of the town was fully armed and equipped and decided to assist the troops in opposing a desperate resistance to the last, but he had good reasons for supposing that their forces were quite insufficient for the purpose of holding the town against a determined attack.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[47817] No. 305.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 932.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 3, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica transmitting a résumé of his telegraphic correspondence with this embassy respecting the course of events in Macedonia, and reporting the action taken by him in consequence of the suppression of his cypher telegrams since the 25th ultimo.

All these telegrams have eventually reached me, with the exception of the last one mentioned—No. 66 of the 27th October—but many of them were held up at the telegraph office here for five days.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 305.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 143.)

Sir, *Salonica, October 29, 1912.*

SINCE the commencement of hostilities events have marched with such rapidity, it has been so difficult to obtain any reliable information concerning them on this side, and communications have been so uncertain that I have not as yet addressed any despatches to your Excellency, but have limited myself to communicating by telegraph the leading features, and supplementing my telegrams by transmitting such details as I was able to obtain in the form of private letters to the military attaché.

A résumé of the telegrams dispatched is annexed hereto (Enclosure No. 2).

Yesterday, however, I received from the telegraph office here a communication copy of which will be found in Enclosure No. 3, and from which it appeared that none of my telegrams after No. 60 of the 25th had been delivered to the embassy. On discovering this I withdrew my telegram No. 66, which had not been dispatched from here on account of a temporary interruption of the line, and substituted for it the following telegram *en clair*, also bearing the number 66:—

"Five telegrams addressed to you are held up at Constantinople. I am informing vali that Ottoman Government will be held responsible for all consequences to interests of British subjects resulting from this unjustifiable interference with official correspondence."

I addressed to the vali a *takrir*, of which a copy is annexed in Enclosure No. 4, and followed it up with personal representations, which I insisted on his immediately communicating to the Minister of the Interior by wire. Nazim Pasha at once admitted the well-foundedness of my complaint, and directed a telegram to be dispatched to the Porte in the sense desired, but no reply has been so far received. I also addressed to your Excellency a telegram *en clair* in the following terms:—

"Situation déplorable. Troupes turques en pleine déroute partout. Démoralisation complète. Anxiété croissante parmi Européens,"

pointing out to the vali that the first result of the prohibition of cypher messages was merely to give undesirable publicity to the expression of opinions which, out of consideration for the Turkish Government, we ourselves would prefer to keep private.

I have to-day also had the honour of addressing to your Excellency the following telegrams *en clair*:—

No. 68, "Karaferia surrendered last night"; and No. 69, "'Loreley' arrived."

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 305.

Record of Telegrams addressed to His Majesty's Embassy from the Commencement of Hostilities down to the 27th October.

October 19:—(No. 50.) It has been reported that a number of Greeks, estimated at 1,000, under the command of Kapitan Mastrapas (or Maiapas), have been disembarked on the coast near Platamona, with the object of occupying the pass on the road which leads from Caterina to Elassona. All the telegraph and telephone wires connecting Salonica with the Chalcidic Peninsula have been cut, and it is supposed that other landings have been effected there also.

(It transpired subsequently that the number of Greeks landed on the Caterina coast had been much exaggerated, and that the landings in Cassandra were merely small bands of irregulars.)

October 21.—(No. 52.) Elassona has been occupied by the Greek forces without any serious opposition, which, however, it is expected that the Turks will offer in the defile of Sarantoporon. The Greeks are also understood to be in possession of the village of Litokhoron (in the Caterina kaza), and troops are being hastily dispatched to Ghida, for the purpose of protecting the railway line from Salonica to Monastir.

October 22.—(No. 54.) It is reported that the Servian forces operating against Prishtina have advanced to a point within 10 miles of that town. The Turks have evacuated Eghri-Palanka and withdrawn their frontier posts to Devlen and to the Kresna defile, both of which points are being attacked by the Bulgarians.

A body of Greeks of some considerable strength is reported to have reached Caterina.

(It subsequently transpired that the Greeks had not advanced further than Litokhoron, but fugitives from Catarina reported their arrival there.)

October 23.—(Nos. 55 to 59.) Prishtina is reported to have been occupied by the Servians at noon yesterday, and the Greeks occupied Lemnos the day before. The Servians have also taken the towns of Preshovo and Kumanovo, thus threatening Uskub from the west while they are advancing on Katchanik from the north. The civil population of Uskub has already begun to escape to Salonica.

Osmanich (or Pehtchevo) has been taken by the Bulgarians, who are attacking the Kresna defile. Another force, which is reported to have with it as many as fifty guns, is reported to be striking at the Constantinople railway line in the direction of Gumuldjina. On the other hand, it seems that Djouma-i-Bala has been retaken by the Turks in the rear of the Bulgarians.

The Greeks were this morning reported to be threatening Kozhani, but there is no confirmation of the report that they had occupied Caterina.

October 25.—(Nos. 60 to 63.) It appears that on the 23rd instant the Turks retook Osmanich from the Bulgarians, and also regained the ground which they had lost about Kumanovo.

It is asserted that they have abandoned Kozhani after setting it on fire, and orders have been issued for all the rolling-stock on the Monastir line to be brought back to Salonica. At Kumanovo the Turkish troops were completely routed by the Servians yesterday. In consequence of this defeat it is regarded as probable that Fethi Pasha will be compelled to abandon Uskub. Kara-Said Pasha's division, which was at Kotchana, has been driven back on Ishtib. The greatest consternation prevails in Salonica, whither refugees and wounded are pouring in from both lines (*i.e.*, Uskub and Monastir). The Greeks are expected to be before the town in two or three days. Attempts will indeed be made to stop them at Kailari and at Caraferia, but their unexpected series of defeats appears to have completely demoralised the Turks.

October 26.—(Nos. 64 and 65.) The situation in Salonica is becoming very critical, in consequence of the general collapse of the Turks. The Servians have occupied Ferisovitch and the Bulgars Ishtib. Uskub was evacuated last night by the Turks, who were unable to rally even at Zelenikovo. It is even feared that their communications have been cut on this side of Kuprulu. Large numbers of fugitive soldiers and more than 5,000 civilian refugees have already arrived in Salonica. Ali Riza Pasha and his staff left hurriedly this morning for Monastir, to which place the railway authorities have sent back fifteen locomotives and about 300 waggons. It is supposed that the object is to withdraw the military stores in that town. The rolling-stock on the Uskub line is also being brought back here.

October 27.—(No. 66.) Fighting was going on last night at Kastanja, to the south of Karaferia, though nothing is known of the results. Aidin redifs and other troops are being forwarded on to the latter place as fast as they come in, but they are very largely unprovided with rifles. Great anxiety prevails in Salonica, where quite 10,000 refugees are accumulated, and bread has already doubled in price.

Enclosure 3 in No. 305.

Communication received from Salonica Telegraph Office on the 28th October, 1912.

Le 27 octobre, 1912.

DE Péra et pour Salonique.

Langage chiffré étant interdit, vos chiffrés Nos. 17146, 17165, 17181, 17204, 17218 pour Prodromo, Constantinople, sont arrêtés; langage clair seulement admis.

Enclosure 4 in No. 305.

Consul-General Lamb to Nazim Pasha.

M. le Gouverneur général, *Salonique, le 28 octobre*, 1912.

JE viens d'apprendre par le Bureau télégraphique que toutes les dépêches que j'ai adressées à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté à Constantinople depuis le 24 courant ont été arrêtées à Constantinople sous le prétexte que la correspondance en langue chiffrée aurait été prohibée—fait dont aucun avis ne nous a été même communiqué.

Je vous notifie, M. le Gouverneur général, que le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman sera tenu strictement responsable de toute conséquence fâcheuse qui pourra résulter pour les intérêts confiés à ma charge à la suite de cette entrave inqualifiable apportés à la correspondance officielle des représentants d'une Puissance amie.

Veuillez, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

[47818] No. 306.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 934.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 2*, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that Mohammed Naby Bey, late Ottoman Minister at Sophia, has just been appointed as the new Turkish Ambassador at Rome.

Naby Bey, who is a diplomatist *de carrière*, was formerly councillor to the embassy in Paris, and later Ottoman Minister at Athens. He was temporarily recalled from the latter post at the same time as M. Grypiaris, the Greek Minister, left Constantinople in connection with the tension between Greece and Turkey occasioned by the Greek boycott.

Naby Bey did not return to Athens upon the resumption of diplomatic relations between Greece and Turkey, but proceeded to Sophia, where Sir H. Bax-Ironside reports to having found him "intelligent and well informed," and as less excitable than his predecessor, Assim Bey.

He was recently employed on the peace negotiations with Italy, and I have been informed that a wish was expressed by the Italian Government that he might be appointed to Rome.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[47826] No. 307.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 942. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 7*, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram No. 579, Confidential, of the 4th November, and to point out that this is the second occasion (*vide* my telegram No. 524 of the 24th October) during the present situation on which Gabriel Effendi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking privately and not on behalf of the Government, in itself perhaps a somewhat curious attitude for a Minister for Foreign Affairs during a serious crisis, has sounded a note which circumstances at the moment did not entirely warrant. At the same time, in view of certain possibilities of the situation as set forth in my despatch No. 928 of the 2nd November, his language could not be safely ignored. It is to a certain extent natural that an Armenian, holding such a responsible position during a severe Turkish and Islamic crisis, should be inclined to fits of timidity, and to be an opportunist. Though the present Cabinet is non-committee, his Excellency, some months ago, became at least an adherent of the committee party in the Senate, and it may be well to recall that in April 1909, as Minister for Public Works, he was believed to have privately authorised the Austrian Railway Company to supply transport for the invading army from Salonica, which overthrew his colleagues and Abdul Hamid. He maintains his connection with and is undoubtedly influenced by certain members of the committee, and the latter body, whose present policy seems to be to fish in troubled waters, is no doubt responsible

for many of the alarmist rumours calculated to sow panic among the ignorant masses. Gabriel Effendi would thus seem to be playing in a way the rôle of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, and in native circles both his Excellency and Hussein Hilmi Pasha are frequently styled the "Chameleons."

The Austro-German idea would seem to be to internationalise the present situation as opposed to allowing the Balkan States and Russia to play a predominant part in its settlement, and there is no doubt that this fits in with Turkish policy. It is perhaps legitimate to conclude that the object of spreading alarmist rumours was partly to influence the Powers to bring up more ships, and it was noticeable that when the Russian Ambassador expressed the opinion that the interests of humanity in protecting the foreign communities was of a higher order than any question of principle as regards the Straits, the crop of alarmist rumours at once ceased, and both the Austrian Ambassador and Gabriel Effendi showed decreased enthusiasm for the arrival of the second man-of-war.

Speaking privately to Mr. Fitzmaurice, the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday gave as a reason for his change of front that, as the possibility of an armed collision between Russia and Austria was not excluded, he would be reluctant to see hostilities occur between their naval forces within the Straits.

In this connection I have the honour to enclose an article from the ex-"Tanin," the committee organ. As many of the rumours which have influenced the Minister for Foreign Affairs to suggest the entry of foreign ships come from committee sources, it would be difficult to explain the attitude of the "Tanin" in the matter except on the Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde theory.

As reported in my telegram No. 588 of last night, the atmosphere of the capital has become calmer, while the German military attaché, it is stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has declared that Tchataldja lines can successfully resist any Bulgarian advance for two months or more. It is impossible to gauge what reliance can be placed on this statement, and the danger point will apparently only be reached if and when the Balkan forces are able and decide to enter the capital.

In regard to the question of the Straits, it may be mentioned that should the Balkan troops get on to the rear of the Dardanelles forts, *e.g.*, Bulair lines, or should they enter the capital and take the European forts of the Bosphorus in the rear, while the Sultan and Porte, whose firman regulates the procedure of the Straits, retire to Asia Minor, the *status quo* of the Straits would be for the time being automatically altered by such *faits accomplis*.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[47828] No. 308.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 914.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 5, 1912.*

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your telegram No. 914 of the 1st instant, I communicated to Gabriel Effendi yesterday the reasons which made it impossible for His Majesty's Government to consent to an increase of 1 per cent. in the Turkish customs duties, while making it clear that His Majesty's Government did not wish to add to the embarrassment of Turkey at this moment.

His Excellency was in such a condition of extreme depression, owing to the unfavourable news of the war, that he was disinclined to discuss this or any other matter of routine business, but merely said that there was a misunderstanding, that Tewfik Pasha had not been instructed to ask for the consent of His Majesty's Government to the increase, but had been directed to say that the Turkish Government hoped that His Majesty's Government would not make any objection to the levy of these extra customs duties.

As, however, Gabriel Effendi did not pursue the matter, I did not consider it necessary to discuss with him the slight difference between the instructions said to have been sent to Tewfik Pasha and the message conveyed by his Excellency to you.

I understand from my French and Russian colleagues that they have informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that their Governments are unable to agree to the increase.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[47843] No. 309.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 81.)
Sir, *Belgrade, November 6, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 79 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of a further report addressed by Major Thomson, military attaché, to the Director of Military Operations, War Office, on the progress of the war.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 309.

Report by Major Thomson.

I.—*General Situation.*

THE Servian advance continues with little opposition on the part of the Turks.

The first army is moving down the railway-line towards Salonica, and yesterday, the 5th instant, reached Demir Kapu, an important defile due west of Strumnitza. The big bridge over the Vardar had not been destroyed. A column of Servian troops detached from the first army has taken Prilep.

The third army is moving towards Monastir by the road leading through Kalkandelen, it reached Gostivar on the 2nd instant. It is rumoured that a column will be detached from the third army at Gostivar and sent to San Giovanni di Medua on the Adriatic. Prizren has now been taken.

The Ibar army has occupied Ipek, where it is said to have effected a junction with the Montenegrins.

Large reinforcements of Servian troops have been sent to Adrianople—it is impossible to obtain exact figures, but probably 30,000 troops of all arms have already left. These include heavy artillery batteries and some howitzers. There is reason to believe that the bulk of the infantry sent to Adrianople has been taken from 2nd Ban divisions; the divisions with the Ibar army are now said to be at half their original strength, *i.e.*, six battalions have been taken away from each of them. A secretary in the Bulgarian Legation at Belgrade says that as many Bulgarian troops as possible are being withdrawn from the investment of Adrianople to reinforce the field armies, and that they are being replaced by 2nd Ban Servian divisions.

The War Minister informed me yesterday that the Turkish army in Macedonia was concentrated in two principal masses near Dibra and Monastir respectively, that a smaller body had been located north of Salonica, near the Djoran Lake, and that it was this latter force which had been defeated by the Greek army at Yenidze Vardar on the 2nd instant.

When asked whether the presence of these Turkish forces on the right flank of the Servian advance did not constitute a serious menace to their lines of communication, he replied that the Turks would, of course, have to be sought out and beaten, but that they would soon starve as no supplies could reach them, and their method of living on the country was wasteful, owing to lack of organisation.

II.—*Fight near Kratova.*

After the battle of Kumanovo, in which the artillery of the second army intervened at a critical moment, this army had a second encounter with the Turkish Vardar army, 2 miles south-west of Kratovo. The Timok division attacked the Turkish positions on the morning of the 26th October, and after a combat lasting thirty-two hours, drove the Turks in the direction of Köprulu. The success of the Servians must again be attributed to the superiority of their artillery, and is a further triumph for Creusot over Krupp. This battle is considered here as the last serious resistance to be expected from the Vardar army, since during subsequent fighting near Köprulu, the Turkish troops seemed to be demoralised, and the only opposition offered was on the part of scattered units rallied by a few junior officers acting on their own initiative.

The Servian losses were not large—34 killed, 140 wounded. Most of the wounded have already reached Belgrade. The Servian Artillery Regiment had no casualties

III.—*Total Casualties up to Date.*

The casualties up to date are said at the War Office to be 1,000 killed and 6,000 wounded. As compared with the foregoing, the Austrian consul at Uskub furnishes the following figures :—

Killed—	
Officers	72
Rank and file..	3,417
Wounded—	
Officers	238
Rank and file..	9,682
Missing	688
Sick	1,341
Grand Total	15,438

IV.—*Supply Arrangements.*

The Minister for War gave me the following information regarding the supply services for the field armies. Twelve trains per diem are running each way on the single line connecting Belgrade with Uskub; occasionally this number is exceeded, but it marks the minimum hitherto. Fresh bread is supplied to the troops whenever possible, and is baked in towns all over Servia, including such distant places as Semendria. The bread ration is about 2 lb. and the fresh meat ration 12 oz. The rations carried in the field are :—

On the Man.—The unexpended portion of the day's ration and two reserve rations, consisting of biscuits, bacon, and cheese.

In the Regimental Transport.—Two days' rations.

In the Divisional Transport.—Four days' rations.

The reserve rations are only used on emergency, regimental supplies are kept intact as long as possible, while the divisional transport works between units and the railway in two sections, one full and the other empty.

The mobility of the Servian troops has been surprising, and on my suggesting that possibly the more advanced units had not depended on these sources of supply, the War Minister replied that the men had in reality carried rations for several days on their persons, a practice to which they were accustomed, and that they were easily fed as regards meat, since a live sheep or bullock could soon be turned into soup. The provision of bread is the great difficulty, but considerable quantities of flour have been captured and issued as rations. Cooking is done during the night, and consists in boiling the meat, the soup so obtained is drunk in the morning before starting, and the lumps of meat are then distributed and carried inside the bread ration in the form of a rough sandwich.

All supplies taken from the inhabitants of both Servia and Macedonia have been paid for in cash. There is enough money in the country for another month of cash payments, after which requisitioning will be introduced.

The Servian private soldier's pay is 1*s.* 4*d.* a-month; the wives and families of poor men are looked after by municipalities.

C. B. THOMSON, *Major*,
General Staff, Attaché to Servian Army.

Belgrade, November 6, 1912.

[47844] No. 310.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 82.) *Belgrade, November* 7, 1912.

Sir,

MY Bulgarian colleague came to call upon me on the 3rd instant. After a few preliminary remarks the conversation turned upon the sanjak of Novi-Bazar.

I suggested that if the Balkan States were ultimately victorious the sanjak might cause difficulties between Austria and Servia. M. Toshef interrupted with vehemence, "Not between Austria and Servia but between Austria and the Balkan *bloc*." He said the Powers should make no mistake, the allies were absolutely united in their determination to keep the territory they have conquered, and would assist one another to do so. Of course, before a combination of the European Powers they would have to give way, but this would cause such implacable hatred and resentment and would lead to such unrest in the Balkans that the Powers would be most unwise to make the attempt.

M. Toshef showed impatience with regard to the supposed difficulties of Austria. He maintained that the Austrians had principally themselves to thank for the troubles they experience with the Serb population in their dominions. If they would only introduce milder and more just methods in their Serb provinces and would adopt a friendly attitude towards the Servian Government these troubles would cease.

I pointed out to him, however, that it was impossible to deny that from the Austrian point of view the junction of Servia and Montenegro would create an entirely new order of things and make the position of Austria exceedingly uncomfortable. In the first place the mere fact of the presence on the Austrian frontier of a Serb combination, where ideas of the creation of a southern Slav kingdom would be harboured, could not fail to be a disturbing factor in the Austrian provinces. Against this no kind treatment of the Serbs and no good relations with the Servian Government would be of avail. Secondly, Servia and Montenegro could not be looked upon as wholly independent States with an independent policy of their own; the former, at least, is entirely under Russian influence and guidance, and the growth of Servia, therefore, meant the growth of Russian influence, and this in regions where it might be very easily detrimental to Austrian interests. This circumstance makes Austria peculiarly sensitive regarding Servia's occupying any part of the Adriatic coast. Thirdly, if Servia keeps the sanjak, Austria sees herself not only cut off definitely from the ambition which, whether rightly or wrongly, she is supposed to have cherished of some day possessing Salonica, but in view of Servian antagonism she would not even be sure of having a commercial outlet in that direction.

M. Toshef admitted these apparent difficulties, but said Austria would have to renounce some of her ambitions, whilst as to the danger from a Pan-Serb movement and from Russian influence Bulgaria would see that the Servian Government did not intrigue. Bulgaria wished for peace after so many years of turmoil and would even be willing, should Austria desire it, to guarantee Servia's good behaviour. Just now it might look as though Bulgaria were also under Russian influence, but this influence was not in accordance with the feelings of the country and would very soon be thrown off. Bulgaria wished to be free, as there was always the danger of Russia and Austria coming to some arrangement between themselves at the expense of the Balkan States.

Reverting to the sanjak, M. Toshef questioned me concerning the probable attitude of His Majesty's Government, whether they would support the claim of the Balkan States to retain what they had conquered or whether they would lean to the side of Austria. He said this was all-important and would turn Austrian public opinion one way or the other.

I replied that I had received no indication whatever.

Since my conversation with M. Toshef I see that the "Neue Freie Presse," in its leading article of the 4th, points to Russian influence in Servia as that which makes it difficult for Austria to come to an understanding with Servia, and as the objection to Servia occupying any part of the Adriatic littoral, whilst in its issue of the 6th instant the same paper states that if the monarchy and Italy are in accord nothing is likely to happen on the Adriatic coast which these two Powers do not want. Judging by the rapid movements of the Servian troops towards San Giovanni di Medua, it would seem as though the Servian Government did not intend to allow the wishes of any other Power to interfere with its projects on the Adriatic at the present moment.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[47845] No. 311.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 83.)
Sir, *Belgrade, November 7, 1912.*

THE Roumanian Minister, who is usually well informed, told me recently that he had reason to believe negotiations were in progress at Vienna between Austria and Servia, and that it would be found eventually that the Servian Government were not really so uncompromising in their attitude regarding the sanjak and other regions where Austria has interests as they now professed to be. He thought it was more the result of a *mot d'ordre* than in accordance with their real intentions that the Balkan States now declared they would not cede one square foot of the territory they had taken, otherwise why should M. Gueshof a few days ago have indicated that he would be willing to accept mediation?

As I gathered from the altered and conciliatory tone of the Austrian press that possibly M. Filality's information might be correct, I subsequently enquired of the secretary-general of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs whether the Servian Government had in any way lately approached the Austrian Government to bring about an exchange of views. M. Yovanovitch replied in the negative, and said that under the present circumstances it was not for the Servian Government to take the first step. Servia would merely remain where she was after the war. If the Austrian Government wished for any arrangement they could make proposals. They had not done so, at least not officially. A certain Dr. Redlich, professor at the Technical High School in Vienna, and possibly an emissary of the Austrian Government, had, however, recently called upon him and had suggested that, if Servia would be willing to enter into a customs union with Austria, all the points at issue between Servia and Austria could be easily adjusted.

According to M. Yovanovitch, this proposal presents no advantages to Servia. In the first place, economic dependence would, with Austria, develop into political dependence, and now that Servia will, it is expected, have entirely free outlets to the sea both viâ Salonica and a port on the Adriatic, and that Austria can no longer hem her in, there seems no good reason why Servia should in any way willingly bind herself to Austria. The policy of the Servian Government should be independence, and to give equality of commercial rights to all nations.

I told M. Yovanovitch I had heard it suggested Austria might ask for a sanjak railway under international management. He replied that this would be a most unpractical project, as the route is many miles longer than by the Servian railways, over which Austrian goods could pass altogether unhindered to Salonica, which the Balkan States intended should be a free port.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[47918] No. 312.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 31.)
Sir, *Odessa, November 7, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith extract from the "Russkaya Retch" of to-day's date reporting the despatch to Constantinople of the Russian volunteer steamer "Saratof," so as to be ready in case she is wanted for refugees.

The "Saratof" left during last night.

I have, &c.
C. S. SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 312.

Extract from the "Russkaya Retch" of October 25 (November 7), 1912.

(Translation.)

URGENT despatch of the steam-ship "Saratof."

Yesterday night the local office of the volunteer fleet received from the committee of the volunteer fleet in St. Petersburgh a telegram immediately to send to Constantinople the steam-ship "Saratof," which is here in reserve, to be at the disposal of the Imperial Russian Embassy to the Ottoman Government.

All through yesterday the steam-ship "Saratof" was hurriedly loading coal and provisions for the whole crew and possible Christian passengers from Constantinople. The provisions for the whole anticipated number are prepared for one month.

The steam-ship "Saratof" is able to take to a long distance 1,000 passengers; on a short run, 2,500 passengers.

At 1 o'clock this morning the "Saratof" leaves for Constantinople under command of Captain V. F. Kisel.

[47804] No. 313.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 475. Confidential.)
Sir, *Berlin, November 9, 1912.*

DURING the whole of this week questions connected with the intention of Servia to demand access to the Adriatic by means of a strip of territory through Albania has engrossed the attention of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I should mention that his Excellency always speaks now of a Servian demand for the whole of Albania with the exception of a small tract in the south which would fall naturally to the Greeks, so I presume that Servia has now increased her original demand which was for a mere strip of territory through Albania to the Adriatic.

It is, as you have pointed out, highly unfortunate that this question should have been so freely discussed while the war is still in progress, but circumstances rendered this almost inevitable. The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs lost no opportunity in his conversations with the Ambassadors of other Powers of making it perfectly clear that Italy and Austria were entirely of one mind in this question, and that they could under no circumstances yield to Servia's demands, and that in this matter they could count on German support. Herr von Kiderlen confirmed these statements, but it is doubtful whether the fact that Germany would give military as well as diplomatic support to Austria-Hungary would have been given so much prominence if, in spite of warnings, or probably because of them, the Servian Government had not chosen this very moment for making such a strong assertion of their intentions—an assertion which could not fail to render the situation prematurely acute.

Herr von Kiderlen quite shares your view that this and similar questions should have been allowed to remain untouched until after the cessation of hostilities. In fact he said to me several days ago that it was extremely annoying that we should be bothered *during* the war with questions that really belonged to the period following its conclusion.

As you will have seen from the telegram which I had the honour to address to you on this subject to-day, he still holds this view, and, moreover, gives the assurance that the Austro-Hungarian Government is of the same opinion, and, in the case of Albania, will only raise remonstrances and take action if Servia should attempt to occupy any portion of that country definitely after the war is over. Such a proceeding, as he assured the Servian chargé d'affaires, would be regarded as a *casus belli* by Austria and by Germany, also if Russia were to give military support to Servia and her allies. In answer to a question put to him by the Servian chargé d'affaires, he stated that in the latter case Germany would support Austria whether France joined Russia or not.

This certainly sounded very serious, nevertheless, Herr von Kiderlen seemed fairly optimistic up to the moment when Herr von Schoen reported the conversation with M. Isvolsky, in which the latter had said that if Servia failed, through the opposition of Austria, to get access to the Adriatic, it would be a fresh humiliation for Russia. On receiving this report his Excellency at once asked M. Jules Cambon and myself

to go and see him. He saw us separately, but used almost identic language to us both. He was much perturbed, and said that he could imagine nothing more dangerous than remarks such as those uttered by M. Isvolsky, which, if seriously meant, would seem to foreshadow the acme of criminal folly, namely, a European war on the question of *amour-propre*. He added, however, that he did not think that M. Isvolsky in this case represented the views of the Russian Government any more than he thought that M. Hartwig, at Belgrade, always kept within the limits of his instructions, and he hoped that the British and French Governments might find it possible to convey a hint to M. Sazonof as to what was being said at Paris by the Russian Ambassador, with a word of warning as to the danger of such utterances at a moment of such international gravity.

His Excellency added, when he first spoke to me on this subject, that he intended to instruct the German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to make a discreet allusion to M. Isvolsky's language, but subsequently he informed me that, on reflection, he thought that such a communication coming from him might "envenimer les choses," and that therefore he had contented himself with reporting M. Isvolsky's language to M. de Pourtalès, instructing him at the same time not to mention it to M. Sazonof unless the latter alluded to it himself.

This morning I found Herr von Kiderlen rather easier in his mind with regard to the situation, and inclined to the hope that the willingness of the Austro-Hungarian Government to meet the wishes of the Servian Government to have access to the sea by means of a railway terminating at possibly a free port on the Adriatic would eventually, when the matter came to be discussed at the close of the war, pave the way to a compromise satisfactory both to the Servians, their allies, and to the Russian Government.

His great hope is that a period of reason will follow the excitement engendered by the present war, and that all the nations principally concerned will then see that a European war on the question of whether Servia should have access to the Adriatic or not must be entirely out of the question.

During the whole of this time Herr von Kiderlen has given me the impression that he has been doing his best to incline the Austro-Hungarian Government to moderation. From many observations he has made to me in our numerous conversations I have come to the conclusion that he is sincerely anxious that complications should be avoided, and particularly that he thoroughly dislikes the idea of Germany being drawn into a war for a question in which she takes but small interest, and in which, moreover, a compromise would seem to be by no means difficult of attainment. But Herr von Kiderlen evidently now thinks that Austria, by readily giving up many of her old ideas, such as the possession of Salonica and the exclusion of any other Powers except Turkey from the sanjak, by her cordial acceptance of the idea of an enlarged Servia with access to the Ægean, and by her willingness, should this prove impossible, or indeed in any case, to support Servia's former desire to have access to the Adriatic by means of a railway under her control through Albania, has done her share towards effecting a compromise, and that it is for Servia and her allies to show some signs that when the proper time comes they will be ready to meet Austria in a conciliatory spirit and do their share also in endeavouring to come to a peaceful settlement satisfactory to all parties concerned.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[47873] No. 314.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 104.)
Sir, *Vienna, November 9, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the debate in the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Austrian Delegation, now sitting in Budapest, was opened yesterday by a speech from the reporter of the committee, Marquis Bacquehem, who referred in friendly terms to M. Poincaré's endeavours to bring about a mediation between Turkey and the Balkan States. Marquis Bacquehem, however, expressed the opinion that the moment for mediation was not yet come. A return to former conditions in the Balkan Peninsula was, in any case, not to be thought of. The bases of Austria-Hungary's Near Eastern policy were the maintenance of peace in Europe, non-aggressive, clear relations

with the Balkan States, especially Servia, and the determination to safeguard the interests of the monarchy. Marquis Bacquehem concluded his speech by referring to Count Berchtold's recent visit to Italy, which he regarded as an event of great significance, for important results had been achieved, which proved the complete understanding which existed between the two Governments.

Dr. Baernreither, who spoke next, laid special emphasis on the necessity of cultivating friendly relations with Servia. The policy of the Dual Monarchy towards the Balkan States must be grounded on the abandonment of the principle *divide et impera*. Dr. Baernreither warned his hearers of the danger of leaning too much on the side of Albania or of employing that country for a flank attack on Servia. No one in Austria-Hungary desired territorial compensation, but she had economic interests which must be safeguarded. Those interests could not be assured through treaties alone. Austria-Hungary must adopt a benevolent attitude, and not grudge the Balkan States the future which is opening before them. In particular, regard for the interests of Bosnia necessitated close commercial relations with Servia and Montenegro. In this connection it was very important to have railway communication from Servia through Bosnia to the Adriatic, which would assure to Servia the quickest route to the sea. The speaker concluded by suggesting the possibility of internationalising certain railways, after the manner of the Manchurian Railway, and, if necessary, of neutralising certain harbours.

Dr. Ellenbogen declared, on behalf of the Social Democratic party, that it was the duty of Austria-Hungary to recognise unreservedly the new state of affairs in the Balkans and to live on a footing of friendliness, not of threats, with the Balkan States. The Austro-Hungarian protectorate over the Albanian Catholics was, he said, not worth shedding a drop of Austrian blood for, while a war with the Balkan States would be not only a mistake, but also highly unpopular in Austria-Hungary, whose population was unanimously in favour of peace. He attacked the Christian Socialist organ, the "Reichspost," for its aggressive attitude, and expressed suspicions that it represented the opinions not only of the Heir Apparent, but also of the Minister for Foreign Affairs —statements which Count Berchtold at once hastened to contradict as being pure inventions. Dr. Ellenbogen concluded his speech with the observation that the surest method of combating the attraction which a Greater Servia would exercise on the Southern Slavs of the Dual Monarchy was to extend to the latter a favourable and liberal treatment, which would prevent them from looking across the border. Dr. Ellenbogen's utterances were also contradicted by Count Clam-Martinic, who stated that no war party existed in Austria, that the Heir Apparent was certainly not in favour of war, and did not interfere in the affairs of Government. (The question had been raised by Dr. Ellenbogen as the result of a leading article in the "Reichspost" of the 5th November, describing the political activity of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the harmony of his views with those of Count Berchtold.)

Dr. Sustersic, the leader of the South Slavs, declared that Turkey in Europe must completely disappear, for the slightest remnant of Turkish domination in Europe would only be a point of unrest. The greater part of this speech was devoted to an impassioned demand for the formation of a third Slav kingdom within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; it would be intolerable that the South Slavs in Austria-Hungary should be less free than their co-nationals, who had just established an independent Slav Empire on the other side of the frontier.

Dr von Grabmayr, of the German Liberal party, spoke most cordially of Austria-Hungary's relations with Italy and of the necessity of maintaining the Triple Alliance in force.

Both Dr. Masaryk and Dr. Kramarz, the Czech leaders, emphasised the importance of the cultivation by Austria-Hungary of good relations with the Balkan League, now so important a factor in international politics. Dr. Kramarz observed that Albania must either be divided between Greece, Servia, and Montenegro, or else must become an independent State. The latter solution could only lead to a constant rivalry for influence between Austria-Hungary and Italy. He observed that no one in Austria-Hungary would comprehend the monarchy making war to prevent Servia obtaining a port on the Adriatic; as long as that port were not fortified it could not be a danger to Austria-Hungary, whose only enemy in the Adriatic was Italy. As for the railway to Salonica, he warned the Austro-Hungarian Government that neither Greece, Bulgaria, nor Servia would admit of its being internationalised.

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Austrian Delegation concluded its sittings on the 8th November. The proceedings on that day were opened by a statement by Count Berchtold in regard to an enquiry addressed to him as to the Austro-Italian

Boundary Commission. His Excellency stated that the commission met last year in order to settle the various disputes regarding the whole frontier from the Stilfser Joch to the mouth of the Aussa, but that geographical and climatic difficulties had prevented the entire completion of this extensive work. At the same time, considerable progress had been made, a complete agreement had been reached on certain points, and it might be confidently hoped that the labours of the commission (which would begin again in May 1913) would lead to a satisfactory conclusion.

As to the Austrian steam-ship traffic on the Lake of Garda, Count Berchtold observed that Austria's right to exercise this traffic had never been contested by Italy, and that the Austrian Government would grant a concession for that purpose as soon as the arrangements for the undertaking had been completed.

The debate on foreign policy was then resumed. M. Stapinsky expressed the sympathy of the Polish nation for the successes of the Slav peoples in freeing the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula from the Turkish yoke. The Balkan States would no doubt respect Austria-Hungary's just interests, and also the rights of the Catholics. The speaker considered that independence would be the best solution of the Albanian question. M. Stapinsky referred to the unfortunate situation of the South Slavs in Hungary as dangerous to the interests of the monarchy, and also warned the Austro-Hungarian Government in very strong terms that the Poles could not continue to support the Triple Alliance if Germany used such unjust measures towards the Poles in Prussia as those laid down by the Expropriation Law. It must be clearly understood that Austria-Hungary's foreign policy could not be carried on without the consent of the Austrian Slavs, who would not tolerate the continuation of the Triple Alliance so long as one of the parties to it did not respect the rights of the Poles. This violent attack on Germany caused considerable sensation in political circles here.

Herr Lewycky, on behalf of the Ruthenes, stated that his compatriots did not desire to see a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia. It was not certain whether in Balkan affairs Austria would be supported by Germany and Italy in the same way as Russia would undoubtedly be by France and England. The Ruthenes were strongly in favour of the Triple Alliance, and were therefore opposed to the attitude of the Poles.

After a résumé of the debate by the reporter, Marquis Bacquehem, the foreign affairs estimates were accepted.

The Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian Delegation met on the 8th November. The reporter, M. Nagy, expressed the hope that the war would remain localised; and that it would eventually lead to a final and definite settlement of the Near Eastern question. Austria-Hungary could not, at the same time, permit that settlement to be made against her wishes or without due consideration being paid to her interests. The committee therefore supported Count Berchtold's utterances, all the more as he had clearly stated that Austria-Hungary had no aggressive tendencies towards expansion. The speaker trusted that it would be possible for Austria-Hungary to make her wishes felt without having to resort to strong measures.

M. George von Lucacs expressed approval of Count Berchtold's action in rejecting M. Poincaré's *désintéressement* protocol. He objected to the leading rôle which France was attempting to take on herself, particularly when she was secretly supported by Russia. Her financial interests in the Near East gave France no right to assume so much responsibility.

Count Charles Khuen-Hédérváry expressed entire agreement with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The chief part of his speech was devoted to the question of Albania, which, he declared, must be maintained by Europe as an independent State, as being in accordance with the just principle of "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples." He deprecated any connection of foreign affairs with internal politics. Austria-Hungary did not interfere with other countries, and expected no interference from others in her own affairs.

Count Berchtold then thanked the committee for its approval of his statement of policy, and the foreign estimates were thereupon passed in all details by the committee.

A pause will now take place in the labours of the Delegations, the plenary sittings of which will begin on the 15th November and will continue until the 23rd November.

I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Budapest reporting on the reception of Count Berchtold's *exposé* by the Hungarian press.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 314.

Mr. E. Grant Duff to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 7.)

Sir, *Budapest, November 6, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of the criticisms of the principal Hungarian newspapers in regard to Count Berchtold's recent *exposé* on foreign affairs.

A war in which Hungary was involved as the result of the present state of affairs in the Balkans would be most unpopular here.

I have, &c.
EVELYN GRANT DUFF.

Enclosure 2 in No. 314.

Summary of Criticisms of principal Hungarian Newspapers.

THE "Budapest" (Kossuth party) attacks Count Berchtold, and is of opinion that his policy has been a fiasco. This has been due to the fact that, instead of the *status quo*, there will be a division of European Turkey which may lead to a quarrel. Hungary can in no way sympathise with such a policy. Armed intervention would be of no advantage to Hungarian national interests.

The "Pesti Hirlap" (Opposition) sees a promise of peace in the *exposé*, as it is expressly stated that Austria-Hungary is not influenced by territorial aspirations. Every Hungarian would rejoice if this means the giving up of the traditional policy of the House of Hapsburg. But the statement that Roumania also has a claim to a share of the spoils may be the germ of a great European war. What does Count Berchtold mean by the legitimate interests of the monarchy? How far will such interests lead? The Slav victory will cause the loss of Hungarian commerce in the Balkans. Although the *status quo* has been dropped, the new policy to be adopted is not clear. May God save Hungary from war!

"Budapest Hirlap" (Independent, inclining to the Government side) thinks that Count Berchtold's remarks with regard to Roumania compromise the Austro-Hungarian Government. It seems rather an antiquated idea that a Great Power should sacrifice itself in the interests of a little country in return for its fidelity to the Triple Alliance. It is a pity Count Berchtold referred to Roumania in such a marked manner. A few weeks ago he made the same mistake of laying too much stress on the *status quo*. Except in the case referred to, the *exposé* was too colourless. The country is face to face with a grave danger.

"Az Ujsag" (Government). The *exposé* gives no just reason for pessimistic views. It shows that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy only desires to defend its political and commercial interests. This should not be difficult, as Russia admits these interests in the Balkans, and the interests of Austria-Hungary in Albania are admitted by Italy.

"Neues Pester Journal" (Independent, tending to Government) is dissatisfied with the *exposé*, which was eagerly awaited. It is improbable that the Delegations will comply with Count Berchtold's request and refrain from asking for further explanations. The *exposé* reflects the views of the Triple Alliance, and demonstrates its power not as a menace of war, but in the interests of peace. It is natural that Count Berchtold should have given up the *status quo*. He states that the interests of the monarchy will be maintained, but does not say whether the cession of the sanjak to the Slavs would infringe Austro-Hungarian interests or whether that territory will, in fact, be relinquished. It compares these questions to a precipice, but awaits interpellations in the Delegations.

"Pester Lloyd" (Government) thinks the *exposé* a declaration of friendly feeling towards the Balkan States, which will appreciate this attitude and admit the interests of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in these regions. It is to be hoped that Servia will cease to complain that Austro-Hungarian policy is not sincere. The monarchy can safeguard her interests without damaging those of other nations. As regards Roumania, the views of Austria-Hungary have already been admitted by Russia. The echo of the *exposé* is awaited here with calm, as the Triple Alliance are united in regard to the questions involved.

"Magyarorszag" (Justh, or Opposition party) is delighted at the peaceful tone of the *exposé*. Vienna has perceived that an attempt to maintain the *status quo* would involve too great a risk. Hungary has no desire to go to the slaughter in the Austrian interest. A war would be extremely unpopular. What is meant by the expression "legitimate interests of the monarchy"? If this refers to commercial interests the matter can be easily managed. If Roumania wishes for a share of the spoils she may take it herself.

[47874] No. 315.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 195.)

Sir, *Vienna, November 9, 1912.*

A FEW days ago Dr. Szeps, the editor of the semi-official organ of the Ballplatz, the "Freudenblatt," came to me, and in the course of conversation alluded to the impossibility for Austria of allowing Servia to establish herself on the Adriatic coast.

I then observed to him that if Servia's real intentions were to use her access to the sea merely for the purpose of developing her commercial interests, and not her political ones, I thought that the following scheme might solve the problem:—

If Austria obtained a satisfactory settlement of the Salonica question, and the safeguarding of her economic interests in that direction, she might show her good-will towards Servia by offering to construct a trunk line from some convenient spot on the Servian frontier across Southern Bosnia to a Dalmatian port. I suggested that this port should become a free port, and that Servia should be guaranteed special transit facilities for her merchandise on the railway in question.

Dr. Szeps told me that he would mention this idea to Count Berchtold, and he has apparently done so; for the plan just mentioned above is now being much discussed in parliamentary and financial circles in this country, as will be seen from the following article which appeared in last night's "Neue Freie Presse":—

"In diplomatic and parliamentary circles in Budapest, where the Delegations are now sitting and the leading personalities of the monarchy are assembled, a plan is being discussed by means of which it would be possible to gratify Servia's wish for a seaport without detriment to Austro-Hungarian interests. No objection would be raised to the intentions of the Servian Kingdom to establish itself on the Adriatic if it were possible to exclude political complications in the future. Care would have to be taken that the port should not be used for foreign purposes or misused for the policy of a foreign Power against Austria-Hungary and Italy. This object could be attained if Servia, after an agreement with the Austro-Hungarian Government, only aimed at the furtherance of her commercial interests by means of a free outlet to the sea. The plan is now being mooted in Budapest of granting to Servia the free use of one of our Dalmatian ports. If this plan should become the subject of practical negotiations, some point on the Dalmatian coast, either in Metkovic or in some other port, might be handed over to Servia by treaty to be used by her for her trade and commerce just as if it were in her own possession. We do not know if this plan has really been put forward by the Government or not, but the fact of its being discussed in political circles proves that Austria-Hungary does not desire to exclude Servia from the sea, but only wishes to make certain that, after the Balkan problem has been solved for the rest of the world, it will not continue to trouble the Dual Monarchy by political disturbances on the Adriatic and every kind of annoyance on our frontiers."

The "Zeit" of yesterday evening published an interview between its correspondent at Belgrade and the Servian Prime Minister, in which the latter stated that the Balkan League would never consent to the establishment of an independent Albania, which would only lead to constant rivalry and discord. On the other hand, the Albanian leader, Ismail Kenyl Bey, who has just passed through Vienna on his way from Constantinople to Albania, has declared to a correspondent of the "Neue Freie Presse" that Albania must become independent and that Servia must content herself with her present conquests. For Servia to insist on an Adriatic port would be, he said, as absurd as for Switzerland to demand the cession of Genoa in order to provide an outlet for her commerce. (M. Pasitch's rejoinder to this argument is that Switzerland's

neutrality is guaranteed by the Powers, and that Alessio and Durazzo were originally Servian ports.) All Albanians of all creeds were, he asserted, united in this view. The future Albanian State must include the whole vilayet of Scutari; the Albanian portions of Janina and Monastir; the western part of the sanjak of Monastir, near Ochrida; Dibra, Elbassan, Kritza; the sanjak of Ipek, with Djakova; the sanjak of Prisrend; and a part of the sanjaks of Uskub and Prischtina. The capital would be Elbassan, with Valona as the chief port and railway terminus. The principality would, he said, cultivate friendly relations with Austria-Hungary and Italy, and would offer Servia every advantage for her commerce towards the Adriatic.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[48062] No. 316.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 11.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 11, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated 11th instant, relative to affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 316.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 11, 1912.*

FOLLOWING have left Salonica for Besica Bay: "Dartmouth," "John Duncan."

[47966] No. 317.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 11.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 11, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 10th and 11th instant, relative to the movements of His Majesty's ships and foreign vessels of war in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 317.

Senior Naval Officer, Crete, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 10, 1912.*

"HENRI IV" left Suda for Beirout.

Enclosure 2 in No. 317.

H.M.S. "Prometheus" at Beirout, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 11, 1912.*

ARRIVED here to-day.

Enclosure 3 in No. 317.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, November* 11, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 623. Proceed to Besika Bay with ships you have at Salonica, unless danger of serious unrest at Salonica not yet over. Acknowledge by telegram.

Enclosure 4 in No. 317.

H.M.S. "Barham," at Beirout, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 11, 1912.

HAVE arrived Beirout.

Enclosure 5 in No. 317.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 11, 1912.

"GELDERLAND" (Dutch) reported by "Yarmouth" at Smyrna. "Rostislav" (Russian) arrived yesterday Constantinople.

[48060] No. 318.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 11.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November* 11, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams, dated 11th instant, relative to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 318.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 11, 1912.

"GEOBEN" will arrive here to-morrow, and leave for Constantinople on Wednesday. "Breslau" will leave for Salonica to-morrow.

Enclosure 2 in No. 318.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 11, 1912.

REPORTED by His Majesty's ship "Barham" 9th November:

No change in situation at Adana. Armenians and Kurds continually colliding. Isolated outrages on Christians. No disturbances at Latakiya, Aleppo, Alexandretta. At last place fifteen cases of Asiatic cholera since last Sunday.

[47905] No. 319.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 11.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November* 11, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copies of telegrams respecting movements of warships in the eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 319.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 9, 1912.

ITALIAN gunboat sailed west from entrance Dardanelles. "Admiral Spaun" (Austria) anchored off Tenedos.

Enclosure 2 in No. 319.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 10, 1912.

VICE-ADMIRAL 3rd squadron reports "Victor Hugo" sailed for Constantinople.

Enclosure 3 in No. 319.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 10, 1912.

"BERSAGLIERE" (Italian) arrived Salonica. At request of Ambassador, "Hampshire" will proceed at daylight to Constantinople.

Enclosure 4 in No. 319.

H.M.S. "Barham" to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 10, 1912.

"BARHAM" arrived Tripoli; sailing for Beirut, 11th November.

Enclosure 5 in No. 319.

Vice-Consul Palmer to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Dardanelles, November* 10, 1912.

"ADMIRAL SPAUN" (Austrian), "Coatis" (Italian) and "Victor Hugo" (French) left north.

Enclosure 6 in No. 319.

Sir R. Rodd to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, November* 10, 1912.

CONSUL SPEZIA reports "Benedetto Brin" left at 5 A.M. for Constantinople.

Enclosure 7 in No. 319.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 10, 1912.
"YARMOUTH" sailed for Smyrna.

Enclosure 8 in No. 319.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 10, 1912
"YARMOUTH" arrived Smyrna.

Enclosure 9 in No. 319.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 10, 1912.
ITALIAN gunboats and "Admiral Spaun" proceeding to entrance of Dardanelles, according to report from 3rd battle squadron.

Enclosure 10 in No. 319.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 9, 1912.
"BARHAM" reports 15 cases cholera, 6 deaths, since Tuesday at Alexandretta. Mohammedan population showing signs of considerable unrest.

Enclosure 11 in No. 319.

Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 9, 1912.
"BIEN-HOA" (French) sailed east through Straits.

Enclosure 12 in No. 319.

Consul Powell to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Philadelphia, November* 9, 1912.
UNITED States ships "Tennessee" and "Montana" left for Turkish coast to-day.

Enclosure 13 in No. 319.

H.M.S. "Barham" to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 9, 1912.
ARRIVED Latakia, and leave to-morrow for Tripoli, Syria.

Enclosure 14 in No. 319.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 9, 1912.
"RADETZKY," "Uskoke," and "Erz." "Franz Ferdinand" arrived Smyrna.

Enclosure 15 in No. 319.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 10, 1912.
CROWN Prince of Greece occupied Salonica, and Greeks have taken over administration. If King of Greece arrives, should he be saluted by foreign ships present, and should they salute Greek flag if Greek sovereignty proclaimed by Governments.

Enclosure 16 in No. 319.

Sir G. Lowther to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 11, 1912.
FOLLOWING ships arrived: "Victor Hugo," "Coatit" (Italian), "Admiral Spaun," "Hampshire."

[48066] No. 320.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinje, November* 11, 1912.
MONTENEGRIN expedition sent against Alessio has been compelled to retire on account of inundations.
Siege of Scutari seems to be making very slow progress.

[48073] No. 321.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 134.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November* 11, 1912.
PRESIDENT of Bulgarian Parliament has had interviews with Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Budapest. The impression prevails here that he has come to give explanations as to Bulgaria's attitude towards Servian aspirations and compensation to Roumania. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs they are very reserved, and Minister for Foreign Affairs has delayed his return to Vienna. In well-informed circles the impression prevails that President of Bulgarian Parliament has given satisfactory assurances that Bulgaria will not pursue anti-Austrian policy.
Bulgarian Minister here has stated that Balkan League was merely a war league, and that no definite decision has been taken by its members as to the partition of conquered territory.

[48068] No. 322.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 53. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November* 11, 1912.
AUSTRIAN Minister, who has just returned from seeing Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs at Budapest, had an interview with Prime Minister yesterday, and in an unofficial and informal manner communicated views of his Government to the latter. Briefly, these are that Austria is perfectly willing to admit the principle, as previously proclaimed by the allies, of the Balkans for the Balkan people along ethnical

lines, and in the circumstances raises no objection to Servia occupying Old Servia and those ports where Serb population is predominant, but also maintains that Albania must then remain for Albanians.

This, of course, excludes Servia entirely from Adriatic, and Prime Minister seemed much taken aback. He endeavoured to argue that a port on Adriatic is a necessity for Servia, and public opinion would not permit him to abandon the idea, but Austrian Minister informed him that his Government and the Italian Government were firmly resolved not to depart from position they have now taken regarding Albania.

Austrian Minister tells me that there is no warlike feeling in Austria, and, especially, the Emperor was most averse to war, but they have given way to Servia on many points already, and feel that Russia is behind this persistence for an Adriatic port, and that such a port might eventually be used for other than commercial purposes —in other words, become a Russian base.

He anxiously enquired of me what was likely to be the attitude of His Majesty's Government, and I understood that some indication is anxiously looked for in Vienna. Not that British sympathy with Servian pretensions could alter the decision of the Austrian Government about Albania, which is considered fully justified, and is backed by Italy and Germany, but that a mere sign to the effect that His Majesty's Government do not feel called upon to mix themselves up in this question, and do not intend to be drawn into it by Russia, would be sufficient to at once bring Servia to reason. So far as I can judge from symptoms here this impression is correct.

From an Austrian point of view several considerations have to be borne in mind: firstly, Servia is in her foreign policy a part of Russia, and would not take the present line unless encouraged to expect support from Russia; secondly, Servia can find a convenient outlet for her commerce viâ Salonica; thirdly, Servia's actual successes and territory now occupied already far exceed anything that she ever expected; fourthly, Servia can establish no right to Albania, and there seems to be no reason why the Albanians, who have connections with Austria and Italy, should be handed over to Servian rule.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[48069] No. 323.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 11, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

I hear from Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs that, in order to persuade Servia to abandon idea of an Albanian port, Austrian Government have made the following offers, of which Servian Government can take their choice:—

1. That Servia should connect her railways with Bosnian railways and be given special facilities for commerce at Spalato.
2. That Austria should assist Servia to obtain special facilities for transit through Montenegro and at a Montenegrin port.
3. That Austria should assist Servia in construction of the projected Danube–Adriatic railway, but the port would be in an autonomous Albania.
4. That Austria should assist Servia to obtain an exit on Ægean Sea.

The Prime Minister stated to Austrian Minister, who made these proposals, that he could not give official reply until he had consulted the King and allied Governments, but, speaking personally, he said that a port on the Adriatic was of vital importance to Servia, and her determination to possess one could not be abandoned. He dismissed first three proposals as quite unsatisfactory, whilst stating that the fourth would be impracticable, owing to the territorial claims of Bulgaria and Greece.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that Servia would claim port in Albania by right of conquest, regardless of any ethnical considerations.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[48070] No. 324.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November 11, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 49 of 5th November.

Austrian Minister tells me that the idea of a customs union with Servia has been abandoned on account of opposition in Hungary.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[48071] No. 325.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 56.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November 11, 1912.*

SERVIAN Government have complained to Austrian Government that Austrian consul at Prizrend fired upon Servian troops from consulate when the town was taken. They demand his immediate recall, stating that his life is in danger.

Austrian Government have replied that they cannot recall him until they have enquired into circumstances.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[47907] No. 326.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 608.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, November 11, 1912.*

BRITISH, Russian, French, and Austrian ships "Hampshire," "Rostislav," "Victor Hugo," and "Admiral Spaun" arrived.

[48006] No. 327.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 609.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 11, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"Bulgarians occupied Sinekli yesterday, and Turks have evacuated all railway stations beyond Hadenkeui. Railway bridge over Kara Su has been demolished. Forward lines of entrenchments, armed with eight large guns from Constantinople, about the railway line 10 kilom. in front of Hadenkeui. Approaches to position have been mined. Forty-two imams left by train yesterday to exhort and encourage the troops."

[48125] No. 328.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 611.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, November 11, 1912.*

TURKISH Government are now inclining towards direct negotiations with allies. Grand Vizier remarked to-day that generalissimo of Turkish army had discretionary powers to ask for an armistice in the event of his finding, after further fighting, that position on Chatalja lines was untenable.

His Highness, in conversation with Mr. Fitzmaurice later in the day, adopted a more definite attitude, and stated that being anxious to communicate direct with the King of

the Bulgarians, with whom he had once had relations, he would be obliged if I would let Mr. Fitzmaurice convey to M. Popof (Bulgarian dragoman now in charge of consular business here) an intimation that his Highness would be glad to see him. On Mr. Fitzmaurice remarking that M. Popof could not at present be said to have any official character, Kiamil Pasha said that the desired interview would be a purely private one, and that some means of direct communication with the King of the Bulgarians must be found in view of the negative result of the Porte's request for mediation of the Powers.

M. Popof, having been duly informed of the Grand Vizier's desire, did not consider he could refuse his Highness's invitation without showing a lack of deference, and is informing Russian Ambassador, since he is at present attached to Russian consulate-general. He is calling therefore on his Highness to-morrow morning, and begs that the above be at once communicated to Sophia.

I understand that the idea of immediate and direct negotiations between Turkey and the allies is favoured by the Russian Ambassador.

[48065] No. 329.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 614.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 11, 1912.*

YOUR circular telegram to Sophia, &c., of 8th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that Turkish Government is much disturbed at having received no answer to request for collective mediation, and no indication as to where or why a hitch has occurred.

[48072] No. 330.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 134.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 11, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 148 of 9th November.

Greek Minister has just called. He states that no arrangement has been made between Greek and Bulgarian Governments as to a future settlement. He admits that Bulgarian Government wants both Salonica and Monastir, claims which he asserts that his Government could never admit.

I told him that it seemed to me more practical for the allies first to formulate their terms of peace with Turkey and later to come to an arrangement. To this he replied that such a method of procedure was in his opinion impossible. I fear that if Greek Government press question of arrangement on lines indicated above their programme will fail; they will become gradually separated, and alliance dissolved.

I gathered that Greek Minister, who has considerable influence in Athens, where he was for many years secretary-general, is telegraphing his opinion to M. Venizelos.

It is important that allies should present a solid face to Europe in present juncture.

[47773] No. 331.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 362.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 11, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 157 of 9th November.

The Austrian Ambassador tells me that the Austrian representatives to the four allies have now been instructed to join in enquiring whether allies will accept mediation, and, if so, on what terms. I do not see why we should not proceed with that without saying anything further to Turkey.

[47143] No. 332.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 545.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 11, 1912.*

M. DE FLEURIAU read to Sir A. Nicolson on the 4th November a telegram recording a conversation at Sophia between the French Minister and M. Gueshof, in which the latter had stated that it was for Turkey, as the conquered party, to ask for mediation; and that if she did so the Balkan Alliance on its part would not refuse to examine it, and, after having taken counsel of their generals, they would make known their conditions, and after they had in hand sufficient territorial guarantees such as Adrianople.

Gabriel Effendi had applied to the French Ambassador at Constantinople in regard to suspension of hostilities; and M. Poincaré had telegraphed to M. Bompard that an armistice would be all to the advantage of Turkey, and the French Government could only entertain "une demande ferme pour une médiation amicale."

Sir A. Nicolson told M. de Fleuriau that since these telegrams had been dispatched the Turkish Government had made communications to the Powers as to intervention.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[48137] No. 333.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 11, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant, enclosing a copy of a telegram, No. 623 of the 10th instant, from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, regarding the attitude of His Majesty's ships at Salonica in the event of the arrival of His Majesty the King of Greece at that port, or in the event of the Greek Government issuing a proclamation of sovereignty over the town.

In reply I am to state that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, His Majesty's ships should salute the Greek Royal Standard wherever flown.

Apart, however, from this, I am to state that Sir E. Grey is unwilling that His Majesty's ships should recognise in any manner whatever the proclamation of Greek sovereignty over Salonica; and I am accordingly to express Sir E. Grey's hope that His Majesty's ships may leave Salonica, where their presence is no longer required for the protection of British subjects, at the earliest possible moment.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[48110] No. 334.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 29. Treaty.)
Sir, *Athens, November 4, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 23, Treaty, of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to report that the Greek Government two days ago sent an urgent request to the manager of the Eastern Telegraph Company to make the very repairs which their ships had prevented just before, as well as some others. The manager has obtained the permission of his principals in London, and will carry out the work provided he obtains from the Ministry of Marine an express order to all Greek ships of war that the cable-ship is not to be interfered with. He does not think a guarantee against capture by the Turks necessary, because the company has obtained permission from the Turkish Government to repair three out of the four cables (though he does not wish the Greek

Government to know this), and the fourth, not having that permission, he will probably not repair.

The three cables to be repaired are the Salonica–Lemnos, Lemnos–Tenedos, and Tenedos–Scio (Chios) lines. The fourth line is between Scio and Syra, on which there are two cables, both cut by the Italians.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[48148] No. 335.

Consul Freeman to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Sarajevo, November 8, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to submit a few remarks on the state of feeling here in regard to the war in the Balkans and its possible effect on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Servian community are, of course, elated by the success of their congeners. Their sympathy has also taken a practical form, for they have subscribed about 8,000*l.* to the Red Cross Fund, including 3,000*l.* from Sarajevo alone, and two Servian doctors and several ladies have gone to help in the care of the sick and wounded. From several sources I have learned that as many as 2,000 volunteers, most of them Herzegovinians, have crossed the frontiers into Montenegro and Servia since the beginning of October. A lame official *démenti*, which appeared in the papers on the 4th November, to the effect and an evidently inspired announcement, published on the 4th November, to the effect that no more foreigners are to be admitted into Servia while the war lasts, seem to confirm rather than disprove the reports of such movements. A strict watch has been kept on the Montenegrin, Turkish, and Servian frontiers to prevent volunteers from going across, but it is unlikely that many of those who have made up their minds to go have been unable to do so. Some who were thought to be volunteers may have been Servian subjects and reservists of the Servian army. But it seems pretty certain that the number of those who have gone as volunteers is much larger than the authorities care to admit. According to a telegram from Foča to the "Bosnische Post," which is always in close touch with the Government, about sixty Mussulmans and only twenty Servian volunteers had left up to the 29th October. The same day it was semi-officially stated that an Austro-Hungarian officer stationed at Foča, who was said to have crossed the frontier with his men, had, in fact, failed to return from leave, but that not a single man was missing from the garrison. I am told that the officer in question is of Servian origin.

The brilliant successes of the Balkan League have undoubtedly strengthened the hope cherished by the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina that they may eventually be united with their brethren in a greater Servia and a southern Slav federation, and that meanwhile the Slav provinces of Austria-Hungary, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, may win a more and more predominant position in the Empire itself. These aspirations, of course, do not find vent in the newspapers, but the ideal is none the less kept steadily in view.

Mussulmans of the last generation appear to regard the downfall of Turkey with fatalistic resignation, but those who have grown up under the protection of the Hapsburg throne, though somewhat depressed, seem to take a more detached view of the case, and I am inclined to believe that they are not represented in the war, either absolutely or relatively, by anything like the same number of enthusiasts as the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The emigration of Mussulmans to Turkey, which after all has not been so considerable as was expected at the time of the annexation, will now no doubt be checked, and there may even be a certain inflow of Mahommedans (other than Turks) unwilling to submit to Servian rule. But the natural increase in the number of the Moslems, who constitute as it is only 32½ per cent. of the total population, is but half as rapid as that of the Servian community, which already forms 43½ per cent. of the whole. The Mussulmans are of the same race, speak the same language, and can, if they will, enjoy the same privileges in regard to education and self-government as the rest of the population. But their stolid pride, their conservatism, and lack of enterprise must continue to handicap them in the race with the more progressive Christian Slavs. They consequently tend more and more to lean on Austria and Hungary in order to avoid being overwhelmed by the Christian Slavs, and, if wisely treated, they will necessarily form one of the most loyal communities in the Empire.

The Roman Catholic Slavs include nearly all the remainder of the population (23 out of 24¾ per cent.). Their sympathies, though at bottom with the Balkan League, are less articulately expressed. This is easy to understand, for most of their leaders are natives of more distant parts of the Empire, who cannot feel the same hatred for the Turks as is felt by those whose fathers and grandfathers suffered under Turkish rule.

I am told that in both commercial and military circles the evacuation of Novi Bazar is now bitterly criticised. Whether or not, without this concession, peace would have been preserved, first with Turkey and afterwards with Servia and Montenegro, is a consideration probably now overlooked. But the commercial community—and it is trade after all that brings together Jews and Christians, and even Mahommedans, more effectually than anything else—are already hoping to secure in Macedonia in the near future, by diplomatic pressure, some at least of the openings and privileges that they have hitherto regarded as likely to be theirs by territorial expansion at a more distant date. The joining up of the line through Bosnia with the Mitrovica and Salonica railway can scarcely enter for the present into this scheme of peaceful penetration. His Excellency the Governor-General told me a few days ago that he expected that the railway extensions which are now being discussed by the Diet would be taken in hand next spring, though quite six years would elapse before they were finished. This may be a somewhat sanguine forecast, like that which originally assigned the commencement of the undertaking to the autumn of the present year. The work is to include the conversion of the line to the normal gauge from the Hungarian frontier to Sarajevo, but not that of the costly strategic section between Sarajevo and the frontier of Novi Bazar, which has been worked at a loss ever since it was opened six years ago. Thus, for some time to come, unless considerably greater expenditure is incurred than is at present contemplated, there will still be a narrow gauge section to impede the efficient working of the line. And even if and when it is widened throughout, it can hardly be much of an improvement, from the point of view of commercial interests of Vienna and Budapest, on the already existing direct route viâ Belgrade and Vranja.

In the speech from the Throne the loyalty and patriotic demeanour of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina are specially mentioned. Whatever their real sentiments, they are certainly, under the restraining influence of the civil and military powers, behaving commendably, and if there has been any ill-feeling between Christians and Moslems in consequence of the war, it has shown itself chiefly in a disposition on both sides to avoid discussion of the subject.

I have, &c.
F. G. FREEMAN.

[48129] No. 336.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 12.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November 11, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 11th November, which has been sent to the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 336.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *November 11, 1912.*

REFERRING to Admiralty telegram No. 287 and your No. 623, whenever Greek Royal Standard is flown His Majesty's ships should salute it, but otherwise no recognition whatever to be given to Greek proclamation of sovereignty at Salonica.

You are to proceed with your ships at Salonica to Besica forthwith, Foreign Office being satisfied presence no longer necessary.

[48230] No. 337.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 12.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, November 12, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated 12th instant, relative to movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 337.

Consul-General Barnham to Admiralty.

Smyrna, November 11, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

DUTCH ship "Gelderland" arrived.

Enclosure 2 in No. 337.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

November 12, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

VICE-ADMIRAL "King Edward VII" reports Dutch ship "Gelderland" went up Dardanelles. "John Duncan" arrived Besika Bay.

Enclosure 3 in No. 337.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

November 12, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

GERMAN ship "Breslau" has left.

[48249] No. 338.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 12.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, November 12, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 12th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 338.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

November 12, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

FOLLOWING telegram from "Barham," forwarded by navy agent, Port Said—situation on Syrian coast unchanged; no disorder:—

"Prometheus" and "Barham" remain for present at Beirout after consultation with consul-general at Beirout, to await shortly expected arrival of "Henri IV." "Prometheus" remains at present at disposal of consul-general, Beirout; "Barham" will sail about 14th, visiting Tripoli and Alexandretta, and taking back vice-consul, Alexandretta, remaining there.

Enclosure 2 in No. 338.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

November 12, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

REAR-ADMIRAL "Hibernia" reports from Smyrna:—

"Hibernia," "Britannia," "Cumberland," "Commonwealth," "Black Prince," "Dominion" arrived to-day.

Enclosure 3 in No. 338.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

November 12, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

"CHELMER," "Jed," "Colne," "Garry," "Kennet" left for Piræus; "Gibraltar" left.

[48130] No. 339.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 12.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, November 12, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram dated the 11th and 12th instant, relative to movements of ships in the eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 339.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

November 11, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

ARRIVAL of "Dartmouth" at Besika Bay reported by vice-admiral, 3rd battle squadron.

Enclosure 2 in No. 339.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

November 11, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

COMMANDING officers of His Majesty's ships are to join with commanding officers of foreign ships, to protect as far as is feasible and necessary, *bonâ fide* American citizens in case of disturbance.

Enclosure 3 in No. 339.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

November 11, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

DUTCH ship "Gelderland" proceeding to Constantinople from Smyrna.

Enclosure 4 in No. 339.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

November 12, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
"BRESLAU" leaves this morning for Alexandretta.

Enclosure 5 in No. 339.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

November 12, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
SOME tension yesterday at Salonica. King of Greece arrived there with 20,000 Greeks, and Bulgars dissatisfied with Greeks for entering before them and taking possession in name of Greece. Tension relaxed to-day, Bulgars being admitted, and Prince Boris entering with 5,000 Bulgars. 40,000 Greeks outside the town; 30,000 Bulgars a few miles off.

Enclosure 6 in No. 339.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

November 12, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
YOUR No. 287: Salonica.
Until the situation here is more settled I consider desirable to remain, probably for two days. Propose to leave "Medea" here when I go.

Enclosure 7 in No. 339.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

November 12, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
KING OF ITALY'S birthday yesterday. Ships dressed and salutes fired in honour by all ships at Salonica, French, Russian, Austrian, Italian, British.

Enclosure 8 in No. 339.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

November 12, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
"GOEBEN" arrived here to-day.

[48075] No. 340.

Sir C. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 612.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, November* 11, 1912.
I AM informed that the Committee of Union and Progress have been meditating some bold stroke with the view of turning the present situation to their own profit. So far the Government feel that they have got the situation well in hand, and the Sultan, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, and the Grand Vizier have held well together. The committee press organs, and notably the "Tanin," have been suppressed, and it is stated that leading committee-men, and Hussein Djahid among them, are leaving the country.

The committee's plan seems to have been to urge the Sultan by every means in their power to appoint Mahmoud Shevket Pasha to the Chatalja command. The tactics of April 1909 would then be repeated, a force led by committee officers would march on the capital, and Mahmoud Shevket himself would be proclaimed dictator. It is even suggested that the inner circle of the committee would then institute a reign of terror, and thus work to establish a republic on Portuguese or rather Chinese lines.

[48244] No. 341.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 158.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, November* 12, 1912.
YOUR telegram No. 362 of 11th November.
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is sending instructions to German representatives to the four allies to join in simultaneous but not collective enquiry as to mediation as soon as their colleagues have received similar instructions.

[48263] No. 342.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 159.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, November* 12, 1912.
SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that he quite concurred with the views expressed by Mr. Asquith that isolated views should be reserved for discussion at general settlement.
His Excellency added that, in view of the statements of Servian Prime Minister and Servian representatives, he hoped that any time gained might be utilised for counselling more prudence and reticence at Belgrade.
He used the same language to French Ambassador, who had informed him, under instructions, that the views of the French Government were in complete accord with those expressed by Mr. Asquith.

[48236] No. 343.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 135. Most Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November* 12, 1912.
WITH reference to Belgrade telegram No. 53 of 11th November, in which allusion is made to the calming effect which would be produced in Servia if His Majesty's Government made it known that they disinterested themselves in Servian pretensions to obtain an Adriatic port, I may mention that the Russian Ambassador here has confidentially said to me that he would be very glad if England could see her way to say a moderating word to the Servian Prime Minister. Russia's position made it, he said, very difficult for her to exercise moral pressure on Servia.

[48264] No. 344.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 136. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November* 12, 1912.
BULGARIAN Minister told me to-day that the demand made by Turkey to the European Powers for mediation was not sympathetic to the Bulgarian Government. According to him, Bulgarian Government would prefer that a Turkish officer should appear in the Bulgarian head-quarters expressing willingness of the Porte to conclude peace, asking for conditions. Bulgarian Minister said to me that within a few hours the reply would be given stating main lines of Bulgaria's demands. If these were accepted in principle, arrangements for armistice could easily be made. He said that

he expected his Government would ask for surrender of Adrianople and for guarantees that no further troops should be brought from Asia during the armistice. He added that Bulgaria fully recognised that European Great Powers would have to approve final peace conditions.

Bulgarian Minister pressed me very hard to know whether His Majesty's Government would support Servian demands for a port on the Adriatic.

I said that England wished to keep out of Balkan complications, and, above all, desired to maintain concert of Europe intact.

He asked me whether I thought that Austria would yield on the question of Adriatic port.

I replied that my personal impression was that she would not, and I pointed out that if trouble was to be avoided Bulgaria should use her influence at Belgrade to tone down Servian ambitions, which he himself confessed were becoming a source of anxiety to Bulgaria.

Bulgarian Minister said that he would telegraph my views to the King of Bulgarians.

He added that Servia could not be allowed to keep Monastir, and enquired whether England would propose Bulgarian annexation of Salonica. I replied that I had no information on this subject.

[48259] No. 345.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 136.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 12, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 133 of 9th November.

Lieutenant Wagner, correspondent of "Reichspost," whose telegrams have created considerable sensation, has been living at a hotel in this town for the last ten days.

His recent telegrams about fighting at Chataldja are able inventions.

[48260] No. 346.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 137.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 12, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 110 of 3rd November.

Roumanian Minister informs me that he has heard from Bucharest that Bulgarian Government have just sent two regiments to Silistria from Varna, and that this action has caused much excitement in Roumania.

The Prime Minister and the Minister of War have both informed him that if such a step has been taken it has been done without their knowledge, and such action would be opposed to their wishes and policy.

Enquiries as to the truth of the report are being made.

Roumanian Minister, who has relations in high positions in Vienna and has resided there for many years, does not think that Austria will proceed to extreme measures as regards Servian Adriatic seaport.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[48261] No. 347.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 138.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 12, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 133 of 9th November.

Minister of Railways leaves for Uskub and Salonica to-day to put Macedonian railways in a fit state to facilitate transport of troops of allies and military supplies viâ Dedeagatch and Demotika to fighting lines.

[48258] No. 348.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 428.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 12, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs is alarmed at the language held to him by Bulgarian Minister, who declared by the terms of alliance Bulgaria is bound to support Servia under any circumstances.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told him that it would be madness on Bulgaria's part to join Servia in attacking Austria, were the latter to occupy Durazzo or any other port on Turkish territory with the object of forestalling Servia. Were she to do so Turkey would recommence the war and attack her in the rear, while Roumania would join Austria. His Excellency hopes that you will continue to give good advice at Sophia, as unless assured of Bulgarian support Servia will think twice before engaging in war with Austria.

His Excellency said that he would do all he could to effect peaceful solution of the question. He had begged Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to persevere in conciliatory policy which he had pursued since outbreak of the war, and not to have recourse to any military action, as that would place Russia in a very difficult position. He told me that, if Austria was going to occupy any of the Albanian ports, he wished that she would do so at once, before the Servians got there, as the situation then would not be so dangerous as if she were to expel Servians by force from a port which they had occupied.

He was glad that M. Danef had gone to Vienna, as he would find out for himself that Austria was not bluffing, as Bulgarian Government imagined. Roumania has requested Russia's mediation with regard to the question of rectification of her frontier. Minister for Foreign Affairs is sounding Bulgarian Government on the subject. Bulgarians find it difficult to consent to the cession of any territory whose inhabitants have taken part in a victorious war.

[48245] No. 349.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 616.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 12, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs yesterday stated that he had understood from Turkish Ambassador at London that in the event of Ottoman Government applying the 4 per cent. His Majesty's Government would be content with a *pro formâ* protest.

[48240] No. 350.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 617.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 12, 1912.*

CONSULAR officer at Jaffa reports bitter feeling against foreign community owing to latest war news, and asks for man-of-war.

[48124] No. 351.

Consul Clive Bayley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Warsaw, November 12, 1912.*

FOLLWING sent to embassy:—

Persistent rumours have been current since yesterday to the effect that a mobilisation will be announced on 13th November in Warsaw, Vilna, and Odessa districts.

I cannot, however, obtain any confirmation or trace the source of the rumour.

I am informed that time-expired men will not be dismissed till March.

[48118] No. 352.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

Odessa, November 12, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
FOLLOWING telegram received from Nicolaief to-day and repeated to embassies:—

"Telegram to the military authorities received yesterday orders time-expired men, due for discharge 14th November, to be retained for two months in consequence of serious negotiations with Austria."

[48127] No. 353.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

Odessa, November 12, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
SIMILAR telegram sent to embassies.
My immediately preceding telegram of yesterday.
Retention ordered at Odessa also.

[48240] No. 354.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 998.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 12, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 617 of 12th November.
Admiralty are ordering His Majesty's ship "Prometheus" to proceed to Jaffa to-morrow.

[48245] No. 355.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 999.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 12, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 616 of 12th November: Turkish customs duties.
As we understand that the measure is only provisional, and to cease with termination of war, we shall take no steps to enforce protest provided that no other Powers do so.

[47789] No. 356.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 12, 1912.*

MR. PECKHAM'S telegram of 7th November: Capitulations in Kossovo vilayet.
It seems to His Majesty's Government that the Servian occupation of Kossovo is parallel, in regard to Capitulations, to Italian occupation of Tripoli at outbreak of Turco-Italian war; that is, no Servian annexation of the territory has yet been recognised, and the Capitulations are not, therefore, abrogated, as far as British subjects are concerned, but continue automatically in force, save in regard to cases properly coming under military law.
I am enquiring what instructions other Powers are sending to their representative at Belgrade. If and when your colleagues are similarly instructed, but not before, you should inform the Servian Government that for the foregoing reasons His Majesty's Government cannot admit the attitude of the Servian military authorities in this respect save within the limitation mentioned.
(Repeated to embassies; also to Constantinople for information only.)

[47789] No. 357.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 693.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 12, 1912.*

MR. PECKHAM'S telegram of 7th November and my telegram to Sir R. Paget, No. 91 of 12th November: Capitulations in Kossovo vilayet.
You should enquire of Government to which you are accredited what instructions they are sending in this matter to their representative at Belgrade. If questioned, you may inform them of the view which I have provisionally expressed to Sir R. Paget.
(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 1002, and Belgrade, No. 92.)

[47752] No. 358.

Sir Edward Grey to Viscount Kitchener.

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 12, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 76 of 9th November: Khedive's interests at Thasos and Kavala.
It will be better that the Egyptian Government should say nothing to the Greek representative at this juncture, but you should inform the Khedive and the Egyptian Government that His Majesty's Government are well aware of His Highness's interests in the island and at Kavala, and that he may rest assured that we shall not forget them.
Would you like Sir F. Elliot to be instructed to mention to the Greek Government that the Khedive has large private interests at these places, and to say that we expect the Greek Government to see that they are not injured?
(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 997.)

[47787] No. 359.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1212.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 12, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 424 of 9th November: Balkans and Servia.
I approve your language.

[48633] No. 360.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 522.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 12, 1912.*

THE Turkish Ambassador remarked to Sir A. Nicolson on the 12th November that his attention had been called to a passage in the recent speech of the Prime Minister which alluded to the allies retaining the territories which they had occupied. Tewfik Pasha said that it was not in conformity with usage for such statements to be made before a war was over—and he seemed inclined to enquire what was meant by it. Sir A. Nicolson, however, turned the conversation from so delicate a subject, and his Highness then observed that he gathered from the French Ambassador here that the allies would probably insist on cessions of territory more or less on the lines of the Treaty of San Stefano. This treaty applied, Tewfik Pasha said, to very different conditions from those at present existing; and he was of opinion that the traditional

* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 1215), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 364), Sir E. Goschen (No. 367), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 502).

animosities, and racial and ecclesiastical differences between the Balkan States and Greece would come acutely to the foreground as soon as a division of territory was contemplated. They had united momentarily to attack Turkey, but this combination would not endure beyond the war. It was ridiculous, his Highness added, for Servia to claim any part of Albania, which was the home of a race absolutely distinct from the Slavs, and indeed of much older origin.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[48634] No. 361.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 524.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 12, 1912.

THE Turkish Ambassador enquired of Sir A. Nicolson on the 12th November when the Powers would approach the Balkan States in respect to mediation, and also what was the cause of the delay. Sir A. Nicolson told him that all the Powers, with the exception of Germany, had furnished their representatives at the several capitals of the allies with the requisite instructions, but that there appeared to have been some confusion or misunderstanding at Berlin in respect to the nature of the Turkish request, which had caused delay. Sir A. Nicolson hoped that the matter would be cleared up to-day and that the Powers would be in a position to make the communication to the allies without further loss of time.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[48635] No. 362.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 262.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 12, 1912.

THE Italian Ambassador read to Sir A. Nicolson on the 12th November a telegram from the Marquis di San Giuliano, stating that he had had an interview with the Servian chargé d'affaires. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had spoken in the friendliest manner, assuring the Servian representative of the amicable sentiments felt by Italy towards Servia; his sincere desire to see Servia prosper and develop, and his admiration for the qualities she had recently displayed. He quite understood that Servia desired an access to the sea, and no doubt facilities for that purpose could be found for her, but that he trusted that Servia would abandon the idea of obtaining a port on the Albanian coast of the Adriatic under her sovereignty. The possession by Servia of a port on the Albanian coast would not be in harmony with Italian interests; would be a violation of the autonomy or independence of Albania; and would also be contrary to the principle of nationalities which was to form the basis of any settlement.

The Marquis di San Giuliano has the impression that Servia will not be *intransigeant* on this question; and the Marquis Imperiali told Sir A. Nicolson that from what he heard from M. Tittoni, the Servian representative in Paris was moderate in his language, while M. Grouitch here had also received instructions not to speak any further on the subject.

Sir A. Nicolson told the Marquis Imperiali that he did not believe Servia would ever put into practice the brave words she was so fond of delivering, and that personally he did not think that the question of an Adriatic port would lead to serious consequences.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[48636] No. 363.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 263.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 12, 1912.

THE Italian Ambassador read to Sir A. Nicolson on the 12th November a telegram from Marquis di San Giuliano, in which the latter summarised the results of his recent visit to Berlin as follows:—

That a perfect and complete agreement existed among the members of the Triple Alliance. That the Balkan States should not be deprived of the fruits of their victories. That Austria-Hungary was immovable in her determination not to admit of a Servian port on the Adriatic; and that the three Governments are animated by a profound desire for peace, especially the German Emperor, of whom the Marquis di San Giuliano had a lengthy audience.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[48133] No. 364.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 28.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 12, 1912.

THE Servian chargé d'affaires called at this Office on the 7th November and was received by Sir A. Nicolson.

M. Grouitch said that a "friendly Power" had informed the Servian Government that Austria-Hungary would never, in any circumstances, permit Servia to have an access to the Adriatic. M. Passitch had replied to this information by saying that Servian troops were on their way to occupy Durazzo, and that Servia intended to hold that post permanently against all comers, and that she would on no account abandon it. He was instructed to announce formally this decision to His Majesty's Government.

Sir A. Nicolson observed that Servian troops were still, he understood, some little distance from Durazzo, and that a considerable portion of Albania would have to be traversed to reach it.

However, these were military considerations. Sir A. Nicolson had no remarks whatever to make on M. Grouitch's communication, but he understood (1) it was a formal notification to all the Powers that Servia intended to take possession of Durazzo and to hold it permanently, even at the risk of hostilities with any Power who wished to drive her out; (2) that this notification was in consequence of a communication from a "friendly Power," and not on account of any official declaration from Austria-Hungary.

M. Grouitch replied in the affirmative to both these questions.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[48299] No. 365.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 82.)
Sir, *Canea, Crete, October* 31, 1912.

THE Mussulman whose murder was reported in my telegram No. 158 of the 28th instant was named Bilal Tsikoudakis. He resided with his wife in the village of Kalyves, not far from Suda Bay, where there are no other Mussulman residents. The authorities appear to have had apprehensions on his account, for two gendarmes were stationed in his house for his protection.

On the morning of the 28th instant, before the gendarmes were up, he started with his wife for his field, though warned that he had better wait until the gendarmes were ready to accompany him.

According to the widow's statement they were joined by a rural guard named Mavredakis, who, after a short and peaceable conversation, made as if to leave them, but almost immediately turned round and shot Bilal through the back, and then,

reloading his rifle, fired another shot, which wounded the woman in the leg. He afterwards took himself off, and has not yet been captured.

The execution of M. Dragoumis's intention to punish the assassin (as communicated to His Majesty's Minister at Athens by M. Venizelos) appears to a great extent to depend on the arrest of the criminal. It is rare in my experience that the murderers of Mussulmans in Crete are captured, still rarer that they receive any punishment, and I have never come across an instance when they have been punished adequately.

No motive for the crime is suggested but racial animosity. The murderer is a man 60 years old, hitherto regarded as quiet and inoffensive, and I can only conclude that he was excited by the war and by the reports of atrocities committed on Christians by Turks in Macedonia, which are already in circulation here.

This is the only outrage on Mussulmans which has been reported to me recently, and I believe that the great mass of the Cretans understand that in their own interests it is essential that Mussulmans should not be molested. The latter, however, cannot be guaranteed against the isolated attacks of bad characters, who, under the pretext of anxiety to volunteer for service in Greece, are now enabled to issue from their hiding-places. A band of some thirty men of this class recently carried off a herd of twenty bullocks belonging to a Mussulman between Rethymo and Canea. They first seized ten on the high road, and the next day carried off the remainder from the precincts of a gendarmerie station, where the drovers had placed them for safety. The gendarmes were too few to prevent the theft.

Some little effervescence has recently been caused in Canea by reports that the Mussulmans intended to provoke an attack against themselves in order to bring on an occupation of the island by the protecting Powers, and one of the leading Mussulmans has shown me an anonymous letter, written, apparently, by some illiterate Christian, in which he is warned that the Christians are armed, and will suppress any such attempt. I have no reason to suppose that there is any truth in these reports.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[48300] No. 366.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 83.)
Sir, *Canea, Crete, October 31, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Dragoumis, the Greek Governor-General, has issued an order calling out all retired gendarmes who entered the corps since 1903. No statement is made regarding the service on which these men are to be employed.

If they are to assist the active gendarmerie in maintaining order, the measure will be an advantageous one for the island; but when the idea was first mooted by the now defunct revolutionary executive committee, the intention was either to send them to Greece to reinforce the Cretan militia or that they should take the place of the existing gendarmerie force and leave the latter free to proceed to Greece.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[48282] No. 367.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 945.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 8, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica reporting on the situation there on the 1st November.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 367.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 144.)
Sir, *Salonica, November 1, 1912.*

I HAD the honour of telegraphing to your Excellency yesterday in the following sense:—

The Turks are preparing to make a final stand along a line extending from the Kara Asmak to Toptchin, where fighting is anticipated to-morrow, but little hope is entertained of their being able to offer a successful resistance.

The remnants of Hassan Tahsin Pasha's army, which had been driven back from Elassona by Serfidje, Kozhani, Kailari, and Karaferia to its present position about 15 miles from this town, has been strengthened by the dispatch of some 10,000 fresh levies from here, 1,500 Anatolians from Ghevgheli, and one division of Ali Nadir Pasha's army of the Strouma with twenty-four field and sixteen machine guns, the remainder of the Strouma force being left at Demir-Hissar to protect the railway line from the Bulgarian lands which have taken possession of the districts of Djoumaa, Petritch and Melnik, and eventually to oppose the advance of a Bulgarian regular corps which is believed to be advancing along this line from the direction of Xanthi.

His Majesty's ship "Hampshire" arrived here this morning about 9·30, and was followed some three hours later by the French cruiser "Bruix."

The arrival of these ships has done much to allay the prevailing anxiety amongst all classes of the population, but the situation here is undoubtedly still critical, and the influx of 30,000 or 40,000 defeated and demoralised troops, in addition to the 40,000 refugees from the interior who are already crowded into the town, may easily be the cause of serious disorders.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[48283] No. 368.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 946.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 8, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 565 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica reporting the sinking of a Turkish gun-boat in the Bay of Salonica.

I have approved Mr. Lamb's action with regard to Cavalla and Drama.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 368.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 145.)
Sir, *Salonica, November 1, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report a daring, though somewhat useless, feat which was performed last night by a Greek vessel in this port.

About 11·30 P.M. a Greek torpedo-boat or destroyer entered the bay and torpedoed the Turkish iron gun-boat "Feth-i-Buland," which was lying at anchor off the port breakwater. It appears that three torpedoes were discharged, the first of which was discovered this morning near the Quarantine Office, the second effected the destruction of the gun-boat, while the third would appear to have been fired at the paddle-wheel despatch-vessel "Fuad," and was picked up near the Allatini flour-mill. The adventurous intruder is believed to have remained in the bay until after 1 o'clock, when she dashed past the forts at Karahouroun at full speed, and though clearly perceived by the gunners at the cape regained the open sea unscathed.

I have the honour to annex hereto a memorandum prepared for me on the subject by Mr. Consular-Assistant Fox-Strangways, who was almost an eyewitness of the performance.

About 4 o'clock in the morning a lively fusillade again excited considerable alarm

in the town. This fusillade appears to have proceeded from the despatch-vessel "Fuad," above alluded to; and though it has not yet been possible to obtain any authoritative account of what took place, the following version that has been given me is probably fairly in accordance with the facts:—

The crew of the "Fuad," on learning what had happened to the "Feth-i-Bulend," were not unnaturally alarmed, particularly as they were well aware that their vessel was absolutely devoid of any means of protecting itself. They therefore determined to abandon it and proceed to land. The captain, who endeavoured to prevent them from taking to the boats, was shot by a certain number of the men, who were in turn shot down by other officers. Shortly afterwards a local fishing-boat, happening to pass the "Fuad," was mistaken for a hostile craft and fired upon by the panic-stricken crew.

The "Feth-i-Bulend" was an old coast-defence iron-clad, built in 1870 but reconstructed at the Ansaldo Works in 1906. Her guns having been taken out of her shortly after the commencement of the Italo-Turkish war to strengthen the defences of the Big Cape, she had practically remained at anchor ever since, and was of absolutely no value for the purposes of the war. To risk an effective unit for the purpose of sinking what was practically a mass of old iron appears a foolhardy act; but it was certainly proof of great daring, and has no doubt contributed to still further destroy the shattered *morale* of the Turkish troops.

The "Feth-i-Bulend" now lies on her side, with only the tops of her masts and starboard davits showing above water.

According to telegrams received here from the acting vice-consul at Cavalla, two Greek torpedo-boats arrived off that port about 10 o'clock on the 28th ultimo. Their appearance was the cause of a general panic in the town, which is practically without means of defence. After a few minutes, however, they proceeded in the direction of Thassos, which island was occupied by the Greeks yesterday. The Greek squadron was expected to appear before Cavalla to-day, and there is little doubt that the town would capitulate after trifling, if any, resistance. The notables and heads of the various religious communities at Drama, who not long ago expelled the new mutessarif sent from Constantinople, have telegraphically requested the consuls at Cavalla to proceed to the former town in order to act as intermediaries between them and the Bulgarian army, which was believed to be at no great distance, with a view to the peaceful surrender of the place. The Kaimakam of Cavalla, however, having begged them to remain for the purpose of rendering a similar service on the arrival of the Greek squadron there, the consuls decided to remain, but to delegate members of their staff to proceed to Drama. Both places being practically undefended, I have thought well to approve of Vartan Effendi's conduct in thus acting in concert with his French and Austrian colleagues, especially as there are in both towns considerable British interests which would be jeopardised by any further effort at resistance.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

P.S.—It is officially stated that only the imam (or chaplain) and six members of the crew lost their lives in this occurrence.

H. H. L.

Enclosure 2 in No. 368.

Memorandum by Mr. Fox-Strangways on the Sinking of the "Feth-i-Bulend."

I WAS seated, at about 11·25 P.M., in the Olympus Palace Hotel, distant about a quarter of a mile from the scene of the explosion, in company with several gentlemen, including the special correspondent of "Le Journal," when a loud explosion was heard. Several of the gentlemen present ran at once to the harbour, and on their return told us that the Turkish gun-boat "Feth-i-Bulend" had been blown up. I was unwilling to believe this, but on proceeding to the harbour with the correspondent of "Le Journal" I saw about thirty sailors running out of the harbour behind a cab in which some officers were apparently seated. We were not allowed in the harbour, the officials maintaining that nothing had happened, but I thought the fact that the sailors were running from the harbour confirmed the rumour. I afterwards met the "chef de police" at the hotel, and he admitted that the gun-boat had been torpedoed by a Greek boat and that ninety men had been drowned. I also heard that an Albanian guard on duty at the

harbour had seen a Greek torpedo-destroyer approach the gun-boat quite close and make its escape after the explosion.

One of the gentlemen in the hotel subsequently succeeded in gaining admittance to the harbour in his quality of steam-ship agent, and assured me that he saw steam rising from the boilers of the submerged gun-boat. He was told that seventy men had been drowned.

All the Turkish officials on duty at the harbour and Scala refused any information, stating that nothing had happened, except the "chef de police," who did not attempt to veil the truth.

I think it most probable that the Greek vessel was a torpedo-destroyer. Those who saw it are reported to have said that it was three-funnelled, but I think it likely that it was one of the latest acquired five-funnelled destroyers from England, as these boats have their funnels arranged two-one-two, and thus might be mistaken for three-funnelled boats.

Although the Kum-Bournou searchlight worked for hours after the explosion, I am given to understand that the Greek boat made its escape.

[48285] No. 369.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 948.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 8, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, reporting on the present position of Hassan Tahsin Pasha's army.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 369.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 147.)

Sir, *Salonica, November 3, 1912.*

AS I had the honour of telegraphing to your Excellency last night, the success gained by Hassan Tahsin Pasha's division over the Greeks along the Kara-Asmak-Toptchin line on the 1st instant proved merely ephemeral.

On that day he had driven a weak Greek detachment out of Plati, on the further side of the Kara-Asmak, with his left wing, and further succeeded in repelling a turning movement in the neighbourhood of Yenidjé-Vardar with his right. He was officially declared to have captured 8 cannon and 400 prisoners. In spite of torrential rains during the night of the 1st, which must have rendered all operations in the marshy grounds about Yenidjé extremely difficult, his attack was renewed on the following morning and promised to result in a complete success, when one of those inexplicable panics which have been so remarkable a feature of the present war suddenly deprived him of half his force and compelled him to fall back across the Vardar, both bridges over which were blown up during the night.

To-day his head-quarters were still at Toptchin, where preparations were being made to oppose the passage of the river by the Greeks. As soon as this passage is effected, it is understood that he will retreat in a north-easterly direction along the Serres railroad, abandoning Salonica to its fate. What proportion of his force will follow him is doubtful, but it is confidently believed that all the local levies will then desert and crowd into the town, where no adequate force remains for the preservation of order, and this is the moment which the entire population has looked forward to with increasing anxiety during the past eight or nine days.

The bulk of these troops indeed appear too cowed to be dangerous; but it is to be anticipated that, according to established precedent, the criminals will be released from gaol, and, added to the several thousand Bosniak and other refugees, rendered irritable by prolonged hunger, may proceed to pillage and perhaps set fire to the less protected quarters of the town.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

[48286] No. 370.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 949.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 8, 1912.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 965 of the 7th November, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the joint note which was addressed to-day to the Sublime Porte by the Ambassadors of the Powers, asking that the necessary instructions may be sent to the authorities of the Straits to admit a second war-ship for each Power.

No difficulty was made about the admission of the first ships, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs at first gave it to be understood that the presence of any number of ships would be welcomed. Subsequently he receded somewhat from this attitude, and intimated that some guarantee would be required for the eventual withdrawal of any further ships which might be sent. To meet this wish, the Austrian Ambassador (as doyen) was authorised to send in a note, signed by him alone, to Gabriel Effendi informing him that the Ambassadors were agreed on the declaration, which forms the second paragraph of the enclosed note. Gabriel Effendi raised objections to this form of procedure, and the Ambassadors accordingly decided to present their request in the form of a joint note, without, however, modifying in any way the text of the declaration as to eventual withdrawal.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 370.

Joint Note.

LES soussignés Ambassadeurs d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'Angleterre, de France, de Russie et d'Allemagne prient la Sublime Porte de vouloir bien donner aux autorités des Détroits les instructions nécessaires pour laisser entrer un bâtiment de guerre de chacune des Puissances qu'ils représentent et de l'Italie.

La présence des bâtiments dont il s'agit n'ayant pour but que la sauvegarde des colonies étrangères, dont la sécurité pourrait être mise en danger par l'état de guerre, il va de soi que ces bâtiments se retireront dès que les circonstances qui motivent leur entrée auront cessé d'exister.

PALLAVICINI.
LOWTHER.
BOMPARD.
GIERS.
WANGENHEIM.

Constantinople, le 8 novembre, 1912.

[48292] No. 371.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 476.)
Sir, *Berlin, November 11, 1912.*

HITHERTO the Berlin newspapers have not given expression to any very definite views as to the position to be taken up by Germany in the event of Austria becoming involved in war as the result of her attitude towards the Servian demands for territorial expansion. The Radical "Tageblatt," however, publishes a leading article to-day in which the question is discussed at some length.

Public opinion in Germany, it says, is influenced by two conflicting considerations. On the one hand, it holds that Germany is not responsible for the failure of Austria to solve the Servian question long ago; that it is not her fault if Austria now finds herself involved in difficulties as a result of past blunders; and she is not disposed to be for ever picking chestnuts out of the fire for other people. Germany wants to live on good terms with the Balkan nations on account of their commercial possibilities, and she does not regard Austrian expansion with absolute equanimity, since the German idea is constantly losing ground in the monarchy, where clericalism works recklessly towards an unknown goal. On the other hand, Austria is a nearer neighbour to

Germany than Servia, and an Austrian repulse on this question might easily imply a rebuff to the Triple Alliance, and consequently to Germany herself.

Both these points of view, it continues, are well founded, and so long as the dispute over the Adriatic ports remains a question between Austria and Servia alone, and does not degenerate into a trial of strength between two groups of Powers, the German public will not be deeply interested in it. Germany, however, could not allow it to result in anything that could be construed into a humiliation for Austria and a defeat of the Triple Alliance. Hence the aim of all parties should be to avoid drawing a sharp line between the two groups or doing anything which could have the appearance of a trial of strength.

The view thus expressed by the "Tageblatt" coincides closely with that which I believe to be held by Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, and it may be summed up by saying that, whilst Germany takes but little interest in the actual point at issue and sincerely hopes that a conflict may be avoided, she would be prepared if necessary to support her ally by force of arms in defence of the interests of the Triple Alliance. All parties in Berlin appear indeed to be unanimously of opinion that the obligations imposed by the Triple Alliance must be scrupulously met, though there exists at present no feeling of enmity against any other Power.

Russia is scarcely mentioned in this connection, and no animosity is shown any longer against England, whose disinterested attitude in the present crisis appears to be thoroughly appreciated. Mr. Asquith's speech at the Guildhall on the 9th instant has been greeted with great satisfaction as tending to allay the present anxiety and pour oil on the troubled waters. The "Vossische Zeitung," for example, which has in the past been by no means friendly to England, warmly welcomes the evidence which the speech contains, that England is honestly working for a limitation of the area of hostilities. Mr. Asquith's straightforward language, it says, goes far to dispel the illusion that England is pursuing a deep-laid scheme of her own, and encourages the conviction that she is really working for peace. Should, it adds, such be the case, there should be little danger of an extension of the war, since it was hardly conceivable that Russia would go to war in support of a purely Servian interest when England and France were bent on avoiding a conflict.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[48273] No. 372.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 622.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 12, 1912.*

ST. PETERSBURGH telegram No. 412 of 6th November.

It may be pointed out that the conversation between the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Bulgarian Minister contains no allusion to the future fate of the islands of the archipelago like Mitylene, Lemnos, Tenedos, &c., not occupied by Italy.

[48270] No. 373.

Sir H. Rax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 139.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 12, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 148 of 9th November.

Italian Minister informed the Servian Minister confidentially that the real reason for the opposition of Austria to Servia's wish to obtain a port in the Adriatic was jealousy of Russia.

Austrian Government feared that port would be put at the disposal of Russia in the event of war, and they considered that there was no room for Russia, Austria, and Italy in the Adriatic.

[48311] No. 374.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 140.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 12, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 12th November.

(Very Confidential.)

I hear from a sure source that the Austrian Minister at Belgrade had an interview with Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs prior to latter's departure for Uskub.

He informed M. Pashitch that his Government formally objected to Servia acquiring a port on the Adriatic, and that on this point the Triple Alliance were in accord.

Austrian Minister further added that his Government could, and were willing to, assist them to obtain a port on the Ægean by valley of the Vardar.

(This points to Salonica, and such a suggestion can only be thrown out in order to create discord among the allies.)

Finally, he stated that Austria had already shown her good-will towards Servia by allowing her to occupy the sanjak and Novi-bazar. He would not press, he said, for any commercial advantages until a more favourable season.

Prime Minister made no reply, but he has asked here secretly if Servia can count upon Bulgarian army in case of hostilities.

I gather that Austrian Government will be informed that note has been taken of their objection, but that no programme has been yet decided on, nor will be, until peace is declared with Turkey and allies have had time to consult on all points.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[48379] No. 375.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 13, 1912.*

YOUR telegram to Paris No. 676 of 6th November and your telegram No. 147 of 8th November: Mediation proposals.

All my colleagues except German Minister have received their instructions. As Ottoman Government have now expressed wish to enter into direct communications with allies, may I presume that general mediation proposals will be dropped?

[48420] No. 376.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 145. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, November 13, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 140 of 12th November: Servian Adriatic question.

Prime Minister has informed Servian Government that he considers above as the most important of all Balkan questions. Bulgaria would remain absolutely solid with Servia on this point and would assist her in case of necessity with her military support. This would be as agreed upon in military convention existing between the two countries. Prime Minister has also telegraphed in above sense to Bulgarian representative at St. Petersburgh.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[48421] No. 377.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, November 13, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 133 of 9th November.

Action against Tchatalja lines commenced on evening of 10th November. Two minor forts on front line of defences were attacked, but without decisive result.

[48399] No. 378.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 160.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, November 13, 1912.*

WHILE I was at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs yesterday, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs spoke to my French colleague about loans which Bulgaria appears to be attempting to raise in France and Germany. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs expressed opinion, which M. Cambon has telegraphed to Paris, that it was inadvisable at this moment to furnish Bulgaria with sinews of war, and that the two Governments should oppose loans.

Secretary of State also said that, as difficult questions relating to Ottoman public debt would shortly arise, he was sending telegraphic advice to German delegate on council to confer with his French colleague, so as to be ready for action at the proper moment.

[48422] No. 379.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 161.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, November 13, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 367 of 12th November: Capitulations in Kossovo villayet.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had not heard of attitude of Servian military authorities at Uskub, as the German interests are in the hands of the Austrian consul. On his asking what His Majesty's Government proposed to do in the matter I informed him of your views. He agreed with them, and will send provisional instructions to German representative at Belgrade in the sense of your telegram to Sir R. Paget of 12th November.

[48414] No. 380.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 137. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 13, 1912.*

FOLLOWING information with regard to military position of Austria-Hungary and Servia towards each other has been communicated to me by the military attaché:—

"Consideration of the military situation points to the probability of Servia being crushed by Austria before Russia can come to her assistance. Present attitude of Italy and Roumania will enable Austria-Hungary to set free for operations against Russia and Servia her whole force, at present forty-eight completed Landwehr and Honved divisions, and probably fifteen more Landsturm divisions without deduction for frontier garrisons.

"Both Servians and Bulgarians, especially the latter, will have exhausted much of their material resources, and Bulgaria will have Roumania to consider.

"Seven distribution lines leading from centre of Austria to the Galician frontier available for the conveyance of troops will require fourteen days at least to convey thirty-two divisions, including those at Cracow, Przemysl, and Lemberg, which it is estimated is all that can be usefully employed initially, owing to restrictions caused by lack of roads and other communications in Poland, which will also materially postpone time of contact with Russian army.

"Meanwhile, sixteen divisions, besides Landsturm and other reserve formations, can be concentrated against Servia in Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary, main lines of operations being probably down Morava valley.

"Seventh corps at Temesvar and the twelfth at Hermanstadt, supported by thirteenth from Agram and by neighbouring Landwehr divisions, could cross into Servia within a few days after mobilisation, and it is probable that a decisive blow would be struck at the Servian army in time for greater part of troops employed against her to be re-transferred to Galicia when the railways are available for conveyance of troops thither."

[48429] No. 381.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 138.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November 13, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"There has been considerable movement of infantry from and through Vienna last night and to-day. One Czech battalion passed through on the way to Bosnia yesterday evening. Early this morning about 900 men left railway station for Bosnia, stated to be three-year men of various units. They are certainly not recruits. Fourth regiment in Vienna is under orders to entrain to-night, uncertain yet whether for Bosnia or Galicia. Possibly not more than one battalion will go, but this regiment has already one battalion in Bosnia. Russian military attaché learns from sure source that there are seventy-five battalions in all now in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Fact is established that temporary shelters are being erected now for garrison in Bosnia and budget for Bosnia administration makes provision for this service. It is freely rumoured that additional brigades and even divisions are to be concentrated in Bosnia at once to make demonstrations against Servia, but nothing is so far established beyond the fact that troops now in Bosnia have been pushed forward to the frontier. Majority of Dalmatian troops being now in Herzegovina, there is reason to believe that, in addition to the drafts for the units, the fourth battalions of the four-battalion regiments stationed elsewhere (hypothetically) in Galicia are being sent to occupy detached frontier posts, so that Bosnian and Herzegovinian field units can be concentrated at suitable points ready to move."

[48418] No. 382.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 429.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, November 13, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1215 of 12th November: Capitulations in Kossovo vilayet.

Russian Government are sending their representative at Belgrade instructions similar to those recorded in your telegram No. 91 of same date to Sir R. Paget.

Minister for Foreign Affairs entirely shares your views.

[48419] No. 383.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 430.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, November 13, 1912.*

VIENNA agency telegram stating that Russian Government have notified Servia that Russia will not support her should she go to war with Austria has evoked angry comments in Russian press.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is much annoyed that such a statement should have been published at Vienna, as he never went so far in his conversations with Austrian Ambassador. He is publishing a communiqué to the effect that the Russian Government have taken no engagements one way or the other, and that they are perfectly free to act as they think best for the real interests of the Empire.

[48410] No. 384

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 623.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 13, 1912.*

PLEASE repeat the following to Athens if no objection:—

"Coal is urgently required for the combined fleet before Constantinople. Messrs. Gilchrist and Walker are prepared to supply it if the Greek Government will grant free passage for the steam-ship 'Eastfield,' of Evans, Jones and Co., now loading at Cardiff. A certificate has been granted by the senior admiral of the fleet, declaring that the coal is destined for the sole use of men-of-war now at Constantinople.

"This certificate, countersigned by Ambassadors, will be presented at Athens. Steamer is proceeding direct from Cardiff to the Piræus in hope of getting the necessary permit.

"Could you urge the Greek Government to act as desired and telegraph the results of efforts as soon as possible?"

[48416] No. 385.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 625.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 13, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 91 of 12th November to Belgrade: Capitulations in Kossovo.

Tripoli consuls had no official capacity *vis-à-vis* Italian army of occupation, which dealt with all direct or indirect military matters. Even in cases affecting foreigners in regard to purely civil matters a temporary *modus vivendi* pending peace was locally arranged, Italians agreeing to unofficially notifying arrests of foreign subjects and unofficial presence of dragoman at trial.

[48411] No. 386.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 13, 1912.*

UNDER-SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs informs me confidentially that the principal object of M. Danef's mission to Austria is to ask the Austrian Government to influence Roumania to reduce her claims for a territorial compensation.

Roumania first asked for a new frontier running from Rustchuk to Varna, but is now willing to accept a frontier from Turtukai to Baltchik. Bulgaria, however, still considers this too much.

M. Danef will also inform the Austrian Government that Bulgaria supports the Servian claim to an Adriatic port, and will discuss the subject generally.

(Sent to Bucharest and Sophia.)

[48424] No. 387.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 163.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, November 13, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 502 of 12th November: Capitulations in Kossovo.

There has been no Italian consul at Uskub since outbreak of the war with Turkey. Foreign Office has not, therefore, received collective telegram sent by consuls of the Great Powers. Agent is, however, now returning to his post. View held here is similar to that which you have provisionally expressed to Sir R. Paget.

[48409] No. 388.

Viscount Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 79.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cairo, November 13, 1912.*

THE Khedive desires me to express his gratitude for message conveyed in your telegram No. 82 of 12th November, and hopes that Sir F. Elliot may be instructed as you suggest. Moreover, as great distress exists among the inhabitants of Cavalla and Thasos His Highness would be much obliged if Sir F. Elliot could obtain from the Greek Government permission for him to send by sea flour to relieve their wants.

[48377] No. 389.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 154.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November 13, 1912.*

ARMISTICE.

Unless you receive instructions you should not take any further steps.

Neither the Bulgarian Government nor the Porte have suggested that communications between them should pass through us.

[48069] No. 390.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 13, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 54 of 11th November.

I had hoped that special claims of individual States would not be discussed till Balkan allies formulated their whole terms of peace in common. Any points of difficulty could then be discussed as parts of the whole with much better prospect of favourable settlement.

I have not therefore discussed Servian claim hitherto. You should explain this to Servian Minister, and add that I perfectly understand how important it is for Servia to be sure of outlet for her commerce on the Adriatic, but that there is more than one method of securing this, and that for Servia to reject peremptorily in advance all consideration of possible methods except her own that may be suggested for securing the substance of what she requires will alienate the sympathy and weaken the hands of those who wish to support her. And for Servia to provoke a quarrel separately with Austria on one point before claims of Balkan States are formulated as a whole may jeopardise the whole settlement, under which it is quite certain that Servia, in common with her allies, will secure enormous advantages with the consent of all the Great Powers. The right, therefore, of those of the Great Powers who are most directly interested in the pending change of the map of Europe to have some say in the matter should not be rudely challenged.

(Repeated to Sophia, No. 156; also to St. Petersburgh, No. 1222, and Paris, No. 697, with the following addition: "You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.")

[48410] No. 391.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 277.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 13, 1912.*

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 623 of 13th November.

You should act as desired, and telegraph reply of Greek Government to Sir G. Lowther, and here, as soon as possible.

[48637] No. 392.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 551.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 13, 1912.*

M. CAMBON told Sir A. Nicolson on the 13th November that M. Poincaré had informed the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris that, in the opinion of the French Government, the actual occupation by the Allies during hostilities of this or that locality or point in no wise established a claim to the permanent possession of such localities, as the Powers would at the end of the war have a word to say on that subject. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador was much pleased with this communication.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[47453] No. 393.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. Buchanan.

(No. 377. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 13, 1912.*

THE Russian Ambassador called at this Office on the 8th instant and left with me the accompanying memorandum, showing the views of his Government as to the ultimate partition of Turkish territory among the allied Balkan States in the event of their being victorious.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 393.

Memorandum communicated by Count Benckendorff, November 8, 1912.

(Confidentiel.)

A NOTRE avis, l'intervention des Puissances ne peut avoir de succès que si elle a lieu sans retard. En vue de sauvegarder la sécurité de Constantinople, il est dans l'intérêt général de maintenir un rayon sous la souveraineté réelle du Sultan. Les limites de ce rayon sont déterminées par une ligne partant de l'estuaire de la Maritza et aboutissant, par Andrinople, à la Mer Noire. Toutes les autres provinces de la Turquie d'Europe, devraient, à notre avis, être réparties à l'amiable entre les États alliés en vertu de leur droit de conquête. Dans ces limites nous sommes prêts à appuyer auprès des Puissances le maximum du possible.

Nous estimons que de cette façon une paix durable serait assurée dans les Balkans, alors que les difficultés d'une médiation se trouveraient en même temps sensiblement amoindries.

C'est uniquement par l'acceptation immédiate et unanime de ces conditions de la part des Puissances qu'il sera possible d'obvier au danger d'une occupation de Constantinople par les alliés et aux complications européennes qui pourraient en résulter. Car, si les alliés n'obtiennent pas des Puissances des garanties sérieuses pour la réalisation de leurs demandes, il est à craindre que leurs ressources limitées, ne leur permettant pas d'attendre, ne les obligent à occuper Constantinople afin de s'assurer un gage réel.

Il va sans dire qu'il s'agirait également de prendre en considération plusieurs questions importantes.

Nous admettons en principe la création d'une Albanie maritime autonome sous la souveraineté du Sultan. En même temps on ne saurait perdre de vue la nécessité de satisfaire aux aspirations serbes vers la Mer Adriatique.

Une rectification de frontière entre la Bulgarie et la Roumanie devrait avoir lieu afin de donner à cette dernière une compensation équitable pour son attitude loyale pendant la guerre. Nous sommes prêts à appuyer à Sophia des conseils en ce sens.

Nous serions également tout prêts à admettre entre l'Autriche et la Serbie la conclusion d'un arrangement d'ordre économique qui assurerait à la première le libre transit de ses produits par les nouvelles possessions serbes.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 8 novembre, 1912.

[48314] No. 394.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 13.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November* 12, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated the 12th instant, relative to movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE

Enclosure in No. 394.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 12, 1912.

FOLLOWING telegram from "Barham" forwarded by navy agent, Port Said, substance communicated to commander-in-chief: "War-ship's presence requested at Jaffa where latest news has produced strong feeling on part of Mahommedans against Christians. After consultation with consul-general, Beirout, "Prometheus" proceeding to Jaffa, arriving to-morrow afternoon to protect British life and property. She will stay till the 16th instant."

[48405] No. 395.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 13.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November* 13, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 13th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 395.

His Majesty's Ship "Hampshire," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 13, 1912.

ITALIAN hospital ship "Re d'Italia" and Dutch "Gelderland" arrived Constantinople.

Enclosure 2 in No. 395.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 13, 1912.

ARRIVED Besika Bay. "Hampshire" reported yesterday cholera very severe in army outside Constantinople and eighteen cases in city. Mines have been seen in Bosphorus, said to have come from Varna. Government are sending to Asia all stragglers, and doing utmost prevent any disturbance. All is quiet, though it is rumoured Chatalja lines broken.

Enclosure 3 in No. 395.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 13, 1912.

"GOOD HOPE," "Zealandia," "Africa," "Hussar," arrived Besika, and last-named sailed with mails for Piræus and Salonica. Geoben left Malta.

Enclosure 4 in No. 395.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 13, 1912.

"MEDEA" is to proceed Besika, and none of His Majesty's ships is to remain Salonica. All destroyers are to remain Malta except two, which may, subject to approval of Ambassador, be used to carry mails between Constantinople and Besika.

Enclosure 5 in No. 395.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 13, 1912.

"USKOKE" sailed yesterday afternoon for Salonica according to report from Hibernia

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[48378] No. 396.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 13.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November* 13, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copies of telegrams dated the 12th and 13th instant relative to movements in His Majesty's ships and others in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 396.

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 12, 1912.

IN order to provide His Majesty's Government with latest, or urgent, information, submit I may send, necessary permission being obtained, two destroyers to Constantinople to run despatches to Besika Bay, in view of wireless telegraphic communications being confined to 9 P.M. to midnight, and possibly to be altogether cut off.

Enclosure 2 in No. 396.

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, November* 12, 1912.

GREEK prefect officially invited myself and captains of foreign ships to to-day's *Te Deum* in cathedral: neither France, Italy, Austria, nor England sent representatives, either naval or consular. Russia's action not yet known.

Enclosure 3 in No. 396.

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, November* 12, 1912.

GREEK ship "Sphaktoria" and Greek transport "Arcadia" arrived: situation here still difficult between Greeks and Bulgars. In accordance with your No. 289, am leaving in "Good Hope," with "Zealandia" and "Africa," for Besika Bay. "Medea" stays here.

Enclosure 4 in No. 396.

Consul Powell to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Philadelphia, November* 12, 1912.

GOVERNMENT of United States have postponed till to-day sailing of war-ships mentioned in my telegram of 9th instant.

Enclosure 5 in No. 396.

Vice-Consul Palmer to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Dardanelles, November* 12, 1912.

"GELDERLAND" (Dutch) left north.

Enclosure 6 in No. 396.

His Majesty's Ship "Barham" to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Beirut, November* 13, 1912.

"PROMETHEUS" proceeding to Jaffa. French ship "Henri IV" has arrived.

[48275] No. 397.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 621.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, November* 12, 1912.

MY telegram No. 611, Secret.

This morning Grand Vizier asked M. Popof to telegraph to King Ferdinand, through the Russian Embassy, requesting that an armistice should be arranged so as to put a stop to the war and avoid any further bloodshed.

Generalissimo Nazim Pasha, at the same time, would receive instructions to use discretion in arranging an armistice, whilst the preliminaries of peace would be discussed by Tewfik Pasha, former Turkish Ambassador at Berlin, who would proceed to the front for that purpose. Kiamil Pasha hinted to M. Popof that if the Balkan allies' terms were excessive Turkey would demand that a conference should be summoned, but this course appears hardly practicable.

[48377] No. 398.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 143.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, November* 13, 1912.

WITH reference to telegram No. 611, Secret, of 11th November from Constantinople, the Prime Minister has been informed by me of the wish of the Porte that the Grand Vizier and the King of Bulgaria should be put into direct communication. His Majesty is at present at the front, but the Prime Minister is communicating with him direct. While himself in favour of an armistice, M. Gueshof states that he must ascertain the King's wishes before making any definite statement.

[48426] No. 399.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 146.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, November* 13, 1912.

LAST night M. Danef telegraphed from Budapest to the Bulgarian Government (see my telegram No. 131 of 9th November).

On the 10th instant, he states, both the Emperor and the Archduke Franz Ferdinand granted him a prolonged audience, in the course of which they both referred to Bulgaria in very flattering terms, the Archduke stating that he had come to Budapest expressly to see the President of the Bulgarian Sobranjé. While asserting their readiness to do everything possible to bring about a satisfactory arrangement, the Emperor declared that, as far as Roumania was concerned, the position of the Sovereign of that country was a very difficult one, and Bulgaria would have to make some small territorial concession.

In reply, M. Danef said that the King of Bulgaria was even more awkwardly situated.

The idea of Servia obtaining a port on the Adriatic did not commend itself either to the Emperor or the Archduke; the latter however, after considerable discussion, stated that his country did not intend to make the question a *casus belli*.

In a conversation which he had with the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, subsequently to this audience, M. Danef defended the cause of the Slavs with energy, and informed Count Berchtold that no official demand for cession of territory had so far been received from Roumania.

M. Danef was given to understand by Count Berchtold that the question of the cession of Salonica to Greece had formed the subject of a conversation between the Greek Minister and himself, but that he had declined to make a definite statement on the subject.

In the opinion of M. Danef, it would meet the views of the Austrian Government that Salonica should become an international port, as there seemed no prospect of its falling into the possession of Servia.

[48428] No. 400.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 196. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, November* 13, 1912.

M. POINCARÉ told me this evening that he had been informed by the Greek Minister in Paris that he has good reason to believe that the Italian Foreign Minister arranged with the German Government during his recent visit to Berlin that Rhodes and another island in the Ægean should be retained by Italy. The Austrian Government having concurred in this arrangement, Italy is to come to terms with Turkey on the subject. The French Ambassador at Berlin has given M. Poincaré similar information in a private letter.

M. Poincaré told me that the French Government could not consent to Italy's acquisition of any island or islands in the Ægean. He considers that an early opportunity should be taken by the French and British Governments to remind the Italian Government of the assurances which they gave as to the islands and of the terms of the Italo-Turkish treaty of peace, subject to which the annexation of Tripoli by Italy receives the recognition of France and England.

M. Poincaré will mention the matter to the Russian Government, but as Russia is not a Mediterranean Power it affects her less than it does France and England. He does not think that the friendship between Italy and Russia should be allowed to stand in the way of representations by France and England to Italy on the subject.

M. Poincaré thinks that Germany and Austria might each attempt to follow Italy's example, if she were permitted on one pretext or another to retain an island.

[48379] No. 401.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 155.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 13, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 144 of 13th November.

Communication should still be made when all your colleagues have received instructions. Ottoman Government have not withdrawn their appeal to the Powers.

[49147] No. 402.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 369.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 13, 1912.

AUSTRIAN Ambassador informs me that Count Berchtold shares my view that as long as war with Turkey lasts actions of the allies can be looked upon as war operations, and that he does not intend to interfere with them. He cannot, however, share my view that discussion of questions that affect Austrian interests should be deferred to a moment when Europe finds itself confronted with a *fait accompli*, especially as it is not Austria but Servia that began it.

It is Count Berchtold's earnest wish that every question arising out of this war should have a peaceful solution. It is, however, desirable that creation of an autonomous Albania should not be prejudiced through occupation of part of Albania by Servian troops without a preliminary warning.

I said I supposed this meant a warning that any occupation by Servia of Albania would be regarded as provisional, and the Ambassador said he understood it in this sense.

I told the Ambassador that I was instructing the British Minister at Belgrade to explain to the Servian Minister that I perfectly understood how important it was for Servia to be sure of an outlet for her commerce on the Adriatic, but that there was more than one method of securing this, and that for Servia to reject peremptorily in advance all considerations of possible methods except her own that may be suggested for securing the substance of what she required would alienate the sympathy and weaken the hands of those who wished to support her.

I told the Ambassador that I know Russia had spoken quite as strongly in this sense at Belgrade, and that as everyone was counselling moderation there a peaceable and favourable solution was eventually certain. The only thing that might prevent it would be an outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Servia. I hoped, therefore, that Austria would not resent anything that Servia was doing now as being a provocative gesture, and I was very glad of the communication he had just made from Count Berchtold, which I took to confirm this hope.

The Ambassador said he regarded the communication that I was making at Belgrade as very satisfactory and valuable.

(Repeated to five embassies, with the following addition to each: "You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.")

[48427] No. 403.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

[By Post.]

(No. 195.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair. Paris, November* 13, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 693 of yesterday.

M. Poincaré says that he has informed you through the French Ambassador of his views in regard to Capitulations in Servia. They are in accordance with yours. He has instructed the French consul not to admit that the Capitulations are abrogated, but to temporise with the Servian military authorities.

[48456] No. 404.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 626.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, November* 13, 1912.

MY telegram No. 621 of yesterday: Direct peace negotiations with Bulgaria.

Kiamil Pasha's telegram, which is worded in very courteous terms, was dispatched through the Russian Embassy at 3 A.M. this morning. His Highness appeals to King Ferdinand to agree with his allies as to terms for a preliminary peace, and states that commander-in-chief of Turkish army has been appointed Turkish delegate to receive any communication of such terms.

The telegram lays stress on the necessity of avoiding further bloodshed which is now threatened by the delay in the mediation negotiations regarding which Turkey had appealed to the Powers.

[48516] No. 405.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 139.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November* 13, 1912.

I HAVE seen Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who came to Vienna to-day for a few hours from Budapest, whither he returns to-night. I enquired whether he could tell me anything with regard to M. Daneff's mission. He gave me to understand that he was very fairly satisfied with its results. I gather Bulgaria will use her influence at Belgrade to render Servian aspirations acceptable to Austria-Hungary. His Excellency also told me Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had spoken to Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh in a manner which tended to bring about a *détente* between Russia and Austria. Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs did not believe Russia was mobilising, though she was taking some precautionary measures. Austria had only slightly strengthened her military position in Bosnia. His Excellency said to me that in his opinion the height of the crisis was now over, and that with a little common sense and good-will on all sides a solution could be found for the chief present difficulties.

From what Minister for Foreign Affairs told me, I gather that M. Daneff was anxious for conclusion of peace before Bulgaria was forced by circumstances to enter Constantinople. Bulgaria is apparently encountering strong opposition from Russia to her entering Constantinople. Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he was afraid that Turkey would be unreasonable and would refuse conditions of peace and of armistice, and he hinted to me that the moment might come when it might be well for Europe to put pressure on Turkey to yield.

With regard to Servian demand for an Adriatic port on Albanian coast, I enquired of his Excellency whether he had any information tending to show that Servian army was advancing towards the Adriatic. He said reports were contradictory; but, on my pressing, he seemed to imply that if Austro-Hungarian Government were convinced that a large body of Servian troops were deliberately marching towards the Adriatic, Austro-Hungary would have to give a warning to Servia, so that the latter may not declare later that she received no official intimation that Austria absolutely objected to her occupying Adriatic port.

With regard to Salonica, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs inclined to the idea that it should be made a free port for the general use of Balkan States, by which term he evidently means Austria-Hungary to be included.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he has advised M. Danef to use his influence to bring about a peaceful and satisfactory settlement of Roumanian claims for compensation.

[48477] No. 406.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinje, November 13, 1912.*

AUSTRIAN Minister tells me that, by order of his Government, he has made a verbal communication to the King to the following effect:—

"With reference to occupation of Medua and Alessio, we draw the King's attention to the fact that we do not wish to disturb military operations in any way, but that a permanent occupation of the Albanian coast, either by Montenegro or Servia, could not be brought into harmony with creation of an autonomous Albania, which we have in view."

Italian Minister is to make a similar communication to-morrow.

[48592] No. 407.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 140. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 14, 1912.*

I HAVE received the following information from a good source:—

At the opening of the Balkan war the German Ambassador here was very lukewarm in supporting Austrian standpoint; but of late he has entirely changed his tone, and is now saying that he has obtained from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs satisfactory assurances that Austria-Hungary will not yield another step as regards her views on Albanian and other points. The German Ambassador also declares that Austria must see that Roumania gets full compensation for her neutrality during the war. Reason for this is, he declares, Germany's anxiety to put under a debt of obligation to herself her last remaining friend in the Near East.

I understand that German Ambassador went to Budapest and asked for an audience of the Emperor, in order to make the public here understand that Germany would stand by Austria under all circumstances. I have reason to believe that he is inspiring that part of the press here which is under German influence to attack Russia.

Anti-Austrian attitude of a part of the French press is, I am informed, causing much displeasure at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs here. The general tone of the English press, on the other hand, is much appreciated here.

[48593] No. 408.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 141. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 14, 1912.*

BALKAN League.

The Greek Minister here told an intimate friend that Greece would not support (except perhaps academically) Servian pretensions to a port on the Albanian coast. This would indicate possibility that the Balkan League, as a whole, will not do anything which will complicate the situation as against Austria.

Greek Minister told my informant that the league was originally concluded for three years, during which period war with Turkey was to be carried through; but he intimated that division of the spoils, which exceed all expectation, was left vague.

[48594] No. 409.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 142.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November 14, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 364 of 12th November: Capitulations in Kossovo.

Austrian Minister at Belgrade has been asked for further information and will not receive definite instructions until this has been furnished. Austrian consuls were, however, instructed some time ago that Capitulations were to remain in force and that they were to continue to consider themselves under the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople. Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs shares your views as expressed to Sir R. Paget on the subject of the Capitulations, and will probably forward similar instructions to the Austrian Minister at Belgrade when he is in possession of more details.

[48588] No. 410.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 14, 1912.*

MEDIATION proposals.

My colleagues having received similar instructions to those which you conveyed to me in your telegram No. 147 of 8th November, I have now taken action as directed. Prime Minister made an identical reply to each of us, and, after expressing his thanks, said he would convey our communication to commander-in-chief of allied forces, that is, to King of Bulgarians and to allied Governments, and that he would communicate a further reply to us later.

[48589] No. 411.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 149. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 14, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

After conclusion of my formal conversation with Prime Minister, he spoke to me of his own accord as follows:—

The King had, he said, just left Kirk Kilisse for Chataldja. He had, he believed, done so for two reasons: firstly, for the sake of showing himself in the fighting line, and secondly, because he had received a letter from the Grand Vizier containing proposals for peace negotiations. This letter had been sent in cypher by Bulgarian consul at Constantinople through the Russian Embassy to Russian Legation here.

He himself had forwarded it to His Majesty this morning.

The Prime Minister expressed no opinion as to the result.

During this conversation I was careful to bear in mind instructions conveyed in your telegram No. 154 of 13th November.

[48586] No. 412.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November 11, 1912.*

PRIME Minister being absent at the front, I read a French paraphrase of your telegram No. 93 of 13th November to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

He said it was not Servia who had begun discussion about Albania and the Adriatic port, but that Austria was assuming the right to impose certain restraints

upon Servia in her military operations in Turkey, and had then made certain suggestions which were inacceptable.

Servia would have willingly left the question to be raised subsequently, but cannot submit to being limited in her action at present. At the same time, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs pointed out that in his opinion no other settlement than full possession of an Adriatic port could be considered, as the military party, who had now completely lost their heads, would not be amenable to reason, and Prime Minister, who has gone to consult with the King and Minister of War upon subject of Austria's attitude, might find himself placed before the choice of resigning or defying Austria.

The Servian troops are believed to have already reached the Adriatic.

I gather that even full possession of an Adriatic port would not now satisfy Servian ambitions, and that military party who are at present the masters will not be content except with a division of Albania between Servia and Greece.

Meanwhile Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave me following information:—

Austria has placed 15,000 picked men on Drina between Vishegrad and Ratcha. IVth Army Corps at Budapest is mobilising. One battery of howitzers and four search-lights have arrived at Semlin.

There seems to be increased military activity in Belgrade.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[48584] No. 413.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 431. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 14, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 428 of 12th November.

Bulgarian Minister told me this morning that he had expressed to Minister for Foreign Affairs hope that, if the latter accepted Roumanian proposal, he would not conduct mediation on the lines of frontier rectification. Grand Sobranjé would never sanction cession of national territory, and, even if it did, such cession would leave cause for constant friction between the two countries, while Bulgaria would probably seize the first favourable opportunity to take what she had ceded. Bulgaria would consent to Roumania erecting whatever fortifications she pleased along the frontier, while she would engage, under the guarantee of Russia, to leave her side of the frontier unfortified. She would accord communal autonomy to Kutso-Vlachs settlements in Macedonia, and would meet Roumanian wishes in regard to future commercial relations. Cession of territory would not improve Roumania's strategical position, which was her chief preoccupation, but in the very last resort Bulgaria might consent to cede fortress, but not town, of Silistria.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he had asked Bulgarian Minister to give him these conditions in writing, and that he would probably try to mediate on the lines indicated. As he is not to mention Silistria until the very last moment, I trust that the above conditions may be regarded as strictly confidential.

[48585] No. 414.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 432.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 14, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 93 of 13th November to Belgrade.

I informed Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of the instructions sent to Sir R. Paget. He said that they were excellent, and expressed the hope that you would cause them to be communicated to the Bulgarian Government.

Speaking of Austrian suggestion to give Servia commercial access to the Adriatic through Bosnia and Herzegovina, his Excellency said that if Servia was wise she would

accept such political penetration into country inhabited by Serbs. He fears, however, that Servian Prime Minister will not recede from his original demand.

His language to-day was very pacific, but he talked of using our eventual recognition of autonomy of Albanian province as a means to extract concessions from Austria. He looked to France and England to support him when the question of delimiting the boundaries of that province should come up for discussion.

He is rather preoccupied by the squabble which has arisen between the Greeks and Bulgarians over Salonica, and has told the latter that the allies must settle all these questions between themselves, and not wash their dirty linen in public.

[48537] No. 415.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, November 14, 1912.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 137 of 12th November.

I have noticed no signs of much excitement in Roumania on account of the alleged dispatch of two Bulgarian regiments from Varna to Silistria, and the secretary-general at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs tells me that the news in no way caused the Government anxiety, and all the less so because they knew it to be inaccurate.

(Repeated to Sophia.)

[48582] No. 416.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 627.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, November 14, 1912.*

ROUMANIAN "Regina Elisabeta," Dutch "Gelderland," and Italian hospital-ship have arrived.

[48596] No. 417.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Beirout, November 14, 1912.*

YOUR telegram of 13th November.

British subjects at Aleppo and Damascus advised in sense of your telegram of 9th November, paragraph 1. Rev. James Murtin, of Presbyterian Mission at Antioch, passing through Beirout on Monday similarly advised. "Barham" proceeded Alexandretta to-day, "Prometheus" returns here from Jaffa on Sunday. Have suggested to admiral, through commander of "Barham," desirability of presence of third British war-ship, permitting one to remain here permanently, and other two to cruise north and south, according circumstances; also to secure wireless communication. French war-ship here at present, German Haifa, Mersina.

[48409] No. 418.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 281.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 14, 1912.*

THASOS and Cavalla.

You should make a communication to Greek Government in sense of concluding paragraph of my telegram No. 82 of 12th November to Lord Kitchener, and of last sentence in Lord Kitchener's telegram No. 79 of 13th November.

[48134] No. 419.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 378.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1912.

THE Russian Ambassador told Sir A. Nicolson on the 8th November that M. Sazonof had sent instructions to the Russian representatives at Sophia, Belgrade, Cettinjé, and Athens to inform the respective Governments, when other representatives had received similar instructions, that the Porte had asked for mediation, and that the Powers would be glad to know if the Balkan confederates would accept mediation, and, if so, on what terms.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[48717] No. 420.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 379.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1912

COUNT BENCKENDORFF pressed me to-day for an answer as to what our attitude would be if Austria attacked Servia.

I said that one could not give a decision about a hypothetical contingency which had not arisen, especially when that on which a very great deal depended, the attitude of other Powers, was not yet known for certain.

Count Benckendorff reminded me that Germany had declared her intention to march with Austria if Russia came to the assistance of Servia.

I observed that this declaration had been made in answer to a direct question from the Servian Minister in Berlin, and that it was the sort of thing which Germany was bound to say to the Servians in reply to such a question. It was, however, conceivable that, if the occasion arose, Germany might say to France and ourselves that she would remain neutral if our neutrality could be counted upon. I explained that I was speaking quite unofficially and personally merely to show how impossible it was to give a reply in advance.

Count Benckendorff said that he quite understood that it was impossible for us to give an answer, but he had to put the question, as he had been instructed to do so.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[48709] No. 421.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 281.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1912.

THE German Ambassador came to see me to-day, and, as he spoke of the Servian difficulty, I told him what I had said in Belgrade, as described in my telegram No. 369 to Sir Fairfax Cartwright. I also told him what I had said to the Austrian Ambassador, deprecating any outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Servia, and I emphasised the importance of this.

The Ambassador said that his Government hoped that we would influence St. Petersburgh to counsel moderation.

I replied that the Russian Government had already done this.

The Ambassador told me that, if we could influence Servia to be moderate, the German Government were quite prepared to use their influence to help us in preventing the Bulgarians from retaining Constantinople.

I said that I understood that the Bulgarians had no intention of retaining Constantinople.

The Ambassador remarked that they might acquire the appetite for this if they entered the town.

As the Ambassador gave me a friendly message from Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, I took the opportunity of expressing pleasure that there had been no friction between

Germany and this country all through the present crisis, and that I had received very friendly communications from the German Chancellor. I hoped that it was felt that I had reciprocated them in the same amicable spirit, for this had been my intention.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[48616] No. 422.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 50.)
Sir, *Munich, November* 13, 1912.

BARON von HERTLING'S statement some weeks ago in the Landtag that the Bavarian Government were kept fully posted in foreign affairs by the Imperial authorities led some of my colleagues to cross-examine him with indiscreet insistence, with the result that he has suspended his weekly audiences and retired to the country, leaving the Foreign Office here in charge of a permanent official of remarkable taciturnity from whom it is impossible to obtain any information whatever.

The Social Democratic "Münchener Post" continues to fulminate against the possibility of Germany being dragged into a European war at the bidding of Austria-Hungary in the style reported in my despatch No. 48 of the 9th November, but the rest of the press, and especially the National Liberal organs, are unanimous in declaring the solidarity of the Triple Alliance, and that full support must be given to Austria in the Albanian question.

I have, &c.
VINCENT CORBETT.

[48602] No. 423.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 479.)
Sir, *Paris, November* 14, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch which I have received from Colonel the Honourable H. Yarde-Buller, military attaché to this embassy, reporting a conversation with the chief of the Intelligence Department of the French War Office on the subject of the preparedness for war of the Russian army.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 423.

Colonel Yarde-Buller to Sir F. Bertie.

Sir, *Paris, November* 13, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that I visited the Intelligence Branch of the French War Office yesterday and had an interview with the chief of that department, Colonel Vignal. We discussed the present European situation from the military point of view, and, being anxious to know the French military views as to the preparedness for war of the Russian army, I asked him his opinion. His evasive answers and evident desire not to go into the subject tend to confirm the information I had previously received that this country, having recently asked her ally, Russia, if she was ready for war, received a reply in the negative.

I found that great importance appears to be attached to the reports from the seat of war on the superiority of the French gun over the German and on the downfall of General von der Goltz and his lessons in strategy, quite a natural pride on the part of the French and no doubt but one in which may lurk a danger of underestimating their neighbour or of overestimating their own powers.

I also met Colonel Vidale, the newly appointed Austrian military attaché, who spoke with conviction on the subject of Austria never conceding Servia's claims to a port on the Adriatic, but he considered the visit of M. Danef to Budapest as a hopeful sign towards a better understanding with the Balkan States. He also spoke of the unpreparedness of Russia, a fact which might cause Austria to take a more unyielding attitude were it not that the sympathies of many of her subjects would be with the

Slav races. This, together with the fact that an European war on such a question would not be a popular one for her ally Germany, will throw weight into the balance towards a peaceful solution of the present difficulties, and I would add that this is the opinion in general of the various military attachés here.

I have, &c.
H. YARDE-BULLER, *Military Attaché.*

[48644] No. 424.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 15.)

(Confidential.)
Admiralty, November 14, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 14th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 424.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 14, 1912.*

"HIBERNIA" reports to-day arrival of Italian ship "Carabiniere" at Smyrna.

Enclosure 2 in No. 424.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *November 14, 1912.*

"MEDEA" may be retained Salonica.

Your proposals in telegram No. 640 as regards destroyers approved.

Enclosure 3 in No. 424.

H.M.S. "Garry" to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 14, 1912.*

"GARRY," "Chelmer," "Kennet," "Colne," "Jed" arrived Piræus.

[48725] No. 425.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 15.)

(Confidential.)
Admiralty, November 15, 1912

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated the 15th instant, relative to movements of ships in the Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 425.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 15, 1912.*

"GOEBEN" passed up Dardanelles.

[48702] No. 426.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 15.)

(Confidential.)
Admiralty, November 15, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams dated 14th and 15th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 426.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 14, 1912.*

EXPLOSION of powder magazine near camp of Turkish prisoners, Zeitunlik, reported by consul-general, Salonica; 100 said to have been killed and windows broken at 2 miles' distance. Greek troops fired on by exasperated Turkish mob during disorder which followed. Soldiers got completely out of hand and poured volleys into crowded cafés in reply, causing indescribable panic and estimated large number of casualties. By latest accounts from Zeitunlik eighty-five killed and 200 wounded. Disturbed sphere guarded by troops, so that impossible to obtain exact details.

Enclosure 2 in No. 426.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Beirout, November 14, 1912.*

"MAHOMMEDANS at Beirout, supported by non-Catholic Christians, agitating very strongly to appeal to Khedive to replace Ottoman Government in Syria rather than any other foreign Government. They regard with great dislike suspected intention of French to assert their right of intervention in Syria. State of affairs normal. Ottoman Government doing its utmost, but cannot recover from present deplorable state of affairs. Foreign intervention is necessary to maintain order.

"Informed Khedive secretly . . . ."

Above message was received from "Barham" as transmitted; end of message missed owing to weakness of signals and some groups undecypherable. Will forward to Ambassador without delay as soon as possible.

Enclosure 3 in No. 426.

Admiral-Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 15, 1912.*

HAVE repeated following message to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean:—

"Navy agent, Port Said, to Admiralty:—

"'Barham' reports quieter state of affairs coast of Syria just now, but would burst into flame should example be set from Constantinople or elsewhere. Christians object of bitter dislike from Mahommedans generally. Annexation by Egypt strongly favoured by Mahommedans and non-Christians, who are agitating secretly, approaching the Khedive. French intervention is feared. Presence of third war-ship Syrian coast strongly urged by consul-general, Beirout, for reasons of policy and prestige, so that

one may be stationed at political centre, Beirout, to maintain wireless telegraphy communication, telegraphic communication being interrupted."

Following is "Barham's" programme:—

Beirout: leaves the 15th November.
Tripoli (Syria): leaves the 17th November.
Alexandretta: leaves the 17th November for Beirout.

"Henri IV" sails for Tripoli (Syria) the 17th November.

[48590] No. 427.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 150.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 14, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 147 of 13th November.

Adjutant-general states that Bulgarian army broke Turkish left wing at Tchataldja, and they hope to achieve a further success to-day.

Gala uniforms for King, head-quarter staff, and Guard regiment have been sent for to Sophia.

I hear that the Grand Vizier's letter has not made much impression on His Majesty. He expressed surprise that the Sultan had not written to him direct.

[48587] No. 428.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 14, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 87 of 8th November.

All my colleagues having received similar instructions, I informed Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to-day of Turkish appeal to the Great Powers, and enquired whether Servia would be disposed to accept mediation, and, if so, on what terms.

He took note of the communication, which he said he would transmit to the Prime Minister, who would probably reply that he must consult the allies.

He added, however, that Turkey is now treating direct with Bulgaria, and mediation of Great Powers would therefore probably not be necessary.

[48599] No. 429.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November 14, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 58 of to-day.

I found Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw again this evening, exceedingly pessimistic. He had just received a telegram from the Prime Minister to the effect that he has been unable to induce military authorities to refrain from making preparations to defend the positions they have taken on the Adriatic and also the western frontier of Servia against Austria. I understand that some of the troops are already coming north again.

Prime Minister is for moderation and for being content, if necessary, with free outlet, but the military party and the press are altogether uncompromising, and insist on the partition of Albania.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs thinks that Prime Minister will resign.

[48583] No. 430.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 628.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 14, 1912.*

MILITARY attachés left to-day for Checmejeh.

[48726] No. 431.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 151.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 15, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 150 of 14th November.

Bulgarian head-quarters staff asked Servian Government to send Servian artillery at all possible speed right to the front. This artillery has been proceeding south from Kirk Kilisse during the last few days. It is estimated here that the forces of the allies concentrated on Chatalja are now of an overwhelming description.

[48733] No. 432.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 143.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 15, 1912]*

FOLLOWING from naval attaché for the Admiralty:—

"I understand that, if Servian General Zukovic arrives at Durazzo with troops, Austria-Hungary and Italy will each send a war-ship there."

[48740] No. 433

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Vienna, November 15, 1912*

MILITARY attaché reports that information in Belgrade telegram No. 58 of 14th November concerning mobilisation of 4th Austrian Army Corps at Budapest is incorrect. No mobilisation has taken place in any army corps, but strength of units in Bosnia, Dalmatia, Herzegovina, and Croatia has been augmented, and certain isolated battalions from various corps have been sent to Bosnia. Information regarding howitzer batteries and searchlights at Semlin corresponds to information received here.

(Repeated to Belgrade.)

48754] No. 434.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 23. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, November 15, 1912.*

BELGRADE telegram No. 57 of 13th November.

Whatever conversations have passed between Roumania and Bulgaria respecting former's demands must have been of a very private character, for Bulgarian Minister tells me that there have been no pourparlers as yet, and that Minister for Foreign Affairs told him at his last weekly reception that he was postponing any proposals while Bulgaria had the war on her hands.

Bulgarian Minister told me that his Government were very grateful for this attitude of Roumanian Government, and he thought that there should be little difficulty later in coming to terms.

(Repeated to Belgrade and Sophia.)

[48737] No. 435.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 434.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 15, 1912.*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Ambassador, whom I saw to-day, seemed preoccupied with rumours which had reached him of Russian mobilisation preparation in St. Petersburgh and other districts. He said that the situation was not as good as it was a few days ago. I know of nothing to confirm this view, and military attaché states that no reserves are being called out in this district. Consuls at Warsaw and Odessa, who have been instructed to report any military preparations, have telegraphed nothing about calling out of reserves.

A report has reached military attaché that the new rifles have not yet been issued to the troops.

[48738] No. 436.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, November 15, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 129 of 8th November: Mediation.

Government of Montenegro reply that they will submit enquiry to head-quarters, and that they will place themselves in agreement with Governments of the allied States.

They add that they would not consent to an armistice unless Scutari be surrendered unconditionally.

[48720] No. 437.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 110.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, November 15, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 274 of 8th November.

German Minister only received instructions yesterday.

I have just read to Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs Turkish appeal, and asked whether Greek Government were disposed to accept collective mediation of Great Powers, and, if so, on what conditions. His Excellency expressed his thanks for the communication and said he must consult allied Powers, but he thought reply would not be long delayed.

Unofficially, he added that he thought Bulgarians could not be restrained from driving the Turks out of Constantinople now that they are at the last gasp. French Minister has communicated to him offer of Turkish Government to make every concession in order to stop hostilities, but he said that use of the word "concession," and not "sacrifice," showed the insufficiency of the offer.

[48721] No. 438.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 111.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, November 15, 1912.*

GREEK Government fully intend to respect private rights of the Khedive at Thasos and Cavalla, if the latter falls to their share; it is at present occupied by Bulgarians.

Minister for Foreign Affairs willingly agrees to dispatch of flour by His Highness, but he had not heard of the existence of distress, and took note in order that Greek Government should also send relief if necessary.

[48723] No. 439

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 112.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, November 15, 1912.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 623 of 13th November.

Greek Government have given instructions to afford all facilities for collier for international squadron.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[48645] No. 440.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 629.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 15, 1912.*

DESPATCH from Smyrna reports everything quiet there on 11th November.

[48727] No. 441.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 632.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 15, 1912.*

THE Porte have sent me notice stating its fears that staff of life-saving station at Kara Burnu, on the Black Sea, may be made prisoners by the Bulgarians, and suggest that, as it is an international institution, an intervention in their favour and in the interests of international shipping may be made.

Position of administration is peculiar; it is supported by an agreed levy on tax on all shipping, and was originally constituted by an international commission, and a European commission controls the funds. Bulgarians last year obtained admission of delegate on the commission.

[48731] No. 442.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey—(Received November 15.)

(No. 633.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, November 15, 1912.*

DIRECT negotiations.

King Ferdinand has not yet, as far as Russian Ambassador is aware, replied to Kiamil Pasha's letter.

Latter has, however, informed my Russian colleague that Nazim Pasha yesterday, in pursuance of his instructions, communicated with Bulgarian commander-in-chief, who replied that he had not yet received any instructions from his Government to negotiate an armistice.

[48736] No. 443.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 634.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 15, 1912.*

SPANISH and German ships "Reina," "Regente," and "Goeben" arrived.

[48428] No. 444.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 674.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 15, 1912.

I THINK the question of the islands had better be considered first with the Russian Government. For instance, the possession of Samos by Greece would possibly enable Greece to block all exit from the Straits by submarines: this might affect Russia very seriously in the future. Some islands are in Greek and some in Italian occupation, and if Russia wishes to raise a question about any of the former, it will provide an opportunity for discussing the question of all the islands with Italy and the other Powers.

[48735] No. 445.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.[a]

(No. 677.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 15, 1912.

PERSIAN Government have asked that Persian subjects at Constantinople may be taken under British protection and, if necessary, accommodated on British ship. I understand that, the number exceeding 20,000, similar requests have been made to French and Russian Governments. Before replying I should like to know what French and Russian Governments propose, but I do not suppose it would be feasible to accommodate them, or that, being mostly Mahommedans, they would be in any danger.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 1124, and Tehran, No. 670.)

[49134] No. 446.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 709.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 15, 1912.

THE Italian Ambassador having in conversation with Sir Arthur Nicolson yesterday asked why we were so much interested in the Ægean islands, I told the Ambassador to-day that, Cyprus being of no use as a naval base, the question of getting a naval base was constantly raised by our naval authorities. The British Government had always resisted this, not wishing to disturb the *status quo* or to provoke the difficulties that would arise from an attempt to secure an advantage for ourselves. But if any Great Power was to keep an Ægean island for a naval base, we should certainly want something of the kind for ourselves; other Powers would want something also; there would be a regular scramble, and the whole apple-cart would be upset.

The Ambassador explained the sentimental reasons for which Italy might have liked to keep Rhodes without any intention of making a naval base, but said that if there were all these difficulties they could not entertain the idea.

On his asking what was to be done with all the islands, I said it must first be settled whether in the terms of peace Turkey was going to give up any of them; if any were given up, they might perhaps be neutralised under the guarantee of the Powers and the administration given to Greece.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 512; also to St. Petersburgh, No. 1236, with the following addition: "You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.")

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[a] Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 1233).

[48499] No. 447.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 540.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 15, 1912.

M. CAMBON told Sir A. Nicolson on the 9th November that M. Poincaré agreed with me that it would be better that whatever Servia said or whatever action she took in regard to the Adriatic question should be treated as forming part of military or warlike operations, and that the question of a Servian port should be left over to be dealt with later. M. Poincaré therefore had instructed the French representatives to hold similar language at Berlin and also at St. Petersburgh.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[48808] No. 448.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 553.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 15, 1912.

ON the 14th November M. Cambon read to Sir A. Nicolson a telegram from M. Poincaré stating that the Russian Government had enquired what attitude France would adopt if Austria-Hungary intervened *actively* in regard to Servia.

M. Cambon pointed out that active intervention was not quite the same thing as armed intervention. Sir A. Nicolson told his Excellency that it seemed to him that there was not much practical difference.

M. Poincaré had replied that he would first like to know what line Russia proposed to follow in a similar case before he could give a reply, and he would wish to have some precise information on that point.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[48865] No. 449.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 264.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 15, 1912.

THE Italian Ambassador informed me to-day that he was not making an official communication, but he would like to give me a résumé of what the Marquis di San Giuliano had telegraphed to him recently, though he had not been instructed to make a communication. The Italian view was that the principle of nationality required an autonomous Albania, and that no Servian demand could be allowed to diminish it. Once this had been settled, the fundamental desire of Italy to maintain peace between the Great Powers would lead her to join all her efforts to those of her allies and friends to get a solution which would reconcile the legitimate aspirations of Servia with the principle of an autonomous Albania. Italy desired the complete independence, both political and economic, of Servia. The Ambassador laid stress on the word "economic," and said that Italy would ask for full liberty of commercial competition in the Balkan Peninsula on the same conditions as any other Power. He then asked me for my views.

I told him of the advice which I had given in Belgrade, as described in my telegram to Sir Fairfax Cartwright, recounting my conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. I said that I did not think that any one would seriously dispute the principle of an autonomous Albania. The Austrian Government said that it must not be too small, and, on the other hand, there was the consideration that it should not be too large; the exact limits could be discussed when the general settlement was being made.

The Italian Ambassador agreed as to this, and asked me whether I sympathised with the principle of commercial liberty.

I replied that of course we sympathised with that, and would support it.

The Ambassador then told me that he wished Austria would be more precise as to what she required in the way of commercial privileges in Servia. The Marquis di San Giuliano could not defend in the Italian Parliament conditions of economic privilege

for Austria in Servia that would place Italy at a disadvantage. He laid much stress on this point, and expressed a wish that Austria would make it clear that there was no question of a customs union between her and Servia. He also said that, speaking for himself personally, he thought that it would be a good plan if Albania could be neutralised under a European guarantee. This would remove possible apprehensions and suspicions between Austria and Italy, and would be much better than placing them in a privileged position with regard to Albania.

It was clear to me from this conversation that, while Italy is at one with Austria in disliking any port on the Adriatic that might fall under the influence of a strong Power, and in resisting any proposal of the kind, she is almost equally apprehensive that Austria may obtain commercial privileges, and she does not wish to be left alone with Austria as regards Albania. In fact, she is on her guard against Austrian influence in Albania, she is strictly opposed to special economic advantages for Austria in Servia, and only on the one point of an Adriatic port is she in agreement with Austria.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[48500] No. 450.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 523.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 15, 1912.*

TEWFIK PASHA mentioned to Sir A. Nicolson, on the 9th November, that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had been painfully impressed by the attitude and language of a portion of our press towards Turkey. Sir A. Nicolson told Tewfik Pasha that we had no control over our press, and that the few papers which he looked at, such as the "Times," had been fair and impartial, and that such, he believed, had been the language and attitude of our more serious journals.

Tewfik Pasha added that he was afraid the press was usually hard on the beaten party. Sir A. Nicolson said that it was not chivalrous to be so.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[48765] No. 451.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 351.)
Sir, *Rome, November 8, 1912.*

M. DIAMANDY, the Roumanian Minister to this Court, returned here a few days ago direct from Bucharest, and I have already had the honour to report by telegraph what he said to me about the position of Roumania. I was not a little impressed by the attitude of detachment from Austria which his remarks suggested. He said that for the last few years Roumania's relations with Russia had been steadily improving and were now all that could be desired. At one time the attitude of Russia had been of a nature rather to induce Roumania to turn towards Austria, but that was no longer the case. Not being limitrophe with Turkey they had had no reason to join with the Balkan league in the war. Their interests were confined to a certain feeling of obligation towards the Wallachian populations in Macedonia, and they very much wanted a rectification of frontier with Bulgaria on the Black Sea. Bulgaria would certainly not concede them what they would like to obtain, namely, the port of Varna, but he did not see why Bulgaria should not meet their views by consenting to make what was a very unsatisfactory frontier into one more consonant with Roumanian views. Meanwhile, they preserved a merely waiting attitude.

As the tendency seems to be at the present moment for the various Powers to be ranging themselves into two groups in contemplation of the eventual liquidation of Turkey in Europe, the gravitation of Roumania would seem to be not without its importance, and if, as I gather from M. Diamandy, she might be induced in return for very moderate concessions to stand on the side of the Balkan league, it would appear to be well worth while that Bulgaria should not close the door to negotiation with her neighbour.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD

[48766] No. 452.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 352. Confidential.)
Sir, *Rome, November 9, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the President of the Council returned to Rome a few days ago and, as I had not seen him since the conclusion of peace between Italy and Turkey, I called upon him yesterday to congratulate him on the termination of hostilities.

Signor Giolitti said he was well satisfied with the result of the peace negotiations. He had been a great deal criticised for the decree of annexation, but, as things had turned out, perhaps it was just as well as it rendered future conditions so much more easy. He then went on to speak, as was inevitable, of the situation in the Balkans, and said the only dark point seemed to lie in the aspirations of Servia to obtain a seaport on the Adriatic, and explained to me what the attitude of Italy was bound to be.

The Russian Ambassador was with him when I arrived, and, on comparing notes subsequently with the former, I found we had both of us derived the same impression, namely, that Italy's support was definitely engaged for the Austrian veto, and that the Triple Alliance Powers would stand together in insisting on the autonomy of Albania, without any deductions from her sea coast area in favour of Servia.

For the education of public opinion here various arguments are being put forward in the Italian press and by the Foreign Department, to demonstrate the disadvantages which an occupation of a portion of the Adriatic coast by Servia would entail upon this country. It is argued that a reinforcement of the Southern Slav element on the eastern shore of that sea would affect detrimentally the position of the considerable Italian population settled there. It is hinted that it may not be long before Russian fleets appear in the Mediterranean, and that for this reason also it is preferable that the Albanians should constitute a counterpoise to the Slavs. And finally, it is contended that, even if the Servians were allowed to obtain a strip of territory conducting them to that sea, it remains always possible that in the future a conflict will arise between Austria and Servia, and that if the latter were hereafter compelled to surrender an acquired sea line to the former Italy would no longer be able to oppose the transfer, if she had once abandoned the principles laid down in her understanding with Austria, whereas it is a primary object with her to prevent any extension of the Austrian Adriatic dominions.

The agreement with Austria is now more than ten years old and its provisions have never been made public. But I have reason to believe they are of a purely negative character, and that it is hardly justifiable even on the grounds of implication to claim, as the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs appears to have done at Berlin, that they pledge Austria and Italy to defend Albanian territory against a third party (see Sir E. Goschen's telegram No. 149 of the 7th November). These provisions are generally understood to include (*a*) a reciprocal undertaking on the part of Italy and Austria-Hungary to disinterest themselves so far as territorial acquisitions in Albania are concerned; (*b*) the maintenance of the *status quo* there, that is to say, Ottoman sovereignty; (*c*) in the event of a change in that *status quo* becoming inevitable, a reciprocal engagement to secure the autonomy of Albania. There is now an apparent tendency to amplify this agreement into a sort of Monroe doctrine.

Signor Giolitti, in volunteering his views on the subject, did not enter into any hypotheses, but, with that directness which is characteristic of him, put the case for Italy bluntly thus: if any part of the Albanian coast could be transferred to another State, we know that Austria-Hungary would claim a portion for herself, and this would not suit Italy at all. It is therefore our interest to stand out for the integrity of Albania.

While the supposed Servian aspirations to the port of Durazzo would, if realised, reduce the remaining Albanian coast line to insignificance, a strip of territory giving her access to San Giovanni di Medua, if this could be arranged with Montenegro, would not greatly reduce the rather undefined area of what may be regarded as Albania, and it would really seem rather to Italy's advantage to widen the interval separating Austria from the debatable frontier of Albania. I am therefore inclined to think that Italy's determination to oppose the Servian seaport is less dictated by interest than by the fear of the consequences which might follow if she did not support her ally. Italian politicians are long-headed, and they probably reason that, though their attitude may

for the moment excite some resentment in Servia, the real responsibility for opposition will be justly attributed to Austria, and they can look forward with some complacency to an exacerbation of the rivalries and animosities between the Empire and the Slavs which the determination of the former will inevitably occasion.

Signor Giolitti, who has of course been in constant communication with the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs in Berlin, seemed to entertain no doubts that Germany would stand by her ally if Russia intervened to support Servia and the Balkan League, and he said quite definitely that in such an event the *casus fœderis* arising under the Triple Alliance would present itself.

As I was not then in possession of your views I did not feel justified in offering my observations, but after listening to his confined myself to saying that it seemed inconceivable that over a matter of this kind, if all the other difficulties were surmounted, the Great Powers should come to loggerheads. He replied, with some apparent assurance of optimism, that this was also his view. Servia must content herself with having access to the Ægean, and the use in the Adriatic of a Montenegrin port under a customs union.

Somewhat later in the day the Russian Ambassador told me that a telegram which he had received from St. Petersburgh made it clear that Russia would not again abandon Servia in her difficulties, and in the meantime the declarations which M. Pasich is stated to have made at Belgrade regarding the unwillingness of Servia to agree to an autonomous Albania indicate an acute conflict of view.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[48814] No. 453.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 21.)
Sir, *Smyrna, November 9, 1912.*

WITH reference to your telegram of the 7th and my reply of the 8th instant, I have the honour to state that I think it would be well that a cruiser should be sent to Smyrna.

My reason for suggesting this is the fact that refugees from Dedeagatch and Cavalla are arriving here in large numbers, and it is probable that this immigration will assume large proportions, because Smyrna is remote from the scene of war and on account of its prosperity could presumably relieve the wants of many.

The presence here of a large number of Mahommedans who have been driven from their homes and naturally are ill-disposed to Christians is an element of danger, especially in view of the large colony of Cretans living in Smyrna.

The garrison of Smyrna consists of two battalions of reserves and another at Kilizmen, on the southern shore of the gulf, about 8 miles distant. These are to be replaced by "mostahfiz"—old reserve men who have long since forgotten the use of arms, and their officers are worthless.

The only reliable force is the gendarmerie. Besides those stationed at the guard-houses in the city and suburbs, there are 500 men at the school who have just completed their course and are to be kept ready for service in case of need.

This, however, is a very inadequate force for the protection of a city of 400,000 inhabitants.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[48793] No. 454.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 953.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 10, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Dedeagatch, reporting alleged occupation by the Bulgarians of Demotica, Soufli, and Drama, and their impending entry into Dedeagatch.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 454.

Acting Vice-Consul Tachella to Acting Consul-General Fontana.

M. le Consul général, *Dédéagatch, le 1er novembre, 1912.*

J'AI l'honneur de vous informer qu'un corps d'armée bulgare a attaqué et pris, avant-hier, la ville de Démotica. Hier, sans coup férir, la ville de Soufli a été occupée, il est à présumer par une partie de ce corps d'armée.

Je viens d'apprendre, en outre, que ce matin, du côté de la ligne du chemin de fer J.S.C., la ville de Drama a été occupée par un autre corps d'armée bulgare et des détachements de cavalerie, en éclaireurs, ont comparu à nos parages soit à Douanhissar et Dervent, du côté de la ligne J.S.C. et à Lidja du côté de la ligne C.O. comparativement à une distance de 20, 10, et 12 kilom. d'ici.

De sorte qu'il est à présumer que ces jours-ci l'armée bulgare fera aussi son entrée dans notre ville.

Agréez, &c.
TACHELLA.

[48795] No. 455.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 955.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 12, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, giving observations on the failure of the Turkish army, and transmitting narrative of events for the War Office.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 455.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 88.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 9, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, under flying seal, a copy of a report on the recent operations, which I have written for the Director of Military Operations, in case it would be of interest to your Excellency or to the Foreign Office to see it. I regret that the time and the clerical means at my disposal do not admit of my embodying this report in a despatch or of forwarding any further copies.

I will, however, supplement this narrative by the following attempt to explain the failure of the Turkish army to at least act up to its traditions.

The military disadvantages under which the Turkish army entered on the campaign have already been pointed out in my despatches. Also the fact that they were concentrating further forward than their state of preparation warranted. It would, however, be too sweeping an assertion to attribute all their disasters to these causes. Defective preparation has generally been a characteristic of the Turkish army, but it was expected that, after the initial reverses, the stout qualities of the Anatolian soldier would assert themselves, as they have done before, and that the Turks would, as in previous campaigns, overcome the difficulties arising out of want of method, organisation, and preparation. We must therefore look deeper for an explanation of the *débâcle*.

Putting aside such obvious reasons as the incapacity of higher commanders, lack of control and direction, absence of means of communication, which are apparent as one reads the narrative of events, and which were more or less expected, there appear to me some predominating influences, the effects of which were not calculated.

1. I have already reported that the chief aim of the Turkish military authorities during the mobilisation seemed to be to collect men, regardless of other important and essential preparations, and if the men failed there was nothing else to help them. At the commencement of the mobilisation one observed that the ihtiyats coming through Constantinople were not the men one expected to see. Many of them were too old, others seemed hardly to be soldiers. They were men, but not the right men. The

same remarks apply to the redif battalions when they began to come in. I now find that when the mobilisation took place the men, who had already been under arms, including those who had just been dismissed from their nizam service (two classes), were for the most part unwilling to come out again, saying that it was now their neighbour's turn, &c. The Government did not feel able to deal with this sort of thing. There was already enough discontent in the country on account of the continual calls to arms, as had been shown by various cases of insubordination and mutiny which had arisen among troops clamouring to be dismissed. The constitution has taught even the Anatolian peasant to exact his legal rights, and he is no longer the passive instrument of orders given by superior authority that he was in the bad old days. During the last four years they have been continually under arms, for Albania, Hauran, Yemen, and finally on account of the war with Italy. Every time they were called out their fields and their private affairs suffered. A large part of the army was tired before the war began, whereas in the old days, when ihtiyats and redifs got no training whatever, they at least came out for war fresh. The result was that the redif districts, instead of supplying the right men to complete nizam battalions, sent men properly belonging to the mustaphiz classes, men who had never done nizam service, &c. To make matters worse, reservists were, owing to hurry and want of system, used to fill up battalions as they arrived, with the result that regiments got congeries of men who did not necessarily belong to the districts from which they are recruited and their reservists drawn. Thus the normal composition of a nizam battalion was about 200 men of one and two years' service, about 100 recruits, and about 400 reservists of sorts who knew neither their officers nor their comrades, and many of whom had had no previous training. There was no cohesion nor *esprit de corps*, and it was a fortuitous collection of men rather than a corporate unit. The battalions were already short of officers and non-commissioned officers, and when, after two or three days of marching and fighting, these had been still further reduced or even disappeared altogether, and stomachs were empty, there was nothing to keep the men together, and they began to melt away. It can easily be imagined how this disappearance of one small party would lead to that of the next, and so it would spread along the line.

2. There is not the same touch between officers and men as there used to be. In former campaigns the large majority of regimental officers were "alailis," men risen from the ranks. Whatever may have been their lack of education, and though their ideas of the art of war were archaic, they were at least good housekeepers. They were identified with the interests of their men, whom they looked after, and with whom they shared and shared alike, in defeat as in victory, in time of starvation as in time of plenty. The tendency of recent years has been to eliminate the alaili as not being up to modern standards, and to replace him by the hybrid products of a counterfeit modern military education. It is not the fault of the education, but of the Turkish material it has to work on, that these young "mekteblis," while attaining the outward polish and veneer of a European officer, have missed the essentials. They have no idea of their responsibility towards their men, nor have they grasped the fact that things will not go without personal attention and trouble. The superior training and instruction have taught them that supply is the business of the intendance, they have studied the most approved systems of *étapes*, transport trains, and distribution, but they do not seem to realise that all this depends on minute preparation and attention to detail; qualities with which the European veneer has quite failed to endow the Turk. A saying attributed to Nizam Pasha when one of the divisional commanders complained to him that his men had retired because they were starving, is so apposite that I repeat it here, even though it may not be true. His reply was, "When I was a youngster in the war of 1877, we found food when there was none. You cannot find food where there is plenty." There was plenty of food behind; the difficulty was that it was not with the troops. The old type of officer would have seen that they got it somehow, the modern officer expected it to come to him, and did nothing.

3. The last three years have doubtless improved the peace training of the army, but they have been detrimental to its moral. It would seem as though the superstructure of German training on the base of the Turkish army is like putting new wine into old bottles. This is not the fault of the German instructors, nor of the Turkish private, but is simply the result of the invariable attitude of the Turkish Government and official classes towards every reform which they have asked Europeans to undertake. Further, politics have undoubtedly sapped the moral, not only of the officers, but of the nation, and, though trite, it is doubtless true to say that the Turkish army does not fight for a Parliament and constitution with the same enthusiasm as it did in more unsophisticated days.

4. *Quality and Conduct of Officers.*—I was profoundly and disagreeably impressed by what I saw of the officers. I may say I was disgusted. The absolute want of a sense of responsibility was apparent at every turn, and I could say a good deal more on this subject than has already been said in (2). The incompetence with which the military attachés' show was run was a sufficient indication of what was happening elsewhere.

In the open country, when the men were streaming back in retreat, units hopelessly intermingled, cohesion completely lost, hardly an officer was to be met. It is perhaps safe to assume that the best ones had been left behind on the field. On the other hand, the railway stations were full of them, and trains going down were boarded by officers in perfect health apparently taking a pleasure trip, for that they were on any business connected with the fighting could not be discovered. In an army admittedly short of officers there seemed to be no keenness to get to the front. Everyone was on the lookout for a soft job, and the amount of loafers would not have been tolerated, I imagine, in any other army. There were many redundant staff officers who did not quite know what they were supposed to be doing, and whose existence seemed to be perfectly aimless. I have before remarked on the futility of organising volunteer corps instead of carrying out the details of the mobilisation scheme, and it was illuminating to find that many of these enthusiastic volunteers for death or glory, who had sufficient influence to do so, had intrigued successfully to be "attached" to the foreign military attachés or to the press correspondents.

Finally, I may say that I see no reason, speaking as a soldier, why the Chatalja lines should not be successfully defended. There is no use my saying anything about the tactical possibilities of the position, which are too well known. There are, doubtless, officers with a sense of duty and self-sacrifice still left at the front; the Turks have a sufficient number of fresh troops which have not suffered in moral from the recent disastrous retreats to hold the lines, without counting the remains of the beaten army; they have still vast reserves in Asia to draw on, and from what has been said before, these should include better material than has yet been employed. But after what one has seen one dare not speak with confidence, and there is no doubt that a certain section of officers is inclined to plot the downfall of the present commander-in-chief rather than to work loyally for a successful military result under his leadership.

I have, &c.

G. E. TYRRELL.

Military Attaché.

[48799] No. 456.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 480.)

Sir,

Paris, November 15, 1912.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my telegram No. 195 of the 13th instant, to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs containing the views of the French Government with regard to the action of the Servian authorities at Uskub in interfering with the régime of Capitulations, and the instructions which have accordingly been sent to the French consul in that town.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 456.

Memorandum communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Poincaré.

L'AMBASSADEUR de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu indiquer au Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, quelle était la manière de voir du Gouvernement anglais au sujet de l'attitude prise par les autorités serbes à Uskub en ce qui touche le régime des Capitulations.

M. Poincaré, qui a été saisi également par le consul de France à Uskub des prétentions du Gouvernement serbe, a l'honneur de faire connaître à son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie que la manière de voir du Gouvernement britannique correspond exactement à celle adoptée par le Gouvernement de la république.

Le consul de France à Uscub a reçu pour instructions de ne pas se prêter, sauf dans les cas où la loi militaire trouverait son application naturelle, à l'abandon des prérogatives existantes avant que la question territoriale ait été réglée par un traité et de maintenir l'usage constant en vertu duquel, ainsi que l'a fait l'Italie en Tripolitaine, les consuls sont reconnus par l'armée occupante. Le Gouvernement de la république estime en effet que l'occupation militaire ne peut détruire *ipso facto* la situation de droit sur laquelle se fonde le régime des Capitulations.

En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance de son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie, M. Poincaré saisit, &c.

Paris, le 14 novembre, 1912.

[48904] No. 457.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 198.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 16, 1912.*

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom I read this afternoon your telegram to Belgrade No. 93 of 13th November and the reply No. 58 of 14th November, said that his communications with Servian Government, and their reply, had been to much the same effect, and that Servians are at present suffering from swelled head.

His Excellency concludes that if an Austrian and an Italian ship of war be sent to Durazzo in the event of Servian General Zukovic appearing there with troops it will be in the nature of a protest, and had best be so considered unless the ships take forcible action.

[48905] No. 458.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

[By Post.]

(No. 199.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 16, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 369 of 13th November to Vienna.

I have informed M. Poincaré of your conversation with the Austrian Ambassador concerning Servia.

[48906] No. 459.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 200. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, November 16, 1912.*

SERVIAN port on Adriatic.

In continuation of my telegram No. 198 of to-day's date, I have the honour to report that, according to information given to me by the President of the Council to-day, the Russian Government have been representing to the Servian Government that England and France have announced that Servia's claim for territory on the Adriatic will not receive their support.

This endeavour of the Russian Government, when urging moderation at Belgrade, to save their face at the expense of the French and British Governments has been the subject of remonstrance from M. Poincaré to the Russian Ambassador.

His Excellency admits that French public opinion would deprecate a resort to forcible measures for the purpose of obtaining access to the Adriatic for Servia, but he has as yet made no official announcement in this sense, and he has the strongest objection to France being put in the position in which she was placed by Russia in 1909, when Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed by Austria.

[48907] No. 460.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 201.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 16, 1912.*

ÆGEAN islands.

I communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day contents of your telegrams Nos. 704 and 709 of 15th November.

His Excellency said he would raise question with the Russian as well as the Italian Government.

He is much less preoccupied by idea of Greece retaining islands than by any retention of an island by Italy, which the French Government could not admit.

[48909] No. 461.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 145.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November 16, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"I learn from a good source that number of men in the drafts now passing through Trieste is not less than 15,000, and possibly more; many being recruits, but a proportion being trained men. My informant says that they are reservists, but this is unconfirmed. Five vessels have been so far chartered to convey them. It is probable that all are being sent to Ragusa to battalions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as no complete units are reported as included. Names of ships chartered will be given later for identification. Stress is laid by my informant on fact that they are not ordinary passenger ships plying between Trieste and Ragusa, as the point has been raised that expedition to Durazzo may be intended. I think it well to state my own opinion that this is most unlikely."

[48879] No. 462.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 152. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 16, 1912.*

I HAD an audience of the Queen yesterday. Her Majesty wished to express her thanks personally for presence of English Red Cross officials in Bulgaria and arrangement of visit to Red Crescent contingent, who have arrived in this capital. Her Majesty, however, proceeded to make certain remarks respecting the war. She said that General Savof had not been pleased because she had taken 150 bullock-carts for the use of Red Cross ladies and Bulgarian wounded, that these carts were wanted, he said, for transport of ammunition, that the wounded were only a secondary consideration, that every effort must be made to conclude war, and that the terms must be dictated from Constantinople.

Her Majesty further added that the King had approved General Savof's views, and that she had given in with a heavy heart because of the wounded.

Above is important, as showing the general's views, which are shared by other Bulgarian generals.

[48895] No. 463.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 153. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 16, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 149 of 14th November.

Following is translation of letter received by the King of the Bulgarians from the Grand Vizier :—

"Majesty, desiring to put an end to the calamities of war, we have had recourse to mediation of Great Powers in order to bring about an understanding with your Majesty and your allies, with a view to conclusion of peace. Recalling the good relations formerly existing between your Majesty and myself, I have considered this result might be more easily attained if in present grave circumstances I was to address myself directly to your Majesty.

"I therefore, in the name of the Imperial Government, beg that your Majesty will, in concert with your Majesty's allies, consent to authorise commander-in-chief of Imperial army with a of your Majesty's army to confer with commander-in-chief of Imperial army with a view to the conclusion of an armistice, in order to arrange preliminaries of peace.—(Signed) Grand Vizier—Kiamil Pasha."

[48896] No. 464.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 154. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 16, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

Prime Minister informs me that the King had conference with Generals Savof and Fitchef after receiving Grand Vizier's letter. His Majesty later instructed M. Gueshof to reply to his Highness that his Government would be willing to accept an armistice, but that he must ask his allies terms on which they would agree to the same. Prime Minister stated that Montenegro had already given them to understand that they would agree to cessation of hostilities if the Turks would surrender Scutari; that his Government would require capitulation of Adrianople and surrender of Chatalja fortifications. No answer has as yet been received from the Greek and Servian Governments. Fahreddin Bey, formerly Turkish Minister at Cettinjé, had called on Bulgarian consul-general at Budapest, and had informed him that Ottoman Government would agree to practically any terms if they could save Constantinople and Dardanelles.

Prime Minister did not know categorically if the Turkish ex-Minister had received instructions in the above sense, but he seemed to think that it was probable.

Prime Minister gave me to understand that he had used and was using all possible influence in favour of an armistice in order to prevent great slaughter at Chatalja. No serious fighting had taken place there up to date.

I did not enquire what medium his Excellency was employing to communicate with Grand Vizier, but it is probable that messages now pass direct through Bulgarian dragoman at Constantinople.

[48897] No. 465.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 155. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 16, 1912.*

BUCHAREST telegram No. 23 of 15th November.

Prime Minister informs me that no pourparlers have as yet passed between Bulgaria and Roumania. At a meeting of the Cabinet yesterday it was decided to send M. Danef on a special mission to Bucharest. M. Danef left to-day for the front to discuss details with His Majesty. He will return here before starting for Bucharest.

Prime Minister stated that his Government would do all that was possible to meet the wishes of Roumanian Government, but that Bulgarian territory could not be ceded to a foreign Power without the consent of a Grand Sobranjé. His Excellency is anxious that decision of his Government to send M. Danef to Bucharest should not yet be made known in that capital.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[48898] No. 466.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 156.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, November 16, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 163 of 15th November.

Prime Minister asked me to thank you for informing him of the substance of your telegram No. 93 of 1 th November to Sir R. Paget. He thinks that it will have good effect. He expressed hope also that Greek Government would not urge any special claims until conclusion of war (see my telegram No. 134 of 11th November).

[48880] No. 467.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 635.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 16, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 633 of 15th November.

M. Gueshof has replied to Kiamil Pasha through Russian Embassy that the King of the Bulgarians has received his letter, is consulting his allies, and that on receipt of their replies an answer will be sent at once.

[48881] No. 468.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 636.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 16, 1912.*

NEWS contradictory and indefinite. As far as I have been able to ascertain now about 80,000 men entrenched in Chatalja lines and some hundred guns.

Kara Burnu, on Black Sea, and Chatalja reported captured by Bulgarians, who seem to be also entrenching opposite Chatalja lines, though no account of any serious fighting for some days.

Inefficient soldiery in great part dismissed and all desertion stopped.

Sanitary arrangements at Chatalja deplorable; cholera assuming large proportions; a few wounded and many sick men coming in. Cholera camp being formed at San Stefano. Troops still arriving from Black Sea.

Numerous army supply contracts cancelled.

[48900] No. 469.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Belgrade, November 16, 1912.*

PLEASE inform "Heeltool" War Office Major Thomson leaves Uskub for Prilep to-day.

Copy sent to War Office, 16th November.

[48917] No. 470.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 164.) *Rome, November 16, 1912.*
(Telegraphic.)

M.Y despatch No. 352 of 10th November.

There is evidence here of considerable modification of view as regards issue between Austria and Servia. Public opinion, as evidenced in various prominent organs, evidently resents Italy becoming mere cat's-paw of Austrian policy, and President of Council, whose tendency is to follow that opinion, has accordingly become much more tractable on Servian question. He has expressed himself negatively on most points advanced by the Austrian Government as basis of settlement with Servia, and as emphatically against any exclusive economic privileges for Austria. He gave French Ambassador to understand that Medua might become solution of Servian port question.

[48834] No. 471.

Consul-General Spence to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

Trieste, November 16, 1912.
(Telegraphic.)

TWENTY-FIVE thousand men embark here to-night for Southern Dalmatia.

Vessels chartered convoys war material.

Great secrecy observed.

[49133] No. 472.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.[*]

(No. 165.) *Foreign Office, November 16, 1912.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

GERMAN Government have asked that we should join in acquainting Government to which you are accredited that in any settlement which may be made the interests of the Turkish bondholders will have to be safeguarded.

When all your colleagues are similarly instructed, you may take the above step.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 713; Constantinople, No. 1031; St. Petersburgh, No. 1241; Vienna, No. 375; Rome, No. 515; and Berlin, No. 380.)

[48721] No. 473.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 166.) *Foreign Office, November 16, 1912.*
(Telegraphic.)

KHEDIVE has large private interests at Cavalla, now in Bulgarian occupation.

You should inform Bulgarian Government, and say that His Majesty's Government expect Bulgarian authorities to see that these interests are not injured.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 85.)

[48727] No. 474.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 168.) *Foreign Office, November 16, 1912.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 632 of 15th November.

I presume there are no grounds for the Porte's apprehensions, having regard to the international character of the institution, on which Bulgaria herself has a representative. You might, however, take an opportunity of speaking in the above sense.

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[*] Also to Sir R. Paget (No. 105); Count de Salis (No. 131); and Sir F. Elliot (No. 282).

[48807] No. 475.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. Louther.

(No. 528.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 16, 1912.*

SIR A. NICOLSON told Tewfik Pasha on the 14th November that he hoped there was no misunderstanding as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government regarding the 4 per cent. surtax. We had protested against its levy provisionally and for the duration of the war, and we had not taken steps to enforce the protest as we understood that as soon as the war was over the surtax would be withdrawn. Of course if it were maintained after the war we should have to make our protest effective.

Tewfik Pasha said he had perfectly understood our position, and that the surtax would be withdrawn after the war.

Sir A. Nicolson remarked that he hoped that the end of the war was near at hand.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[48631] No. 476.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 552.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 16, 1912.*

M. CAMBON said to Sir A. Nicolson on the 9th November that M. Poincaré had been approached by the French representative of the Turkish bondholders as to what measures could be taken for safeguarding the bondholders' interests. M. Poincaré would be ready to examine this question with His Majesty's Government.

I consider that there would be no objection to such an examination, though it seems somewhat premature. It would, however, be preferable that the bondholders' representatives should first submit their views as to how these interests could best be safeguarded, in face of the changed conditions in European Turkey.

M. Cambon agreed that this would be the more practical course, and said he would so inform M. Poincaré.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[48135] No. 477.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 381.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 16, 1912.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF called at this Office on the 9th November, and handed to Sir A. Nicolson the text of the communication which he had been instructed to make to me on the 7th instant. I enclose a copy of the communication, as it may be of interest to have the *ipsissima verba* of the communication.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 477.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff.

NOUS ne nous opposons pas à une occupation temporaire de Constantinople par les alliés, mais nous tenons à attirer l'attention sur les difficultés qui en résulteraient pour les négociations ultérieures.

Le Gouvernement turc, retiré en Asie, pourrait profiter des avantages d'une situation où il serait garanti de toute perte ultérieure. L'armée turque, à l'abri d'attaques, pourrait suffisamment se reformer; et la Turquie, n'ayant plus rien à perdre, n'aurait aucune raison pour se montrer conciliante.

D'un autre côté, les ressources des alliés sont limitées, et l'unanimité des Puissances insuffisamment établie. Pour le cas de négociations prolongées la première de ces

circonstances peut avoir des résultats fâcheux pour les intérêts des alliés; la seconde mettrait en péril la paix européenne.

En vue de cette possibilité d'une occupation prolongée de Constantinople par les alliés, nous nous verrons obligés d'envoyer à Constantinople, avant l'arrivée des alliés, notre escadre de la Mer Noire, qui y séjournera autant que se prolongera l'occupation par les alliés de la capitale turque.

Nous pensons qu'après la démarche de la Turquie auprès des Puissances celles-ci devraient immédiatement éclaircir la question si elles sont disposés à agir comme médiatrices maintenant, et ensuite s'adresser aux alliés avec leurs propositions.

[48901] No. 478.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November 16, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from Uskub, dated 8th November, and received to-day by hand :—

"On 2nd November consuls here addressed a letter to the commandant protesting against violation of the Capitulations and demanding satisfaction, and an undertaking that it should not happen again. Servian [group undecypherable] asked for a short time for consideration pending arrival of Prime Minister. No formal answer having been received, consuls yesterday addressed a collective telegram to their Governments asking for instructions.

"Yesterday we met ex-Servian consul-general at Salonica, delegated by Government to talk the matter over with us.

"He asserted that Capitulations were *ipso facto* suppressed by Servian military occupation, and seemed inclined to think that we were no longer consuls because our exequatura were delivered by the Ottoman Government. My colleagues and I are of opinion that both contentions are bad in international law.

"Will His Majesty's Government support me if I claim right to communicate with them in cypher?

"Please acknowledge receipt by telegraph."

Your telegram No. 91 of 12th November.

All my colleagues have not yet received instructions and have therefore not yet made representations concerning Capitulations.

[48902] No. 479.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 16, 1912.*

I HAVE seen Prime Minister, who returned from Uskub this morning. He appears very firm regarding Servia's claim to a port on the Adriatic, and says that port must be Durazzo. He maintains that not only the military party but the nation demand it after the sacrifices that have been made, and are prepared to resist any attempt to deprive them of the fruits of their victory. He added that acute phase of this question would not arise until the allies had made their terms with Turkey.

Bulgarian Minister told me to-day that his Government have no intention of supporting Servia in a stubborn attitude against Austria. He thinks that present display of feeling in Servia will calm down, and that it will be possible to find some means of solving the Adriatic port difficulty.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[48903] No. 480.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 16, 1912.*

SERVIAN Government are informing the Bulgarian Government with regard to the overtures made by Turkey that they are willing to discuss preliminaries of peace.

[48883] No. 481.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 638.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 16, 1912.*

GOVERNMENT has to day effected the arrest of numerous prominent members of the Committee of Union and Progress, and further arrests to the number of sixty are to be made in consequence of evidence of an anti-Government plot.

[48884] No. 482.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 639.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 17, 1912.*

FIRING has been continuing along the whole length of Chatalja lines throughout morning, and can be heard here. Turkish Government is very seriously alarmed, and had hoped that its appeal for peace would have brought temporary cessation of hostilities.

[48885] No. 483.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 640.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 17, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has been here urging very urgently that Great Britain, and if possible the King, should use their influence with the King of the Bulgarians to cease hostilities now that Turkey has appealed for statement of terms.

In support of this he urges terrible calamity that will overtake town owing to alarming spread of cholera, from which there were yesterday 2,700 cases and 800 deaths in the army at the front, besides cases in town. He urges this not only in the interests of natives but also in that of foreign community, foreign ships of war, &c.

[48921] No. 484.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 642.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 17, 1912.*

HEAVY firing at Chataldja lines was continued throughout the day until dark, when it ceased. Grand Vizier asserts that Bulgarian attack was repulsed and that the enemy was forced to abandon some twelve guns.

[48887] No. 485.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 435.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 17, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 432 of 14th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw yesterday immediately after Austrian and German Ambassadors, told me that he had been impressing on them necessity of allowing Servia to have San Giovanni di Medua with a narrow strip of territory connecting it with Prisrend or some other point in Servian territory on condition that Servia was not to fortify it or keep ships of war there. This he said was the only feasible solution. He trusted that you would use all your influence at Vienna in above sense.

I said that I thought that we were agreed not to discuss this question separately. He replied that he did not propose to say a word to Servia on the subject, but that the question was becoming so acute that the Powers must discuss it quite privately between themselves. He did not know whether Austria would listen to us or not, but if she took any military action against Servia, Russia could not keep out of the war.

I said that if Austria did by chance do what we asked she would only do so on condition that Servia abandoned her more ambitious claims in Albania.

(P.) I then enquired whether the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would, in the event of Austria yielding, be prepared to make it clear to the Servian Government that Russia would decline to afford her any further support, if she refused to be content with what was offered to her; to which he replied that he might do so privately, but could give her no such warning publicly. M. Sazonof added that Servia's extreme claims had never met with any support on his part.

His Excellency reserved for future discussion the question whether Russia would join the other Powers in the event of their agreeing to make a collective communication to Servia (in the sense which I had suggested) in return for Austria's giving way on the question of a port on the Adriatic.

In reply to a subsequent enquiry of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs I said that I could not answer for what His Majesty's Government would say or do in the event of Servia being attacked by Austria. (End of P.)

Much would depend on the nature of the provocation offered, and nothing could be more provocative than the manner in which Servia was at present defying Austria by demanding the partition of Albania. A war about a wretched Adriatic port was madness. While agreeing with this latter remark, his Excellency said that he only wished that Russia could keep clear of it.

In reply to a question of mine he denied that any military preparations were being made.

I am to see President of the Council this afternoon and will telegraph his views.

[48914] No. 486.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 436.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 17, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 435 of 17th November.

President of the Council expressed much the same views, though in different language.

He was careful to explain that these views were personal, as he was not charged by the Emperor to deal with foreign affairs.

He had, he said, told the Austrian Ambassador that the Russian press attacked its own Government, while Austrian, which was in close touch with its Government, was always accusing Russia of aggressive designs and of wishing to use the future Servian port as a naval base. Such a supposition was absurd, as it would be much easier for Russia to obtain permission from Montenegro to create a naval base at Antivari if she wanted one in the Adriatic. Moreover, ever since Japanese war Russia's military policy had been based on purely defensive principles. Russia ought therefore to be left entirely out of the discussion, which ought to be restricted to what Servia had a right to ask. Servia, he had contended, could not live without a port any more than the lungs could breathe without air, and if she was given San Giovanni di Medua on the condition that she was not to fortify it or to keep ships of war there it could not menace Austrian interests.

His Excellency admitted that your proposal not to raise this question till final settlement had many advantages, but said that it was necessary to calm the general nervousness which it was occasioning by some prompt solution. He fully recognised that Germany must stick to Austria, but Germany wanted peace. The Triple *Entente* was not a negligible quantity, and should exercise all its influence at Vienna and Berlin to obtain satisfaction for Servia. He spoke optimistically of the possibility of getting all six Powers into line on this question.

While not apprehensive of an Austrian attack on Servia, his Excellency said that such an attack would infallibly bring Russia into the field.

[48916] No. 487.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 437.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, November 17, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1233 of 15th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs had not yesterday received any such request from Persian Government. He will let me know if he receives one later.

[48915] No. 488.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 438.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 17, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 709 of 15th November to Paris.

Minister for Foreign Affairs entirely shares your views, as he is strongly opposed to any of the Ægean islands being ceded to Greece or any other State.

He thinks that they should form autonomous entity under a Christian Governor-General somewhat on the lines of Lebanon. Provided that Governor-General is a Turkish subject, he would not object to his being of Greek origin.

[48908] No. 489.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 202.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, November 17, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 707 of 15th November.

President of Council states that French Ambassador at Constantinople will endeavour to provide security for all foreigners of whom French Government have undertaken protection, but Persians are too numerous to admit of any special measures being taken as regards them.

[48919] No. 490.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 146.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November 17, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 16th November.

Following from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"His Majesty's consul-general at Trieste confirms news of passage of troops for Ragusa and Cattaro. He puts their number at 25,000; says that they are mostly trained men, and that great secrecy is preserved. I hear from a very good source that total number in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be raised to 80,000 at once. Units have been moved from Linz to Bosnia and from Prague to Galicia. Increase to establishment of certain battalions in Galicia is also proceeding. I am going to Budapest to-night."

[48899] No. 491.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 157.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 17, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 154 of 16th November.

The growing prevalence of cholera and typhoid is influencing His Majesty in favour of an armistice, and tends to weaken determination of both himself and Bulgarian generals to enter Constantinople.

[48981] No. 492.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 958.)

Constantinople, November 12, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 949 of the 8th November, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that the iradé authorising the passage through the Dardanelles of a second war-ship of each Power had been issued on the understanding that they leave Constantinople immediately on the re-establishment of a normal state of affairs.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 492.

Note by Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs.

LE soussigné, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, a l'honneur d'informer leurs Excellences MM. les Ambassadeurs d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'Angleterre, de France, de Russie et d'Allemagne, en réponse à leur communication du 8 courant, que l'iradé Impérial autorisant un second navire de guerre par Puissance, y compris l'Italie, à passer les Dardanelles pour venir à Constantinople a été promulgué.

Il est bien entendu que ces navires de guerre ainsi que ceux récemment autorisés, ne resteront dans les eaux de Constantinople et des détroits que jusqu'au rétablissement d'un état de choses normal aussitôt après la signature des préliminaires de paix.

GABRIEL NOURADOUNGHIAN.

Sublime Porte, le 10 novembre, 1912.

[48944] No. 493.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 331.)

St. Petersburgh, November 13, 1912.

Sir,

IN my despatch No. 322 of the 30th ultimo I called attention to the fact that, since his audience with the Emperor at Spala, M. Sazonof had begun to realise that Russian public opinion on the Balkan question is a factor that has to be counted with, and that a Minister for Foreign Affairs cannot defend himself against the attacks of the press by the simple expedient of not reading its articles. His Excellency has since then so far departed from his original attitude of aloofness as to grant interviews to representatives of certain leading journals; but, if by so doing he hoped to silence his critics, he must have been grieviously disappointed, as but little notice has been taken of the reports of these interviews. He now seems to have made up his mind that, as he cannot hope to lead public opinion, he must, in framing his foreign policy, allow himself to be influenced by the sympathies and the antipathies of his countrymen. While the tone of the press towards England has undergone a marked change since His Majesty's Government have declared in Parliament that no one would be disposed to deprive the Balkan States of the fruits of their victories, its attitude towards Austria is becoming every day more hostile. This has been particularly the case since it has become known that the Austrian Government have placed their veto on Servia obtaining a port on the Adriatic.

In my recent conversation with him M. Sazonof has repeatedly asserted that this is a question on which the Russian Government would be powerless to resist the pressure of public opinion. He has from the very outset taken the line that Servia's claim to such a port was perfectly legitimate, and that it was one that must be satisfied. Though he did subsequently assure me that the Russian Minister at Belgrade had never been instructed to encourage the Serbs to put forward this demand, his own attitude on the question has been a direct encouragement to the Servian Government to persist in it, when once it had been formulated. He told me himself on the 8th instant that, in his conversations with the German and Austrian Ambassadors, he had spoken to them in such serious language of the necessity of

arriving at an honest and final settlement of the Balkan question—a result which could not be achieved were Servia's legitimate claims to be ignored—that, had he added another word, his language would have been almost a menace. He, indeed, gave me the impression that he had wished to convey to the two Ambassadors the fact that, if the present settlement was to leave clauses of friction behind it, that might endanger the maintenance of peace in the future, he would prefer not to postpone the inevitable conflict but to settle the matter once for all with the sword.

On his reverting to the subject on the following day, I took occasion to warn his Excellency of the danger of committing himself too far by an uncompromising support of this Servian claim, as he might in such case have to choose between a war with the Triple Alliance or a solution of the question, that would be represented as a fresh humiliation for Russia. The Emperor, I ventured to think, could hardly contemplate embarking on such a war for the sole purpose of giving a strip of Albanian territory to Servia, when the latter's economic interests might be safeguarded by means of a railway under proper guarantees, and when, apart from this one point, the Balkan question was about to be settled in a manner so advantageous to the Balkan States and to Russia. His Excellency admitted that, so far as he was personally concerned, a railway such as I had suggested would offer a satisfactory solution; but unfortunately it would not satisfy Servia. Albania was Turkish territory, and Servia would be acting within her rights as a belligerent in occupying a port on the Albanian coast. He could tell me privately that he had only the day before warned the Servian Minister that Servia must not count on Russian military support, should she provoke a war with Austria; but, though he had thought it right to administer this warning, he well knew that, were Austria to attempt to expel Servia from a port at which she had established herself, Russia would be obliged to come to the latter's assistance.

His Excellency at the same time expressed himself as in entire agreement with what you had said to the German chargé d'affaires as to the advisibility of leaving this question of a Servian port on the Adriatic to be discussed later on by the Powers as part of the general settlement, instead of treating it as a separate matter to be dealt with at once. He observed, however, that closely connected with this question was that of the future status of Albania. Were it to be erected into an autonomous province, its frontiers would have to be delimited, and while, in his opinion, they ought to be drawn at no great distance from the coast, Austria and Italy would endeavour to give the new province as large a hinterland as possible; and this would again conflict with Servian aspirations.

M. Sazonof is so prone to see things in the light in which he would like to see them, that he at first easily persuaded himself that the opposition of Austria could be bought off by an arrangement, under which she would be guaranteed unrestricted railway communication with the Adriatic. He has also been disposed to believe that, even if Austria did prove troublesome, Germany was so bent on maintaining peace for the present that she would not support her ally in any step that might give rise to international complications. The assurances which he had received from M. Bethmann-Hollweg at Port Baltic were still fresh in his mind; and the declaration made by the Triple Alliance at Belgrade came on him as an unpleasant surprise. While most anxious to find a pacific solution of the question, his Excellency, like the majority of his countrymen, has not forgotten the humiliation to which Russia was subjected in 1909, and will not tamely submit to anything of the kind in the present instance. It was, therefore, rather unfortunate that the German Ambassador should have been instructed to enquire whether it was Russia's intention to treat this question as a trial of strength ("Kraftprobe") as this tactless form of enquiry only elicited the reply that both Russia and Germany had had experience of such trials of strength in 1909 and 1911, but that if the latter contemplated repeating her Agadir policy in the present case the consequences might be very serious. After this exchange of compliments the conversation resumed a normal course; and M. Sazonof gave Count Pourtalès to understand that, while Russia held that Servia must be emancipated from her present position of dependence on other States, the question of how this result was to be attained was one which should be left to be discussed by the Powers as forming part of the general settlement which must follow the war.

In my subsequent conversations with M. Sazonof I found his Excellency most pacifically inclined. He desired, he said, to do all that was possible to prevent international complications, but he was alarmed at the fact that Bulgaria considered herself bound by the terms of her alliance to support Servia under all circumstances. He had tried to impress on the Bulgarian Minister the madness of placing so large an interpretation on these treaty obligations; and he trusted that His Majesty's

Government would speak in the same sense at Sophia, as, were Bulgaria to refuse to support her, Servia would think twice before engaging in a war with Austria. He had pointed out that the occupation by Austria of Durazzo or Alessio, even if undertaken for the purpose of forestalling the Servians, could not be regarded as an attack on Servia, as both these ports were on Turkish territory.

On my asking him whether any communications had recently passed between the Austrian and Russian Governments, his Excellency said that he had let Count Berchtold know how much he had appreciated the conciliatory attitude adopted by the Austrian Government since the beginning of the war, and had expressed the hope that this policy would be pursued to the end; as, were Austria to have recourse to military intervention, the Russian Government would be placed in a very difficult position. If Austria intended to intervene he would, he told me, much prefer that she should seize the Albanian ports before Servia had time to occupy them, as the forced eviction of Servia from these ports would rouse Russian public opinion to danger point.

As regards Russia's attitude towards Bulgaria, it is only necessary to state that during the past fortnight M. Sazonof has withdrawn from the position which he originally took up. He has, much to his regret, tacitly consented to the temporary occupation of Constantinople and he has acquiesced in the retention of Adrianople as a fortress, as well as in a frontier line that will bring the Bulgarians much nearer to Constantinople than he had at first intended. This last concession was, as he told the Bulgarian Minister, his final word on the subject; but, from a remark which M. Nératof recently made to me, I am by no means sure that the Bulgarians will regard it as such. His views with regard to the rectification of frontier demanded by Roumania have varied from day to day. He at one moment assured me that Bulgaria would meet Roumania's wishes, and at another that she would not cede an inch of her territory. He has, however, consistently urged the Bulgarian Government to settle the question amicably, but without indicating the precise lines which such a settlement ought to take. The Russian Government has now been invited by Roumania to act as mediator between her and Bulgaria; and his Excellency is enquiring at Sophia whether such mediation would be agreeable or not. I personally have always felt that this will be a very difficult matter to arrange, as cession of territory means the transfer to Roumanian nationality of a certain number of Bulgarian subjects, who have fought in a victorious war; and it will not be easy to induce the Bulgarian Government to make this sacrifice.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[48948] No. 494.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 338.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, November 14, 1912.*

AS I had the honour to inform you yesterday by telegraph, the agency telegram published in Vienna stating that the Russian Government had notified Servia that Russia could not support her should she go to war with Austria, has evoked angry comments in the Russian press.

The "Novoe Vremya" points out that the telegraphic agency in question is an official institution the director of which has access to the Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. If a communiqué of such supreme importance respecting the actions of Russian diplomacy was published it was evident that it was done with some definite object, viz., co-operation in the problems of Austrian diplomacy. Russian public opinion could not be satisfied with information of this nature received from Austrian sources only, and it had a right to be told whether the report were true or not. It had the greater right to be informed of the true facts of the case in this instance because the step attributed to Russian diplomacy was not only a thoughtless, but an extremely dangerous one. The telegraphic agency must know that the mere rumour that Russia had let Austria know in advance that she intended to leave Servia defenceless and to hand her over to an unconditional subjection to Austria would produce an appalling impression in the Balkans. The publication of this report without any explanation for the information of the Russian public must inspire a general conviction that some irreparable step, or some step extremely difficult to repair, had been actually taken.

Modern States only waged war as an extreme course when there was no other

manner of defending their vital interests. The desire of Servia to obtain free access to the Adriatic was in reality a matter of vital interest. It was one of the reasons which had induced Servia to embark on a severe and dangerous war. For Austria the question was different. It might be unpleasant for Austria if Servia possessed a port on the Adriatic, but nothing more. The greater number of ports on that sea already belonged to other Powers.

The "Novoe Vremya" in conclusion expresses its conviction that Austria will not decide to go to war with Servia in order to oppose a claim which does not in the slightest degree threaten the vital interests of the Hapsburg Dynasty, and it enquires why, in these circumstances, Russian diplomacy should whisper to Count Berchtold that he could act, and that Russia would not interfere.

The following is a translation of the communiqué published to-day by the semi-official "Rossia" on the subject:—

"The 'Novoe Vremya' in the form of a commentary on a statement in one of the Vienna papers, reproaches the Russian Government, alleging that it has bound itself by certain one-sided agreements. We are enabled to state that the Russian Government has not restricted its freedom of action by any one-sided agreement. The sole problem of the Russian Government is the protection of the real interests of Russia.

"The 'Novoe Vremya' of to-day's date, commenting on the Cabinet meeting held yesterday, observes that the non-satisfaction in full of the aspirations of Servia towards the Adriatic is apparently not considered to be a serious cause for any fresh complications."

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[48964] No. 495.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 961.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 14, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul-General Lamb reporting the preparations for the surrender of Salonica.

Mr. Lamb's action in the difficult and dangerous situation which he describes seems to me most commendable.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 495.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 148.)
Sir, *Salonica, November 7, 1912.*

AFTER falling back across the Vardar, as reported in my immediately preceding despatch of the 3rd instant, Hassan Tahsin Pasha spent the best part of two days practically inactive at Toptchin. The force under his command being little better than an armed rabble, insufficiently supplied with officers, commissariat and artillery, it would appear that only one more effort on the part of the Greeks was required to throw open the road to Salonica. They, however, seem to have remained almost as inactive as the Turks, without the reason for this inactivity being apparent. During these two days deserters from Hassan Tahsin's force poured in an almost continuous stream into Salonica, where they were mostly collected and sent back, after refitting, to the front. They took no pains to conceal either their unwillingness to continue the war, their complete indifference to its results, or their supreme contempt for the greater number of their officers. Their only idea seemed to be to get into Salonica, where they looked forward to receiving food and a night's rest. Many declared that they had been three or even four days without bread, and it is officially admitted that the commissariat arrangements of a whole division broke down for forty-eight hours.

On the evening of the 4th instant, without any apparent reason, the army began to fall back from the line of the Vardar, and withdraw slowly up the hills to the east, while Hassan Tahsin and his staff removed from Toptchin to Kadikeui. On this day a deputation of the inhabitants of Salonica went out to his camp with a view to dissuading

him from prolonging a useless resistance. The general, however, declared that he would fight so long as any force remained with him, but agreed that in case of his being compelled again to retreat he would not fall back on Salonica, but would withdraw in a north-easterly direction towards Doiran and Serres.

Late that evening I received a summons from the vali, whom I found in consultation with the mayor, the kadi, mufti, and various members of the municipal council. After a lengthy, but quite personal and unofficial, discussion of the general situation, the vali communicated to me Hassan Tahsin Pasha's decision, and asked if the consular corps would consent, in the event of the town being left without defence, to act as intermediaries between it and the advancing enemy with a view to arranging for its surrender and the taking over by the Greek forces. According to the information which I had received, on the withdrawal of the regular troops, the gendarmerie intended also to withdraw, and it was certain that the police, left unsupported, would immediately disappear. The greatest apprehension existed in almost every quarter as to what might happen in the town between that moment and the entry of the Greek troops. Under these circumstances I thought that, while repudiating any appearance of intervention, we could safely consent to accompany the delegates of the civil government and population, with a view to facilitating their negotiations with the Greek head-quarters, on condition that we were assured that the gendarmerie and police would remain at their posts. These assurances were given me both by the governor and by the military commandant, Ali Nadir Pasha. At a meeting of the representatives of the Powers signatory of the Berlin Treaty my point of view was unanimously approved, and it was agreed that I should continue to act in this matter, in conjunction with my Austrian and Russian colleagues, as delegates of the consular body.

During the next two days, however, the position materially changed. Hassan Tahsin Pasha, instead of drawing off to the north-east, as he had at first commenced to do, drew nearer to the town, throwing up earthworks on the adjacent heights, and from thence down to the seashore within a very few yards of the city boundaries. He called up the remaining division of the Strouma Valley army corps, which had been left at Demir-Hissar, and made evident though obviously inadequate preparations for a last stand in front of the town. Yesterday morning the general came in to town and openly declared that this was his intention. There now seemed indeed to be no alternative to this but complete surrender, seeing that in the meantime a Servian force had been reported as far down the Uskub line as Hudovo and Ghevgheli, while Bulgarians were reported to have occupied Doiran and Kilkish on the Constantinople line, and Greek irregulars were moving from Izvor towards Langhaza. He was therefore completely hemmed in.

The representatives of the population, of all religious denominations, made one more effort to persuade Hassan Tahsin Pasha to yield; whereupon he sent in a letter to the vali intimating that he was prepared to negotiate for a surrender if ordered to do so by the official representative of the Government, with which he had no further means of communication. Failing such orders he insisted on fighting, be the consequences to the town what they might. If he were defeated the vali could then resort to diplomacy.

Last night the vali sent the mayor to invite my intervention on the lines of our conversation of the other night. I pointed out that the actual situation was quite different from the one which we had then discussed, and it was quite inadmissible for us to interfere, even on his demand, between two belligerent forces in the field. The problem now presented to us was a purely military one, which the general must solve on his own responsibility. The civil governor and population were free to expose their views and plead their interests, but even they could not override the decisions of the commander in the field, while neutrals, whatever interests of their own might be involved, could not exercise any pressure either on one side or the other.

Eventually, on the suggestion of one of my colleagues, we agreed that we would accompany the Turkish *parlementaires* to the enemy's lines, if requested in writing by the general commanding. Another letter was accordingly prepared in the name of the vali and civil population urging Hassan Tahsin Pasha to enter into direct negotiations for a cessation of hostilities, and acquainting him of our willingness to accompany his emissaries if so requested by him in writing.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[48965] No. 496.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 962.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 14, 1912.*

ON receipt of your telegram No. 992 of the 12th instant, I lost no time in communicating its substance to the Portuguese consul-general in this city.

It appears that most of the Portuguese subjects resident in Constantinople live in Stamboul—a quarter which it has been found impossible to include in the proposed scheme of international protection—but the consul-general stated that in case of necessity he could bring his colony, about forty in number, to his own house, which is situated in Pera, and would thus be well protected by the landing parties from the foreign men-of-war at present in the harbour.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[49026] No. 497.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 200.)

Sir, *Vienna, November 14, 1912.*

THE differences existing between Austro-Hungarian and Servian policy at the present moment continue to form the principal subject of discussion in the Viennese press, but the tone of the latter is distinctly more optimistic and more friendly towards Servia than was the case a few days ago.

The "Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung," a newspaper often used for officially inspired utterances, published last night a statement of the situation under four headings. It declares, firstly, that Austria-Hungary's objection to a Servian port on the Adriatic is not (as is asserted in quarters unfriendly to the Dual Monarchy) inspired by hostility to the commercial expansion of Servia. On the contrary, Austria-Hungary does not wish to place the slightest hindrances in the way of Servia's commercial progress, which will meet with warm sympathy from this country. A way can certainly be found to give Servia commercial "elbow room" without the occupation of territory on the Adriatic coast.

Secondly, the "Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung" observes that the suspicion is entirely unfounded that Austria-Hungary is attempting to sow discord among the Balkan League by suggesting that Servia should be given a port on the Ægean Sea. That suggestion did not proceed from Vienna, and Austria-Hungary has no intention to interfere in what she considers to be a purely internal affair of the Balkan League, towards which she will continue to preserve an attitude of friendship and benevolence.

A third important factor in the present situation is, this paper points out, the circumstance that the opinion, not only of Austria-Hungary, but of all Europe, inclines to the preservation of the independence of Albania; while the fourth and final point emphasised by the "Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung" is the entirely peaceful and moderate attitude of Austria-Hungary. The latter will continue to be guided by friendly sentiments towards Servia, and will endeavour to settle in a peaceful manner the questions at issue. It must not, however, be forgotten that the demands of the Dual Monarchy represent a minimum on which there can be no question of bargaining.

This morning's "Fremdenblatt" contains a leading article on the visit of M. Danef to Buda-Pesth, in which it warmly welcomes as of high political significance his statement that Bulgaria (possibly, says the "Fremdenblatt," under the influence of M. Sazonof's moderating counsels) fully realises and respects the interests of the Great Powers in Balkan affairs. The "Fremdenblatt" expresses the hope that Servia will adopt the same sensible standpoint, and will realise that she cannot extend her territory to the Adriatic coast without injuring the interests of others. The lack of an Adriatic port has not, the "Fremdenblatt" points out, hindered Servia hitherto from developing commercially and politically to a degree which made it possible for her to declare that she was independent of Austria-Hungary in her export trade. Servia's intimate

relations with her Balkan allies will in future render her even more independent, but if she will only cultivate a friendly understanding with Austria-Hungary she will find the way open for her to the Adriatic. She must, however, resign herself to the fact that territorial connection between Servia and that sea is a "flat political impossibility."

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[49036] No. 498.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 51.)
Sir, *Munich, November 16, 1912.*

THE Mansion House speeches of Mr. Asquith and Mr. Churchill were awaited with interest, and were fully reported in the South German papers. Of illuminating comment, owing no doubt to the amount of space occupied by war news, there is practically none. The British Prime Minister is represented as having frankly accepted the principle of *Vae Victis!* or in other words as saying that the victorious allies, or any one of them, may keep the fruits of their victory unless a stronger Power is prepared to contest their rights, in which case England will be on the side of the stronger. The Liberal "Allgemeine Zeitung" says: "Grey [*sic*] has by his Guild Hall speech, in which he loyally recognised Austria's special interests in the revision of the map of the Balkans, rendered an extremely great service to the cause of peace."

In my despatch No. 10 of the 10th April I ventured to express the view that the Parliamentary debate on the introduction of the naval estimates, and especially the firm tone of Mr. Churchill's speech, marked the beginning of a new and more friendly era in our relations with Germany. Since then more than six months have past and—outwardly at least—the hope then formulated has been realised more fully than could have been anticipated. Not only are the Governments of the two countries in friendly co-operation on the Balkan question, but with very few exceptions the press on both sides is full of peace and good-will.

In the present case, while the statesmanlike moderation of the Prime Minister is recognised on all sides, the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty naturally commands less unanimous approval. The sharpest criticism I have seen is in the "Münchener Zeitung," an independent Liberal paper, which considers that Mr. Churchill has dealt "a brutal blow in the face" to those who have been striving at the London conference to place Anglo-German relations on a sound and pleasant footing. I have not seen the view taken elsewhere, nor have I heard it expressed. On the contrary, the experience of the last few months goes to prove that Mr. Churchill was absolutely correct when he said "no harm has been done during the year by plain speech on naval matters. The Germans like to have the facts put plainly and squarely before them." It is by being fully prepared for defensive war and not by peace conferences that we shall gain that respect which is essential to our good relations with this Empire.

I have, &c.
VINCENT CORBETT.

[49096] No. 499.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 18.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November 16, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 16th instant, relative to movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 499.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 16, 1912.*

"BENEDETTO BRIN" arrived Besica to-day.

Enclosure 2 in No. 499.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 16, 1912.*

"BARHAM" reports from Tripoli no cause for anxiety.

[48920] No. 500.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 18.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November 16, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copies of telegrams, dated to-day, respecting movements of war-ships in the Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 500.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 16, 1912.*

"HIBERNIA" reports arrival Smyrna "Jules Ferry."

Enclosure 2 in No. 500.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 16, 1912.*

TWO Austrian battle-ships are expected Salonica this afternoon, according to captain of "Kaiserin und Königin Maria Theresia."

[49041] No. 501.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 18.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November 18, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams dated the 16th and 17th instant relative to movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 501.

Vice-Consul Catoni to Admiralty.

Alexandretta, November 16, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
"BRESLAU" arrived.

Enclosure 2 in No. 501.

Vice-Consul Morrison to Admiralty.

Palermo, November 16, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
"KERAVNOS" (Greek torpedo-boat destroyer) arrived 6 P.M., 15th November.

Enclosure 3 in No. 501.

H.M.S. "Prometheus" to Admiralty.

November 17, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
ARRIVED Beirout.

Enclosure 4 in No. 501.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

November 17, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
"OLEG" (Russian) and "Uraletz" (Russian) left Salonica for Piræus. "Zrinyi" and "Bersagliere" arrived Salonica. Latter sails for Stampalia to-morrow.

Enclosure 5 in No. 501.

H.M.S. "Barham" to Admiralty.

November 17, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
ARRIVED Alexandretta. "Breslau" is remaining here.

Enclosure 6 in No. 501.

H.M.S "Hampshire" to Admiralty.

November 17, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
"GOEBEN" arrived Pera, 15th November. Rear-Admiral Trummler on board.

Enclosure 7 in No. 501.

Consul Saliba to Admiralty.

Syria, November 17, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
"JURIEN DE LA GRAVIÈRE" (French) arrived Syria, and left same day.

Enclosure 8 in No. 501.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

November 17, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
HAVE ordered two destroyers from Piræus to Besika. "Hampshire" reports from Constantinople expected international landing party will land 5 A.M. to-morrow, and that firing was heard all day. One battle-ship and "Dartmouth" have steam up ready to go to Constantinople if required. I have informed Ambassador accordingly.

[48991]

No. 502.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 641.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, November 17, 1912.

IN view of the danger to be anticipated from probable large numbers of troops retreating on the town, foreign representatives this evening decided to land detachments early to-morrow morning and to confine them for the present to their respective prearranged depôts, embassies, &c. They will not patrol Pera except in case of urgent necessity.

Porte has been informed, has taken act, and promised to inform military authorities.

[49033]

No. 503.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 643.)
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, November 17, 1912.

SIR RICHARD CRAWFORD, on behalf of Turkish Customs, asked that a wireless telegraphy message might be sent to Turkish Customs authorities at Salonica to continue their work.

Commander-in-chief declined to transmit message without my authority, which I did not consider myself in a position to give.

Sir Richard tells me that he hears that Greek military authorities have issued protocol authorising Public Debt Régie and Customs to continue their work, but Customs were waiting for instructions from home.

In addition to interest of foreign bondholders, 8 per cent. is devoted to reimbursement of Treasury bonds taken up by National Bank. If you can authorise message going through, it might be done through commander-in-chief.

[48922]

No. 504.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 644.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, November 17, 1912.

FOLLOWING by wireless telegraphy from His Majesty's ship "Medea," at Salonica:—

"Consul-general says that it appears confirmed that Bulgarians are systematically exterminating Mussulman populations of the districts occupied by them. Urgent representations desired."

[48970]

No. 505.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 645.)
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, November 17, 1912.

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Dardanelles:—

"Local reserve division is arriving here for the defence of Besika against a Greek landing. They are full of cholera, and the military authorities have just consented to their isolation on the European shore, for fear that they break cordon at Nagara."

[49176] No. 506.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 647.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 18, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 642 of yesterday.

Attack on Chatalja lines continued throughout day. Minister for Foreign Affairs told me chief of staff declared attack had been successfully repulsed all along the line. He added that *morale* of troops had been much improved and useless reserve men had been sent back.

[49185] No. 507.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 648.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 18, 1912.*

BRITISH salvage company Grech and Co. are running short of coal. It cannot be obtained from here and would be stopped by Greeks if ordered from Mediterranean. Company's steamers have been useful in connection with bringing His Majesty's ships up here, and their services might be required again. Vice-consul states that he counts on them in case of local disorders, and suggests whether it would not be possible for one of the colliers furnishing coal to fleet in Besika Bay to bring out 200 tons for company, which would of course pay for it. Please consult Admiralty.

[49177] No. 508.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 439.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, November 18, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 437 of 17th November.

Russian Government will take such measures as may be possible to satisfy request of Persian Government for protection of their subjects at Constantinople.

[49178] No. 509.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 440.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 18, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 435 of 17th November.

From conversations which he had with Austrian and German Ambassadors to-day, my French colleague gathers that Austria's chief objection to granting Servia a commercial port, such as Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes, is that, judging by past experience, States in the end always fortify such ports, despite their treaty engagements to the contrary. Were Servia in a few years' time to adopt this course, and were Austria then to try to force her to observe her treaty obligations, Russia would certainly intervene on the ground that she could not allow a Slav State to be crushed by Austria.

On French Ambassador repeating this to Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter said that to accept this contention as valid would be to say that it was useless to make any treaty in the future for fear of its being broken. His Excellency's language

was, however, calmer than that which he held to me on Saturday. He seemed to be under the impression that Austria is anxious to find a way out of the difficulty. Austrian solution would be a neutral or international port, and Minister for Foreign Affairs even went so far as to say that if only Servia would be contented with this he would not make difficulties. His Excellency added, however, that he could not answer for Russian public opinion.

As far as I can ascertain, public opinion at present is distinctly bellicose. It is generally believed that Italy will not support Austria, that Germany wants peace, and that Austria will have difficulties with her Slav population. The moment is therefore considered favourable for Russia, and it is contended that if Russian Government are only firm Austria will have to yield.

[49173] No. 510.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 166.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, November 18, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs observed to me this morning that he considered that attitude of Austria towards Servia was now very conciliatory. She would accept idea of Danube-Adriatic railway running wholly outside Austrian territory. Only point in which Austrian Government remained firm was opposition to Servian sovereignty over Adriatic port. I asked if this would apply to the fiction of lease, and he said he thought objection would equally lie to any compromise involving military control. Our conversation was then interrupted.

[49181] No. 511.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 158. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 18, 1912.*

ALLIES have decided to maintain their programme, as reported in my secret telegrams of 6th November. They have agreed to ask the Kings of Bulgaria and Greece to act as arbitrators in all questions arising between Servia and Montenegro, and to invite the Emperor of Russia to arbitrate on all questions which may arise between Bulgaria and Servia.

They have not yet fixed on arbitrators for settling questions between Greece and Bulgaria, in settlement of which much difficulty is anticipated.

[49179] No. 512.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 18, 1912.*

I LEARN that my French and Russian colleagues have spoken much in the same sense to Servian Government as I was instructed to speak by your telegram No. 93 of 13th November.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs asked French Minister whether Servian Government must understand from this that they would only have diplomatic support from *entente* in their dispute with Austria. My French colleague replied that this was his impression.

This should have had a sobering effect if Russian Minister has genuinely carried out his instructions, but the tone here still seems most unreasonable.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[49161] No. 513

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 18.)

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November* 18, 1912.

I LEARN that at the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs a very serious view is taken of the treatment extended to certain Austrian consuls by Servian authorities. I have been told by a well-informed person last night that Austro-Hungarian Government will have to insist upon signal reparation for outrages committed on their consuls. Facts, as far as I can ascertain them, are as follows:—

Austrian consul at Prisrend has disappeared, and all communication with him has been interrupted for about three weeks. It is unknown whether he is alive or dead. A courier known to have been sent by him has not reached Vienna, but despatches and private letters, of which he is believed to have been bearer, have been published, I am informed, in Servian newspapers. It is presumed that courier has been murdered or robbed. To representations made by Austro-Hungarian Government no satisfactory reply has as yet been received from Servian Government.

Austrian consul at Mitrovitza, after confinement lasting some fifteen days, has with much difficulty succeeded in escaping, and has just reached Budapest. It is alleged here that animosity shown by Servian authorities against these two consuls is due to fact that they witnessed atrocities supposed to have been committed by Servian troops upon Albanian population.

Reports of disgraceful outrages committed on Albanian men, women, and children are beginning to reach Austria.

Consuls in question were both consuls "de carrière," and not local people.

(Repeated to Belgrade.)

[49163] No. 514.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 18.)

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November* 18, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 93 of 13th November to Belgrade.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs came here from Budapest for a few hours yesterday, and called on Russian Ambassador to express the regret of the Austro-Hungarian Government at the outrage on the Russian consul at Czernowitz. Russian Ambassador tells me that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs took the opportunity of expressing his great satisfaction at the attitude of England and at the language used by Sir R. Paget to the Servian Government. This probably refers to the instructions contained in your above-mentioned telegram. Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs evidently wished Russian Ambassador to understand that he thought that it would be well if the Russian Government instructed their representative at Belgrade to use similar language.

[48992] No. 515.

Vice-Consul de Garston to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 18.)

(Telegraphic.) *Ragusa, November* 18, 1912.

AUSTRIAN steam-ships "Mass" and "Trieste" arrived at Gravosa this evening with 3,400 troops Hungarian regiments, of which 2,500 are proceeding by rail to Herzegovina and Bosnia, and 900 remain here; 1,200 men were also landed at Neum, and further detachments are being landed there for Metkovich and Mostar, and at Cattaro by other steamers, bringing up present reinforcements of trained men to over 10,000.

It is rumoured that further reinforcements of another 10,000 to 15,000 men for the detachments in Dalmatia, Herzegovina, and Bosnia will immediately follow, being landed at various Dalmatian ports.

Military authorities at Ragusa have hired various buildings for housing the troops. Large supplies of military stores and munitions of war have been received here and at Cattaro, and also, I hear, mountain and field guns.

[48901] No. 516.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 110.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 18, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 62 of 16th November: Capitulations at Uskub.

Please report by telegram which of your colleagues have not yet received instructions.

You should also instruct consul at Uskub to report through legation, by cypher telegram, any further developments, and inform him of views of His Majesty's Government respecting the Capitulations as contained in my telegram No. 91 of 12th November to you.

[49284] No. 517.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1256.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 18, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 436 of 17th November.

I entirely agree that to get all six Powers into line is most desirable. But to induce Austria to agree to let Servia have San Giovanni di Medua as proposed by Minister for Foreign Affairs it will be necessary to give Austria firm assurance that no Power, including Russia, will support Servia in asking for anything more than this in the Adriatic, and that principle of an autonomous Albania of reasonable size will be supported by all the Powers. I do not see why Russian Government should not sound Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs direct. If France or ourselves were to make the proposal suggested by Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, we should, if Austria were prepared to entertain it, which is doubtful, be asked what assurance there was that if Servia refused it or continued to press her claims in Albania she would receive no support from Russia. It is essential that Russian Government should be explicit on this point if there is to be any chance of further concession from Austria.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 718.)

[48632] No. 518.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 382.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 18, 1912.

THE Russian Ambassador called at this Office on the 12th instant and left the enclosed copies of telegrams from his Government relative to the question of Servian access to the Adriatic and Austria's objection to the acquisition by Servia of a port on the Adriatic coast.

I have informed Count Benckendorff and M. Cambon that I agree to the preliminary discussion suggested in the penultimate paragraph of the telegram dated the 12th November.

When Count Benckendorff drew my attention to the last paragraph, I said that it was true, but that Servia first provoked the discussion, and Austria would no doubt retort by calling attention to the published interview given by M. Hartwig.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 518.

Télégrams received by Count Benckendorff from Russian Government.

(1.)

(Très confidentiel.) *Saint-Pétersbourg, le 12 novembre*, 1912.

NOUS pensons que Sir Edward Grey partage notre point de vue sur le danger d'une action armée autrichienne contre la Serbie, au sujet d'une question dont la solution n'appartient pas à cette dernière sans sanction internationale. D'autre part, nous estimerions extrêmement utile que les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris donnent à Belgrade des conseils de modération et de raison.

Nous pensons que la décision prise par l'Autriche-Hongrie de ne pas laisser pénétrer la Serbie sur le littoral adriatique est ferme. L'Autriche-Hongrie est soutenue par ses alliés. Cette solidarité de la Triple Alliance rend pour nous extrêmement important de savoir quelle attitude prendraient la France et l'Angleterre pour le cas où les efforts d'empêcher une intervention armée de l'Autriche-Hongrie resteraient sans résultats.

Le Comte de Thurn étant venu chez moi hier, je me suis efforcé de le convaincre des inconvénients et des dangers d'une action qui ne serait pas justifiée par une nécessité absolue. J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur de s'informer par télégraphe si le Cabinet de Vienne ne consentirait pas à accorder à la Serbie, sur l'Adriatique, un port qui aurait un caractère exclusivement commercial. Le Comte de Thurn ne me cacha pas qu'il doutait fort que la question puisse être ainsi posée. D'un autre côté, il me signala que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal serait disposé à accorder à la Serbie, pour la garantie de ses intérêts économiques et du transit de ses produits par chemin de fer sur Salonique et l'Adriatique, des conditions tout à fait semblables à celles qui garantiraient les siens.

Nous pensons que le moment approche où il s'agira d'établir l'équilibre entre la situation que l'Autriche-Hongrie compte s'assurer et les intérêts tant politiques qu'économiques de la Serbie. Il nous semblerait indiqué de resserrer dans les limites du possible le territoire albanais, et aussi d'établir certaines garanties dans son organisation future.

Toutes ces questions peuvent faire l'objet d'un échange d'idées préliminaire, tandis qu'une décision définitive ne saurait être prise que par les Puissances collectivement et après un examen des intérêts réciproques engagés.

C'est pourquoi la façon autrichienne de forcer la question de la pénétration de la Serbie sur l'Adriatique, comme décision catégoriquement prise, ne nous semble pas régulière.

(2.)

Je télégraphe à Belgrade :—

La décision prise par l'Autriche de s'opposer à l'acquisition par la Serbie d'un port sur l'Adriatique est irrévocable et approuvée par ses alliés. La France et l'Angleterre ne sont nullement disposés d'entrer pour cette cause en conflit avec les Puissances de la Triple Alliance. De notre côté, nous déclarons catégoriquement à la Serbie que nous ne nous laisserons pas entraîner par elle. Nous ne ferons pas la guerre aux trois Puissances pour un port serbe sur l'Adriatique.

Si vraiment les alliés balkaniques ont pris la décision de partager entre eux la Turquie d'Europe intégralement sans tenir nul compte des intérêts de l'Autriche et de l'Italie, nous tenons à les mettre en garde contre une politique aussi irréfléchie. Elle lui aliénera tout d'abord les sympathies de l'Angleterre et de la France. On oublie en Serbie le danger de ne pas compter sur les circonstances. Elles rendent inévitable la création d'une Albanie littorale.

Plus la Serbie montrera d'esprit de sagesse, plus il deviendra possible d'obtenir, lorsqu'il s'agira d'établir les limites et de créer une administration pour l'Albanie, des conditions avantageuses pour elle au point de vue économique. Mais plus elle manifestera d'obstruction, plus augmenteront pour elle les dangers d'un complet isolement.

Veuillez sans le moindre retard vous expliquer avec M. Paschitsch surtout ce qui précède et le prévenir contre une occupation de Durazzo. La Serbie ne doit pas nous obliger à renoncer hautement à toute solidarité avec elle sur une question où nous considérons qu'elle se laisse guider par pur entraînement.

[48136]

No. 519.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 383. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 18, 1912.*

THE Russian Ambassador called on the 10th instant and communicated the enclosed copy of a telegram sent by the Russian Government to their representative at Belgrade, indicating the extent to which Russia is prepared to support Servia, and denying the truth of the statements made by the Servian representative at Berlin as to Servia being able to rely on Russian help.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 519.

Telegram sent to Russian Representative at Belgrade.—(Communicated to Foreign Office by Count Benckendorff, November 10, 1912.)

JE télégraphie à Belgrade :—

La question de l'accès de la Serbie à l'Adriatique a pris, ces derniers jours, une tournure qui ne laisse pas de nous causer de sérieuses inquiétudes.

Nous sommes disposés à prêter à la Serbie, conjointement avec l'Angleterre et la France, un appui diplomatique des plus actifs. D'après des renseignements sérieux, nous ne pouvons pas mettre en doute que l'Allemagne et l'Italie sont, ainsi que l'Autriche, préparées à s'opposer à une expansion territoriale de la Serbie sur la côte de l'Adriatique.

Il n'est guère admissible d'accentuer, pour cette question, le conflit au point de risquer le danger d'une guerre européenne. L'attitude de certains représentants serbes à l'étranger nous paraît, pour cette raison, d'autant plus préjudiciable.

Nous apprenons que le représentant serbe à Berlin aurait déclaré à M. de Kiderlen-Waechter que les alliés avaient partagé le littoral adriatique, et que l'appui, non seulement de la Bulgarie, mais même de la Russie, avait été accordé à la Serbie. Nous considérons inadmissible pareille déclaration faite en notre nom.

La convention de l'alliance balkanique ne permet guère à la Serbie de compter sur le concours armé de la Bulgarie pour faciliter son accès vers l'Adriatique. Les pertes subies par la Serbie et la Bulgarie pendant cette guerre prédestinent d'avance leur insuccès dans un conflit avec l'Autriche.

L'envoi de détachements serbes dans la direction de Durazzo, à l'occupation duquel l'Autriche ne manquera certainement pas de s'opposer, démontre jusqu'à quelles conséquences dangereuses peut amener pareille détermination irréfléchie.

Veuillez attirer l'attention de M. Pachitch sur l'intérêt qu'auraient les Serbes de ne pas nous rendre plus difficile notre tâche de défendre leur cause.

Nous faisons, dans la question de l'accès de la Serbie à la Mer Adriatique, une distinction entre le but et les moyens d'y aboutir.

Le but consiste en l'établissement de l'indépendance économique de ce pays. Les moyens, en l'accès vers l'Adriatique, soit par voie d'acquisitions territoriales sur le littoral, soit en garanties spéciales en vue du ralliement de la Serbie avec tel ou autre port, par une ligne ferrée, dans des conditions identiques à celles qu'obtiendrait l'Autriche pour le transit de ses marchandises sur Salonique.

Une concession faite par la Serbie dans la question d'acquisition d'un port adriatique faciliterait les démarches en faveur d'autres compensations, telles qu'expansion territoriale vers le sud, ainsi qu'une certaine limitation du territoire albanais.

Si l'Autriche ne se rend pas compte de l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à établir une paix durable dans les Balkans, la Serbie devrait, semble-t-il, comprendre qu'à force de prétentions exagérées elle ne pourrait que compromettre le résultat final d'une guerre qui lui apporte des avantages inespérés. Il est dans l'intérêt de la Serbie de ne pas formuler des demandes exagérées, dont le rejet porterait atteinte à son amour-propre.

[48806] No. 520.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 527.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 18, 1912.

ON the 14th November Tewfik Pasha read to Sir A. Nicolson a telegram announcing that, as there had been delay in the steps taken by the Powers for mediation, the Porte had entered into direct pourparlers with the Balkan allies, through Bulgaria, for an armistice and for the arrangement of the preliminaries of peace, but the Porte hoped that the Powers would still continue to afford their *bons conseils*.

Sir A. Nicolson told Tewfik Pasha that he was sure we should all welcome the cessation of hostilities, and that he trusted that this would be brought about. Sir A. Nicolson understood that the preliminaries of peace would be merely laying down certain bases, and that it was not contemplated to arrive at a definite treaty of peace without any reference to the Powers. Tewfik Pasha said, of course, it would be impossible to make a definite treaty without the co-operation of the Powers. Sir A. Nicolson said he had only mentioned the point as the future of the islands in the Ægean was, for instance, a matter of importance to us and others, and we would naturally have a word to say in the question.

Tewfik Pasha read to Sir A. Nicolson another telegram to say that this step on the part of Turkey was not taken because she was exhausted, but solely with a desire to avoid further bloodshed. It was true that there was cholera at Chatalja, but the lines were in good order, and they hoped to make a brilliant defence there. Adrianople was still holding out, and the defence in Macedonia at Janina and Monastir was being well conducted. The fall of Salonica had painfully affected the Porte.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[48805] No. 521.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 265.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 18, 1912.

SIR A. NICOLSON mentioned to the Italian Ambassador on the 14th November that the Turkish Ambassador had communicated the steps which the Porte were taking for the cessation of hostilities, and that he, Sir A. Nicolson, had remarked to Tewfik Pasha that among other matters to arrange was the question of the islands. The Marquis Imperiali enquired rather abruptly to what islands Sir A. Nicolson alluded. Sir A. Nicolson replied that he had in his mind the islands occupied by the Greeks. As of course, in regard to those for the moment in Italian possession, there was the Treaty of Peace, and also the assurances which the Italian Government had been good enough to give to us and others. We were, therefore, not in any way disquieted as to their disposal, though there was the question of their future mode of administration.

The Marquis Imperiali then asked Sir A. Nicolson why we were so interested in the Ægean Islands. Sir A. Nicolson told his Excellency that naturally we did not desire to see naval Powers, and especially powerful naval Powers, establish themselves in localities which might be formed into strategical naval bases.

Sir A. Nicolson was left with the impression that an idea is floating in the Italian minds of acquiring one or more islands.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[49564] No. 522.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 268.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 18, 1912.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI read to Sir A. Nicolson on the 18th November a telegram from Marquis di San Giuliano saying that he was continually urging upon the Vienna Cabinet to give Servia access to a neutralised port on the Albanian coast, and that he thinks he may succeed.

I am, &c.,
E. GREY.

[49234] No. 523.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 85.)
Sir, *Canea, Crete, November* 7, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that last night about 150 Cretan gendarmes left Canea for Greece. It is understood that the Greek Government intends to employ them as a police force in Salonica and its neighbourhood when that town has been occupied.

Colonel Monforratos, the commandant of the Cretan gendarmerie, started before his men by a different steamer.

Four Cretan custom-house officials have also gone to Greece. I am told that they also will be made use of at Salonica, where an *ad valorem* tariff is in force as in Crete. The Greek custom-house functionaries, being accustomed to a specific tariff, are presumably considered less competent for the special service required.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[49209] No. 524.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 173. Confidential.)
Sir, *Athens, November* 7, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of an article published by the "Estia," which sometimes represents the views of the Greek Government, arguing that there is no contradiction between the declaration of the Allied States before the war, that they would be satisfied with the real introduction of effective reforms in Turkey, and their present resolution to put an end for ever to the Turkish dominion in Europe.

Although the rapidity and completeness of the success of the allies has struck all Europe with amazement, I cannot help thinking that they themselves had gauged fairly accurately the rottenness of the fabric of Turkish administration, military as well as civil; and that being not unprepared to see the Turks driven across the Bosphorous by their arms, they have discussed in advance the question of partition. I confess that I have little to go upon beyond chance remarks let fall by M. Coromilas, but I know that he is in favour of the internationalisation of Constantinople and the Straits, and that he has a scheme in his head under which the international administration would bear a portion of the Ottoman Debt, and which would thus conciliate European financial interests.

I imagine, without any definite grounds for the supposition that the share of Greece will be found to lie within a line starting from Vallona and including possibly Monastir and certainly Salonica and the Chalcidic Peninsula, besides, of course, Crete, such islands as have been captured by the Greek fleet, and probably some of those still in Italian occupation.

No one could contend that any of the Balkan States are models of administrative efficiency, but their defects are in great part due to their having been hampered in

the first stages of their existence by their insignificance. With a considerable territorial expansion their progress may be expected to be rapid, and cannot but be advantageous to all legitimate interests of the other nations of Europe.

The attitude of my Austrian and German colleagues betrays disappointment at the success of the allies, but no disposition to interfere with the results of it. The Roumanian Minister, however, freshly returned from Bucharest, manifests great irritation at the prospect of Bulgarian aggrandisement; and while lamenting that his Government did not, as he thinks they could have done, prevent the war by mobilising on the Bulgarian frontier, seems to think that they may yet draw the sword to frustrate the constitution of a Bulgaria even greater than that contemplated by the Treaty of San Stefano. The suggestion that his Government may have been bought off in advance by the promise of a rectification of the Dobrudja frontier he seems to regard as improbable. On the other hand, the Bulgarian Minister will not admit that his Government can have made any such promise, and declares that the cession of any Bulgarian territory to Roumania would only have the effect of setting up an Alsace-Lorraine between the two countries, with results disastrous to their future relations.

I have, &c.

F. ELLIOT.

[49210] No. 525.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 174.)

Athens, November 9, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 170 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a continuation of the diary of the war, taken from the official bulletins, up to yesterday's date. It includes the capture of Prevesa, the defeat of the Turks at Yenidje-Vardar, and the capitulation of Salonica with 25,000 troops.

The reticence concerning what is going on in the direction of Monastir has been maintained, and vague rumours of a defeat of the Greeks, with the loss of ten guns, have been met with equally vague denials. I have ascertained that two battalions were badly cut up near Banitsa, south of Sorovitch, but that no anxiety is felt about General Matthiopoulo's division, which is holding a strong position until the reinforcements which have been dispatched can reach it, and it is able to co-operate with the Servians against the Turkish forces at Monastir, which are estimated at 60,000 men.

General Ricciotti Garibaldi arrived a few days ago, and has left for the seat of war in Epirus with a red-coated (not red-shirted) regiment, composed almost entirely of Greek volunteers. Mme. and Mdlle. Garibaldi are in charge of an ambulance.

I have, &c.

F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 525.

Diary of the War for November 2 to 8, 1912.

November 2.—To-day the attack on Nicopolis commenced. Our troops took the heights of Nicopolis. A Turkish redoubt was blown up. Turkish troops and irregulars abandoned their positions and were followed up.

Dated at Arta. SAPOUNTSAKIS.

November 3.—The national flag flies on the forts of Prevesa. The detachment under Engineer Major Spiliades, with the Cretan and Epirote volunteers, after overcoming the enemy's stubborn resistance yesterday, entered the town this morning. A general attack had been ordered, but at 4·30 A.M. the Austrian, Russian, and British consuls, and a representative of the governor appeared, and made the following proposals: (1) Surrender of the fort to our regular troops; (2) protection of the inhabitants, officers, soldiers, and their families; (3) the dignity of the officers and Government officials not to be offended. These terms were accepted. Four hundred and fifty regular troops (including forty officers) and 150 Mussulman Albanians with

their chiefs surrendered. Some guns and other matériel were captured. The enemy's losses yesterday were severe. Our casualties about ten killed and fifty-six wounded. The Turkish torpedo-boat "Adalich" in the Gulf was sunk by the Turks yesterday, and two motor-launches were set on fire by our guns.

Dated at Prevesa. SAPOUNTSAKIS.

November 3.—A strong force of the enemy, lately arrived and entrenched near the Moslem sacred city of Yenidje-Vardar, offered a very stubborn resistance to our advance. After a fight lasting the whole of yesterday and to-day, from 6 to noon, the enemy was defeated and is being pursued. Yenidje was occupied at 12·15.

Later.—The enemy opposing us at Yenidje was composed of the whole of the Serres division and other bodies of troops, in all about 25,000 men, with twenty-four to thirty guns, and occupied fortified positions. He was dispersed by a direct attack by my centre and a flank attack by my extreme right coming from Gidà. We took about fourteen guns and four quick-firers, and a crowd of prisoners. Enemy's losses heavy. The road from Yenidje to Salonica is strewn with matériel of all kinds and with fugitive soldiers. I do not yet know the result of the pursuit from Gidà over the Kara-Asmak bridge.

Dated from Yanitsa (Yenidje-Vardar). CONSTANTINE.

November 4.—Revised list of Prevesa prisoners:—

Officers	58
Men of the regular troops	600
Albanian irregulars	152
Total	810

Skirmishes continue on the heights of Anogi.

Dated from Arta. SAPOUNTSAKIS.

November 4.—A notice issued by the Ministry of Marine announces the occupation of the island of Psarrà.

November 4.—A notice issued by the Ministry of War announces that the division which was advancing from Banitsa to Florina encountered superior forces beyond Banitsa, and was obliged to halt and occupy strong positions.

November 5.—Fighting lasted all day yesterday at Anogi and continues to-day. Yesterday's casualties: three soldiers and one irregular killed; two officers (one mortally), nine soldiers, and one irregular wounded.

Dated from Arta. SAPOUNTSAKIS.

November 5.—List of casualties at Yanitsa (Yenidje-Vardar):—

Killed—	
Officers	6
Non-commissioned officers and men	154
Wounded—	
Officers	39
Non-commissioned officers and men	737

November 5.—We are here preparing to cross the Vardar. We are informed that the enemy is withdrawing to Salonica after partially destroying the bridges. Between Yenidje and the Vardar there are large quantities of ammunition and other matériel of the retreating army.

Dated at Kirdjalar. CONSTANTINE.

November 6.—Notice issued by the Ministry of Marine.

The island of Tenedos was occupied to-day at 3 P.M. by the Ægean fleet.

November 6.—Fighting continues along the Anogi–Tsangaropoulos line. Yesterday, near the latter place, which has been occupied by our troops, we took four prisoners, three of them wounded.

Dated from Arta. SAPOUNTSAKIS.

November 8.—The Ministry of War issued an official statement, about 5 P.M., announcing the capture of Salonica. This turned out to have been an intelligent anticipation of events by the telegraph clerk at Gidà.

The following telegram was published in the afternoon of the 9th instant:—

Forwarded from the King's head-quarters at Gidà, at 8·20 A.M., the 9th November:

"Yesterday evening a protocol was signed in Salonica providing for the surrender of the Turkish garrison of the town and of the fort of Kara-Burun. The Turkish army, numbering 25,000, lay down their arms and become prisoners. The officers retain their arms, and are to be released on giving their parole to take no further part in the present war.

"CONSTANTINE."

[49191] No. 526.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 485.)

Paris, November 18, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to call your attention to a Havas agency telegram, dated Beirout, 17th November, which appears in the French press to-day.

It is in the following terms:—

The population of Syria is unanimous in desiring a separation from Turkey. All the Catholics and the great majority of the Moslems express their ardent sympathy for France, and show a certain amount of apprehension at the fact of a group of Moslems having sent a direct appeal to England. The same apprehension exists in Egypt, where certain papers openly state that England is thinking of occupying Syria shortly. It is announced that an English representative in Egypt is about to make a voyage in Syria, and this news is confirmed by the papers and from private sources. The representative in question will, so it is stated, travel in Syria, receive deputations, and will be able to speak of the possibility of an intervention on the part of Great Britain.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

[49241] No. 527.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 19.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, November 18, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 18th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 527.

Commander in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 18, 1912.

"JULES FERRY" arrived Besika Bay this morning.

Enclosure 2 in No. 527.

H.M.S. "Prometheus" to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 18, 1912.

"HENRI IV" left here (Beirout) for Tripoli (Syria), where she will remain five days.

[49433] No. 528.

Pro-memoriâ communicated by Tewfik Pasha, November 19, 1912.

LE Conseil international de Santé, sur la proposition du délégué anglais, a voté la résolution suivante dans sa séance du 18 courante:—

"Vu le danger d'une catastrophe qui pourrait se produire pour la santé publique tant à Constantinople qu'en Europe, si les armées belligérantes entraient dans la ville, le Conseil supérieur de Santé émet le vœu le plus instant tendant à ce que les démarches urgentes soient faites afin d'empêcher l'entrée des armées dans la capitale."

Le Gouvernement Impérial ne manquera pas de prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour qu'après la conclusion de la paix les soldats de l'armée ottomane ne passent pas par la capitale à leur retour dans leurs foyers. Il est à espérer que l'armée bulgare, se rendant également à ces considérations humanitaires, se conformera à son tour à la recommandation des Grandes Puissances, surtout à un moment où les négociations de paix future sont sur le point d'être entamées.

Devant les ravages que fait actuellement le choléra tant dans les rangs ennemis que dans les rangs ottomans, on ne peut méconnaître le danger qui menace Constantinople avec une population de plus d'un million et demi d'habitants, et les équipages des navires de guerre étrangers mouillés actuellement dans les eaux du Bosphore.

Les conférences internationales de Paris, Venise, Dresde et Rome, auxquelles les États balkaniques ont également pris part, ont édicté des prescriptions rigoureuses quarantenaires et d'isolement pour empêcher précisément l'extension du fléau.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 19 *novembre*, 1912.

[49329] No. 529.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 19.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, November 19, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams dated the 19th instant, relative to movements of ships in the Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 529.

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 19, 1912.

"BARHAM" reports 19th November "Montcalm" arrived Beirout, and "Montana" expected there 1st December. "Benedetto Brin" left Besika for Constantinople.

Enclosure 2 in No. 529.

Consul-General Barnham to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Smyrna, November* 19, 1912.

"JULES FERRY" arrived Smyrna.

Enclosure 3 in No. 529.

H.M.S. "Prometheus" to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 19, 1912.

"MONTCALM" and "Henri IV" arrived Beirout.

[49311] No. 530.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received, November 19).

(Confidential.)
Admiralty, November 19, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram dated the 19th instant, relative to the movements of ships, &c., in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 530.

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 19, 1912.*

"HAMPSHIRE" reports 18th November men landed 5 A.M. approximately 3,000, of whom 497 British. Men confined to quarters for present in British and American embassies and clubs. Cholera hospital is at embassy for men landed, special arrangements aboard. Cholera in Pera, not known how many cases. Bulgarians reported to have agreed not to enter Constantinople.

[49268] No. 531.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 149. Most Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 18, 1912.*

THE Albanian leader Ismail Kemal has just returned here from Budapest, where he went to see Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. He is satisfied with result of his interview and leaves to-night for Trieste, where an Austrian steamer has been put at his disposal by the Austro-Hungarian Government which will land him at Durazzo or Valona.

I gather that the Austro-Hungarian Government are desirous that the Albanian leaders should issue a proclamation of Albanian independence with as little loss of time as possible, and that they should make an appeal to the Powers at once thereafter.

[49247] No. 532.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, November 18, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 43 of 13th November.

It is given out here officially that the King replied to Austrian Minister that he considered the communication made to him as *nul et non avenu*. The King pressed me yesterday frequently whether I thought his answer was a good one; I replied I could not say so. He pressed for an indication of the views of His Majesty's Government; I replied I believe they deprecated the raising of any controversy at present moment on separate points which might suitably be dealt with later as part of general settlement.

He told me that his troops had occupied Medun. He was now negotiating through Bulgarian Government for an armistice.

[49160] No. 533.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Belgrade, November 18, 1912.*

IT is officially stated that Monastir has surrendered to Servian troops with 45,000 men and three generals, including Fethy Pasha.

[49267] No. 534.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 649.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 18, 1912.*

MAJOR DOUGHTY-WYLIE, who was out on fighting line yesterday and to-day, tells me he does not consider fighting to have been very severe, and thinks that Bulgarians were trying to ascertain position of Turkish guns.

He says that cholera is very severe, and estimates deaths at 1,000 per day.

[49270] No. 535.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 650.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 18, 1912.*

PORTE have issued a circular note to embassies complaining that foreign ships of war are entering Smyrna harbour without previous warning to competent authorities.

They request that local authorities be warned in time of date and time of entry of all such ships, and add that two blank shots will be fired by shore batteries to warn any vessel which may appear to be incurring imminent risk of accident.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, informed.

[49319] No. 536.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 651.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 19, 1912.*

ADMIRALTY telegram sent 13th November in sections.

I have informed admiral that there would be great difficulty in obtaining permission for a destroyer to pass the Straits. Other Powers would claim similar privilege, and the Porte would possibly decline.

It might be convenient for the admiral to make some arrangements with the Greek Company (see my telegram No. 648 of 18th November).

[49266] No. 537.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 150.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 19, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 157 of 17th November.

Monastir has fallen to-day to Servian army. All the officers with Zeki have been captured, and there are 40,000 prisoners, and many guns, arms, and stores have been taken. Turkish army in Macedonia has now ceased to exist as a fighting force. Dibra and Durazzo still hold out.

Cholera has now appeared in Bulgarian army; statistical details as to fatalities cannot be relied on.

[49330] No. 538.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 160. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 19, 1912.*

THE general situation, especially as regards Albania, has been secretly discussed by the Bulgarian and Servian Governments.

They are convinced that the occupation of Alessio by Servia will not make Austria go to war, and they intend to insist on Servia obtaining access to the Adriatic, although not necessarily at Durazzo. They do not recognise the Albanians as forming a nation, but realise that the autonomy of Albania must be temporarily permitted, in spite of their belief that it will form a centre of discontent and trouble. Their decision is therefore not to put difficulties in the way of Austria as regards the creation of an autonomous Albania, and to defer to her judgment as to special commercial advantages, administration, &c., and thus to endeavour to win her over to their cause.

The Austrian press (*vide* the "Neue Freie Presse" of the 16th November) is already carrying on a campaign in favour of a rapprochement between the allied States and Austria-Hungary.

It is the disposal for once and for all of the pretensions of Italy in the Balkans that is the real object of this policy. They hope that if Italy can be prevented from obtaining a hold on Albania at the present juncture she can be definitely excluded from the Adriatic, and they count on sowing the seeds of discord between Italy and Austria on the Albanian question. They will seize their opportunity of occupying Albania in the troubles which they anticipate will follow the death of the Emperor Francis Joseph.

A similar telegram has been sent to His Majesty's legation at Belgrade.

[49324] No. 539.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 161. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 19, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 154 of 16th November.

Replies have been now received from the Greek and Servian Governments as to the terms on which they would accept an armistice. Suggestions made by Greece the Prime Minister considers out of all reason; one is the evacuation of Constantinople by the Ottoman Government, and the establishment of an autonomous European administration, in which Greeks would have most power, owing to their numerical preponderance. They make other impossible demands. The Servian Government insist only on the evacuation of Durazzo and Dibra by Turkish troops.

I believe negotiations respecting armistice will continue regardless of the views of the Greek Government.

Bulgarian generals are still anxious to proceed to Constantinople, but the King is weakening considerably in view of the prevalence of cholera in both armies.

His Majesty is constitutionally averse to coming into contact with disease of any description.

[49323] No. 540.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 162. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 19, 1912.*

THE Prime Minister has just been instructed by the King to inform the Grand Vizier that Bulgarian generals at the front have been ordered by His Majesty to negotiate at once with the Turkish generals respecting immediate conclusion of an armistice.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[49342] No. 541.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 163.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 19, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 165 of 16th November.

As regards interests of Turkish bondholders, it would appear that Russian Government are not included in proposed action. I am informed that they have no great interests in debt.

The Governments interested appear to be those of France, Germany, Italy, and Austria. Shall I join these four colleagues when they all receive their instructions?

[49326] No. 542.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 164. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 19, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 161 of 19th November.

There seems reason to believe that the allies would have no great objection to the maintenance of Turkish suzerainty in Albania if they are obliged to agree to establish an autonomous Albania.

This information may be of use at the present juncture.

[49338] No. 543.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November 19, 1912.*

ON closer enquiry I find that it is quite correct, as stated in my telegrams Nos. 58 and 60 of 14th November, that Servian troops have been on the Adriatic coast since the last five or six days, but I am unable to get any precise information as to their exact whereabouts.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[49339] No. 544.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 19, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 59 of 14th November.

Prime Minister asks me to convey his grateful thanks for offer of mediation, but, owing to direct negotiations with Turkey, Servian Government consider that there is no necessity for availing themselves of any outside mediation. Should the occasion arise, they will not fail to appeal to the good offices of His Majesty's Government.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[49340] No. 545.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 69.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 19, 1912.*

GERMAN and Italian representatives yesterday made a declaration to the Servian Government identical with that made by Austrian Minister a week ago, on the subject of the Adriatic littoral (see my telegram No. 53 of 11th November). Prime Minister replied that this question will have to be discussed later on when the final results of the Turco-Servian conflict will be known.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[49341] No. 546.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 19, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 110 of 18th November.

My Austrian and German colleagues have made representations concerning Capitulations, but as French and Russian Ministers have as yet received no instructions from their Governments, I have made no communication to Servian Government. Italian chargé d'affaires received his instructions this morning, but is likewise making no representations for the present.

No cypher messages with consuls at Uskub are permitted either by post or by telegraph – as officially stated, on military grounds, but in reality on account of distrust towards Austrian consular officials.

I have informed His Majesty's consul at Uskub, in a despatch sent by British Red Cross unit, of the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to question of Capitulations, and instructed him to report further developments by safe opportunity.

[49334] No. 547.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 441.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, November 19, 1912.*

BALKANS.

I informed Minister for Foreign Affairs of substance of your telegram No. 369 of 13th November to Vienna.

His Excellency made no observation thereon.

[49335] No. 548.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 442.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 19, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1256 of 18th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said he was in constant communication with Vienna, but that last word spoken by Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs was to the effect that he could not consent to giving Medua to Servians. On my mentioning what Servian Prime Minister had said about Durazzo as reported in Belgrade telegram No. 63 of 16th November, His Excellency declared that that was a claim which he could not support.

I said that, as Medua was the minimum which Servia was likely to accept and maximum which Austria could possibly give, we must assure latter that if she made this concession we would none of us support Servia's future claims in Albania. His Excellency said that he would be ready to promise to tell the Servians that there was nothing more to be hoped for, and to use all his influence to induce them to abandon their other claims. He could not, however, engage to join in any action which savoured of a threat.

We had, his Excellency maintained, in Albania a powerful weapon wherewith to extract this concession from Austria. Latter could not hope to erect it into an autonomous province without consent of England, France, and Russia, who were signatories of Treaty of Berlin. We were being asked to consent to an arrangement which would virtually create an Italian and Austrian sphere of influence in what, up to the present, had been an integral part of Turkish Empire. Russia was putting forward no such claim in any other portion of Turkish territory, and in consenting to this Austrian proposal we should be making an very great concession. The least that Austria could do in return would be to consent to a Servian port at Medua. If she refused, we must let her know that we should make difficulties about Albania and its eventual delimitation. Russian Ambassador will be instructed to speak to you in above sense.

His Excellency is much exercised as to how the eventual delimitation of Greek and Bulgarian territorial claims is to be effected, as former are claiming all the coast as far as Cavalla.

[49332] No. 549.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 150. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 19, 1912.*

THE political situation here is becoming very serious. Public feeling in Vienna, Hungary, and Poland is running strongly against Servia. The Poles are secretly pressing for war in the hope that if it breaks out with Russia there will be a probability of Russian Poland being liberated. In military circles the feeling against the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs is running very high, and I hear that last night two colonels entered the office of the semi-official "Fremdenblatt" and declared that if the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not act energetically against Servia they would resign their commissions in a manner that would produce a scandal. I am informed on good authority that Minister for Foreign Affairs, although very preoccupied, still holds to moderation and has not abandoned all hope of a peaceful settlement with Servia. I hear confidentially that as long as he possibly can Count Berchtold will hold to his principle of postponing to end of war official discussion of question of Adriatic port, Albanian autonomy, and other matters. Consular dispute with Servia, however, will have to be settled in a very few days, but trouble is expected as result of fear in which Servian Government stand of the military party, who think themselves invincible. One hopeful sign is the information I have just received to the effect that Austrian consul at Prisrend is to be brought to Uskub.

I have been informed confidentially that military authorities here have decided, in the event of mobilisation being necessary for an armed intervention in Servia, to call out half-a-million men, and not merely a small force. It is intended that no risks should be run.

German Ambassador is going to Budapest this afternoon to see Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. I am informed confidentially by a person in contact with Ministry of Foreign Affairs here that Germany is urging Austria-Hungary to stand firm, as the prestige of the Triple Alliance is at stake. The military prestige of Turkey having been broken by the Balkan League, Germany is of opinion that it will not do for the world to believe her ally shows fear of any member of the league.

[49344] No. 550.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 167.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, November 19, 1912.*

TELEGRAM No. 62 of 16th November from Belgrade.

Italian Minister has been instructed to make a representation to Servian Government respecting Capitulations and consular status on lines suggested in your telegram No. 91 of 12th November to Belgrade.

[49345] No. 551.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 168.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, November 19, 1912.*

YOUR telegram to Vienna No. 369 of 13th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed gratitude for communication of information contained in your telegram to His Majesty's Ambassador in Vienna, and considered representation made at Belgrade most opportune. Italian Minister there was yesterday instructed to inform Servian Government that an occupation of Durazzo would be regarded by Italy as only provisional. It appears that German Minister made similar representations.

[49343] No. 552.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November 19.*)

(No. 204.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, November 19, 1912.*

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me this afternoon. He informed me that he had just received a telegram from French Minister at Sophia reporting that Balkan States have accepted proposal of Grand Vizier for an armistice, and that representatives of those States are to meet commander-in-chief of Turkish troops to settle its conditions and subsequent terms of peace.

This information, showing as it does that Balkan States will not avail themselves of mediation of Great Powers, confirms French Minister for Foreign Affairs in opinion which will be or has been expressed to you on his behalf by French Ambassador that French and British Governments should adhere to line laid down in Mr. Asquith's speech, and not deal piecemeal with various questions at issue between belligerents, and between them and some of the other Powers, such as position of Albania and access for Servia to the Adriatic. I showed to his Excellency your telegram No. 1256 to St. Petersburgh of yesterday, and as I had not received the telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador there to which it was a reply, he read to me a telegram describing the Russian proposal. French Minister for Foreign Affairs feels that if the French and British Governments conveyed to Austrian Government Russian proposals it might be regarded as dividing the Powers into two camps, viz., the Triple *Entente versus* Triple Alliance, and if French and British Governments enquired at Vienna views of Austrian Government they would almost certainly be such as would not be acceptable either to Servia or to Russia.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs gathers from Italian Ambassador that Italian Government favour a neutralised port for Servia on Adriatic, such as Medua or even Durazzo, rather than facilities at an Austrian port in Bosnia. French Minister for Foreign Affairs hears that Porte is disposed to make very large concessions to the demands of the Balkan States in the hope and expectation that terms of peace between the belligerents will be revised in favour of Turkey by the Great Powers, as was the case in regard to Treaty of San Stefano. His Excellency says that as the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, will be upset as a consequence of the war it will be necessary for the Great Powers to take some action such as a conference for substituting for it some other general arrangement.

[49487] No. 553.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 267.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 19, 1912.*

THE Italian Ambassador read to Sir A. Nicolson, on the 19th November, a telegram from the Italian consul at Uskub reporting the atrocities which are being committed by Servian troops and their evident intention of extirpating as many of the Albanian inhabitants as possible. The Marquis di San Giuliano enquired if we had received any similar information. Sir A. Nicolson said that he did not recall any direct information from our consul to that effect, but that we had heard from other sources that the Servians were murdering and generally misbehaving themselves.

Tewfik Pasha to-day showed Sir A. Nicolson a telegram from his Government, complaining of the misdeeds of the Servians towards women, children, and prisoners of war, and asking that a consular enquiry should be held. The telegram also complained of the manner in which the Greek soldiery were treating the prisoners at Salonica and elsewhere.

The Marquis Imperiali also read to Sir A. Nicolson a telegram from Sophia to say that little or no official news was coming from the front, that people were becoming depressed and weary of the war, and that the knowledge that the losses had been exceedingly heavy was causing people to long for the close of a war which was ruining the country in many ways.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[49033] No. 552[a].

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 287.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 19, 1912.*

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 643 of 17th November: Salonica customs.

As the Greek military authorities have apparently agreed to Customs continuing their work, we presume Greek Government can have no objection to the message in question being transmitted as proposed; but first you should ascertain the facts from Greek Government, adding that as interests of bondholders are concerned it seems desirable that, pending a final settlement, existing customs arrangements should be disturbed as little as possible. You should make this communication unofficially.

[49431]

No. 554.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 269.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 10, 1912.*

THE Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 10th November that the Servian Secretary-General had told the Italian chargé d'affaires at Belgrade that he had heard from M. Pasitch, who was with the head-quarters, that the military were so elated with their successes that they were unanimous in being ready to settle the difficulty with Austria-Hungary by force of arms; and M. Pasitch added that this feeling was so strong that he feared that he had not sufficient influence to prevent a fresh war.

Marquis di San Giuliano considered that it was desirable, in these circumstances, that all the Powers, especially Russia, should "shower" upon Belgrade councils of moderation.

Sir A. Nicolson told Marquis Imperiali that, as his Excellency knew, we had quite recently spoken in that sense at Belgrade, and that Russia had also used most emphatic language. Sir A. Nicolson said that the Servians were so intoxicated with their successes that they had lost all sense of proportion.

Marquis Imperiali said that when the Italian chargé d'affaires had recently given a message advising prudence, he had been informed that the Italian Government must be careful or they might run the risk of losing the friendship of Servia!

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[49516]

No. 555.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 565.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 19, 1912.*

M. CAMBON read to Sir A. Nicolson to-day a telegram from M. Poincaré, saying that M. Sazonof had not asked that the French Government should sound Vienna as to a solution of the Servian port difficulty—but this may be because M. Louis is ill in bed at St. Petersburgh. M. Poincaré agreed with the Prime Minister that it was a mistake to raise isolated questions at this moment, and he entirely agreed with my view that if Vienna is to be sounded, the Russian Government should clearly and unequivocally state that she would give her support to Austro-Italian desires as to an autonomous Albania.

The Marquis Imperiali read to Sir A. Nicolson a telegram from the Italian chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburgh recording the change in M. Sazonof's attitude, on which Sir G. Buchanan has also remarked.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[47547]

No. 556.

Foreign Office to Council of Foreign Bondholders.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 19, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant, in which you intimate that the Council of Foreign Bondholders deem it their duty to request the protection of His Majesty's Government in the event of any attempt being made to interfere with the rights of British bondholders of Turkish bonds.

I am to inform you, in reply, that in the financial settlement which must engage attention after the cessation of hostilities, His Majesty's Government will bear in mind the rights in question.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[48357] No. 557.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 963.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 15, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 910 of the 28th October, and to previous despatches on general matters connected with the war, I have the honour to report that His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana writes on the 18th October that some 700 Adana redifs, and about the same number of redifs from Mersina and Tarsus, had already paid the military exemption tax in order to avoid going on active service. He estimates that in the Adana vilayet the tax had brought in at least £T. 50,000.

In the Aleppo district the same reluctance to perform military service was shown among the redifs. Writing on the 14th October, Mr. Consul Fontana stated that great difficulty had been met with in prevailing upon the Arabs to serve. The Turks appeared to join the colours readily, but the Arabs took no interest in Macedonia, and said that the war in Montenegro did not concern them. At Aleppo itself a crowd of Moslem women followed their reservist relatives to the citadel and raised a great outcry, protesting and beating against the gates with stones. At the same time there was some show of anti-foreign and fanatical feeling. The windows of the Russian consulate were broken, and songs were sung threatening death to Christians and Jews. The commandant of the troops behaved admirably on this occasion, calling up the officers and ordering them to command their men to respect to the utmost every Christian and especially foreigners.

The laxity of discipline and the unsatisfactory relations between officers and men, to which competent observers largely attribute the subsequent Turkish disasters, are well illustrated by an incident related by Mr. Consul Fontana, who reports that in the reservist camp just outside Aleppo the major in charge was forced to take to flight after having been beaten by his own men for refusing them as much bread as they demanded. He further relates that a large number of reserve troops, which he himself saw proceeding to Constantinople, were without officers, and were straggling along the route in parties of from three to fifteen or twenty in the charge of a few sergeants. The officers travelled quite apart from their men in carriages. At a Han on the road the men seized all the copper cooking utensils and carried them off with them.

From Monastir on the 24th October His Majesty's vice-consul reported that in the Perlepe, Ochrida, and Florina districts bands of Moslem volunteers were being formed with a view to countering the expected activity of Bulgarian and Greek bands.

As a rule the nationals of the hostile States in Turkey outside the war area appear to have been left unmolested, though in Constantinople the local papers have from time to time reported the capture in the capital of supposed Bulgarian spies. On the other hand His Majesty's vice-consul at the Dardanelles reported on the 29th October that orders had been received there to expel all Greeks from the European side of the Straits, and these orders appear to have been carried out with unnecessary energy. About 50 Greeks were ejected from Maitos, and many more took refuge at the French consulate at the Dardanelles, which is in charge of Greek interests there. I have not heard whether the French consul was able to take any action on their behalf.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[49359] No. 558.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 965.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 16, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 961 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, reporting further on the negotiations in regard to the surrender of the town to the Greeks.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 558.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 150.)

Sir, *Salonica, November* 11, 1912.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 148 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to enclose herewith translation of a letter which was on that date addressed to me, as doyen of the consular corps, by his Excellency Hassan Tahsin Pasha, general commanding the 8th Kol Ordu, the head-quarters of which were then at Daoud Bali, some three or four miles outside this town.

On my submitting this letter to the representatives of the other Powers signatory to the Treaty of Berlin, it was agreed that we should accompany the Pasha's delegate to the Greek lines for the purpose merely of submitting his proposals to the Greek commander-in-chief and bringing back his reply. The Russian consul-general only, though he had from the commencement been in complete agreement with myself and other colleagues, decided at the last moment to abstain.

Owing to the fact that the Turkish staff were in ignorance as to the true whereabouts of the enemy's head-quarters, we were dispatched in the wrong direction, and did not arrive at our destination until 7 P.M. Prince Constantine received us at once, but, as we fully expected, declined to entertain the proposal that the Turkish army should retire with its arms to Kara-Bouroun. After a short discussion with Shefik Pasha, however, he consented to offer the following conditions:—

The Turkish forces to lay down their arms, which should be kept under Greek guard until the end of the war, when (subject to the approval of the higher authorities, which he expressed the opinion that we would probably be able to secure) they should be restored to the Ottoman Government; all troops meanwhile to be interned in suitable localities and provisioned by the Greek authorities until means could be found to repatriate them.

Officers to be allowed to retain their swords.

All civilian employés to be completely free to remain or go where they pleased.

The Turkish gendarmerie and police to continue at their posts until regularly replaced by corresponding Greek forces, and then to be at liberty to withdraw, retaining their arms.

The Prince required a definite acceptation or refusal of these terms before 6 A.M. the next morning, by which time he insisted that the Turkish advanced posts must be withdrawn and the retrograde movement commenced, since all dispositions had been made to attack the Turkish positions and enter the town by force on the 8th, that being the Greek festival of St. Dimitri, the patron saint of Salonica.

These conditions appeared to all of us, including the Turkish delegate, to be as satisfactory as could possibly have been expected, and we returned to Salonica about 10 o'clock to communicate them to the authorities there. Owing to the lateness of the hour and the impossibility of providing transport, it was not practicable (even if it had been deemed necessary) for us all to go out to Daoud Bali. It was therefore left to Shefik Pasha to acquaint his commander-in-chief and take his reply back to the Greek head-quarters.

Neither we nor the Turkish authorities here had any doubts but what the terms would be acceptable. I therefore ventured to request the admiral to transmit to your Excellency a wireless telegram to the following effect:—

"Terms of capitulation practically settled. Crown Prince will probably enter to-morrow (Friday.)"

I was therefore considerably astonished when, about 8 o'clock on the following morning, I was called by the vali and informed that Hassan Tahsin Pasha had refused them and endeavoured to substitute others, which I was perfectly certain could not be accepted by the Greeks.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 558.

General Hassan Tahsin Pasha to Consul-General Lamb.

(Translation.)

Daoud Bali Camp, November 25(7), 1912.

Sir,

PROCÈS-VERBAUX have been drawn up by the Administrative Council of the vilayet conjointly with the Municipal Council of Salonica, setting forth that in the course of the fighting which is about to take place in the vicinity and environs of that town the town itself will be exposed to the danger of destruction, and its inmates—both residents and refugees—will be reduced to the greatest straits. The statements contained in these *procès-verbaux* have been confirmed by the vali and communicated to myself. The army has been necessarily compelled to take into consideration this urgent plea and supplication of the provincial councils, and I have thought it desirable to appeal to you and your colleagues for the purpose of bringing the matter to a favourable conclusion.

Brigadier-General Shefik Pasha, "commandant de place" of Salonica, has accordingly been appointed to assist at the discussion, with a view to bringing about a settlement on the basis of the conditions that the Ottoman army should retire without combat to Kara Bouroun and remain there until the termination of the negotiations which are being carried on with the Great Powers at Constantinople, the supplying of the force during this interval being undertaken from Salonica.

The Greek army will be notified from here of the dispatch of the commission, and I beg you to communicate to me the result of the discussions.

I have, &c.

FERIK HASSAN TAHSIN,

Commanding the VIIIth Army Corps.

[49360] No. 559.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 966.)

Sir,

Constantinople, November 16, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout, reporting on the state of public feeling in Beirout vilayet caused by the military events in European Turkey.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 559.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 74. Confidential.)

Sir,

Beirout, November 8, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that, notwithstanding the telegraphic reports of the serious reverses sustained by the Ottoman troops in the European provinces of Turkey, the population of this town and vilayet is keeping quiet. The greatest consternation and surprise is universally felt at the rapidity of the enemies' successful advance on the capital, which was yesterday reported to be occupied by the Bulgarian army, but otherwise demonstrations against Christians and foreigners, which it was feared might take place, have so far not been reported.

In official circles, where the Turkish defeats are naturally most keenly felt, there is great despondency, but hopes are entertained that the European Powers will intervene to save the country from further humiliation.

In Moslem circles there is great depression, and complaints are loud against the Committee of Union and Progress Government, which is held responsible for the, to them, inexplicable inefficiency of the army after the heavy expenses incurred of late years.

The danger of foreign intervention in Syria as a result of the weakening of Turkish rule is much discussed, and, in despair, they openly deprecate the possibility of a French or any other foreign occupation of Syria but that of England.

The Christian population view the discomfiture of the Turkish Government with quite opposite feelings, and do not hide their elation at what they hope will prove a step nearer the accomplishment of their dreams of a change of rule in Syria and the advantages to be derived from foreign masters, whoever they may be.

Their present exultation reminds me forcibly of the impression caused by the ill-suppressed gratification of a large crowd of Christians watching the sinking of the two Turkish war-ships in this harbour in February, just as if the ill-fated vessels were to all intents and purposes those of an enemy and not of their own nationality.

The reported departure of a French squadron for these waters has revived active speculation amongst all classes in Beirout and the Lebanon as to the intentions of the French Government in case disturbances occur in any part of Syria, and I have every reason to believe that the arrival of British war-ships would cause great satisfaction among the Moslems and non-Catholic Christians for reasons that have been made known to your Excellency by me.

I have, &c.

H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[49482] No. 560.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 20.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, November 20, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 560.

Vice-Consul Keyser to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

Constantza, November 18, 1912.

TURKISH cruiser, understood to be regular escort for Roumanian mail steamer, left 17th November.

Enclosure 2 in No. 560.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

November 19, 1912.

"KORTENAAR" (Dutch) arrived Smyrna.

Enclosure 3 in No. 560.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

November 19, 1912.

"BARHAM" reports no change in situation coast of Syria. All quiet at present, but ready for outbreak on Constantinople giving lead. Am informed quiet assured if necessary reforms guaranteed by England and France, or England alone. There is strong political agitation going on amongst non-Catholics and Mahommedans in favour of annexation by Egypt or British protectorate [end of message unintelligible].

Enclosure 4 in No. 560.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

November 19, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
REPORTED Servians occupied Monastir, and fighting between Greeks and Bulgarians occurred at Serres. Report unconfirmed, received through consul-general, Salonica.

Enclosure 5 in No. 560.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

Admiralty, November 19, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
REMAIN until further orders at Besika in case required to proceed Constantinople. Order 3rd Battle Squadron to Malta ordinary speed, the two divisions joining up at sea.

[49519] No. 561.

"Jewish Chronicle" to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

2, *Finsbury Square, London, November* 20, 1912.

Sir,
I BEG to inform you that I have to-day received a telegram from our correspondent in Constantinople, copy of which I enclose you. The sender of the telegram is well known to me personally and is quite reliable. I have therefore every reason to believe that his telegram is based upon facts and is not in any way exaggerated.

I feel sure I have only to bring this matter to your notice in order to ensure the British Government doing whatever it can in order to protect the Jewish people in Salonica and other parts of the affected districts.

Believe me, &c.
J. GREENBERG, *Editor.*

Enclosure in No. 561.

Copy of Telegram received by "Jewish Chronicle."

Constantinople, le 20 *novembre*, 1912.

SOLDATS grecs, Salonique, saccagèrent quartier juif, synagogues, filles violées, terreur, désolation, attentat. Meir Nahoum sollicita protection Bompard, Lowther.

[49410] No. 562.

Sir C. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 654.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November*, 19, 1912.

FOLLOWING from Adana to-day :—

"My despatch No. 44.

"Situation has not improved and foreigners and Christians are extremely nervous, many families having fled to Mersina during last few days. Inflammatory anti-Christian article was published on 15th November in a Tarsus newspaper and has caused a panic.

"I am informed that a French ship is being sent to Mersina, and I respectfully urge that a British man-of-war may be sent in order that British interests may be adequately protected.

"(Addressed Constantinople; repeated to His Majesty's ship 'Barham.')"

[49411] No. 563.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 655.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, November* 19, 1912.

DIRECT negotiations.
My telegram No. 635.
Following reply received through Russian Ambassador to M. Gueshof :—

"Bulgaria has exchanged views with her allies and is prepared to accept proposal for direct negotiations between Bulgarian plenipotentiaries and Turkish commander-in-chief with a view to the conditions of a preliminary armistice and to their proceeding to the conclusion of a definite peace."

[49412] No. 564.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 656.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, November* 19, 1912.

RUSSIAN Ambassador tells me he has heard from Sophia that armistice conditions are as follows :—

1. Surrender of Chatalja fortifications to Bulgarians.
Surrender of Adrianople and garrison to Bulgarians, of Janina and garrison to Greeks, of Scutari to Montenegrins, of Dibra and Durazzo to Servians.
2. Turks to retire from peninsula to west of Chatalja, and this to remain as a line of demarcation between the two armies.
3. Turks to raise blockade of Bulgarian ports so that Bulgarian army can obtain supplies.

Bulgarian Prime Minister has informed Russian Government that it may give assurance that if armistice is signed at once the line Midia and River Ergene joining the sea at Enos will be assured to Turkey as a definitive frontier. The contradiction between this and No. 2 may be explained by the desire of the Bulgarian Government to leave a road open for bargaining.

M. Gueshof asks Russian Government that French and British Ambassadors should support Bulgarian demands in order that protocol may be signed at once. He states that San Giovanni di Medua has been occupied, and that Monastir has surrendered with 40,000 men. He adds that a further advance of Bulgarian troops would increase their demands.

My Russian colleague tells me that, in making communication contained in my immediately preceding telegram, he did not allow Grand Vizier to see that he was cognisant of the armistice conditions, but confined himself to impressing on Kiamil Pasha and the Minister for Foreign Affairs that if Turkey was to save the rest of her Empire she must be prepared to make great sacrifices.

[49502] No. 565.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 165.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November* 20, 1912.

MY telegram No. 148 of 14th November.
The Prime Minister has made identic verbal reply to my colleagues and myself.
His Excellency, whilst expressing his own thanks and those of his Government for kind offer of mediation made by the representatives of the Great Powers, has the honour to state that, the Grand Vizier having expressed a wish that direct negotiations be carried on between the Ottoman Government and Bulgarian Government, and as this procedure is now being adopted, the proposal for mediation made by the Great Powers has become unnecessary.
(Sent to Constantinople.)

[49454] No. 566.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 657.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 20, 1912.*

FIRING continued on line of Chatalja throughout day, but no action of importance as far as it has been possible to ascertain. Position maintained.

General Mahmoud Pasha has come in wounded and two generals have died of cholera, but the wounded sent in are not numerous.

[49520] No. 567.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 659.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 20, 1912.*

FOLLOWING just received from military attaché, dated Chilingir, 18th November :—

"Bulgarian attack commenced early yesterday morning and continued all day. It was confined to central portion of position, which is probably the strongest. Having been over the position, I consider that the attack on Turkish right has best chance of success, but the defence of flanks is assisted by presence of fleets. Turks organised in six army corps of three divisions: three corps in first line, three in reserve—roughly 100,000, but fresh troops arriving. Not enough work has been done in entrenching and field fortification, but position is strong and line well chosen and field batteries well placed. Attack failed everywhere and appeared to me rather objectless. If merely to draw defence, unnecessary loss was incurred and too much ammunition expended. Infantry advanced without sufficient artillery preparation and before any superiority over fire of defence had been obtained. Bulgarian firing was bad, and Turks suffered no loss to speak of either in matériel or personnel. On the contrary, Turkish artillery fire seemed to be very good and well directed.

"Turkish and Bulgarian lines are divided by Kara Su, but Bulgarians are said to have pushed two or three batteries beyond river, which are now in a dangerous position in front of Turkish right centre. Infantry attacks on left centre may have been with a view to extricating these batteries.

"Unless anything unforeseen occurs this should be long fight, and Turks are very confident and pleased with yesterday's results."

[49521] No. 568.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, November 20, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 129 of 8th November: Mediation.

Montenegrin Government express their deep gratitude for step which His Majesty's Government have been good enough to take in proposing their mediation. Since, meanwhile, Porte has addressed itself directly to Balkan countries, Montenegrin Government are not in a position to have recourse to it.

[49518] No. 569.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 20, 1912.*

VIENNA telegram No. 147 of 18th October.

Austrian Minister made serious representations to the Servian Government yesterday respecting treatment by military authorities of consuls at Mitrovitza and Prisrend. Authorities state that latter, who was supposed to be dead, as no news had been received from him for some time, was alive, and an Austrian consular official is leaving from here for Prisrend to-day to enquire into the facts.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs acknowledged to me to-day that Servian military authorities had probably exceeded their rights, but the attitude of the consuls had been provocative. If, after the enquiry had been concluded, Austrian Government refused to be [? satisfied with] explanations given, it would be suggested to refer circumstances to The Hague.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs thinks that these incidents have much aggravated the situation as regards the Adriatic port question, the tension concerning which as yet shows no signs of diminishing.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[49514] No. 570.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Belgrade, November 20, 1912.*

IT is announced officially that Servian troops have entered Alessio.

[49505] No. 571.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 166.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 20, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 162 of 19th November.

I hear that proposals respecting armistice were dispatched to the Ottoman Government last night.

A condition was attached that they should be accepted within twenty-four hours.

The proposals are on lines of my previous telegrams.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[49499] No. 572.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 167.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 20, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

On commencement of negotiations for armistice Bulgarian troops were ordered to suspend operations before Chatalja whilst holding captured positions.

Rumours of Turkish successes at Chatalja are reported from head-quarters to be untrue.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[49525] No. 573.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 151.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November 20, 1912.*

IN absence of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs I have just seen Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He says that a certain *détente* has taken place owing to Servian Government having consented to allow an Austrian official to proceed to Prisrend to put himself in contact with Austrian consul. This Under-Secretary of State considers to be a step in the right direction, but it is not all that Austria-Hungary demands. It remains to be seen whether this move by Servia is merely intended to gain time. Under-Secretary of State, however, assured me that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would not allow himself to be influenced by public excitement here and would continue to act with moderation. He would give reasonable time for messenger to reach Prisrend, and would await a report from consul before making next move.

Under-Secretary of State told me that question of Adriatic port would be kept quite separate from consular incident.

As this consular incident is likely to give rise to much trouble, it would perhaps be well if the representatives of the Powers at Belgrade could use their influence to make Servian Government understand that it is to their own interest to come to a prompt and amicable settlement of this question.

[49522] No. 574.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 205.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 20, 1912.*

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me that Italian Ambassador expressed opinion to him this afternoon that Austro-Hungarian Government might consent to a division of the sanjak between Servia and Montenegro and the annexation to Servia of Ipek, Djakova, and Prisrend; and the constitution of Medua as a free port with a band of neutralised territory giving access to it to Servia.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs sounded the Austrian Ambassador on these ideas and on an alternative free port for Servia in Albanian territory with a neutralised railway access from Servia. French Minister for Foreign Affairs found Ambassador less "intransigeant" than previously, and though he did not express any opinion as to the acceptability of ideas for Austro-Hungarian Government he said that he would inform them of suggestions.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs has received from Jews at Salonica an appeal for intervention of French Government to make representations to Greek Government on account of conduct of Greek troops, who are said to be pillaging and ill-treating the Jews.

Turkish Ambassador has represented to French Minister for Foreign Affairs impossibility for Turkey to withdraw from Tchatalja lines so that Bulgarians may occupy them. It would be abandoning defence of Constantinople itself. French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who evidently thinks it an unreasonable condition of the armistice, told Turkish Ambassador that it is open to the Porte to make counter-proposals to the requirements of the Balkan States.

[49523] No. 575.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 170.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, November 20, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 709 of 15th November to Paris and subsequent telegrams.

Neither I nor French Ambassador have been able to detect any disposition here to contemplate evading conditions of treaty of peace as regards Rhodes. Attitude of Minister for Foreign Affairs has consistently been that ultimately arrangements for their administration will have to be considered by Powers, and that Italy will, with the others, have a voice. I am inclined to think Italian Ambassador must have started question of Rhodes on his own initiative.

[49342] No. 576.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 176.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 20, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 163 of 19th November: Turkish bondholders.

Ascertain from your Russian colleague if security of Russian war loan are not concerned. Russian financial interests such as It is desirable that no steps should be taken without co-operation of all the Powers.

[49786] No. 577.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 288.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 20, 1912.*

THE German Ambassador informed me to-day that the German Minister in Athens had advised the German Government that the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs had suggested the internationalisation of Constantinople and a small strip on each side of the Straits. He had said that Greece would stand by her allies, and fight for Servia against Austria, if need be; and that Greece wished to have the Bay of Valona.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[49787] No. 578.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 289.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 20, 1912.*

THE German Ambassador was instructed to ask me to-day to send the necessary instructions to our representatives in the Balkan States to say that, in any settlement, the rights of the Turkish creditors must be safeguarded.

I said that I thought we had already sent instructions to this effect. I would let the Ambassador know to-morrow.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[49788] No. 579.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 41.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 20, 1912.*

THE Bulgarian Minister told me to-day that he felt that the principle of nationality required that there should be an autonomous Albania. It might be independent, under a Prince of its own; or it might be under Turkish suzerainty, with a governor appointed by the Turkish Government with the consent of the Powers, as had been the case in Eastern Roumelia. He favoured the latter solution.

The question of a Servian port on the Adriatic was also mentioned.

I said that the conduct of the Servians with respect to the Austrian consuls had not smoothed matters, and that, if a conflict broke out between Servia and Austria, there might be raised at the end of it other points, such as the ownership of the sanjak, about which Austria was at present making no difficulties.

He told me that he had reported at length to his Government what I had said to him previously about the Servian question. He thought that M. Gueshof had been using his influence in that sense in Belgrade, and not without effect. The treatment of the Austrian consuls was presumably the act of the military authorities separately.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[49789] No. 580.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 75.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 20, 1912.*

THE Greek Minister informed me to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had made a *démarche* in Berlin and Vienna in favour of the retention of Rhodes by Italy. The German and Austrian Governments had agreed, and he heard that the Italians had made the same intimation to us. The Italians had a great sentiment for Rhodes, which appeared on their 5-franc pieces.

I said that I had heard a report that the Italians had mooted the question in Vienna and Berlin, but the Greek Minister's information was the most direct and

positive that I had yet received. The Italian Ambassador had mentioned to me the sentiment of Italy about Rhodes, but he had not been instructed to do so by his Government; and neither he nor his Government had intimated to me that it was the intention of Italy to retain Rhodes permanently. The view which I had always expressed was that, if any great naval Power acquired an Ægean island for a naval base, difficult questions would be raised between the Great Powers.

The Greek Minister observed that, speaking personally, he thought that, if the Italians attempted to keep Rhodes, the disposition of the inhabitants would not make it a bed of roses for them.

The Greek Minister went on to ask me whether Russia had definitely objected to the passing to Greece of the group of four islands nearest the Straits.

I replied that the Greek Government really must make their own enquiries in St. Petersburgh.

The Minister assumed that this confirmed what he had said, and he added that his Government knew that Russia had stated an objection with regard to these four islands.

I said that this was the first time that I had heard these four islands mentioned together; and that on this, as on the previous point, he was giving me information more definite than any that I had yet had. My own view was that the question of the islands, like other individual questions, should be discussed when the settlement of the whole situation was being considered.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[49535] No. 581.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 362. Confidential.)

Sir, *Rome, November 17, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my despatch No. 352 of the 10th instant, that the attitude adopted by the Italian Foreign Office on the issue raised by the aspirations of Servia and the opposition of Austria-Hungary, as evidenced by official conversations and by the inspired articles of the semi-official press, does not appear to have met with general support in this country. The note of disapproval has been struck in three different quarters.

In the first place, the organs of the Radical Left have very plainly announced their disapprobation in articles from the pens of the deputies Signor Bissolati and Signor Barzillai, the latter of whom has also expressed himself very strongly in a public meeting, in a speech in which he contended that the real interests of Italy lay in a close accord with the allied Balkan States. Signor Barzillai, however, who was born an Austrian subject, and is the most prominent exponent here of the anti-Austrian propaganda, carries much less weight with the general public than Signor Bissolati, who is in constant touch with the President of the Council, and who was, as I have mentioned in previous correspondence, offered a portfolio in the Ministry. Signor Bissolati protests against Italy being deluded into playing the game of Austria, to the detriment of her own real interests, and argues that an independent Albania will become a focus of future intrigues and ambitions, and that its incorporation in the Balkan States would be more to the general advantage.

Secondly, the views of the constitutional opposition, as represented by the "Giornale d'Italia," are equally opposed to the policy of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. An autonomous Albania is regarded by this group as consistent with Italian interests. But Italy must not on that account lend her support to all the claims and pretensions of the Austro-Hungarian Government. There must not be submissive assent to special privileges and preponderating influences, and she cannot afford to give a blank cheque to the Empire or to see the autonomous Albania become its political and economic satellite.

In the third place, there is the independent public opinion of Italy, which is best expressed in the influential "Corriere della Sera" of Milan. In this organ the engagements which the Marquis di San Giuliano is assumed to have entered into, tangible evidence of which is afforded by the joint representations made at Cettinjé and Belgrade, are severely criticised. The attitude of Italy is contrasted to her disadvantage with that of Germany, whose representatives have endeavoured to

maintain touch with the views held in Great Britain, France, and especially in Russia, whereas Austria has been backed up by Italy in a manner not at all in conformity with her real interests.

The above represents the substance of the most recent article in the "Corriere della Sera," but there have been a whole series in the same sense, while the policy of the Italian Foreign Office seems to have few defenders in the press except in the columns of the "Tribuna" and the "Popolo Romano," which are known to be inspired at head-quarters.

I understand that this criticism, coming as I have shown from three different quarters, has not failed to have its effect on the President of the Council, whose general attitude is governed by his quick apprehension of the prevailing currents of popular opinion. He has, I am told, considerably modified the views he was disposed to defend some days ago, and has realised that the traditional and instructive sentiments of the nation will inevitably assert themselves against an undiscriminating acceptance of Austrian policy, in active opposition to the Balkan States, and to the leanings of some of the Great Powers. Between the President of the Council and the Minister for Foreign Affairs there is no question which view will prevail.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[49604] No. 582.

Council of Foreign Bondholders to Foreign Office.—(Received November 21.)

Sir, 17, *Moorgate Street, London, November 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Sir L. Mallet's letter of the 19th instant, and to tender to Sir E. Grey the thanks of the council for his promise that, in the financial settlement which must engage attention after the cessation of hostilities between Turkey and the Balkan States, His Majesty's Government will bear in mind the rights of the British holders of Turkish bonds.

We have to-day received information from the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt at Constantinople that on the 26th ultimo the following communication was addressed by the consulate-general of Russia at Salonica to the commandants of the Greek army of occupation:—

"Le consulat général Impérial de Russie à Salonique, chargé des intérêts hellènes en cette ville, a l'honneur de prévenir les honorables commandants de l'armée hellène que la Dette publique ottomane est une institution internationale se trouvant sous la protection et la responsabilité des Grandes Puissances.

"Le consul général,
"A. BELAIEF."

The Council of Foreign Bondholders earnestly beg that His Majesty's Government will cause instructions to be sent to the British consulates in the districts occupied by the Balkan armies to take the same action as that taken by the Russian consul at Salonica.

I have, &c.
JAMES P. COOPER, *Secretary.*

[49530] No. 583.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 21.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 20, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated 20th instant, relative to movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 583.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

Admiralty, November 20, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
ORDER "Cumberland" to Vigo viâ Gibraltar to resume her programme, reporting dates. If necessary she should coal at Gibraltar.

Enclosure 2 in No. 583.

Senior Naval Officer, Crete, to Admiralty.

November 20, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
"SALTWELL" (?) left for Smyrna. "Oleg" left.

Enclosure 3 in No. 583.

H.M.S. "Hampshire" to Admiralty.

November 20, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
"BENEDETTO BRIN" arrived here (Pera) to-day.

Enclosure 4 in No. 583.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

November 20, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
YOUR No. 298. Departure of 3rd Squadron cannot take place until to-morrow, as three days' mails from Piræus and large quantity of provisions from Smyrna are awaited.

[49572] No. 584.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 660.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 20, 1912.

M. GUESHOF having requested Russian Ambassador to transmit to Turkish Government a draft protocol of armistice, which contains all the conditions mentioned in my telegram No. 650 of 19th November, with the addition of some details of no essential importance, his Excellency, after some hesitation, determined to do so, thinking he would incur too much responsibility by being cause of delay. He handed the document to Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that he had no instructions to do so from his Government, but was merely transmitting it as being charged with Bulgarian interests and made no observations beyond advising him to come into contact without loss of time with Bulgarian delegates.

Following have been appointed Turkish delegates:—

General Nazim Pasha; General Izzet Pasha; Osman Nizami, Ambassador at Berlin; and Chadan Bey, a legal expert.

[49662] No. 585.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 661.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 21, 1912.

FOLLOWING from consular officer, Mitylene, dated to-day:—

"Twelve Greek war-ships anchored. Demand immediate occupation of island."

[49619] No. 586.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, November* 21, 1912.

MY telegram No. 110 of 15th November: Mediation proposal.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thanks His Majesty's Government, but says that appeal of the Turkish Government has been superseded by their offer, through the French Ambassador, to make every concession as well as by their direct negotiations with the allies for an armistice.

[49663] No. 587.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, November* 21, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 287 of 19th November: Salonica Customs.

Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs is not aware of any difficulty, but will enquire. I represented the suggested message from Constantinople as designed to assist Greek authorities if desired.

Minister says that many capable custom-house officers have been sent from here and from Crete.

He realises the expediency of disturbing the existing arrangements as little as possible pending final settlement; 11 per cent. is being levied on goods from all countries except Greece, on which only the additional 3 per cent. is charged.

[49674] No. 588.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November* 21, 1912.

MY telegram No. 70 of 19th November.

I learn that Servian representatives at the various capitals have been instructed to state that, for the time being, consular officers in Turkish territory recently occupied by Servian troops retain all rights and privileges which they possessed under the Capitulations except in respect of cases coming under military law.

I have informed vice-consul at Uskub of the above. Communication by cypher permitted.

Should I, under the circumstances, still take action as instructed in your telegram No. 91 of 12th November?

[49675] No. 589.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 74.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November* 21, 1912.

PRIME Minister informed me to-day that he believes that Servian troops have reached Durazzo.

(Sent to Vienna and Sophia.)

[49676] No. 590.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 75. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November 21, 1912.*

SERVIAN Government gave a provisional reply some days ago to Austrian expression of views concerning Adriatic port (see my telegrams Nos. 53 and 54 of 11th November), in which they stated, in accordance with advice in your telegram No. 93 of 13th November, that these questions had best remain for discussion at termination of the war and when terms of general settlement are arranged.

They have now reason to believe that Austrian Government intend to press them for a more definite reply, and they enquire confidentially what answer His Majesty's Government consider they had best return should this prove to be the case.

Servian representatives in London, St. Petersburgh, and Paris have, I understand, been instructed to ascertain the views of respective Governments.

[49677] No. 591.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November 21, 1912.*

I GATHER in a conversation to-day with Prime Minister that tension between Servia and Austria has slightly diminished. Servian Government are showing good-will in the matter of Austrian consuls, and Austrian Government appear to have given an indication in some indirect manner that under certain conditions they might not be altogether obdurate concerning Servia's desire for an Adriatic port. But as the Servian demand still seems to be for Durazzo, it is not clear for the present how Austrian and Servian views could be reconciled. At the same time, Prime Minister said that in dealing with this question the Government would not allow any extreme ambitions of the military party to stand in the way of a sensible arrangement.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[49673] No. 592.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, November 21, 1912.*

A COMBINED force of Servians and Montenegrins has occupied Alessio.

[49661] No. 593.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 21, 1912.*

ST. PETERSBURGH telegram No. 440 of 18th November.

In my opinion it would be a misfortune if Russian official circles should be encouraged to believe that Austria will shrink from enforcing her minimum demands against Servia from fear of a war with Russia and its consequences. The moderation of the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs must not be taken as a sign of weakness, nor is it due to the realisation by him that Austria is not in a position to wage a successful war with Russia. I learn that the Emperor has told many members of the Delegation now assembled at Budapest that he wants peace, but only peace with honour. It is a mistake to believe that Germany is now seeking to moderate the present Austrian policy with regard to Balkan affairs. This seems to have been the case about a month ago (see my telegram No. 114 of 21st October), but now German Ambassador has openly spoken to leading people here to the effect that Germany will support Austria through thick and thin. If Russia officially comes forward as the protector of Servia and as defender of her pretensions to an Adriatic port, I do not see how war is to be avoided.

Here it is believed that if war should break out, Austria-Hungary, with the help of Roumania, will be more than able to hold her own against Russia, and at the same time to crush Servia. It is fully expected in well-informed circles that as the Austrian army penetrates into Poland it will be welcomed by population, as Poland and also Russia are believed to be infected with revolutionary spirit. With regard to military situation here, I beg to refer you to my telegram No. 137 of 13th November.

[49802] No. 594.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 391.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 21, 1912.*

GERMAN Ambassador has informed me that German Government think the Great Powers should now come to an agreement on the main points of the Balkan settlement. He mentioned Albania, Servian access to Adriatic, Constantinople, Adrianople, and Mount Athos.

I said that the points on which agreement between Great Powers was required appeared to be three:—

1. Whether there should be an autonomous Albania, and, if this was in principle agreed to, what the limits of it should be.
2. By what method and under what conditions should Servia be given access to the Adriatic.
3. The question of the islands.

I thought it would be desirable that the Powers should, if possible, come to an agreement on these points, but any discussion should be as informal as possible; it would not be desirable yet to formulate definite proposals for acceptance or rejection.

As far as I was aware difficulties were not likely to arise now between Russia and Bulgaria about Constantinople, Adrianople, or Mount Athos. Bulgaria was not claiming Constantinople in any of her terms, and unless Russia wished to raise these points I did not suppose any other Great Power would wish to do so.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 1269, and Paris, No. 732.)

[49803] No. 595.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**

(No. 393.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 21, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 116 of to-day to Sir R. Paget.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[49803] No. 596.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 21, 1912.*

SERVIAN chargé d'affaires informed me that to Austrian communication at Belgrade respecting Servian access to Adriatic M. Pasitch had replied that the discussion should be postponed till a later period when the results of the war were definite. He asked my opinion of this reply.

I said that it seemed to me quite a proper answer if it implied that everything done during the war was to be regarded as provisional. The chargé d'affaires thought of necessity this must be so, and I said I thought if it was understood to mean this the Austrian Government would accept it.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 392; Paris, No. 733; Vienna, No. 387; St. Petersburgh, No. 1270; and Rome, No. 530.)

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* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 735), Sir R. Rodd (No. 531), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 1272), and Sir F. Cartwright (No. 388).

[49802] No. 597.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.[a]

(No. 734.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 21, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 391 of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and ask his view.

[49785] No. 598.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 286.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 21, 1912.*

THE German Ambassador was instructed to inform me yesterday that Herr von Kiderlen thought that the Great Powers should come to an agreement on the main points of the Balkan settlement so as to prevent one Great Power supporting and another opposing one or other of the Balkan States on particular items. Albania was a very important point. Austria had shown great forbearance in face of Servian provocations, and Herr von Kiderlen would suggest that the Servians should be informed by the Powers that all the things which they were doing at present were regarded as acts of war against Turkey, and that any occupation of parts of Albania was, in the general view of the Powers, provisional and not definitive. Such an intimation to Servia would make it easier for Austria to maintain the reserve which she had hitherto shown. Servia must not divide Albania in her access to the Adriatic, but she should have railway connection with a port through which a way for Servian exports and commerce generally should be guaranteed. The port should not, however, be in the ownership of Servia. Servia should be assured rights of transit on the Bosnian railways for her commerce, just as Austria must be assured similar rights on the sanjak railways and the Servian railways to Salonica. Herr von Kiderlen understood that Russia wished Constantinople to remain Turkish; that we also desired this, though to Germany this was a matter of indifference; and that Russia, in addition, had reserves to make about Adrianople and Mount Athos. He would make these suggestions to Austria and Italy if we would make them to Russia and France.

I said that I must have time to consider this proposal, and I asked the Ambassador to come to see me to-morrow afternoon.

I added, however, that it occurred to me on the spur of the moment that it might be a little difficult for the Powers to single out Servia as one of the Balkan States for a special communication; but the Powers might agree in principle that there must be an autonomous Albania, of which the limits were to be discussed later, and they might make this decision known. This would be equivalent to saying that any occupation of parts of Albania made during the war with Turkey was regarded as provisional.

I mentioned that I knew the Russian view to be that Constantinople should remain Turkish, but I did not say anything as regards our own views on this point.

I also observed that the question of the Ægean islands was one which would interest the Powers; but I found that the Ambassador had not been instructed to include this question in those which he mentioned to me.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[49790] No. 599.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 287.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 21, 1912.*

THE German Ambassador informed me yesterday that the German Government had discouraged the making of loans to the Balkan States at present, but they found that the Banque de Paris and the Banque des Pays-Bas had agreed to issue 40,000,000*l.* of Bulgarian Treasury Bonds.

[a] Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 1271.)

I said that I knew nothing of such a loan, and the amount seemed to me incredible. As far as we were concerned, I thought that two enquiries had been made some time ago: one with regard to lending money to Turkey, and another with regard to lending money to Bulgaria; and to both we had replied that our practice, as in previous wars, would be that we could not interfere as regards loans to either of the combatants, and financiers must decide for themselves at their own risk. We had no control over Stock Exchange quotations or British financiers in such a matter.

The German Ambassador informed me to-day that there had been a mistake, and that the loan was for 40,000,000 fr.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50214] No. 600.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 291.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 21, 1912.*

WHEN the German Ambassador came to see me to-day, I spoke to him in the way described in my telegram No. 391 of to-day to your Excellency.

He observed that I had not expressed any opinion as to how Servia should get access to the Adriatic.

I replied that I desired rather to find a method of reconciling different views and to bring about an agreement than to express personal opinions of my own. Austria had proposed economic access for Servia, but not through Servian territory. This, I thought, would not be accepted as it stood. On the other hand, a solution might be found by giving Servia a neutralised slip of territory to a port on the Adriatic neutralised under the guarantee of all the Powers.

The Ambassador asked me whether this was a Russian proposal.

I said that I did not understand that Russia had made it as a proposal; it was rather what I gathered from what I heard of the conversations which were taking place in all the capitals, where all the Ambassadors had been talking about the subject.

The Ambassador said that Austria would not agree to this, and Germany would have to support her.

I admitted that it did not at present meet the Austrian view, though I thought that there was not really so much difference between this and what Austria was prepared to agree to.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50215] No. 601.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 292.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 21, 1912.*

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day that we had already sent instructions to our representatives in the Balkan States to make a communication about the Turkish debt. They had not yet been acted upon in every case, because in some cases the foreign colleagues of our representatives had not yet received similar instructions.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50213] No. 602.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 89.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 21, 1912.

THE Austrian Ambassador came to see me to-day. He had nothing to communicate, but we had some general conversation.

In the course of this, I said that there did not seem to be so very much difference between giving Servia economic access to the Adriatic, as Austria had proposed, and giving Servia a strip of neutralised territory to a neutralised port, which would be under Servian control.

The Ambassador told me that M. Mjatovitch, who was years ago Servian Minister in London, had the other day—being presumably unaware that he was speaking in the presence of a member of the Austrian Embassy—expressed the opinion that Servia could not require an outlet on the Adriatic for economic purposes. The only use to her of a port on the Adriatic would be that she hoped some day to acquire Bosnia, and when that time came it would be useful for her to have a port on the Adriatic which she could place at the disposal of Russia, to enable Russia to assist her. This sort of talk, if it represented what was in the mind of the Servian Government, naturally made things difficult for Austria.

I said that I was afraid that M. Mjatovitch indulged in mischievous talk, of which this was not the first instance. I had never to my knowledge met him.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50219] No. 603.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 566.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 21, 1912.

THE French Ambassador informed me to-day of the communication which Herr von Kiderlen had made to the French Ambassador in Berlin, suggesting that the Powers should come to an agreement as to (1) the points which they would leave the Balkan States to settle for themselves, and (2) the points on which the Great Powers must have their say. These last were the questions of Albania, Constantinople, Adrianople, Mount Athos, the Roumanian demands, and the Ægean islands.

I told M. Cambon that the German Ambassador had not mentioned Roumania or the islands to me. I would suggest the islands to him as a subject which interested the Great Powers, but I would make no mention of Roumania, as I thought it preferable that the Roumanian claims should, if possible, be settled direct with Bulgaria.

M. Cambon told me further what the Italian Ambassador in Paris had suggested. It showed, amongst other things, the importance which Italy attached to the economic independence of Servia, and her desire that Albania should be internationalised under the guarantee of the Powers. The Austrian Ambassador, in conversation with M. Poincaré, had not excluded the idea of a strip of Servian territory to San Giovanni di Medua, and though it was not clear whether this was the opinion of his Government or only his own personal opinion, M. Cambon regarded it as a very favourable indication. It appeared that Montenegro was now claiming San Giovanni di Medua.

I agreed with M. Cambon that the impression derived from the Austrian Ambassador in Paris was a very favourable indication. If confirmed by his Government, it might reduce the question of Servian access to the Adriatic to a dispute between Servia and Montenegro for the possession of the particular port in question.

M. Cambon also told me that M. Sazonof objected to an autonomous Albania, believing that the Albanians were not homogeneous, and that the autonomy of their country would lead to endless trouble, but, out of deference to the opinion of others, he was prepared to waive his objection.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50220] No. 604.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 568.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 21, 1912.

M. CAMBON gave me to-day the accompanying communication with regard to the creditors of Turkey.

I promised to send instructions to your Excellency, as desired.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 604.

Note communicated by M. Cambon.

L'AMBASSADEUR de France a l'honneur de communiquer, ci-joint, à son Excellence Sir Edward Grey les conclusions d'une commission chargée par les Ministères français des Affaires Étrangères et des Finances d'étudier la situation faite aux créanciers de l'Empire ottoman par les événements actuels.

D'après les renseignements parvenus au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, il semble que les Gouvernements dont les nationaux sont intéressés dans la dette publique ottomane seraient disposés à procéder en commun à l'étude de cette question.

M. Paul Cambon a été chargé de demander au Gouvernement britannique d'autoriser son Ambassadeur à Paris à entrer en conversation avec M. Poincaré sur le sujet qui fait l'objet de la présente note.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 21 *novembre*, 1912.

Enclosure 2 in No. 604.

Conclusions de la Commission chargée par M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères d'étudier la Situation faite aux Créanciers de la Turquie par la Guerre de 1912.

I.

LA commission, partant du principe de droit public aujourd'hui généralement reconnu qu'en cas de démembrement d'un État, l'État annexant ne saurait prendre possession du territoire annexé qu'avec les charges qui le grèvent, et qu'il doit équitablement supporter une part de la dette publique contractée par l'État démembré, envisageant d'autre part le mode suivant lequel ces charges doivent être réparties, estime, dans le cas particulier de l'Empire ottoman, qu'il n'est ni opportun, ni pratique de baser cette répartition sur la spécialisation des gages affectés aux divers éléments de la dette publique ottomane.

II.

En conséquence, les États alliés devront supporter une part de la dette publique ottomane proportionnelle aux revenus des territoires cédés, conformément au principe déjà inscrit, pour les cessions territoriales antérieures dont ils ont bénéficié, dans le Traité de Berlin de 1878 et dans la convention signée à Constantinople le 24 mai, 1881.

III.

La participation des territoires cédés au service de l'ensemble de la dette extérieure de l'Empire ottoman sera arrêtée d'après le rapport existant entre les revenus de ces territoires et le revenu global de l'Empire ottoman, calculés d'après la moyenne des trois dernières années, suivant le système déjà proposé à la Sublime Porte par une note de l'Ambassade d'Angleterre en date du 6 novembre, 1883.

Cette méthode de calcul de la participation des États alliés à l'ensemble de la dette publique ottomane ne saurait annuler, au détriment des porteurs étrangers, le principe même de la garantie spéciale affectée aux différents emprunts.

Il appartiendrait, au contraire, aux États alliés de fournir, pour la quote-part laissée à la charge des provinces cédées, des sûretés équivalentes à celles dont le maintien serait reconnu impossible ou impraticable.

Ces sûretés pourraient être recherchées dans l'intervention des organismes de contrôle déjà existant.

IV.

L'annuité des États alliés sera versée, pour le compte du Gouvernement ottoman à l'Administration de la Dette publique, qui sera chargée d'en faire la répartition entre les différents emprunts, qu'ils soient gérés ou non par cette administration.

V.

L'annuité des territoires cédés destinée au service des emprunts ottomans pourra faire l'objet d'une conversion en capital suivant le précédent inscrit à l'article 10 du Traité de Paix italo-turc du 18 octobre, 1912.

Dans ce cas les sommes ainsi capitalisées seront versées pour le compte du Gouvernement ottoman, à l'Administration de la Dette publique, chargée d'assurer la destination qui leur revient

VI.

Aucune compensation ne pourra être admise en cas de stipulation par les alliés d'une indemnité de guerre, entre cette indemnité et la part de la dette ottomane qui demeure à la charge des territoires cédés.

Cette compensation ne saurait davantage s'établir entre les arrérages respectifs de l'une et de l'autre au détriment des porteurs étrangers de fonds ottomans.

VII.

Au cas où une indemnité de guerre serait exigée de l'Empire ottoman, les Puissances se réservent de faire un rappel de la part contributive non encore liquidée des États alliés à la dette ottomane existant en 1878 pour les territoires cédés en vertu du Traité de Berlin.

VIII.

Il y aura lieu de demander aux États alliés de participer à l'extinction de la dette flottante ottomane constituée avant la date de l'ouverture des hostilités.

La contribution des États alliés serait calculée en capital d'après la proposition existant entre le revenu global de l'Empire ottoman et les revenus des territoires cédés.

Les versements à intervenir seraient faites par les alliés pour le compte du Gouvernement Impérial dans un établissement préalablement désigné à cet effet et chargé de s'assurer de l'exact emploi de ces sommes.

IX.

Les Gouvernements alliés devront reconnaître et confirmer les concessions quelles qu'elles soient accordées par le Gouvernement ottoman ou par les différentes autorités administratives sur les territoires cédés.

Il en sera de même des contrats en cours d'exécution conclus par l'État, les villes ou autorités ottomanes.

Les Gouvernements alliés demeureront subrogés à tous les droits et à toutes les charges qui résultaient de ces concessions et de ces contrats pour le Gouvernement ottoman.

X.

Les Gouvernements alliés demeureront subrogés en tout aux droits et obligations du Gouvernement ottoman en ce qui concerne les concessions de chemin de fer.

Les provinces cédées conserveront notamment à leur charge les garanties kilométriques afférentes aux lignes existant sur leur territoire.

XI.

Dans le cas où le monopole de la Régie coïntéressée des Tabacs de l'Empire ottoman, qui expire d'ailleurs prochainement, ne serait pas maintenu, il y aurait lieu à indemnité envers cette société de la part des États alliés.

XII.

Les mesures envisagées pour la protection des porteurs vis-à-vis des États alliés n'excluent pas la nécessité pour le Gouvernement ottoman, en sa qualité de principal débiteur, de fournir de son côté des garanties additionnelles aux porteurs étrangers.

[50216] No. 605.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 29.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, November 21, 1912.

THE Servian chargé d'affaires informed me to-day that his Government had decided to give the consuls in the territory occupied by Servian troops the rights which they had before, including correspondence in cypher and by sealed letter with their Governments. He hoped that this would be satisfactory.

I said that I thought it would be satisfactory. Our attitude in Turkey was the same as our attitude in Tripoli after the Italian occupation: We did not interfere with military measures, but regarded everything as provisional until the settlement after the war.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50217] No. 606.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 30.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, November 21, 1912.

THE Servian chargé d'affaires informed me to-day that the Servian Government had given permission to a functionary of the Austrian Foreign Office to go to Prisrend in order to enquire into what had happened to the Austrian consul there. The military authorities had had to take action when they occupied Prisrend owing to the hostile action of the Austrian consul, who had incited the Turks and Albanians to continue their resistance. In addition to this, shots had been fired from the roof of the Austrian consulate. The Servian Government had complained at the time at the Austrian Foreign Office. The matter had not been put in a proper light by the Austrian newspapers.

I said that I had not been aware that the Servians had originally lodged a complaint as to the consul; but, in any case, I was very glad that the matter was in a fair way to be settled. It would be a great pity if an incident of this sort, which was quite apart from other questions, was not settled satisfactorily.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50218] No. 607.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 31.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, November 21, 1912.

THE Servian chargé d'affaires informed me to-day of the communication made by Austria in Belgrade, respecting Servian access to the Adriatic. Austria said that she could not allow Servia access to the Adriatic through Albania, but she was very sympathetic to Servia, and it was a proof of this sympathy that Austrian troops had not been mobilised when Servia entered the sanjak. Austria suggested various methods of getting economic outlets for Servia; and these, as described by the

chargé d'affaires to me, corresponded with what you have reported. M. Pashitch had replied that the discussion should be postponed till a later period, when the results of the war were definite. He asked my opinion of this reply, as he feared that still sharper steps might be taken by Austria.

I said that it seemed to me a quite proper answer, if it implied that everything done during the war was to be regarded as provisional.

The chargé d'affaires said that he thought this must of necessity be so; for instance, territory gained one day in a war might be lost on another.

I said I thought that, if M. Pashitch's reply was understood in this sense, the Austrian Government would accept it.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[49883] No. 608.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 23.)

(No. 202.)
Vienna, November 20, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 194 of the 9th November I have the honour to report that the Austrian Delegation commenced its plenary sittings on the 15th November at Budapest in order to discuss the foreign estimates.

The reporter of the Committee, Marquis Bacquehem, after summarising the three days' debate in committee, stated that Austria-Hungary was prepared to examine every question that arose with entire absence of prejudice and in a spirit of good-will towards the Balkan States. The only reserve made by the Dual Monarchy was that her great interests should not suffer. He closed his short speech with an appeal to the members of the Delegation to facilitate in every way the difficult and responsible task of Count Berchtold in combining the desire of the country for peace with the protection of her interests so necessary to the welfare of all.

The Socialist leader, Dr. Ellenbogen, observed that the great obstacle to the maintenance of good relations with the Balkan States was the opposition of the agrarians to a reasonable commercial treaty. He declared that Austria's mistaken foreign policy had only ended in driving Servia into the arms of Russia. Although the claim of the Albanians to the independence of their country could not in justice be denied, it was not one for which German, Slav, or Italian blood should be shed. He concluded with an earnest appeal for peace.

Count Luetzow, ex-ambassador at Rome, criticised Austro-Hungarian policy towards Servia of late years, but repelled the attacks on Count Berchtold in respect of his attitude to the actual crisis. The greater part of his speech was, however devoted to an expression of satisfaction at the good relations existing between Vienna and Rome, and of regret that the Italian University question had not been settled. After proclaiming the necessity for Austria-Hungary of a strong fleet, he concluded by an expression of confidence in Count Berchtold's foreign policy and of reproof for the socialist demonstrations in favour of "peace at any price." Such demonstrations were, he declared, an actual danger to the cause of peace.

Herr Tomaschek, a Czech Socialist, declared that it would be madness for Austria-Hungary to make war for the sake of preventing a Servian port on the Adriatic, which could not do her any harm, and the refusal of which would only make Servia more dependent on Russia than ever.

The Czech leader, Dr. Kramarz, in a lengthy speech, said that no one could be more loyal than himself in defence of the interests of Austria-Hungary, but he must be convinced that they were vital and not imaginary ones. After warning the Balkan States against presumptuousness, Dr. Kamarz stated that they must be permitted to aim at complete independence. Turning to the question of Albania he enquired whether the preservation of its autonomy was worth going to war about. He warned his hearers that an Austro-Italian protectorate over Albania could only lead to trouble in the Balkans, and urged that if Albania was to be independent under control, it must be under an international control. As to the Servian harbour on the Adriatic, he admitted categorically that it must not be a war-harbour or naval base, that was, he said, a vital point for Austria-Hungary on which he wished the Servians to realise that their friends the Austrian Slavs were firmly determined. He could, however, see no reason

why Servia should not have a purely commercial port on the Albanian coast. To refuse this and to insist on an independent Albania would result in an unsatisfied condition which would prevent the Balkan settlement from being a really permanent one. To bring about such a settlement was, he concluded, the highest interest of Austria-Hungary, who had no more loyal subjects than himself and his fellow-Slavs.

On the following day speeches were made by the representatives of no less than seven distinct parties. Dr. Masaryk, who spoke on behalf of the Czech Liberals, has recently been in Belgrade, and his words were therefore awaited with great interest after the opportunity he had had of learning the feeling in Servia. He spoke very strongly against the idea of an European war on the ground of a Servian harbour on the Adriatic, a circumstance the importance of which was, he said, exaggerated by both Austria-Hungary and Servia; the fear of Russia using it as a naval base was, he said, groundless, and might be aroused quite as justifiably by a Montenegrin harbour. As for Albania, Austria-Hungary would do well to consider that question in a cooler manner; to preserve Albanian independence would only mean the preservation of a portion of Turkey. He concluded with an appeal for better commercial relations with Servia in the future, and for a recognition of the special interests of the South Slavs in the Monarchy. There was, he declared, no reason why they should not be just as good Austrians as the German-speaking section of the community.

Herr Seidel, a German agrarian, protested against the socialist peace demonstrations as endangering the cause of peace, against the pro-serb policy of various Austrian Slav politicians as encouraging the Servians in groundless hopes, and finally against the hostility shown to Germany by the Polish party. Party disputes must, he declared, vanish in order that the Monarchy might exert its united influence in favour of peace.

Dr. Smodlaka, a Croatian, emphasised the national relationship between his countrymen and the Servians, and warned Austria-Hungary that hostility to the aspirations of the latter would only end in the loss to Austria of the commercial advantages which other Powers would obtain in the Balkans. The danger to Austria did not lie in an independent Servia but in the oppressive policy of the Magyars, whom the Croatians now realised to be their worst foes. Dr. Smodlaka warned the Austrian Government, in an impassioned tirade against Hungary, that the Magyar tyranny must now be swept away as the Turkish had been.

Herr Seidl, a German Liberal, warmly defended the Triple Alliance and expressed his conviction that Germany's support on the Balkan question would not fail when the moment came for Austria-Hungary to demand it. If Servia desired merely an outlet for her commerce, some arrangement might be come to, but Austria-Hungary must be ready to defend her vital interests with the most resolute action, in order to ensure herself a "place in the sun" and the freedom of trade routes in the Balkans.

The Czech Socialist, Dr. Smeral, protested strongly against the idea of a war, and also against the system of oppression in Croatia. He observed that the internal *status quo* of Austria-Hungary would soon be in the same condition as the *status quo* in the Balkans.

Dr. Schoepfer, a Tyrolese priest and a member of the Christian Socialist party, welcomed the improvement in the relations between Austria and Italy, which he hoped would penetrate to all classes of the population. This, he said, would be particularly welcome to the inhabitants of the Tyrol, who were anxious to live on friendly terms with their neighbours. The Italian population of that Province were, he declared, not irredentist; those on the frontier were the most Austrian of all. Dr. Schoepfer concluded by an appeal for peace and for good commercial relations with Servia, while observing at the same time that Austria-Hungary must be armed and prepared to defend her interests.

The Ruthenian, Herr Lewycki, protested strongly against the Russophil propaganda in Galicia, which he maintained was an attempt by Russia to prepare the way for occupation of that province and which would become a serious danger unless the Austrian Government insisted on better treatment of the Ruthenes by the Poles.

On the 18th November the debate was opened by Count Latour, a Conservative member of the Austrian Upper Chamber, who expressed considerable doubt as to the wisdom of so detailed a discussion of foreign affairs as had been indulged in by the Delegation at the present critical moment. Certain expressions of opinion which had occurred in the course of that discussion, might, he feared, create a mistaken impression abroad as to the united character of Austro-Hungarian opinion in favour of the Triple Alliance. He expressed the conviction that strength of the Austria-Hungary's position would lead to a peaceful solution of the crisis, more especially as her policy had been

conclusively shown to be opposed to any territorial expansion on her own account. After emphasising the necessity that Austria-Hungary should enforce her moderate minimum of demands with all the means in her power, he observed that the Dual Monarchy would have to be prepared for some time to come for all eventualities, as the new situation in the Balkans could not fail to lead to many struggles and conflicts. It was therefore necessary that Austria-Hungary's armaments should be kept at a high standard of perfection. Count Latour concluded his speech by enquiring of Count Berchtold whether he had any information as to the reports respecting the Austro-Hungarian Consul Prochaska at Prizrend. (It is understood that this question was put by arrangement with Count Berchtold, who was anxious to have an opportunity of making a statement on a matter which has profoundly stirred public opinion in Austria-Hungary).

Herr Korosec, a South Slav delegate, expressed on behalf of his compatriots an earnest desire for the solution of all the questions at issue and for the creation of close and friendly relations between the Dual Monarchy and the Balkan States. He emphasised the loyalty and affection of the South Slavs to the throne and the dynasty.

Herr Hruban, a Catholic Czech, expressed complete confidence in the conduct of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy by Count Berchtold. The Czechs were, he declared, unanimous in the desire that the interests of the Dual Monarchy should suffer no loss whatever, and that at the same time peace should be maintained. He begged the Austro-Hungarian Government, in view of the Dual Monarchy's protectorate over the Albanian Catholics, to see that their interests and the rights of all Catholics in the Balkans were properly safeguarded. This would, he pointed out, be particularly necessary if the orthodox hierarchies of Bulgaria and Greece were to be united.

Her Hehner, the Abbot of Topl, warmly welcomed the attitude taken up by the Austro-Hungarian Government towards Albanian freedom. The separation of that country from Turkey would, he said, probably lead to the adoption of Christianity by the whole of its population.

Herr Pittoni, an Italian-speaking member of the Socialist party, explained that his party were opposed to war because they did not believe that the Dual Monarchy's situation as regards Servia could be settled by that means, or that the independence of Albania was a sufficient reason for a war. He warmly supported the necessity for better relations between Austria-Hungary and Italy, declaring that the number of "irredentist" Italians under Austrian rule was diminishing rapidly.

Dr. Leo, a prominent member of the Polish party, observed that the recent amazing Slav victories necessitated a complete revision of Austro-Hungarian policy towards the South Slavs within the borders of the Dual Monarchy. Austro-Servian relations must, he declared, be either openly hostile or openly friendly, there could be no middle way between annexation and an amicable understanding. He urged that the existence of an important Slav State on the southern boundaries of the Monarchy must necessitate better treatment of the South Slavs in Croatia, and pointed to Bosnia-Herzegovina as a proof that the South Slavs, if given free political institutions, were quite prepared to live peaceably under Austro-Hungarian rule.

Dr. Leo then spoke in grave tones of the situation of the Poles in Prussia. He observed that his nation was the only important Slav nation in Europe which had remained uninfluenced by pan-Slav or pan-Russian ideas, and he therefore found it all the more incomprehensible that so objectionable a policy should be carried on towards the Poles by Austria's ally. It was a matter of painful regret to his compatriots that the leaders of Austria-Hungary's foreign policy should have failed up to the present to convince the German Government that their action was highly prejudicial to the maintenance of the Austro-German alliance, and could only end in the refusal of the Austrian Poles to support a foreign policy based on that alliance. "As citizens of the Austrian State," said Dr. Leo, "and thus as allies of the German Empire, we raise a warning appeal for the abandonment of a policy which injures the most sacred rights of mankind, which shakes the very basis of justice, and which is digging an impassable cleft between the two Christian peoples of Central Europe." The only reason which prevented the Polish party from showing their disgust at the Prussian Expropriation Law by voting against the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary was their feeling of loyalty to the Emperor and the conviction that it was their duty in this serious international crisis to show that loyalty in the highest degree. The Austrian Poles made, he said, this sacrifice to their country and their Emperor in the conviction that His Imperial Majesty would, in his wisdom and goodness, understand and appreciate their difficult position, and would bring about a situation which would bring the feelings of the Poles into harmony with the demands of the foreign policy of the Monarchy. "We have," he concluded, amidst the cheers of his compatriots, "the duty and the right to

demand that in future our allies will consider the feelings of those who offer their loyal assistance in the moment of danger."

(Some sensation has been aroused by the resignation of Count Skarbek, a Polish delegate, of his mandate. Count Skarbek had decided to make a speech opposing the passing of the foreign estimates on the ground of the ill-treatment by Austria's ally, Germany, of her Polish subjects, in which he intended to speak very openly on the subject of the Prussian Expropriation Law. The remainder of the Polish party were opposed to these tactics, and represented to Count Skarbek that he could not act in this way without running counter to the wishes of his party, whereupon he resigned his mandate rather than remain in the Delegations unable to express his views. It is understood that Count Berchtold and the remaining Common Ministers used all their influence with the Polish party to induce them to prevent an outburst of anti-German opinion at this moment of international complications. It is also stated that Count Berchtold promised the Polish party, in return for their compliance, to intervene at Berlin in favour of a milder application of the Expropriation Law.)

Herr Wolf, a German Radical, protested strongly against any admission of Servia to the Adriatic as fatal to the interests of Austria-Hungary. He then attacked Dr. Kramarz and the Slav parties in Austria for their disloyal attitude in these critical times, and warned the Germans of Austria against the dangers of the trialistic idea, which would now certainly gain ground as a result of the Slav victories in the Balkans. Herr Wolf urged that the Germans and Magyars should combine against any change in the constitution of the Monarchy, though he appealed to the latter for better treatment of the Germans in Hungary.

The speech of Count Berchtold, which followed, is reported in a separate despatch.

Herr Sedlak, a Czech agrarian, expressed the conviction that with a little good-will peace would be preserved and friendly relations established between Austria-Hungary and Servia in spite of the questions of Albania and the Adriatic port. He warned Austria-Hungary against constituting herself a kind of European gendarme over Albania, and urged that commercial relations with the Balkans should in future not be regarded from a purely Hungarian view, as in the past. He concluded with an assertion of Czech loyalty: their opposition was only directed against the various Austro-Hungarian Governments, never against Austria-Hungary herself.

Dr. von Langenhan protested strongly on behalf of the German Liberals against Dr. Leo's utterances in respect of the Polish policy of the Prussian Government. International policy should not be made dependent on purely internal matters which concerned only one part of the German Empire. He expressed the hope that the Polish party would soon resume their old policy. After speaking warmly in support of the claims of Roumania, Dr. von Langenhan urged that Austria-Hungary should insist with all the force at her disposal on the preservation of her interests in the Balkans.

The anti-Prussian language of the next speaker, Dr. Bialy, a Pole, was so violent as to call forth excited protests from the German delegates. Dr. Bialy went so far as to say that even savages had never been guilty of such action as the Prussians in Posen, a statement which was reproved by the president as contravening the principles of international courtesy. Dr. Bialy declared that only his loyalty to his party and to the Throne had restrained him from voting for the rejection of the estimates. He trusted that the sense of justice of the German people would prevent any further execution of the Polish Expropriation Law.

Herr Greeul, a member of the Roumanian party, protested strongly against the treatment of the Croatians by Hungary. He strongly emphasised the loyalty to the Throne of the Roumanians in the Dual Monarchy, but he observed that those who lived under Austrian rule enjoyed a far more favourable position than the Roumanians under the Hungarian Crown. The confidence which the Roumanians reposed in their Emperor would, he declared, make them ready to take up arms at once should His Imperial Majesty order it.

Herr Udrzal, a Czech agrarian, spoke in favour of an Adriatic port for Servia as being in the interests of Austrian commerce. A Servian port on the Ægean Sea would, on the other hand, only result in directing Austrian trade towards Budapest.

Dr. Kramarz, the Czech leader, expressed his admiration of the attitude adopted by the Polish party. He urged the Austro-Hungarian Government to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards Servia, though he did not attempt to justify any such violation of international law as the alleged ill-treatment by the Servian authorities of Austro-Hungarian consuls.

The last speaker in the debate, Dr. von Kozlowski, a Pole, declared that the

proceedings of the Prussian Government towards their Polish subjects was incapable of being described in parliamentary language.

The reporter of the Foreign Committee, Marquis Bacquehem, then concluded the debate with a long and interesting speech, to which I have the honour to draw your particular attention, as on these occasions Marquis Bacquehem is the mouthpiece of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with whom he arranges beforehand the terms of his speech.

The Marquis began by expressing his personal opinion that he had never been convinced by the arguments that it would have been proper for Austria-Hungary to show a "désintéressement absolu," to use the terms of a well-known formula, towards the fate of Albania; or by those arguments which were intended to prove that the principle "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples" should stop short at the frontiers of Albania. Marquis Bacquehem spoke most warmly in favour of the independence of that country as being both a matter of importance to Austria-Hungary and an act of justice to the brave inhabitants of Albania. He protested strongly against Dr. Kramarz's attacks on Austro-Hungary foreign policy as following a "prestige" direction. These attacks were, he said, not only particularly regrettable and unsuitable at the present critical moment, but were also wholly unjustified. The moderation of Austria-Hungary had been highly appreciated in all quarters, even by the Powers of the Triple *Entente*, and in particular by the English press.

Marquis Bacquehem then entered upon a glowing eulogy of the Triple Alliance, probably with the intention of effacing the unpleasant impression created by the anti-German speeches of the Polish party. He referred to the faultless attitude of Germany in support of her ally and to the unbounded confidence which existed between the two countries. He also expressed satisfaction at the friendly attitude of the Italian people and press. Marquis Bacquehem took this opportunity of administering a sharp rebuke to the French press, whose attitude was, he observed, not so friendly as it had been during the annexation crisis. "Possibly," he observed, "certain influences in Paris, which I do not need to describe more precisely, may have contributed to this." On the other hand, the English press had, he said, shown a most welcome appreciation of Austria-Hungary's interests in the Balkans. Refering again to the "désintéressement" proposal, Marquis Bacquehem declared emphatically that the surest method of maintaining peace was to make it perfectly clearly understood everywhere that the Dual Monarchy would defend her vital interests with all the power at her disposal. He considered that the situation was at present decidedly better, and expressed the hope that the Servian Government would now return to the usages of international law and diplomacy, and would no longer prevent the unimpeded intercourse of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs with its consular officials. He concluded his speech with an expression of confidence in the Minister for Foreign Affairs, now burdened with so grave a responsibility.

After a short debate on the details of the measure, the foreign estimates were passed by the Austrian Delegation on the 19th November.

The foreign estimates were also passed on the same day by the Hungarian Delegation, which (in contrast to the Austrian) devoted only one day to the discussion in plenary sitting of the foreign budget. I shall not report the various speeches in full as they were on much the same lines as those in the Austrian delegation. There were, however, far fewer expressions of sympathy for the Slav cause, and no speaker in the Hungarian Delegation advocated the granting to Servia of an Adriatic port or the refusal of independence to Albania. Even the patriarch of the Orthodox Church in Hungary, who emphasised the loyalty to the Crown of the Serbs in Hungary, went no further than to express the earnest hope that the Minister for Foreign Affairs would find a means of preserving the interests of Austria-Hungary without having resort to war while Count Pejacsevich declared on behalf of the Croatians his entire approval of Count Berchtold's policy of permanent friendship with the Balkans combined with the preservation of Austria-Hungary's vital interests. He urged the construction of a line from Uvac to Mitrovitza to connect Croatia with the Ægean.

The remaining speakers dwelt on the fact that Austria-Hungary had become, since the collapse of Turkey, the only Great Power in the Balkans, and on the necessity of defending her interests with resolution and of repelling with energy any infractions of international law which the Servian treatment of Austro-Hungarian consular officials might have involved. All, however, expressed the hope that peace would be preserved, and that friendly relations with Servia would eventually be established. Austria-Hungary's benevolent attitude towards the Balkan States was constantly referred to by the speakers, none of whom adopted anything in the nature of a provocative tone.

After the debate, Count Berchtold made a statement almost precisely similar to that which he delivered before the Austrian Delegation on the 18th November (reported in my despatch No. 204 of the 19th November). The only difference was that in the Hungarian statement his Excellency made a reference to Servia which did not occur in the Austrian Delegation. "It is," he said, "our intention to live on friendly and neighbourly terms with Servia in all matters. We trust that the attitude of the Servian kingdom will render possible the fulfilment of this intention."

The calm and moderate tone with which Count Berchtold has referred in the Delegations to Austria-Hungary's relations with Servia, and to the incident of the Austro-Hungarian consul at Prizrend, is very generally praised by the Viennese press.

The Austro-Hungarian Delegations, having passed the foreign estimates and thereby testified their confidence in the Minister for Foreign Affairs, have now reached the conclusion of their labours so far as the consideration of Austria-Hungary's foreign policy is concerned.

In the course, however, of the discussion by the Austrian Delegation of Bosnian affairs on the morning of the 20th November, Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, intervened in the debate in order to make a statement with regard to the Austro-Hungarian consul in Prizrend. Baron Macchio stated that he was instructed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was prevented by urgent business from being present, to inform the Delegation that a telegram had been received on the previous evening from the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade to the effect that the Servian Government had given their consent to the dispatch of an official from the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Prizrend, in order to investigate the whole incident. The possibility was thus provided, Baron Macchio added, for a direct communication with Consul Prochaska, and thus, he hoped, for the treatment, in an "objective" manner, of the whole matter. A similar communication was made in the Hungarian Delegation, where Count Wickenburg stated on behalf of Count Berchtold that the Austrian official in question would start that afternoon for Belgrade and Prizrend. These statements were received by both Delegations with much satisfaction.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[49704] No. 609.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 205.)
Sir,
Vienna, November 19, 1912.

IN spite of official optimism on the subject, there are not wanting signs that the sympathy felt by the Slav peoples of the Dual Monarchy for the cause of the Balkan States is in places assuming a somewhat warmer tone than is consonant with strict loyalty to Austro-Hungarian interests.

This is particularly the case in Dalmatia, where the demonstrations in favour of the Balkan States have gradually assumed a character so unpatriotic that the provincial authorities at Zara have been obliged to take the extreme measure of dissolving the municipalities of Spalato and Sebenico, a step which has aroused great sensation and no little opposition in South Slav circles. A demonstration of protest at Spalato against this measure was only prevented by force.

Although the ruling parties in Sebenico and Spalato are of entirely contradictory political views—the one being democratic and anti-clerical, and the other clerical and conservative—their attitude to the events in the Balkans has been identical. Steamers conveying Montenegrin and Greek reservists to their respective countries were greeted with emphatic demonstrations of sympathy at which the Servian and Montenegrin national anthems were sung; while the Russian Red Cross mission received a particularly warm ovation on its passage south. On the fall of Salonica the municipal flag was flown at Spalato, and a large demonstration took place at which the Balkan Monarchs were the subject of cheers and cries were heard in favour of the liberation of of all the South Slavs. The tendencies of these demonstrations were described by the authorities at Zara in the decree ordering the dissolution of the two municipalities as "incompatible with the highest interests of the State." This was also the reason given for the measure by the Austrian Minister of the Interior at a conference held in

Vienna yesterday between his Excellency and the Dalmatian members of the Austrian Parliament, who declared that the affair had been greatly exaggerated, and that the South Slavs in Dalmatia were perfectly loyal to the Dual Monarchy.

Another symptom of the pro-Servian attitude adopted by the Austrian Slavs may be seen in the memorandum addressed to the Austrian Minister of Commerce by the Chamber of Commerce of Prague, which sets forth the view that a Servian port on the Adriatic coast would be in no way prejudicial to Austrian commerce, but would rather be a benefit, as it would provide a sea-route for the transport of Austrian exports to Servia. The Chamber begs the Minister of Commerce to lay this view before the Minister for Foreign Affairs, pointing out that it is eminently desirable in the interests of Austrian commerce to win the friendship of the Balkan States.

The "Neue Freie Presse" comments adversely on this memorandum, observing that it is Servia's political, not commercial, ambitions that Austria-Hungary objects to, and remarking that although the memorandum from Prague professes to deal with purely commercial considerations, its political motive is clear to all.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[49689] No. 610.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 22.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November 21, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 21st November, relative to movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 610.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 21, 1912.*

REAR-ADMIRAL, "Hibernia," sailed for Malta. Ships in company, "Hibernia," "Britannia," "Commonwealth," and "Dominion."

Enclosure 2 in No. 610.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

November 21, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)
"CARLO ALBERTO" (Italian) arrived Smyrna.

Enclosure 3 in No. 610.

Vice-Consul Keyser to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Constantza, November 21, 1912.*

"MIDHAT PASHA" arrived to embark war material. Turkish transport (late "Oldenburg") embarking horses.

Enclosure 4 in No. 610.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 21, 1912.*

"HUSSAR" arrived and will leave with mails for Piræus to-day. 3rd Battle Squadron left Besika for Malta. "Good Hope" and "Dartmouth" remain. "Cumberland" will arrive Gibraltar 28th instant. Have ordered "Inflexible" arrive here 25th instant, and after transfer of flag "Good Hope" will sail for England, calling Malta.

A Greek submarine arrived Tenedos yesterday, and this morning proceeded to entrance of Dardanelles.

[49811] No. 611.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 22.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November 22, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 21st and 22nd instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 611.

Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 21, 1912.*

"TENNESSEE" and "Montana" arrived.

Enclosure 2 in No. 611.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 22, 1912.*

"BARHAM" reports all quiet Syrian coast. Report from consul, Adana, that state of affairs improved. Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, informed.

[49780] No. 612.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 22.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November 22, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated 21st instant, relative to the position of affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean, &c.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 612.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 21, 1912.

"BARHAM" reports from Alexandretta, and I have informed Commander-in-chief as follows :—

"Situation unchanged, and do not anticipate trouble unless there is any outbreak at Constantinople. Christian population increasingly anxious owing to feast of Bairam."

[49767] No. 613.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 662.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November* 21, 1912.

MY telegram No. 654 of 19th November.

British vice-consul at Adana reports situation greatly improved by publication of telegram from Sheikh-ul-Islam enjoining Mussulmans to respect rights of non-Mussulmans. Telegram was addressed to all authorities in all vilayets of Arabia and Anatolia, and I am sending translation by post.

[49672] No. 614.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 663.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, November* 21, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 1043 of 19th November : Cholera.

Commanding officer is satisfied that he has sufficient supplies both on shore and on board ship for any probable requirements.

[49768] No. 615.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 664.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November* 21, 1912.

MY telegram No. 660 of yesterday.

An official declaration has been published stating that Bulgarian Government have communicated conditions of armistice, and that Council of Ministers consider them inacceptable. But as commander-in-chief is authorised to negotiate armistice, he will discuss terms with Bulgarian plenipotentiaries. It adds that commander-in-chief has been ordered to continue military operations until reasonable and moderate conditions have been proposed.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[49783] No. 616.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 665.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, November* 21, 1912.

FOLLOWING from consular officer, Mitylene, to-day :—

"Greek fleet gave two hours' notice. After consultation between authorities and consular body was decided to ask twenty-four hours' delay. Commander accorded only one and half to occupy town without resistance, vali promising to retire troops in interior island. Landing will take place half-past twelve. Populace quiet."

[49769] No. 617.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 666.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November* 21, 1912.

MILITARY attaché writes privately, dated 7 A.M., 20th instant :—

"For last three days Bulgarians have been bombarding the line, but not effected much progress as yet. Unless weather becomes very bad, I think that army here will resist for some time yet."

[49809] No. 618.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 667.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 22, 1912.

FOLLOWING from consul at Alexandretta this morning :—

"According to information obtained, malevolent attitude of Turkish population in Dorsyol district compelled Armenians to concentrate into Dorsyol, fearing an unexpected attack ; anxiety prevails there.

"Situation at Alexandretta apparently calm, notwithstanding hostile feeling of Moslem villagers of this district, which, according to reliable private information, are checked by presence of men-of-war."

[49812] No. 619.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 669.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 22, 1912.

FOLLOWING from Trebizond, dated to-day :—

"Vali has just informed me that arrival of Russian ship from Sebastopol has been officially announced.

"As public tranquillity is assured, such arrival is quite uncalled for."

[49813] No. 620.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 446.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, November* 22, 1912.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs entirely concurs in the views expressed in your telegrams No. 391 of 21st November to Berlin and No. 116 of 21st November to Belgrade. He thinks that discussions between the Powers should have private and informal character, and that, while three points mentioned by you should form basis of such discussion, any Power should be free to raise others if it wished. Russia will not raise question of Constantinople provided that it remains Turkish.

His Excellency said that now that peace negotiations have broken down he proposed urging the Bulgarians not to try to force Chatalja lines, but to concentrate on siege of Adrianople. He did not believe that Turkish army was capable of taking offensive, and peace might be concluded on fall of Adrianople.

His Excellency seemed rather to hope that question of Servian port might be arranged on lines suggested by French President of Council to Austro-Hungarian and German Ambassadors in Paris. He is also strongly in favour of Italian proposal that future autonomous Albania should be placed under some sort of international control.

[49784] No. 621.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 168. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 21, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 146 of 13th November.

M. Danef told Austrian Minister yesterday that Archduke Francis Ferdinand had informed him that Austro-Hungarian Government, although objecting to Servian access to Adriatic, would not make it a *casus belli*. Austrian Minister told Prime Minister last night that he had telegraphed this statement to his Government, and he had been instructed to say that M. Danef had misunderstood His Imperial Highness. Prime Minister replied that these were the very words used by Archduke.

Prime Minister is annoyed at M. Danef's indiscretion.

Greek Minister has informed Bulgarian Government that the Greek Government will be thoroughly united with their allies on the matter, even to the point of war.

Both Greek and Bulgarian Governments realise that, if Servian access to the Adriatic is stopped, compensation must be given in another direction whereby their own interests would be vitally affected.

[49817] No. 622.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 169.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 22, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 166 of 20th November : Mediation proposal.

In view of increasing cholera amongst Bulgarian troops, which is more feared than losses at Chatalja, there is a certain tendency in Government circles to modify armistice conditions imposed on Turkey, in order to render them more acceptable.

Eight cholera specialists have arrived here from Germany and Austria.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[49818] No. 623.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 170. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 22, 1912.*

SERVIAN access to Adriatic.

I hear that all the Servian treasure and valuables and all State archives, &c., not in absolute use have been moved to fortress at Nish, with a view of their being handed over to Bulgarian Government in case of any overt act on the part of Austria.

Above information received direct from Bulgarian Minister of Finance, who was at Nish recently. No great efforts would be made to defend Belgrade, but allied forces have already arranged their plans. They would defend the sanjak and call upon Russia for assistance.

[49819] No. 624.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 171. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, November 22, 1912.*

THE situation, after reading the telegram sections up to the 12th instant inclusive, seems to me a serious one. It was from a knot of able and determined men in Belgrade that the driving force for this war came. It was this group which persuaded the

Bulgarian Cabinet in favour of the present alliances, and it was by the Cabinet that King Ferdinand was talked over. It was chiefly in order to overthrow the Ottoman Empire in Europe that Bulgaria waged war, while the Servian object was largely to obtain access to the Adriatic, a real war of independence thus resulting. I believe that, unless force is employed, all attempts to divide the allies on the question of access to the Adriatic are destined to failure. They are bound by their secret treaty to support one another in case of attack, and I do not believe that menaces will suffice to stop them.

The attitude of the German Government has been, so far, perfectly frank. If required to do so, she will support her allies. The Balkan allies have been informed by Italy that she will support the policy of Austria, although the latter has made certain reservations, which I will report at a later date. At the same time, His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome is informed by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs that it is unthinkable that the great Powers will embark on a war for the possession of a small port on the Adriatic. Why does his Excellency not attempt to persuade the Austrian Government to accept another solution of this question if he is sincerely desirous of peace and really holds these views?

As regards the policy of Austria, both the language of the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and that of the Italian representative at Belgrade have given Servia to understand that she must yield on the point of access to the Adriatic, while, on the other hand, we have the statement of M. Danef to the Cabinet, in which, speaking by the mouth of the Heir-Apparent, he said that Servian access to the Adriatic will not be considered by Austria as a *casus belli*. It has also been hinted to the Balkan allies that both Italy and Austria will send a man-of-war to Durazzo, if that port is occupied. Should this happen, another Agadir will confront Europe. No effect has been produced so far by these threats. Alessio has been taken by Servia, and her troops, if they have not already occupied Durazzo, are hurrying towards it. There is great danger that the Russian Government may be swept off their feet by popular feeling should Austria take any overt action.

The Russian Parliament, which opens shortly, will be ultra-Slav in its views, and, whatever may be the personal wishes of M. Sazonof, he will have to count with it. He will have to march with the stream or become engulfed.

The situation does not appear to be realised by the French Government. Whilst making attractive speeches for the delectation of Europe, the president of the Council informs His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris that the Servians will obtain, in any case, much more than could have been deemed possible in the first instance, and that they have "swollen heads." He is incorrect in both these statements. The question was fully discussed before the declaration of war, and a firm stand against the demands of Italy and Austria was decided on by the allies.

I venture to hope, with great deference, that the French Ambassador in London may be put in possession of this explanation of the situation. As in 1909, the Triple Alliance are endeavouring to force on the allies, before the conclusion of the war, a policy already formed.

[49810] No. 625.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 173.)
(Telegraphic. R. *Sophia, November 22, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 167 of 20th November : Mediation proposals.

Bulgarian delegates have been appointed to negotiate with Nazim Pasha and Turkish delegates.

They are M. Danef, Generals Savof and Fitchef, with two secretaries.

The party are proceeding to Tchataldja.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[49820] No. 626.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 174.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, November 22, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 173 of to-day.

I have just seen the Prime Minister. He states that if the Ottoman Government accept armistice terms now the Bulgarian forces will not proceed to Constantinople, but that if fighting was renewed they would most certainly do so.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[49805] No. 627.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 153.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November 22, 1912.*

I LEARN on good authority that, at interviews which have taken place during the last few days at Budapest between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the German and Italian Ambassadors, it has been decided that the Triple Alliance Powers shall propose to the other Great Powers that the concert of Europe should publicly announce that they are decided to reserve to themselves the right to revise any peace conditions which the Balkan League may have concluded with Turkey. I understand that definite approval of Italy to this plan is expected here to-night.

Russian Ambassador, to whom I have communicated this information, approves unreservedly of the proposal.

[49822] No. 628.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 154.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November 22, 1912.*

MILITARY attaché informs me that he hears on good authority that orders have been given to mobilise three army corps, two for Galicia, one for Bosnia. Details will be sent later. Many reservists left by Northern Railway last night, and further drafts will leave to-night.

[49823] No. 629.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 155.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November 22, 1912.*

RUMOURS have been current that Triple Alliance are contemplating a naval demonstration along the Albanian coast as a result of Servian occupation of ports. I am informed that Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs declared yesterday to a person of importance at Budapest that there was absolutely no truth in these rumours.

[49824] No. 630.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 156.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November 22, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"I have received information from two excellent and independent sources that orders have been given quietly to mobilise three army corps, one for Bosnia, and two for Galicia. Situation is now as follows:—

"15th Sarajevo and 16th Ragusa Corps are practically mobilised, companies 250 strong; 80 battalions in Bosnia-Herzegovina; 7th Corps Temesvar and 13th Corps Agram have called up three classes of reservists; 1st Cracow Corps, 10th [? Prague], and 11th Corps Lemberg have all been strengthened.

"Troops in uniform and plain clothes left Northern Railway station last night, and more will leave to-night.

"Further details will be sent when available."

[49770] No. 631.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 77.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 21, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 66 of 18th November.

According to latest official reports, the Turkish troops would seem to have broken through in disorder at Monastir, and only 5,000 made prisoners.

[49815] No. 632.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 79.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Belgrade, November 22, 1912.*

KING PETER returns to Belgrade to-morrow.

[49690] No. 633.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 118.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, November 22, 1912.*

TOWN of Mitylene occupied yesterday. Turkish troops withdrawing to interior parts of island. Greeks in pursuit.

[49821] No. 634.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 162.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, November 22, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 393 of 21st November.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs thanks you for communicating conversation with Servian chargé d'affaires.

Subsequently he referred to your conversation with the German Ambassador, reported to me in your telegram No. 391 of 21st November. He said that his idea was that by means of discussions or conversations amongst themselves six Powers should know and agree upon various claims and reserves which each Power proposed to make when the war was finished and conditions of peace came to be discussed; complete accord amongst Powers with regard to points affecting their interests was absolutely necessary when the moment arrived, whether a conference took place or not.

Balkan States probably counted upon disunion amongst Powers for settling things entirely according to their own designs; it was therefore, he thought, absolutely necessary that six Powers should be able to present a fixed programme defining the limits within which those designs should be carried out. He agreed that points which you had mentioned were the most important on which Powers should come to a decision, though there were others, for instance, Bulgarian idea that fortifications on straits should be demolished, which would require attention. He added that question of islands was difficult, and said that it was one in which England might take initiative. He suggested, as regards some of them, solution might be found by making them autonomous under Greece, with provision that no Greek troops should be allowed on them nor Greek men-of-war in their harbours.

[49996] No. 635.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 739.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 22, 1912.*

THE French Ambassador informs me that French Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks it essential, to avoid misunderstandings, that a conference of delegates of the Powers should discuss the points at issue. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs had suggested that the Powers should come to an agreement as to what parts of the settlement could be left entirely to the Balkan States and what were the points on which the Powers must have their say.

I said that I thought French Minister for Foreign Affairs might reply to German Minister for Foreign Affairs that the quickest and most effective way of carrying out latter's suggestion would be by a conference of delegates of the Powers; the Ambassadors at the capital chosen might be the delegates. I observed that the conference should have before it the terms of peace of the Balkan States, but that possibly these might be formulated by the allies to Turkey even though the conditions of armistice were rejected.

[49997] No. 636.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1065.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 22, 1912.*

THE Turkish Ambassador told me this morning that the conditions which the Balkan allies had proposed for an armistice could not be accepted, but that discussions were still continuing in order to ascertain if the conditions first put forward would be modified. The Grand Vizier wished to point out that—

1. There was the possibility of the Bulgarians entering Constantinople, though the Grand Vizier did not consider such an eventuality at all probable. What would be the attitude of His Majesty's Government in that case?

2. The allies might insist on making a definitive treaty of peace with Turkey to the exclusion of the Great Powers. What would the latter do in such a contingency, as some had very important interests involved?

I told Tewfik Pasha, as my private and personal opinion, that (1) if the Bulgarians entered Constantinople the Powers would have to consult together as to their attitude; (2) if it were not found possible to come to terms as to the conditions of an armistice, the Turkish Government might leave the armistice on one side and ask the allies to formulate their conditions for peace. Should they do so, the Turkish Government could then communicate these conditions to the Great Powers for their consideration.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 399; Paris, No. 742; Rome, No. 536; St. Petersburgh, No. 1279; and Vienna, No. 392.)

[49604] No. 637.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Lamb.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 22, 1912.*

DID the Russian consul-general make any communication to the Greek authorities respecting the Ottoman Public Debt on 26th October, and, if so, what was the precise wording of the communication and in what capacity did he make it? A statement on the subject appears in "Times" of 22nd November.

[49519] No. 638.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Lamb.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 22, 1912.*

REPORT by telegraph if there have been extensive outrages committed on Salonica Jews since occupation.

[49563] No. 639.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 387.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 22, 1912.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF mentioned to Sir A. Nicolson on the 18th November the substance of a telegram which he had received from M. Sazonof relating, shortly, what his Excellency had said to the German and Austrian Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh in regard to San Giovanni di Medua, and on which your Excellency has reported more fully.

Sir A. Nicolson read to Count Benckendorff the telegrams which I have received from you on this subject, and gave Count Benckendorff the substance of what I had telegraphed to you. Count Benckendorff said that he would press on M. Sazonof to give the assurance as to the principle of an autonomous Albania of a reasonable size.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[49874] No. 640.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 176. Confidential.)
Sir, *Athens, November 14, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 173 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to report that at his reception this morning M. Coromilas told me that the Turkish resistance at Tchataldja was feeble, and that the Bulgarians would be in Constantinople in three or four days.

I asked what would happen next. His Excellency admitted that the principal difficulties would begin when the terms of peace came to be discussed. He had submitted to the allied Governments his plan for the internationalisation of Constantinople, but had not yet heard their views upon it. (The Bulgarian Minister, whom I saw afterwards, is strongly in favour of the scheme in principle, but I doubt if he knows the details.) I asked if the allies were agreed as to the division of the spoils. M. Coromilas answered that their appetites were increasing in proportion to the amount they swallowed, but that he had no fear of their falling out. The danger came from Austria, who was pressing Servia hard to give up the idea of an outlet on the Adriatic, and who had even told the King of Montenegro that he could not keep Scutari if he took it. Austria was trying to sow discord among the allies by suggesting to Servia that her proper outlet was at Salonica, that is, that she should claim territory which naturally fell to the share of either Greece or Bulgaria or both. Servia was not, however, going to fall into that trap.

The cry which Austria raised of "Albania for the Albanians" was specious, but the idea was unsound, and Austria knew it. Albania could not exist except in dependence upon some other Power, and Austria intended that Power to be herself. In that case he believed that Italy would demand Vallona, although she would prefer that Vallona should be allotted to Greece. As for Greece herself, she wanted Epirus and the Khimara district as far as Vallona, but none of Albania proper, which she was content to leave to Servia, who, to judge by the rapid way in which she obtained the submission of the Albanians during the present war, was quite capable of managing them.

The Greek press is naturally delighted with your declarations in the House of Commons and with Mr. Asquith's speech at the Mansion House. The retention of the

islands by Italy is, on the other hand, a source of much heartburning. I do not, however, see that their present occupation by Italy need be an obstacle to their eventual transfer to Greece under the definitive treaty of peace; and indeed it seems to me that those Governments which demur to the acquisition of them by a considerable naval Power might, by supporting an arrangement of that kind, be able to arrive at an earlier evacuation of them by Italy than is likely to take place if she is to retain them until she declares herself satisfied that the last Turkish soldier has quitted Libya.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[49875] No. 641.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 177.)
Sir, *Athens, November* 14, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a translation of an official report received from Arta by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and published to-day, relating to the burning and looting of a number of villages, and atrocities committed upon their inhabitants, by Turkish troops and Mussulman Albanians in Epirus. The anticipations of M. Coromilas, reported in my despatch No. 147 of the 18th October, have thus unfortunately been verified.

I have, &c,
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 641.

Official Report received from Arta, published by the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Arta, October 30 (*November* 12), 1912.

THE Turkish army, with Albanian bashi-bazouks, continue to make a desert of Epirus and to commit frightful and indescribable outrages. Thus a Turkish force of 700 infantry, 150 gendarmes, and 300 Turkish Albanians, under the command of the chief of the Yanina gendarmerie, committed a few days ago the following atrocities:—

Bringing with them a large quantity of spirits of wine, they entered Greek villages, and after looting them set them on fire. Besides the other villages about which I have already telegraphed to you, they looted and burnt the following:—Godivitsa, Firesiki, Petra, Mati, Boulytaneli. Most of the villages of the Yanina district are a heap of black ruins. There are many villages, such as Gotista (Megale), Krapsi, Syrakon, Fortosi, Koturtsi, &c., in the district of Malakassi, which have escaped being entirely burnt but which have been thoroughly looted. The inhabitants of all these villages have already fled to the hills and forests. About 6,000 women and children have taken refuge in caves near Yanina, and dare not leave them for fear of the Turkish troops. They are feeding on herbs and leaves of trees, and awaiting the arrival of the Greek army in order to leave their caves with safety. Many are dying. Another 1,800 souls have fled to the village of Chaliki, on Greek soil, having lost their all. In the villages of Megalo Gotitsa and Mikra Gotitsa, the inhabitants of which were caught before they had time to take refuge in the hills, the Turkish troops seized 25 of the more important villagers, including 2 priests, and cut them to pieces after torturing them. Unheard of savagery was shown to the priests especially. At the village of Demati, which was also mercilessly treated, the Turkish troops and Mussulman Albanians seized 12 women and girls, whom they impaled and frightfully mutilated after subjecting them to brutal outrage at the hands of a number of Turks.

Ten old men of the village of Prosgoli, who could not, owing to their age, get away with their fellow-villagers, were seized and suffered the death of martyrs. In several well-to-do villages heavy contributions have been extorted, and anyone who refuses to pay is killed. Thus the inhabitants of Metsovo are selling all they have in order to pay the sums demanded. One notable was forced to pay £T. 600, and another £T. 260. The latter subsequently died of fear owing to threats. Many officers of the

Turkish army of high and of low rank, as well as leaders of Mussulman Albanians, are laden with gold, and they send to their families the booty taken from the villages. The flocks of the Greek villages are sent to Tsamochoria. These outrages are but a part of the atrocities committed, because owing to the interruption of communications we have no details as to similar acts committed in other parts of Epirus. The Christian population is in despair.

[49876] No. 642.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 178.)
Sir, *Athens, November* 15, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch from the British delegate on the International Financial Commission, submitting for consideration questions connected with the collection of revenues assigned to the service of the Greek Debt in newly-occupied territory.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 642.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.

(No. 11.)
Sir, *International Financial Commission, Athens, November* 15, 1912.

THE Hellenic Government having already taken over the administration of various places occupied in Turkish territory, questions connected with the revenues assigned to the service of the gold loans are likely to arise, with regard to which I would be glad to learn the views of His Majesty's Government.

The questions are the following:—

1. Can the bondholders, who are largely interested in the increase of the revenue from stamps and from the monopolies established in regard to salt, petroleum, matches, playing-cards, and cigarette paper, claim any share of the increase of these revenues in territory which may eventually be incorporated in the kingdom of Greece?

My German colleague is of opinion that, as the plus-values arrangement was established in order eventually to enable the Government to resume payment of interest in full on the loans contracted between 1881 and 1893, the bondholders are entitled to profit by a change in circumstances which will bring this result about more rapidly than could have been expected when the Law of Control was passed. It is, however, certain that the Greek Government will strenuously resist such a claim, and this view is already confirmed by the dispatch to Salonica, Elassona, and other places occupied, of consular stamps—which are not included among those assigned to the service of the Debt—to be used, with a surcharge, in cases where stamped paper would be required in accordance with Greek law.

My own opinion is that, as for territory now occupied, in case of annexation the Greek Government will almost certainly be saddled with charges for meeting some portion of the Ottoman Debt; it can hardly also be charged with the service of the Greek Debt in connection with such territory. Had the latter been part of Greece when the control was established, it may be assumed that the minimum then fixed in excess of which revenue was to be shared between the Government and the bondholders would have been higher, and the bondholders cannot claim to share an increase which could not then possibly have been contemplated.

2. Assuming that all the revenue from stamp dues and monopolies in annexed Turkish territory will be encashed directly by the Greek Government, what guarantees should be required that the new conditions shall not affect the revenue derived from these sources within the existing boundaries of Greece, encashed by the Financial Commission?

In this case it would appear to be sufficient to require that no difference shall be made in the price of the articles of monopoly or in the law regarding stamp dues in the annexed territory on the one hand, and within the existing boundaries of Greece on the other, so as to prevent the possibility of sale in one part of the country of articles

of monopoly which might afterwards be used elsewhere, and to prevent the transfer of business from one part of the country to another, *e.g.* from Athens to Salonica, because the stamp dues at the latter place were lower. This could be done by having stamps of the same value, but differing in appearance, in any newly-incorporated provinces, and by creating a separate organisation for the sale in those provinces at the same prices of articles now sold by the Régie Company on account of the Financial Commission.

Unless some such guarantee be given there would be nothing to prevent the Government from effecting sales in Epirus or Macedonia of articles of monopoly which might be used in other parts of the kingdom, thus depriving the bondholders of their share in the plus-values.

I have, &c.
HENRY BEAUMONT.

[49877] No. 643.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 179.)
Athens, November 15, 1912.

Sir,

AS soon as the occupation of Thasos by the Greek fleet was announced, I alluded, in conversation with M. Coromilas, to the rights of the Khedive in that island. His Excellency said that his Highness's private rights would be scrupulously respected, but that his claim to a species of sovereignty, which had once upon a time been raised, had been finally disposed of by Sultan Abdul Hamid, who had appointed his own kaimakam and sent his own gendarmerie to Thasos. The Greek Government proposed to take over the *status* as they found it.

Having received last night your telegram No. 281 of the 14th instant, as well as the previous telegraphic correspondence with Lord Kitchener, I spoke again this morning to M. Coromilas as instructed. His Excellency took note of my communication, and repeated his previous assurance of the intention of the Greek Government to respect the rights of the Khedive at Thasos, adding that they would do the same at Kavala, which is now in the occupation of the Bulgarians, if that place is allotted to them in the final arrangements after the war.

With regard to his Highness's desire to send flour to relieve the distress said to exist in those two localities, M. Corolimas said he was most welcome to gratify it, but he thought he must have been misinformed, as the Greek Government had heard nothing of the existence of distress. He, however, said he would enquire, inasmuch as, if the report were true, it was their duty themselves to dispatch supplies to Thasos.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[49878] No. 644.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 180.)
Athens, November 15, 1912.

Sir,

I HAD the honour to receive on the 9th instant your telegram No. 274 of the 8th, directing me to make a communication to the Greek Government with reference to the Turkish appeal for mediation as soon as my five colleagues were similarly instructed.

The Russian Minister had already received his instructions; the Austrian, French, and Italian Ministers received theirs at different intervals, but it was not until yesterday that the German Minister, after enquiring at Berlin, received authority to co-operate with us. We met in the afternoon at this legation to compare notes, and, finding we were in agreement, I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs for an interview, but as a Ministerial Council was being held I was unable to obtain it until this morning, when he received me and my colleagues in succession.

I read M. Coromilas a French version of the Turkish appeal for mediation as given in your telegram, and at his request gave it to him. I then said I was instructed to put to him the simple question whether the Greek Government were disposed to accept the collective mediation of the Great Powers, and, if so, on what terms. His Excellency expressed his thanks for the communication, and said he must consult the

allied Governments before replying to it, but he did not think the answer would be long delayed.

In a less formal conversation which followed, M. Coromilas mentioned the communication which had been made to him the day before by the French Minister, to the effect that the Turkish Government offered to make any concession in order to obtain a cessation of the hostilities before Constantinople. The use of the word "concession" when "sacrifice" was required looked as if the Turks did not yet realise what is expected of them, and he thought the overture would be fruitless. The Bulgarian army was not to be held, and the Turks were completely broken—without men, without arms, without food. He expected therefore to hear within the next three or four days that Constantinople was taken.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[49879] No. 645.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 181. Confidential.)
Athens, November 15, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE received from Colonel Delmé-Radcliffe, director of British Red Cross services, who arrived at Salonica on the 10th instant, a letter dated the 13th, of which the following is an extract:—

"The political situation is rather curious. I thought you might like to know what I have heard in high circles, though perhaps I am going beyond my province in writing about it. The Bulgarians certainly raced the Greeks to get in here. The Crown Prince told me that on the 10th he was told that they were 20 kilom. away, so he deployed his troops across the line of their approach outside the town, giving orders that the Greek troops were not to fire on the Bulgarians, but not to give way. If the Bulgarians persisted they were to be obliged to push their way through the Greek ranks. Since then the conduct of the Bulgarians has given the Crown Prince and the Greek authorities much annoyance. On the 11th the Bulgarian General Petroff asked the Crown Prince out of kindness to allow two battalions into the town for shelter, as the weather had been appalling for this last week. The Crown Prince consented on condition that they left again on ten hours' notice being given, if required to do so. Next day the Bulgarians asked if two other battalions might relieve the first two, but the Crown Prince refused on the ground that the weather was now fine and no necessity existed. But before the Crown Prince's answer was received ten other Bulgarian battalions marched into the town. They have occupied several buildings and private houses, and I myself saw them eject all the patients out of one of the large hospitals in order to put their troops in. They have put guards on some of the Christian churches, and have done some looting and robbing. The Prince Boris has ignored the King of Greece, and has not even left a card on him. Three divisions of the Greek army leave or have left for Monastir, and it is very likely that trouble will arise when the town is left with very few Greek troops and a feeble civil governor instead of an energetic soldier like the Crown Prince. It is a pity that Venizelos does not come here. There are said to be 40,000 Bulgarian troops about here, and they would certainly be more useful nearer Constantinople, unless they have some special object in view here."

Nothing of the above has been allowed to leak out in the Greek newspapers, and it has even been denied that Prince Boris was with the Bulgarian troops at Salonica at all. Comments have, however, been made on the absence of accounts of fraternisation between the Greeks and Bulgarians, which is explained in various ways; and the generous tribute of the Bulgarian semi-official "Mir" to the success of the Greek arms in capturing Salonica is therefore received with gratification.

This evening's papers announce that the greater part of the Bulgarian troops have left Salonica by orders from Sophia, and that the remainder are about to follow.

M. Raktivan, the Greek Minister of Justice, has left for Salonica as representative of the Government to undertake the provisional administration.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[49881] No. 646.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 183.)
Sir, *Athens, November 16, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 174 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a continuation of the diary of the war, taken from the official bulletins, up to the 15th instant. The week has been uneventful in the Greek part of the field of operations. It has been officially announced that the Crown Prince has left Salonica for Monastir, and it is understood that he has taken with him every man who can be spared from garrison and police duties in Salonica. Besides the Cretan gendarmerie, whom Mr. Wratislaw has reported as having been sent there to keep order, 500 Greek gendarmerie have been detached on the same duty, while the territorials of the 1898 class have been called up to reinforce the gendarmerie in Greece.

It is also understood that the Greek division which was checked at Banitsa has again resumed its forward march, and it is confidently hoped that in a few days the Turkish force at Monastir will be caught between the Servians, who have already got round to the north-west of it, and the Crown Prince's army.

Volunteers and conscripts continue to pour into the country, and troops are as rapidly being sent away. Their numbers and destinations are kept as secret as ever. I notice, however, that some are not armed with Mannlicher rifles, but with the discarded Gras rifle, large numbers of which have remained in stock.

A second Garibaldian legion is being raised and equipped, most of the men this time wearing the orthodox red shirt. There is a good sprinkling of Italians among them, and it is said some English are expected.

The hitherto uncalled territorials of the classes of 1896 and 1897 have been called up from the 13th instant. On the other hand, the calling up of the recruits of 1912 has been postponed until the 14th December. Numbers of young men of that class have, however, gone to the front as volunteers.

Prince Alexander, the Crown Prince's second son, who is in a military school in Germany, has been gazetted a sub-lieutenant of artillery.

Two thousand Turkish prisoners taken by the Montenegrins have arrived at Corfu for incarceration there. The 810 prisoners from Prevesa were also sent to Corfu. Other prisoners have mostly been sent to Nauplia, but it is not yet known what will be done with the 25,000 from Salonica.

I understand the Greek Government to estimate their own total losses in killed, wounded, and sick at about 7,000. The health of the troops appears to have hitherto been good.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 646.

Diary of the War from November 8 to 15, 1912.

November 8.—During the whole of yesterday and last night the passage of the troops across the bridges of the Vardar continued. Last night the consuls-general of England, France, Germany, and Austria, and the Turkish commandant of Salonica, came to my head-quarters with a representative of the commander-in-chief, Tahsin Pasha, and offered to surrender the town and army on condition that the latter should retain their arms but remain neutral until the end of the war. I did not agree to this, and insisted on the arms being laid down, but I consented to their being returned after the war; and I gave them until 6 A.M. to-day for a definite reply. At 5 A.M. the commandant returned with a diplomatic official in order to treat; they agreed to surrender the arms, but pressed to be allowed to keep 5,000 rifles to train their recruits with. On my refusal they left, requesting two hours more time to confer with Tahsin Pasha. This term having expired without their reappearing, at 9·39 A.M. I ordered the army to advance. When, however, our ranks were approaching the enemy's outposts, at about 4·30 P.M. Tahsin Pasha sent me by an officer a letter accepting my terms,

whereupon I stopped the advance and dispatched two officers to draw up the protocol of the surrender of the arms and the delivery of the town, before which our troops now are.

Dated from Tekeli. CONSTANTINE.

November 10.—The daily attacks of the Turks since the 5th have resulted in their withdrawal last night from their positions at Pente Pigadia. Our troops have advanced and occupied them. Enemy's losses considerable. Greek casualty list of 139 wounded annexed.

Dated from Arta. SAPOUNTSAKIS.

November 11.—As I telegraphed yesterday, our troops have occupied Pente Pigadia, the fort and the surrounding positions. The enemy on being pursued went up to the Pente Pigadia heights which command the road from Karavassara Khan to Pento Pigadia, and from there his artillery has kept up a desultory and harmless fire all day. Casualty list annexed comprising fifty-nine (including one officer) wounded in the operations at Anogi and Pente Pigadia from the 8th to the 10th October.

Dated from Arta.

SAPOUNTSAKIS.

November 12.—The King has arrived here and received a most enthusiastic reception.

Dated from Salonica. PALLIS.

November 14.—Official announcement by the Ministry of War that after seven hours' fighting Metsovo has been occupied by Greek troops with the loss of one killed and six wounded. No casualties among the inhabitants. Turkish loss forty killed and eighty-one prisoners.

November 15.—Official announcement by the Ministry of War that the Crown Prince is advancing on Monastir from Salonica.

November 16.—Official announcement by the Ministry of Marine that the Greek fleet this morning occupied the peninsula of Mount Athos, parties being landed at different points.

[49882] No. 647.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 184. Confidential.)
Sir, *Athens, November 18, 1912.*

IN conversation with me the other day, the German Minister alluded to an agreement which (as I understood him to say) had been come to in 1909 between Austria and Italy for the maintenance of the *status quo* in Albania. As I had never heard of this, I mentioned it to the Italian Minister, who confirmed the fact of its existence, but said it dated from 1900. I asked if it was merely a mutual self-denying agreement or if it operated against third parties, and he said the latter was the case.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[49859] No. 648.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 971.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 18, 1912.*

YESTERDAY, at noon, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador invited the foreign representatives to meet. The object was to discuss whether, in view of the fact that an engagement was taking place on the lines of Tchataldja, some 20 miles from here, the moment had not come for landing the men from the foreign ships of war. The

result of the engagement could not be foreseen, but, in view of the demoralisation that appeared to exist in the Turkish army, the possibility of a defeat and a general retreat of the Turkish troops had to be considered, and also the possibility that the Turkish Government would give us no warning of it. This might occur at night, and it appeared desirable that our men should be at their posts before it took place.

Everyone was therefore agreed that the men should be landed. The French admiral, together with the French general of the Turkish gendarmerie, had been in communication with the Governor of Pera and some of the military authorities with a view to the avoidance of any difficulties in the matter of landing, and the Turkish authorities had given the admiral to understand that a communication would be made by them. Although we were somewhat sceptical about any such communication, we deemed it wiser to postpone any definite decision till 4 P.M.

We then met again, but the Turkish authorities had not moved. According to such information as was forthcoming there was no indication of a Turkish defeat. It was then decided that the detachments from the different ships should be landed between 5 and 7 A.M. the next morning, and that each one should be accompanied by a dragoman of its embassy in the event of any interference, and that the men were to be installed in their different depôts, but do nothing in the way of patrolling the streets till a further decision was taken.

The Austrian Ambassador was charged with informing the Turkish Government of this decision. His Excellency communicated it to the Grand Vizier, who took act of it, and, after some demur, said that orders would be given to the military and civil authorities.

Some 2,600 men were landed. The British sailors and men are thus distributed: At this embassy, 350; at the consulate, 28; at the American Embassy, 30; and at the club, 70.

They were all landed without any opposition on the part of the authorities, and their presence seems to have produced a calming effect on the foreign population, which was beginning to show signs of nervousness.

It was also decided to send the available ships, once the men were landed, to different points of the Bosphorus and to Kadikoi, where there are foreign communities.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[49011] No. 649.

Consul Freeman to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Sarajevo, November 19, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Servian Orthodox members of the Diet of Bosnia-Herzegovina held a meeting on the 15th November and issued the following declaration:—

"The unparalleled sacrifices and the brilliant victories of the Servian army, as well as the high degree of culture and political development to which the Kingdom of Servia has attained, fully entitle it to resume possession of the ancient Servian dominions which stretch to the shore of the Adriatic. The action of Austria-Hungary in demanding the rights of self-government for uncivilised Albanians, when she denies these same rights to the Southern Slavs in her own territory, and in seeking to prevent Servia from enjoying the fruits of her brilliant victories, is arousing the bitterest feelings among all classes of the Servian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Servian members of the Diet of Bosnia-Herzegovina are fulfilling a sacred duty in expressing to their brothers in the Kingdom of Servia their feelings of fraternity and admiration, and they are convinced that they are thereby giving expression to the sentiments of the whole Servian population of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

The resolution was signed by all the elected and *ex officio* members of the Diet except the Metropolitan Archbishop, Mgr. Letica, whose moderation—or, as some would call it, subservience to the Government—is well known. Such unanimity and such outspoken language, though they may not carry much weight in the present crisis, are, at any rate, significant of the true sentiments of the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The "Srpska Riječ" speaks with contempt of the demand for Albanian autonomy being put forward by Austria-Hungary when she has a "reactionary régime" in Croatia and an "irresponsible government" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and asks whether the half-civilised Arnauts, who have no national consciousness and no literature, are "nearer"—dearer—to the monarchy than its 8,000,000 of Servian, Croatian, and Slovene subjects. The Arnauts themselves would make a fortified harbour of Durazzo or Valona—a fortified harbour, with a free Albania, that would be of service to Austria in her further *Drang nach Osten*. That, the "Srpska Riječ" declares, is the true explanation of these "interests," which have never yet been openly and precisely defined.

A schoolboy demonstration took place in the streets of Sarajevo the day following that on which the declaration of the Servian deputies was issued. Songs were sung and cheers raised for King Peter and the Balkan League. The police had been warned, however, and appeared on the scene armed with canes, with which new and effective weapons they very soon drove the boys home. They seem to have behaved much better on this occasion than during the disturbances reported in my despatch No. 1 of the 26th February. To prevent further demonstrations, the streets were patrolled the next day by gendarmes carrying fixed bayonets, and a few detachments of regular troops were stationed at the points which are most frequented on Sundays.

A counter-demonstration was organised yesterday. A large number of Mussulmans went in procession to the Governor-General's residence and other points, and gave vent to cheers for the Emperor and hisses for the Balkan League, and a leading member of the Moslem community delivered a loyal speech. No disturbance took place.

I have, &c.
F. G. FREEMAN.

[49862] No. 650.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 491.)
Sir, *Paris, November 22, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the "Temps" of to-day's date gives prominence to an announcement that M. Poincaré, in view of possible massacres in the Ottoman Empire, has warned the Porte through its Ambassador here and the French Ambassador at Constantinople that France, "acting in the capacity of protectress of the Christians in the East," will be obliged to hold the Turkish Government responsible for any violence done to them, and has requested in the most pressing manner that instructions should be sent to the governors of provinces to take measures to prevent such an eventuality.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[49972] No. 651.

Imperial Ottoman Bank to Foreign Office.—(Received November 23.)

Sir, 26, *Throgmorton Street, London, November 22, 1912.*

IN view of the present situation which prevails in European Turkey, I am directed to ask you kindly to instruct your consuls to assist the managers of our various branches there by pointing out, whenever necessary, that this establishment is an institution owned by private shareholders, British and others, to protest against any infringement of our rights, and generally to protect our interests.

I am, &c.
C. CORTHORN, *Secretary.*

P.S.—I have the honour to enclose a list of our branches in Turkey in Europe.
C. C.

Enclosure in No. 651.

Imperial Ottoman Bank: Branches in Turkey in Europe and in the Archipelago.

Adrianople.	Rodosto.
Cavalla.	Salonica.
Dedeagatch.	Scutari d'Albania.
Drama.	Serres.
Gumuldjina.	Souffli.
Janina.	Uskub.
Monastir.	Xanthie.
Mitylene.	Rhodes.

The above are exclusive of Constantinople.

[49981] No. 652.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 23.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, November 23, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 22nd instant, relative to movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 652.

Consul-General Barnham to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Smyrna, November 22, 1912*

"ERZ. FRANZ FERDINAND" left, and "Carlo Alberto" arrived.

Enclosure 2 in No. 652.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

November 22, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

FOLLOWING from consul-general, Salonica:—

"Sanitary state of town causing great anxiety; many cases of small-pox. Mussulmans resent stern manner in which refugees, who are in great want, are being cleared out of Salonica. Pillaging and outrages by Bulgarian troops continues. Some of the troops are being shipped for Dedeagatch. Greek-Bulgarian relations outwardly improved."

Enclosure 3 in No. 652.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

November 22, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

"HAMIDIEH" arrived Constantinople early this morning with stern just above water. She was being towed stern first, having struck mine or torpedo.

[49842] No. 653.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

[By Post.]

(No. 206.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 22, 1912.*

TURKISH war.

Your telegram No. 734 of last night acted on.

Your conversation with German Ambassador (see your telegram to Berlin No. 391 of 20th November).

The islands were not mentioned by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs in his conversation with the French Ambassador.

M. Poincaré, in order not to run counter to the German suggestion, is willing that there shall be informal conversations, but none of the questions should be definitely determined by the Great Powers until the end of the war, for the situation changes from day to day, and what Bulgaria may demand or be willing to accept as peace conditions may in a few days not be the same as now. He is not aware that the Russian and Bulgarian Governments are agreed in regard to Adrianople, Mount Athos, and Constantinople.

[49843] No. 654.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 207.)

[By Post.]

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, November 22, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 735 of last night acted on.

The Servian Minister has made to M. Poincaré very much the same communication as is recorded in your telegram No. 116 of 20th November as having been made to you by the Servian chargé d'affaires.

M. Poincaré recommended moderation in the attitude of the Servian Government, told the chargé d'affaires that they would have the sympathy of France in their desire to obtain access in some form to the Adriatic, but that the manner in which it should be effected should be the matter of general agreement between all the Powers, and the occupation by Servian troops of territory in the course of military operations must not be considered as *des faits accomplis* constituting annexation.

M. Poincaré has had conversations with the German and Austrian Ambassadors, of which he has sent an account to M. Paul Cambon for your information. He put forward the suggestion that access to the Adriatic for Servia might be obtained by a neutralised Servian band of territory to a neutralised port between Montenegrin territory and the territory to be allotted to Albania. Neither of the Ambassadors seemed to be opposed to the idea, and they undertook to submit it to their respective Governments.

[49844] No. 655.

Sir C. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 668.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 23, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 664 of 21st November.

My Russian colleague has hinted to the Ottoman Government that the rejection merely by an official communiqué of the Bulgarian terms for an armistice might appear a casual method of reply, and Ottoman Government has to-day instructed General Nazim Pasha to enter into communication with General Savof with a view to finding a possible basis of understanding. Russian Ambassador has telegraphed to Russian Minister at Sophia suggesting that he might in a friendly way advise Bulgarian Government to instruct General Savof to avoid breaking off discussion with the Ottoman general, or closing the door to further negotiations. Russian Ambassador suggests that perhaps British and French representatives at Sophia might give similar friendly counsel to the Bulgarian Government.

Derkos Waterworks Company's agent at Derkos to-day reports heavy rifle firing at Deliyunus, which would point perhaps to a turning movement at that spot by the Bulgarians.

Ottoman cruiser "Hamidieh," damaged at bows by a torpedo, entered dock to-day, coming from Black Sea.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[49986] No. 656.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 671.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 23, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Salonica by wireless telegraphy to-day:—

"Bulgarians continue to pillage, committing outrages; Mussulmans resent. Strict measures being taken to free the town of refugees, who are in great want. Sanitary condition of town causes great anxiety; numerous cases of small-pox. Some Bulgarian troops are being shipped for Dedeagatch. Ostensible improvements in Bulgarian and Greek relations."

[50001] No. 657.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 672.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 23, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Salonica by wireless telegraph to-day:—

"In addition to three regiments embarking to-morrow, I understand that 20,000 Bulgarian troops are being shipped to Dedeagatch for Constantinople. Artillery is being shipped at present."

[50002] No. 658.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 673.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 23, 1912.*

FOLLOWING for Director of Military Operations from Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell, dated Hadjikeui, 22nd November:—

"Attacks on line on 18th and 19th were repetition of those of 17th, but not so severe.

"Two Bulgarian regiments supported by four batteries advanced on evening of 19th towards Baghilic and Karakol and Nokta, but were repulsed with great loss. Up to 20th November Bulgarians have failed to push home any attack. Turks have now got at Chatalja Servian artillery confiscated by them; men and horses supplied by 30th and 31st Field Artillery regiments.

"Reported that cholera is raging in Bulgarian army, and that latter are withdrawing to Cherkesskeui and Chorlu.

"Chatalja lines have been considerably strengthened in last few days, and *moral* of Turkish troops seems to have much improved. Failure of Bulgarians to push home attack on 17th, 18th, and 19th has given Turks confidence."

[50010] No. 659.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 175.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, November 23, 1912.*

OTTOMAN cruiser "Hamidieh" has been torpedoed in Black Sea about 18 miles from Varna. It is believed that she will be able to make her way back to Constantinople.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[50000] No. 660.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 176.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 23, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 173 of 22nd November.

Greek Government have instructed Greek Minister here to proceed to Chatalja to represent them at the armistice negotiations, which are now being discussed.

The other allies are satisfied to leave their interests in the hands of the Bulgarian Government.

During peace negotiations all the allies, including Montenegro, will be represented.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[50011] No. 661.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 177.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, November 23, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 167 of 20th November.

Bulgarians captured Dedeagatch and Malgara on 21st November. Turks commenced general attack against Bulgarian positions round Adrianople yesterday morning early. They followed this up by an attempted sortie. Engagement lasted all day, and eventually Turks were repulsed with heavy losses.

[50012] No. 662.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 178. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 23, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 170 of 22nd November.

Italian Minister told me to-day that he believed question of Servian access to Adriatic would be peacefully settled if the Russian Government did not make themselves too prominent in the matter. Italian Minister is of opinion that Austria would permit Servia to retain a small port like Alessio, together with a narrow strip of territory, rather than go to war.

He stated that any hostile action on the part of Austro-Hungarian Government towards Servia would be extremely distasteful to many millions of the Emperor's Slav subjects, who had through their parliamentary representatives and in other ways shown much sympathy with their Servian kindred.

Italian Minister thought it would be a question of hard bargaining. He asked me not to mention his name in connection with above.

[50013] No. 663.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 179. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 23, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 177 of to-day.

Greek troops are being sent now from Salonica and recent battle-fields to help their Bulgarian allies at the front. More Servian troops are also being collected and pushed forward.

Bulgarian Government anticipate that Ottoman Government will not accept armistice conditions.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[50020] No. 664.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 157.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November 23, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"General Schemua, Chief of the Staff, has proceeded to Berlin with Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Uncertainty still exists as to exact army corps to be mobilised, but most probably it is the 1st Cracow, 9th Leitmeritz, and 7th Temesvar corps. All the cavalry brigades in Galicia are reported to be practically at war strength. Officers of later classes of reserve are being called up for all corps. One hundred officers of various regiments (including some in 3rd, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 12th corps) left Northern Railway station last night for Cracow. From this it may be surmised that additional battalions have already been sent to Galicia at peace strength, which is partly confirmed by information from German sources and also by report on good authority that one artillery regiment from 4th corps will leave for Cracow to-night."

[49989] No. 665.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 163.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, November 23, 1912.*

CHIEF of Austro-Hungarian General Staff arrived unostentatiously in Berlin yesterday, had a long conference with the Chief of German General Staff, and returned to Vienna immediately afterwards.

[50015] No. 666.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November 23, 1912.*

I LEARN that proposals for a settlement of existing differences are being made by Austrian Government to Servian Government through unofficial emissaries, one of whom is Professor Masaryk. One proposal is that Salonica should be constituted a free port, only, however, for Austria and the Balkan allies; that it should be under joint management, in which Austria would have the principal voice; and that it should be enclosed in a neutral area of some considerable extent.

If Servia agrees to and gives this proposal her support and does not advance excessive claims regarding Northern Albania, Austria will not oppose her acquisition of an Adriatic port.

Servian Government are not at all prepossessed in favour of the proposal, which they consider would involve them in difficulties with their allies, but Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that if they found themselves entirely unsupported by the *entente* Powers over the Adriatic port question they would certainly come to terms with and throw in their lot with Austria for the future.

I gather that there exist serious differences between Bulgaria and Greece regarding Salonica and other territorial claims.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[50016] No. 667.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 23, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 105 of 16th November: Turkish bondholders.

My colleagues having received instructions, I took action this morning.

[49674] No. 668.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget

(No. 120.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 23, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 73 of 21st November: Capitulations in Kossovo.

You need not now act as instructed in my telegram No. 91 of 12th November.

[49565] No. 669.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 88.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 23, 1912.*

COUNT MENSDORFF read to Sir A. Nicolson on the 18th November a communication from his Government as to the question of the Capitulations in the Kossovo vilayet and of the action of the Servian military authorities in preventing the consuls from employing postal couriers or sending telegrams. Sir A. Nicolson told Count Mensdorff our views on the subject, and read to his Excellency my telegram to Sir R. Paget No. 91 of the 12th November. Count Mensdorff seemed to be satisfied with our attitude and views. He considered that the Servian military authorities were acting in a provocative manner.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50021] No. 670.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 158.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 23, 1912.*

AUSTRIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that he did not blame Turkey for rejecting armistice proposals of Balkan League, as he considered them too hard and not justified by present position of belligerents. His information as to state of Bulgarian army was most unfavourable, food and ammunition being scarce. In his opinion, question of conclusion of armistice was of minor importance, as a *de facto* deadlock seemed to exist between the two armies. He thought that Turkey might to concentrate her efforts to obtain rapid conclusion of a preliminary peace based on that of San Stefano, declaring that she reserved to Europe right of ratifying or altering.

In conversation with me his Excellency said that he thought it would be well if the Powers who had vital interests to protect in the Balkans should make their reserves known now, so as to avoid being faced with *faits accomplis* at end of war, which might give rise to serious trouble.

I enquired of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether there was any truth in the rumour reported in my telegram No. 153 of 22nd November, and he returned a somewhat evasive reply, but added that he had to-day seen Turkish Ambassador at Berlin, who was proceeding to Constantinople to negotiate peace terms, and that he had suggested to him that Turkey should reserve the right to Europe to revise preliminary peace mentioned above.

[50022] No. 671.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 159.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 23, 1912.*

AUSTRIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I have seen this evening, thinks that, if anything, the situation to-day is somewhat better than it has been of late, and, on the whole, his tone was rather optimistic. He denied anything approaching mobilisation was taking place here, and he declared he had no information that Russia was

taking measures which indicated that she thought war was imminent. Financial circles here, however, seemed to be pessimistic, and the private secretary of Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that he considered situation to be "as bad as bad could be." From a good source in contact with Minister for Foreign Affairs I am informed that about a fortnight ago Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had indicated to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh that the granting of a commercial port to Servia seemed a base on which a peaceful understanding could be arrived at. My informant told me that in last few days Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has changed his attitude on this point, and that he has suggested to German Ambassador that Germany should bring pressure to bear on Austria to make her yield on the Adriatic port question, as such a port was of vital importance to Servia, and Russia might see herself compelled to support Servia.

[50023] No. 672.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 160.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 24, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 151 of 20th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me last night that so far Austrian Government had no definite proof that their consul at Prisrend was alive, and they would not be reassured on this point until the arrival from Prisrend of their agent. He said that we must wait patiently for the agent's report on what had occurred. He said that should it be proved that the consul had been murdered matter would become very serious; but he mentioned precedent of the murder of a Russian consul at Salonica some years ago, when the matter was settled by an apology and an indemnity from Turkey. His Excellency seemed to imply that Austria would probably follow the same course.

[50024] No. 673.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 161.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 24, 1912.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 168 of 21st November.

I enquired of the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs last night whether there was any truth in the report that Heir Apparent had intimated to M. Danef that Austria would not consider Adriatic port question as a *casus belli*. Minister for Foreign Affairs gave me a flat denial of the report and said he had seen Archduke almost directly after his interview with M. Danef, that the former had informed him of what he had told latter, and that language was very different from that reported.

Belgrade telegram No. 80 of 23rd November.

I should doubt veracity of the Servian report as to unofficial negotiations, and I am of opinion that Professor Masaryk is the last person likely to be employed by the Austrian Government on such a mission.

[50025] No. 674.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 162.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 24, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for the Director of Military Operations:—

"I have received information which may be considered reliable to the effect that three classes of reservists have been called for nine corps in all, and certain classes of officers and one-year volunteers for these corps. This means from 300 to 325 men per battalion. It must be remembered that battalions have been much lowered in strength lately owing to drafts for affiliated battalions in Bosnia: individual battalions at peace and reinforced strength have been sent to Galicia from various corps to an extent which I am inclined to think will complicate matters in the event of subsequent general mobilisation.

His Majesty's consul-general at Budapest reports arrival of marines from Pola. Other information received to the effect that two Danube patrol boats left Buda for Belgrade.

Total number of troops passing through Trieste since 17th November has been 36,000, of which 10,000 were recruits. Some complete battalions were included.

Galician cavalry is practically at war strength, and ready.

Chief of Staff returned from Berlin night of 23rd November.

[50003] No. 675.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 674.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 24, 1912.*

VICE-CONSUL at Dedeagatch reports that town was taken by Bulgarians on 19th November with much disorder and pillage.

[50004] No. 676.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 675.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 24, 1912.*

MY telegrams Nos. 612 and 638 of 11th and 16th November.

Arrests by court-martial of committee adherents, including some members of ex-committee Cabinets, are proceeding. As some of most prominent committee leaders, such as Djavid and Hussein Jahid, have been allowed to escape, it is thought that one of main reasons for these arrests, apart from any anti-Government alarming plot, is to strengthen hands of present Cabinet in view of peace negotiations.

It is announced that Government are about to issue a statement on the subject.

[50005] No. 677.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 676.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 24, 1912.*

AUSTRIAN man-of-war "Admiral Spaun" has been suddenly withdrawn, and has left for Dardanelles.

At a meeting of heads of missions called to consider possibility of withdrawing detachments on shore, Austrian Ambassador announced that he had sent off detachment belonging to above-mentioned ship, and would withdraw others on 26th November.

German Ambassador announced his intention of considerably reducing the number of his detachment, and hinted at possibility of one of his ships being recalled.

No decision was taken regarding withdrawal of other detachments. If detachments were withdrawn in any large numbers it would considerably disorganise system of defence.

All is quiet, but withdrawal may have a bad effect.

[50014] No. 678.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 180.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 24, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 23rd November.

The railway from Salonica via Dedeagatch to Baba Eski is now reported as being in working order, and all Greek and Servian troops are being sent by it to the front.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[50017] No. 679.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, November 24, 1912.*

YOUR despatch No. 4 of 14th November: Red Cross.

Dr. Bradford will dispatch party from Antivari to Scutari as soon as hostilities cease. I think that it would be impossible to do anything before.

[50140] No. 680.

Consul Raymond to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

Corfu, November 18, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that between 400 and 500 armed Cretans left here last night per Greek gun-boat for Vallona.

I have, &c.
GEORGE RAYMOND.

[50106] No. 681.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 485.)
Sir, *Berlin, November 21, 1912.*

AT the end of last week there was a general feeling, both in official and other circles, that there had been a change for the better in the international situation. The report that the Russian Government had announced that Servia could not count upon more than diplomatic support from Russia, and that only in a limited measure; the conversations between M. Danef and Count Berchtold at Budapest, and the apparently excellent relations between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, seemed to take the sting out of the reckless utterances of M. Pasitch and Servian representatives abroad, and it was felt that the chances of Germany being dragged into a senseless war had sensibly diminished.

The idea that the epidemics of cholera and typhus now raging in both camps might incline not only the Turks but the allies to arrange an armistice and bring the war to a speedy conclusion also contributed to more optimistic views of the situation.

During this week, however, the answer given by the Governments of Servia and Montenegro to representations made to them by the representatives of the Triple Alliance, the high-handed action of the Servian military authorities at Prisrend and Uskub towards the Austro-Hungarian consular agents and the effect that action has had on Austrian public opinion, and finally the occupation of San Giovanni di Medua by the Montenegrins, have again somewhat upset the growing equanimity of German public opinion, and raised doubts as to whether the more optimistic feeling of last week was not premature.

Count Berchtold's studiously moderate and carefully worded speeches to the Delegations have not had the reassuring effect that might have been anticipated, for while some papers admit that his moderate language might possibly have been due to his conviction that the danger of any grave complications was now remote, others hold the opinion that it was rather the result of a feeling that the situation was one of such extreme gravity that a hasty or ill-chosen word might precipitate matters and bring about a catastrophe which everyone, and not least Austria-Hungary, was anxious to avoid.

The "Berliner Tageblatt," while taking the view that the moderation of Count Berchtold's language was somewhat in excess of what the situation demanded, says that in any case it was in strong contrast to that held by M. Pasitch, and it points out that the tone in which the latter has received the conciliatory offers and representations of Austria-Hungary proves either that the victories of the Servians have mounted to their heads and deprived them of all sense of proportion, or that M. Pasitch has reason to believe that support from Russia will still be forthcoming.

The "Tageblatt" then gives the following reasons, gathered, it says, from diplomatic sources, which encourage M. Pasitch, in the face of semi-official denials, to cling to this belief:—

1. That the Czar is no longer quite in accord with the conciliatory policy of his President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
2. That the Panslavist element which calls for a more vigorous policy has recently gained much ground.
3. That, although no actual mobilisation has been ordered, nevertheless certain significant changes in the disposition of troops have been made in the military districts of Odessa, Kief, Warsaw, and Wilna.

"If this is all true," the "Tageblatt" says, "prudence on the part of Austria-Hungary is quite comprehensible, and her endeavours to settle the Adriatic question without heat and excitement in the face of great provocation cannot be too highly commended."

The same paper returned to the subject in its evening issue, and in alluding to the joint representations made to the Servian Government by the representatives of the Powers of the Triple Alliance at Belgrade, and to M. Pasitch's answer, it expressed some doubt as to whether the Imperial Government had been quite wise in joining in these representations to which the answer could easily have been foreseen. It would have been better, in the opinion of the "Tageblatt," if the Imperial Government had held fast to the principle by which it had hitherto been guided, viz., to abstain from open interference in the Austro-Servian dispute, except in the case that it developed into a trial of strength between the Powers of the Triple Alliance and those of the Triple *Entente*, or aggressive action on the part of Russia entailed a *casus fœderis*. The paper again referred to the atmosphere of doubt which hung over the attitude of Russia, which, it said, contrasted so unfavourably with the straightforward efforts of England and France to pour oil on the troubled waters.

In this connection I may mention that there seems every disposition on the part of the principal German newspapers to recognise and appreciate the attitude of Great Britain throughout the present international crisis. For instance, the "Frankfurter Zeitung," quoting with approval articles in the "Times" and "Westminster Gazette," stated in a recent issue that it was evident that the Governments of Great Britain and France were doing all they could by timely advice and warnings at Belgrade to relieve the present tension between Austria and Servia. It added that it was a most gratifying fact that these Powers were not seeking to avail themselves of the present fortuitous opportunity to wipe out old scores, but were co-operating loyally and harmoniously with the central Powers for the preservation of peace. In this hearty co-operation lay the principal hope and guarantee that, even during the later phases of the transformation now taking place in the Balkans, the general peace of Europe would not be disturbed.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[50211] No. 682.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 25.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November 25, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 23rd to 25th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 682.

Vice-Consul Hadkinson to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Mitylene, November 23, 1912.*

"SYROS" (Greek) demanding delivery of island.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 682.

Vice-Consul Hough to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Jaffa, November* 23, 1912.
"OLEG" (Russian) arrived

Enclosure 3 in No. 682.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 23, 1912.
REPORT received from consul-general, Salonica, that 20,000 Bulgarians are being shipped to Dedeagatch for Constantinople in addition to three regiments which embark to-morrow. Artillery now being shipped. "Cumberland" left Smyrna for Gibraltar.

Enclosure 4 in No. 682.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 23, 1912.
"URALETZ" arrived Salonica. "Garry" left here (Besika Bay) for Salonica and Piræus with mails.

Enclosure 5 to No. 682.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 23, 1912.
"BARHAM" reports from Alexandretta: Breslau informs me in confidence that he has orders on the slightest disturbance to land armed party and keep them on shore. German Government anticipate complete overthrow of Turkish Empire.

Trouble anticipated if orders issued for calling out at once for active service 3rd class reserve are complied with, as district would be left without troops to maintain order.

Enclosure 6 in No. 682.

Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 24, 1912.
"Montana" and "Tennessee" sailed.

Enclosure 7 in No. 682.

Vice-Admiral Commanding Third Battle Squadron to Admiralty

(Telegraphic.) *November* 24, 1912.
"KING EDWARD VII" with "Zealandia," "Hibernia," "Hindustan," "Dominion," "Africa," "Commonwealth," "Britannia" arrived at Malta.

Enclosure 8 in No. 682.

H.M.S. "Hampshire" to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 24, 1912.
ITALIAN diplomatic representative arrived Constantinople in transport "Bosnia" (Italian).

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Enclosure 9 in No. 682

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 24, 1912.
"Talbot" arrived Malta.

Enclosure 10 in No. 682.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 24, 1912.
"BARHAM" now reports that orders calling out 3rd class reserve have been cancelled.

Enclosure 11 in No. 682.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 24, 1912.
SUBMIT "Black Prince," "Yarmouth," or other large ship to be sent coast of Syria. Germans have "Hertha," "Breslau," and "Geier" there, and French have "Montcalm" and "Henri IV" also "Jules Ferry" believed to be proceeding there.

"Zrynyi" left Salonica on the 22nd November, destination unknown. "Usoke," "Wildfang," "Erz," "Franz Ferdinand," and "Radetsky" sailed for Smyrna.

[50034] No. 683.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, November* 24, 1912.
YOUR telegram of 22nd November.

There have been no special outrages on Jews, but innumerable instances of plunder and robbery from persons, of which Jews also have been the victims.

[50149] No. 684.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, November* 24, 1912.
YOUR telegram of 22nd November.

No communication was made to Greek authorities, with whom we were not in touch at date mentioned. At personal request of Director of Public Debt my Russian colleague, representing Greek interests, gave him a certificate that his office was international administration in order to obviate possibility of interference on entry of Greek troops. My Russian colleague also intervened to prevent requisitioning of the director's private residence.

[50035] No. 685.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Bitolj, November 24, 1912.*

TURKISH troops evacuated Monastir on 18th November after four days' fighting with Serbs in immediate vicinity, losing about 6,000 killed and wounded, about 3,000 prisoners, and 51 guns. Retreating Turks were pursued beyond Florina and Ressna, which were occupied on 19th. Commander-in-chief of western army with about 5,000 men surrendered at Florina to allied forces; the remainder are probably retreating towards Yanina. Servian troops occupied Monastir on 19th. The Crown Prince of Servia arrived on the 20th. A Provisional Government has been formed. Town is undamaged and calm prevails. Military attaché confirms above, and requests that War Office be informed. I am unable to communicate with Constantinople.

[50246] No. 686.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 677.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 25, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, dated to-day:—

"British vice-consul at Chios telegraphs that Greek squadron has demanded surrender of island, but that authorities refuse to surrender."

[50247] No. 687.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 678.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 25, 1912.*

DURING last two days my Austrian and Italian colleagues have been unusually active at the Porte, and now there is considerable change in their tone as in that of Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sanitary and general condition of Turkish forces at the lines of Chatalja are now represented as excellent, while my German colleague asserts that Ottoman army are about to take the offensive and advance. Sudden departure of one of the Austrian ships, coupled with the reports of Austrian mobilisation, and complications, and naval demonstrations on the Albanian coast (based partly on information from new Turkish Ambassador at Vienna), as also arrival here of Turkish Ambassador at Berlin, would seem to point to concerted action between Germany and Austria and the Porte, in view of impending peace negotiations. In the Porte's present attitude, as in their exaggerated alarmist professions of a week ago, there is apparently large element of bluff connected with the question of cession of Adrianople, and arrangements concerning Albania and perhaps Salonica, where recently the situation would seem to be intentionally exaggerated.

(Repeated to Vienna, Sophia, Athens, and Belgrade.)

[50248] No. 688.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 679.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 25, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 660 of 20th November.

Reshid Pasha, Minister of Commerce and ex-Ambassador at Vienna, has been also named a delegate for discussing armistice.

[50249] No. 689.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 449.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 25, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 446 of 22nd November

In reply to a question addressed to him by the Servian Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the object to be kept in view was the economic emancipation of Servia, but that the means by which this end might be attained was a question which Servia ought to leave in the hands of the Great Powers.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that, from language of Austrian Ambassador, there seemed but little chance of Austria agreeing to solution which French President of the Council had suggested to Austrian Ambassador at Paris. In that case he might propose as an alternative the neutralisation of all Albanian ports under an international guarantee so that Servian commerce would be placed on the same footing in them as that of all other countries. She might be given access to them by means of an international railway, on the administration of which she would be represented, with a guarantee against any differential rates. His Excellency also spoke to me of the difficulty of carrying on conversations with different Powers by means of telegrams, which were always crossing each other. He thought that the time had come when the Ambassadors at Paris should receive full powers from their respective Governments to meet and discuss all questions outside the actual peace negotiations, which should be left alone for the present. Amongst such questions he mentioned Albania Servian port, islands, and Mount Athos.

[50235] No. 690.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 181. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, November 25, 1912.*

THE junior "Times" correspondent was yesterday informed by the Russian Minister that secret mobilisation of the Russian army was in progress. The correspondent was told not to mention the matter to me on any account.

Taken in conjunction with the statements made to the Bulgarian Prime Minister by the former president of the Russian Duma (see my telegram No. 172) and the information transmitted by His Majesty's consul at Warsaw to the Foreign Office, the statement of M. Nekludof may be of some value, although I do not place full credence on his utterances as a rule.

[50237] No. 691.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 182.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 25, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 176 of 20th November: Bondholders.

I have both written and spoken to my Russian colleague respecting Russian financial interests. He treated the matter somewhat airily, stating that Russia was not represented on the Debt, and therefore had no interests to safeguard.

Eventually, however, he telegraphed to St. Petersburgh, but refused to make any mention of Russian war loan.

Meanwhile my French, German, and Italian colleagues have presented a short formal *note verbale*. My Italian colleague, when presenting his note, asked Prime Minister not to consider his action as complete until notes had been also received from his British and his Austrian colleagues. Austrian Minister is awaiting my action. Russian Minister promised to telegraph on evening of 21st November. If I receive no reply shortly, have I your permission to hand in a *note verbale* similar to that of my French colleague?

[50240] No. 692.

Sir H. Bax Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 183.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 25, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 176 of 23rd November.

It is stated here that armistice discussions did not commence till last night. The delay on Bulgarian side was caused by M. Danef's late arrival at the front.

Prime Minister is of opinion that Turkey will not accept the conditions.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[50253] No. 693.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 184.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 25, 1912.*

ARMISTICE proposals.

These are now being [? group omitted] at Bagche Koi, situated in neutral zone near Biyuk Cheemedje.

[50254] No. 694.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 185.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 25, 1912.*

IT is reported here that Turkish Ambassador at Berlin, who has been appointed as one of the Peace Commissioners, has broken his journey in Roumania and has had an audience with the King of Roumania. It is considered that Ottoman Government are now making belated efforts to draw Roumania into adopting an unfriendly attitude towards allies.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[50251] No. 695.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, November 25, 1912.*

TURKISH Ambassador at Berlin, who is proceeding to Chatalja, has arrived at Bucharest and was received by the King of Roumania to-day.

(Repeated to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[50223] No. 696.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 119.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, November 25, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 285 of 19th November.

Russian Minister assures me that [group omitted: ? he has] telegraphed to St. Petersburgh reporting the proposed representations in the interests of Turkish bondholders, but has received no answer.

[50255] No. 697.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 161. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, November 25, 1912.*

I ASKED Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to-day whether there was any particular reason for the pessimistic tone of the German morning papers. He told me that not only press but also Imperial Government were rendered anxious by the fact that Russia was mobilising and sending large numbers of troops to the frontiers. This anxiety was not lessened by the fact that reports received from many quarters, including St. Petersburgh, tended to show that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had changed his attitude and was no longer holding moderating language at Belgrade. Under these circumstances they could not but regard situation as somewhat disquieting.

He added that they were under the impression that while at Spala the Czar had come rather under the influence of Pan-Slavists, but that they hoped that now that he was in St. Petersburgh wise counsels from President of the Council would counteract that influence.

I asked him whether papers had any ground for their statement that the Emperor had written to the Czar to beg His Majesty to use his influence to moderate Servian attitude. Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that, as far as he knew, the Emperor had done nothing of the sort, adding that, had His Majesty taken such a step, he would have been sure to have heard of it.

A reassuring communiqué has, however, been published to-night with the object of calming the Bourse, which to-day was somewhat disturbed. Nature of communiqué is in some respects not in accordance with Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs' language to me.

[50243] No. 698.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 82).
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 25, 1912.*

ADRIATIC port.

The reply of the Servian Government, referred to in my telegram No. 75 of 21st November, was not given direct to Austrian Minister but to German and Italian representatives when they made a *démarche* associating themselves with Austrian expression of views (see my telegram No. 69 of 19th November), and its tenor is therefore known to Austrian Government. Austrian Minister, however, yesterday told me that in view of the insistence of Austrian press upon the fact that no reply has been received he requested the Servian Government in a friendly manner to state their views. Attitude of Servian Government is that they do not propose to enter upon any discussion with Austria-Hungary until hostilities with Turkey are terminated. When the proper moment arrives they will, as may seem most advantageous to them, either come to terms with Austria-Hungary direct, and then cast in their lot with the monarchy at the prospective conference of the Powers, or place their interests in the hands of the *entente* Powers. For the present Servia maintains her claims to all parts occupied by Servian troops, but if there is to be an autonomous Albania and a rectification of the frontiers some of the military operations will naturally be found to have been provisional.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[50238] No. 699.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November 25, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 82 of 25th November.

The increasing tension between Russia and Austria reported in the press is not, so far as I can ascertain, due to any aggravated situation here, but the Austrian Minister remarked to me yesterday that he despaired of any amicable solution between Austria and Servia so long as M. de Hartwig remains at Belgrade. It is also commonly said here that Isvolsky is not working in the interests of peace, and sees in the present situation an opportunity of paying off old scores against Austria.

[50250] No. 700.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 25, 1912.*

MY despatch No. 69 of 26th September.

I learn that Servians have made a first line of defences against a possible Austrian invasion about 20 kilom. south of Belgrade.

Austrian military attaché, who was at the front with the other military attachés, was recalled to Belgrade by Austrian military authorities some days ago.

[50252] No. 701.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, November 25, 1912.*

SERVIAN Minister tells me confidentially that Austrian Minister has suggested to the King a customs union and cession of high ground above the town of Cattaro; Austria would be prepared to cede territory elsewhere in exchange, and perhaps even consider favourably annexation of Scutari by Montenegro.

The King replied that he could not cede territory in question without losing his throne, while he must consult his allies with regard to customs question.

[50629] No. 702.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1284.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 25, 1912.*

A DIRECT communication from M. Pasitch is published in the "Times" this morning: it claims for Servia as essential 50 kilom. of Albanian coast down to Durazzo, and a large hinterland.

This is directly contrary to advice not to raise prematurely separate questions before terms of peace are formulated and considered as a whole; it also appears to be a larger demand than is at all essential, so that the substance, the time, and the manner of the Servian demand are calculated to alienate the sympathy and weaken the hands of those who might naturally wish to support her. Ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he thinks it desirable that I should express this opinion to M. Pasitch at Belgrade.

[50586] No. 703.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 296.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 25, 1912.*

THE German Ambassador observed to-day that our Minister in Athens was waiting to make a representation about the Turkish Debt until the Russian representative was ready to do so too; but the Russians were not interested in the Debt.

I said that I had given instructions to our representatives not to wait for the Russians, as they were not interested in the Turkish Debt and would very likely not move at all.

The Ambassador told me that the French representatives had been instructed to include in their communication a reference to the moral and material rights of French subjects and French protégés.

I said that we had not given this extension to our instructions.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50587] No. 704.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 297.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 25, 1912.*

THE German Ambassador informed me to-day that Count Pourtalès had informed the German Government that M. Sazonof had said to the Italian chargé d'affaires in St. Petersburgh that the only solution of the Servian difficulty was to give Servia a small strip of territory and a port on the Adriatic. Now Austria and Italy had kept this question back, and, as we desired, had not taken it out of the general settlement to discuss it by itself; but Russia and France seemed to have given definite assurances to Servia, and this was forcing on the question.

I said that I did not understand the fact that M. Sazonof had spoken to the Italian chargé d'affaires to mean that he had given definite assurances of support in Belgrade, nor had the French, so far as I knew. The German Government had themselves suggested that the Great Powers might try to come to an agreement on the points to be reserved; the Austrian Government had already stated that they could not agree to a Servian port on the Adriatic. The Servians, on the other hand, were putting forward claims for the whole, or a great part, of Albania, and all that M. Sazonof seemed to have done was to suggest to the Italian chargé d'affaires something which was much less than the Servians were asking.

The German Ambassador observed that it was less than one asked, and more than the other was prepared to give.

I said that this seemed to me an excellent definition of a compromise, and as a matter of fact it represented what usually happened in a compromise.

The Ambassador said that he understood we had the same object as Germany—to keep the peace. Germany was indifferent as to whether Servia had a port on the Adriatic; and he, speaking personally, and not on behalf of his Government, regretted that Austria had given so much prominence to the question. But he saw that his Government were bound to support Austria now that this had been done.

I said that I entirely agreed that the object of both Germany and ourselves was to keep the peace, and under all circumstances we wished to localise the war and to prevent it from spreading.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50588] No. 705.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 298.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 25, 1912.*

THE German Ambassador spoke to me to-day about the armistice conditions for the war in Turkey, and I told him what I had said to the Turkish Ambassador on Friday, the 22nd instant.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50589] No. 706.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 90.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 25, 1912.*

THE Austrian Ambassador informed me to-day that Count Berchtold gathered from various quarters that there was an impression that San Giovanni di Medua might be made the object of a transaction, so that it might be severed from Albania at a later period and made a Servian port, and that Austria could be reconciled to this. The Ambassador was instructed to say that this was not the case, and did not correspond to Austrian intentions. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had also expressed himself against the territorial possession of a port by Servia, though all manner of economic outlets would be agreed to. There seemed to be some misunderstanding, too, as to Austria's economic views. She did not wish to hinder the economic independence of Servia; all she wished was not to lose markets which she had had before, and she must have rights of transit for her trade.

I said that there had been a suggestion that there might be for Servia a narrow strip of territory neutralised to a port also neutralised.

Count Mensdorff said that it would be difficult to work this. Austria was afraid that Albania would disturb the neutralised strip, and that the Servians would then make this a pretext for asking for more. A commercial port would become a military port, and he did not think that Austria could agree to this. He referred to the communication from M. Pasitch in the "Times" of to-day.

I said that I did not think it a fortunate communication, and I supposed that Count Mensdorff had seen what the leading article in the "Times" said about it.

He replied that he thought the leading article excellent.

I observed that no doubt M. Pasitch was asking for a good deal more than he really expected, in order to get sympathy and support for something less.

Count Mensdorff said that he hoped we would work for peace.

I replied that we would do so, and I hoped that Austria would not shut the door prematurely at this stage upon possible solutions.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50590] No. 707.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 91.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 25, 1912.*

THE Austrian Ambassador informed me to-day that, in Count Berchtold's view, the peace terms, which it was now understood were being negotiated between the allies and Turkey, must not be regarded as being definite as far as the Great Powers were concerned.

I said that I agreed that we could not expect the greatest change which had ever taken place suddenly in the map of Europe to be made without the Great Powers, especially those most directly interested, having some say in the matter, at any rate on certain points.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50313] No. 708

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 125.)
Sir, *Sophia, November 8, 1912.*

I HAD the honour to receive a telegram from you instructing me to contradict an unfounded report, emanating from Vienna, to the effect that certain British men-of-war which His Majesty's Government had decided to send to Constantinople to protect the lives of British subjects were in reality intended as a warning to the Bulgarian Government. You were good enough to supply me at the same time with a copy of the instructions which were sent to the commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean.

I had an interview with the Prime Minister on the following day, and he said that no one more fully realised the danger of such statements emanating from Vienna at the present crisis; he also added that we might even expect a continuation of mendacious statements, created for the purpose of separating the allies.

He asked me to express to you his gratitude for your kind explanations.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[50329] No. 709.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 85.)
Sir, *Belgrade, November 11, 1912.*

WITHIN a period of less than ten days the relations between Austria-Hungary and Servia which during the course of the war have remained, considering all circumstances, amicable, have undergone an unfortunate change.

Towards the middle of last week M. d'Ugron, the Austrian Minister here, was summoned to Budapest by Count Berchtold. On his return he immediately sought an interview with M. Pashitch, and acquainted him, though in an unofficial manner, with the views of the Austrian Government concerning Servia's desire of acquiring a port on the Adriatic. He stated that his Government are quite prepared to admit the principle, originally enunciated by the allies themselves, of the Balkans for the Balkan people according to ethnical divisions, and consequently raise no objection whatever to Sevia occupying the whole of Old Servia and those regions where the Serb population is predominant; but, on the other hand, in accordance with this principle they are also firmly resolved not to admit that Servia should permanently acquire any portion of Albania, which it is the purpose of Austria-Hungary, as well as of Italy, to make into an autonomous State, either independent or under Turkish suzerainty.

The realisation of this project would naturally completely exclude Servia from the Adriatic, and although the Servian Government no doubt apprehended opposition from Austria to their acquisition of an Adriatic port, they probably did not expect this opposition to be based on the ethnic considerations which they had themselves proclaimed. M. Pashitch therefore appeared at first somewhat taken aback by M. d'Ugron's statement; he replied, however, that he must consult the King and Servia's allies, but that speaking for himself he feared that the Austrian and Servian views would be found altogether irreconcilable.

As a result of this interview a feeling of considerable tension has arisen in Servia, and if to-day the situation were to be judged from the point of view of Austrian and Servian relations alone the possibility of war would not seem remote.

So far as I have been able to gather in conversations with my Austrian colleague and with M. Yovanovitch, the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the contentions on the one side and the other which, owing to the importance the dispute threatens to assume, I give at some length, are as follows:—

On behalf of Austria it is urged:—

1. That the Albanians wish for autonomy; that there are no Serbs in Albania, and there is hence no reason why Servia should be permitted to annex any part of the province.

2. That "hands off Albania," both for themselves and every other nation, has been a recognised principle of Austrian and Italian policy for some past.

3. That Servia is incapable of governing Albania, which would consequently become a source of unrest in the Balkans.

4. That Servia being entirely under Russian influence, her possession of an Adriatic port might become a danger for Austria.

5. That Austria-Hungary has shown forbearance and friendliness towards Servia during the war, and Servia should show some appreciation of this attitude by not trespassing where the monarchy's interests are genuinely concerned.

6. That an Adriatic port is not a necessity for Servia, whose commerce—the railway being already constructed—would find a more ready outlet via Salonica or another port on the Ægean.

The Servian contentions in reply to these several points are :—

1. That Servia being at war with Turkey can claim to take and retain any part of Albania by right of conquest, regardless of ethnical considerations.

2. That as Turkey in Europe has ceased to exist, Austrian and Italian arrangements regarding Albania no longer hold good.

3. That the Albanians are incapable of governing themselves; that if Albania be given autonomy it will come under Austrian influence and will be a centre whence will be stirred up disaffection against Servia in her new territory.

4. That Servia is not under the influence of Russia, but merely looks to Russia for support against the aggressive policy of Austria.

5. That Servia has expended lives and money and has a right to the fruits of her victory.

6. That an Adriatic port is a necessity for Servia, her way to the Ægean being barred by territory now belonging to her allies. (It is said that under an arrangement between the allies made previous to the war Servia renounced all claim to an outlet upon the Ægean.)

In a consideration of the several objections which are urged by Austria, although each point undoubtedly contains some truth, probably no great weight need be attached to those arguments which imply solicitude on her part for an ethnical principle, for the welfare of the Albanians, and for loyalty to arrangements with Italy. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shows that Austria is not squeamish in such matters when it is to her advantage to overlook them. The Servian Government, therefore, see nothing in these arguments except a desire to thwart Servia, to stir up trouble and make use of the Albanians to harass Servia in her new territory and finally to take over Albania herself. M. Yovanovitch recently prophesied to me that within one year Austria and Italy would be at war over Albania. But the question arises, Supposing for the sake of argument Austria were to abandon Albania, would the alternative of Servia and Greece taking over Albania be at all preferable? The Servians have neither the men nor the means for keeping order and taking over the administration in such a country as Albania, where practically the whole population is of a different religion and hostile to them, and where Austria would continually stir up the Catholic tribes against them.

So far as future conditions in Albania are concerned, therefore, there seems little to choose between the Austrian intention of making it an autonomous province and the Servian desire of partitioning it between Montenegro, Servia, and Greece.

Of the motives which are influencing the Austro-Hungarian attitude the one upon which most stress is laid, and which I am inclined to think is the most genuine, is the apprehension lest the admission of Servia to the Adriatic should be tantamount to the admission of Russia. Possibly this fear may at first sight appear unreasonable. Austria could no doubt safeguard herself against the establishment of a Russian naval base by stipulations concerning the non-fortification of a Servian port, but I am inclined to think that Austrian opposition proceeds more from uneasiness concerning the aspirations of official Russia than from any well-defined fear of the influence exercised in Servia by official Russia, and when the extent and growth of the Slav elements both in and around Austria and the extent to which Slav ideals have latterly gained momentum are considered, the Austrian attitude must at least appear comprehensible. Whether a policy of repression or conciliation towards the Slav nations with which Austria comes in contact would be the wiser is a matter of opinion. Probably repression will only hasten a struggle which sooner or later is bound to come. But however this may be, the acquisition of an Adriatic port is a question which, to Austria, must present itself in other than a purely commercial light and her contentions on this score cannot therefore be dismissed as altogether fantastic.

The Servian Government start from the premise that Austria's only purpose is to hem in Servia in such a manner that she remains more or less commercially dependent upon Austrian goodwill, and as a proof of this they state that the Austrian Government at first made an offer to permit Servia to acquire a port on the Adriatic if she would enter into a customs union with the monarchy.

I have not been able to verify whether an offer in this form was ever made, but seeing that Austria's principal aim is to guard against an aggressive policy by a Servia penetrated with Russian influence, and that the result of a customs union would be to supplant Russian by Austrian influence, there seems nothing very inconsequent, now that the customs union idea has been dropped, in Austria also opposing Servia's acquisition of an Adriatic port.

So far as I am aware, and notwithstanding assertions to the contrary by the Servian Government, Austria does not contest Servia's claim to have an outlet to the sea for her commerce. But the difficulty lies in reconciling the diametrically opposite views as to the nature of this outlet. Servia desires absolutely unrestricted possession of a port on the coast of Albania, whilst Austria declares that this is, from her point of view, inadmissible.

If Servia honestly desires nothing further than merely an unhindered exit and entry for commerce, some arrangement should be found easily enough; and indeed it is not clear why if Salonica were made a free port and there were a customs union between the allies, Servia should need any further outlet.

Four suggestions are stated by the Servian Government to have been made by the Austrian Minister, namely :—

1. That Servia should connect her railways with the Bosnian railways and be given special facilities for commerce at Spalato or Metkovitch.

2. That Austria should endeavour to obtain for Servia special facilities of transit through Montenegro and at a Montenegrin port.

3. That Servia should construct the Danube-Adriatic Railway, but the Adriatic line and likewise the port would be in Albanian territory and Albanian.

4. That Servia should seek an exit for her commerce on the Ægean.

These suggestions are apparently without any due consideration set down by the Servian Government as being impracticable, and it is becoming evident that with success desire for territory has increased, and Servia will no longer be contented by merely securing means of free communication with the sea for her commerce, but wishes to possess also a strip of coast with hinterland. As matters stand at present there is a very manifest disinclination on the part of the Servian Government to admit the possibility of any interference with their plans. They would, they assert, meet such interference with resistance to the bitter end, and in this attitude they look not only for the unqualified support of their allies, but hope, should Austria and Italy endeavour to thwart them, to be able to draw in Russia and the other Powers in the Triple *Entente*. Should the latter fail them and Servia be humiliated, they announce that their policy will be one of unveiled hostility towards Austria-Hungary, whose Slav population they will endeavour to stir up and whom they will harass in every conceivable manner.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[50314] No. 710.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 126. Confidential.)
Sir, *Sophia, November 12, 1912.*

IN the course of a conversation which I had with the Prime Minister on the 1st instant, his Excellency informed me that the Austro-Hungarian Minister had suggested to him officially that his Government would be very pleased to come to an arrangement with the Bulgarian Government "sur le terrain économique." M. Gueshof had replied that he could give no answer to this suggestion until he had discussed the question with the Servian Government; he added that, up to the present, the two Governments had not touched upon the subject, as their time was completely taken up with the war. The Prime Minister understood that the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade had spoken in a similar sense to M. Pasitch.

His Excellency considered this action on the part of Count Tarnowsky as a new

departure. He judged from it that Austria-Hungary had decided to resign their pretensions to Novi Bazar, and he expressed a hope that no difficulties would be put in the way of Servia's desire to obtain an extension of territory to the Adriatic coast. I told M. Gueshof that I thought he was somewhat optimistic on the latter count, as it appeared from several signs that the Servian Adriatic question would be a point of danger which must be carefully guarded against.

In the course of a few days I received a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome, which you were good enough to supply me with, reporting that the Italian Minister at Belgrade had represented unofficially the danger of Servia pressing for an Adriatic port in view of the determination of Austria to oppose its acquisition. It appeared that the Servian Government not only informed the Italian representative that they could accept no dictation on this point, but the Servian Prime Minister appears to have discussed the matter with a correspondent of the "Temps" and others. Thus it was that the Servian Adriatic question was being discussed separately, and prior to any other question, by the entire European press. This, as you, Sir, are aware, is exactly contrary to the policy of the allies, whose intention it was, and still is, to act as one nation, both towards Europe and towards the Ottoman Government, until an arrangement with the latter is definitely concluded.

The Bulgarian Government are fully aware of the mistake that has been made in this instance, and they will in the future deprecate any discussion with the Great Powers respecting the future of Monastir, Salonica, the question of Servian access to the Adriatic, or other thorny points in their programme, until the whole settlement of European Turkey has been arranged *en bloc*.

I had the honour to report to you on the 12th instant that the Austrian Government had taken steps at Belgrade to inform the Servian Government that they could not permit of their being allowed to take possession of a port on the Adriatic, and that the Triple Alliance was solidly agreed on this point. The Servian Prime Minister did not, however, on this occasion allow himself to be drawn, and he informed M. de Ugron that the Balkan programme had not yet been agreed to by the allies, and it would not be completed until they had formulated their terms of peace with Turkey as a whole. At the same time, the Servian Government instructed their Minister to ask the Bulgarian Government if they could rely upon the support of the Bulgarian army in case of hostilities.

With reference to the above, I have the honour to state that the Bulgarian Minister of Finance, who is the most able and most determined member of the present Cabinet, told me that the Bulgarians would stand by their allies, on the question of access to an Adriatic port, to the last soldier.

The chief reasons for the alliance between Bulgaria and Servia were:—

On the part of the Bulgarians, for the purpose of freeing the Christians in European Turkey from Turkish domination and for extending their own territory.

On the part of the Servians, for the purpose of occupying the sanjak of Novi Bazar and of obtaining free access to a port on the Adriatic Sea, thus liberating themselves from Austrian commercial and political domination and opening a path to the free market of the world.

It is my personal conviction that European diplomacy will again fail if such free access is not granted to Servia. Weakened as they will be with their severe contest with the Turkish Empire, the allies would involve Europe in another war rather than cede their point. They well know that the limited autonomous Albania which they will be obliged to concede to Austrian and Italian aspirations will create a *foyer* of discontent in the Balkan Peninsula, and that the larger Albania is, the sooner another war will ensue for its possession. The allies are most anxious to enter at once upon an era of peace, but they fully realise that an unsatisfactory settlement of their territorial aims and claims at the present time would oblige them at an early date to take up arms, even against another Great Power.

In view of this contention, the visit of M. Daneff, President of the Sobranjé, to Budapest, where he has had audiences with the Emperor of Austria and the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, must not be lost sight of. M. Daneff was dispatched by the King direct from the head-quarters at Stara Zagora, and he was instructed to inform Count Berchtold that Bulgaria would support her ally in her determination to have a port in the Adriatic.

At the time of writing M. Danoff's mission is not yet concluded.

I have, &c.

H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[50315] No. 711.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 127. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, November 12, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 120, Confidential, I had the honour to telegraph to you on the 28th ultimo that Ishtib and Kruprulu had been evacuated by the Ottoman army, and that a portion of the Montenegrin and Servian armies had effected a junction to the south of Novi Bazar.

The important junction of Baba Eski was captured on the night of the 27th ultimo, thus cutting the last link between Constantinople and Adrianople. At the same time heavy military train was seized as it was proceeding to Adrianople. I was able on this date to confirm from official sources all the military news sent by me up to that time.

The same evening I heard of the capture of Lule Burgas, which town, however, the Bulgarian army were obliged to evacuate, and it was eventually in this neighbourhood that the greatest battle of the war, up to date, was fought.

Meanwhile, a whole Servian division, which had been released after the battle of Kumanovo, was hurried up to Mustapha Pasha, and rapidly entrained to join the Bulgarian forces. At this time the Bulgarian Government believed that the allied armies would be able to march straight forward to the Tchataldja lines without encountering any serious resistance; they did not anticipate the great battle which was so shortly to take place.

On the 30th ultimo a member of the Cabinet informed me that Constantinople had been entirely cut off both from Salonica, Adrianople, and from the rest of the Turkish Empire in Europe. I heard also that the "débris" of the Turkish army of the Vardar, which had been beaten by the Servians, had retired in a south-westerly direction towards Perlepe, Krushevo, and Monastir. A small engagement had taken place at Outche Polye; the Turkish army had, however, suddenly retreated, leaving a large amount of stores and ammunition in the hands of the victors. Up to this date the Bulgarian army had captured about forty-eight guns and the Servian army about 130.

On the 31st ultimo I had the honour to report that a great battle had taken place on a crescent-shaped front extending about 35 miles from Lule Burgas on the west to Sarai on the east. This battle has been so fully described by the press that there is no need for me to enter into details. I would merely state that the head-quarters' staff consider that it was the most important of the campaign. They believe that they met the flower of the Turkish army, and that the only remaining first-class troops are shut up in Adrianople.

In consequence of this battle they expect to be faced at Tchataldja with a demoralised force largely supplied with Martini rifles; they express confidence both as to the result of the final action on the lines before Tchataldja and as to the fall of Adrianople.

I reiterated my belief in the determined intention of the Bulgarians to march into Constantinople, if successful. It was not until a week later that an official account of this battle was published.

The head-quarters' staff estimate the total loss in killed and wounded on both sides at 55,000 men, and compare the engagement to the battle of Mukden. They state that the Turks lost 40,000 in killed and wounded, and they themselves admit a loss of 15,000. I am inclined to believe that the total estimate is correct, the Turkish loss being overestimated and the Bulgarian underestimated. The victors captured forty-two quick-firing guns, and took 2,800 prisoners besides large numbers of wagons and many stores.

On the 3rd instant I heard that Demotica had been definitely occupied by Bulgarian troops, and that hard fighting was still going on south of Sarai with a portion of Nazim Pasha's army. On the 4th instant the vice-consul at Philippopolis telegraphed that the allied forces were within sight of the village of Tchataldja, which lies 5 miles to the south-west of the outer lines of fortifications. On the same day the Bulgarian head-quarters were moved to Kizil Agatch. On the 5th instant the Bulgarians took Seres, and later it was reported to me that heavy fighting was still being continued round Tchorlu and Istranja. On the 6th instant a last contingent of 8,000 Macedonian volunteers left Sophia, and as both this year's and next year's recruits have been called

to the colours it is certain that all Bulgarian resources have been stretched to their utmost limits.

In the course of the afternoon I received a visit from the adjutant-general of the Bulgarian army, who told me that Istranja, which lies to the south of Sarai, had been captured, and that the Bulgarian cavalry had swept the eastern portion of the peninsula right up to the Tchataldja lines. He stated that the newspaper reports of the capture of Tchorlu and Karevlio had been premature, but that they had now been at last definitely occupied.

General Demitrieff admitted to me that the fighting had been very heavy, but he did not seem anxious to go into details as to the number of killed and wounded on both sides. He stated that the Ottoman forces could no longer be reinforced by way of Rodosto, which led me to believe that the latter town was in danger. This belief was confirmed later in the day by the Prime Minister himself, who informed me that he had just received news of the capture of Rodosto, and that the small town of Midia, on the east coast, had also been taken.

The adjutant-general seemed extraordinary confident for a person in his high position, separated as he is from the head-quarter staff. Before leaving he repeated to me that he did not anticipate any great resistance at Tchataldja.

I was also informed, from an excellent source, that the Crown Prince together with his brother, Prince Cyril, had gone south in order to make a joint entry with the Crown Prince of Greece into Salonica; it was also hoped that Prince Alexander of Servia would be able to join in the triumphant entry with his allies: in view of the long distance which the Servian troops had to traverse this latter plan did not seem likely to be accomplished.

On the 9th instant I had the honour to telegraph that all newspaper reports as to an action having taken place at the Tchataldja lines were premature. The Minister of Finance told me that he did not anticipate any reliable news from the front for at least three days, as the transport difficulties were enormous, owing to the heavy rains, and it was particularly arduous work bringing up the guns.

As Lieutenant Wagner, of the "Reichspost," has been, and is still quoted in the press of the whole world for his brilliant war news, it may be of interest for His Majesty's Government to know that, in the first instance, he dressed himself up as a Bulgarian peasant and picked up information at the front. His knowledge of the Bulgarian language stood him in good stead, and he was successful in evading the censor for about ten days. He was, however, eventually turned back, and has been resident at an hotel in Sophia for about eleven days, from where he continues inditing his brilliant forecasts.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[50397] No. 712.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 86.)
(Sir, *Canea, Crete, November 15, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 85 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to report that Major Michalopetrakis arrived here yesterday from Greece to take over the duties of commandant of the Cretan gendarmerie in the absence of Lieutenant-Colonel Monferratos.

A further consignment of Cretan gendarmes are to leave to-day for Salonica. I believe that the number is about 200.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[50339] No. 713.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 87.)
Sir, *Bucharest, November 16, 1912.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs in his conversation with me, reported in my No. 21 of the 5th instant, had stated to me so positively that there had been no pourparlers with Bulgaria regarding the rectification of the Dobrudscha frontier, and his language had left me with so clear an impression that no such pourparlers were imminent that it was with some surprise that I received Sir R. Paget's telegram No. 57 of the 13th instant, in which he reported that the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had given him particulars of pourparlers which had been proceeding on the subject. At the same time, the rectification of the frontier which the Under-Secretary said Roumania would be willing to accept tallied so exactly with what I had reason to believe, as reported in my telegram No. 21, would content Roumania, that I was at first inclined to think that the Minister for Foreign Affairs in his conversation with me on the 5th instant had misled me. I accordingly took an opportunity yesterday of enquiring of the Bulgarian Minister whether there had or had not been any negotiations with Roumania regarding the compensations to be given to that country. His answer was reported in my telegram No. 23 of yesterday. He entirely confirmed what the Minister for Foreign Affairs had told me, and added that M. Majorescu had informed him at his weekly reception on the 12th instant that the Roumanian Government would postpone making any proposals until the conclusion of the war.

It is not easy to reconcile the Servian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs' language to Sir R. Paget with what has been said to me both by M. Majorescu and the Bulgarian Minister, or, for that matter, with the language of the Bulgarian Prime Minister to Sir H. Bax-Ironside, reported in the latter's telegram of the 1st instant.

It may be that Roumania has made known her requirements at Sophia through some private channel, and in this connection I would refer you, Sir, to the final paragraph marked Secret of my telegram No. 20 of the 4th instant, which mentioned an exchange of messages between M. Take Jonescu, the Bulgarophil Minister of the Interior, and Mr. Bourchier; though I should mention that this morning's "La Roumanie" (M. Take Jonescu's organ) quotes in very flattering terms the passage in the Prime Minister's speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet, in which Mr. Asquith deprecated the raising and pressing of isolated questions at this juncture.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

P.S. *November 21.*—Since writing the above, I have received Sir H. Bax-Ironside's telegram No. 156 of the 16th instant reporting the decision of the Bulgarian Government to send M. Daneff on a special mission to Bucharest, and the Roumanian press to-day announces that M. Daneff is leaving for Bucharest in a day or two.

G. B.

[50330] No. 714.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 86.)
Sir, *Belgrade, November 17, 1912.*

M. PASITCH returned from Uskub yesterday morning and I saw his Excellency in the afternoon. I repeated to him the substance of your telegram No. 93 of the 13th instant, which I had already communicated to the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs some days previously, and said I hoped that, pending a general settlement at the end of the war in which Servia's claims would certainly receive all due consideration at the hands of the Powers, the Servian Government would not adopt an attitude which might bring on a quarrel with Austria-Hungary and which would render the task of the Powers more difficult.

M. Pasitch replied that it was in no sense his desire to bring on a quarrel with Austria-Hungary, but that Servia must have a port on the Adriatic and that the port must be Durazzo. Not only the military party, but the whole of the nation demanded this,

and was prepared to resist to the bitter end any attempt to deprive them of the fruits of their victories.

I observed to M. Pasitch that Servian demands seemed to be growing, and I should like to know whether it was really only a commercial outlet Servia wanted or more. If the former I thought some arrangement could be devised to satisfy both Servia and Austria, but if Servia wanted to take a portion of Albania she would encounter difficulties.

M. Pasitch did not seem best pleased at my pointing out the change in Servia's demands. He replied that Durazzo was the only really good harbour, that Alessio would have to be dredged and was not suitable, neither would Servia be content with San Giovanni di Medua. So long as Servia obtained Durazzo, with sufficient territory to the north of it, he saw no objection to the Powers making a small autonomous Albania to the south if they thought it worth while; in his opinion, however, an autonomous province would always be a source of trouble and Austria and Italy would certainly some day fall out over it.

I said I presumed that for the present discussion of this question would remain in abeyance between Austria and Servia, M. Pasitch replied in the affirmative.

My Bulgarian colleague, whom I had seen shortly before visiting M. Pasitch, told me that, although Servia's claim to a commercial outlet is fully recognised in Bulgaria, his Government has no intention of supporting Servia in unreasonable demands and in a stubborn policy towards Austria. He scoffed at the idea of Servia dragging Bulgaria into war over this dispute, and said the present excitement would soon calm down.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[50317] No. 715.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 129.)
Sir, *Sophia, November 18, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of an interesting despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Philippopolis reporting on the state of public feeling with regard to the war and the secrecy maintained by the authorities in concealing military information and the casualties sustained in the war.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 715.

Vice-Consul Young to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 2.)
Sir, *Philippopolis, November 11, 1912.*

APART from such news as has been transmitted telegraphically of military operations taking place at a daily increasing distance from this centre, there has been little of urgent interest to report from the immediate neighbourhood of Philippopolis during the past fortnight. Now, however, that the general trend of hostilities appears to be no longer a subject for anxious apprehension or even doubt, the patriotic obligation of absolute silence, which has been so scrupulously observed by the whole populations, lessens, and the local situation becomes proportionately less obscure.

The stubborn, impassive determination to push the war to its conclusion is as marked as ever; but little by little, people are beginning to speculate upon the cost in lives entailed upon the country. More than a month before the outbreak of hostilities, a Bulgarian professor in Sophia told me that the country was fully prepared, resolved upon, and even anxious for the struggle, though "they knew it to be a life-and-death one for the nation and that 40 per cent. of them would not return to their homes"; and the past weeks have shown that this was not an overestimate of the spirit of self-sacrifice which permeates the whole country. Up to date, the 11th to the 36th "nabors" have been called to the colours; if, as I am told is contemplated,

the 37th "nabor" is called up, practically the whole male population between the ages of 45 and 18 will be under arms.

One realises to what extent the war is a national one when one hears of a woman whose five sons are all at the front and of another who counts thirty-four near relations in the field, of whose fate possibly nothing will be known till the end of the war. Very rarely a letter or telegram is permitted to get through from the seat of war—hardly ever if it contain a date or indication of the place at which it was written. No lists of killed or wounded are published; all statistics are kept secret. Persons attending to the wounded are forbidden to question them; and it is even said that wounded, as they arrive from the front, are not sent to their own districts if it can be avoided. In short, but for the laconic official bulletins of successes, the public are kept in complete ignorance of what is going forward, and it must be almost by chance if news of individuals has hitherto reached their relatives at home. But one hears no grumbling or criticism of those in authority, and the frigid, almost mechanical, determination to "see it through," whatever the cost, is unabated.

Until now any attempt to estimate the cost of the war in lives or money would have been impossible, but, as hinted above, speculation is becoming rife and with it the inevitable questioning as to what is to be the result to Bulgaria of sacrifices faced so unhesitatingly and with such perfect unanimity. Here in Philippopolis there is no noisy exultation and, to all outward appearance, no enthusiasm even when a success is announced or when a couple of hundred Turkish prisoners are marched through the city, and it is not improbable that, until the moment arrives for discussing conditions of peace, popular feeling will hardly show itself at all. The meetings, speeches, and demonstrations familiar in other countries are entirely absent. So far, however, as can be judged from the conversation of individuals of various classes, public opinion in this district fully expects that the Bulgarian troops will in due course march into Constantinople, and, whatever may be the decision of the Powers as regards the future of the city itself, there is strong confidence that no vestige of Turkish authority will be permitted to survive on the European side of the Bosphorus.

Bitter resentment is pretty freely expressed at the "failure of the Powers to take action in time which might have averted the necessity of the present struggle"; but there is a general feeling of reliance in the benevolent neutrality of England, who, it is believed, "will be no party to any sort of compromise calculated to deprive the Balkan States of the just consummation of their exertions."

Russia is popularly supposed to be tied by the overwhelming sympathies of the Russian people with the ideals of the allies, while Austria is believed to have been conciliated by the promise of certain extraordinary commercial advantages.

There is a firm belief that the agreement between the four allied States comprises a quite definite understanding in respect to the partition of their conquests, and that there is no danger of discordant complications.

The predominant note, however, is everywhere still one of almost sullen resolve to sacrifice all rather than compromise the objects of the war.

The foregoing are of course only crude expressions of local opinion, but they appear to constitute the "situation" in this district, so far, indeed, as a "situation" may be said to exist in a community which, absorbed heart and soul in one tremendous effort, has had as yet neither time nor energy to spare for anything but the main issue.

I have, &c.
H. E. W. YOUNG.

[50318] No. 716.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 130. Confidential.)
Sir, *Sophia, November 19, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 125, Confidential, I had the honour to report to you that M. Frangia, the Minister of Railways and Telegraphs, left Sophia on the 12th instant for Salonica, travelling *viâ* Uskub, in order to put the Macedonian railways in a fit state to facilitate the transport of military supplies and ammunition, and of the troops of the allies, *viâ* Dedeagatch and Demotica, to the Chatalja lines.

On the 13th instant I had the honour to report that an action against the Chatalja lines had commenced late in the evening of the 10th instant, and that two minor forts in the front line of the defence had been attacked without any decisive result. On the 14th instant the Adjutant-General of the Bulgarian Army informed me that there had been some fighting on the 13th instant; that the Turkish left wing had been broken, and that he hoped that further success would soon be achieved. On the same day I heard that gala uniforms for the King and the head-quarter staff and the guard regiments had been sent for to Sophia.

The Prime Minister told me on the 14th instant that His Majesty had just left for the front, both for the sake of showing himself to his troops, and also because he had received a letter from the Grand Vizier containing proposals for peace negotiations. This letter had been forwarded through the Russian Embassy in Constantinople, at the request of the Bulgarian dragoman in the Ottoman capital, to the Russian Legation in Sophia. M. Gueshof had himself forwarded it at once to its high destination. Copy of this letter is herewith enclosed.

On the 16th instant M. Gueshof informed me that His Majesty had had a conference with his chief generals after the receipt of the Grand Vizier's letter. As a result of this conference M. Gueshof received instructions to inform Kiamil Pasha that the Bulgarian Government would be willing to accept an armistice, but that he must ask the allies on what terms they would be prepared to do the same. The Montenegrin Government had already given the Bulgarian Government to understand that if the Ottoman Government would surrender Scutari they would agree to a cessation of hostilities. King Ferdinand himself would require the surrender of the fortifications at Chatalja and the capitulation of Adrianople. The Greek and Servian Governments had not so far replied.

The Prime Minister further stated that Fahreddin Bey, formerly Minister at Cettinjé, had informed the Bulgarian consul-general at Budapest that if they could save Constantinople and the Dardanelles they would agree to practically any terms. M. Gueshof did not, however, state *ex cathedrâ* that the Turkish Minister had received instructions to speak in the above sense, but he believed it to be likely. He gave me further to understand that he was greatly in favour of an armistice, and that he was using all his personal influence in this direction. There had been, he said, no really severe fighting at Chatalja up to date, and the newspaper reports to the contrary effect were entirely erroneous. He was, however, most anxious to avoid further slaughter.

On the 17th instant I had the honour to report that the growing prevalence of both cholera and typhoid was tending to weaken the determination of His Majesty to enter into the Turkish capital, and that this calamity was working in favour of an armistice.

On the 18th instant I reported the fall of Monastir and its capitulation to the Servian army, 40,000 officers and men with guns, arms, stores, &c., having fallen into the hands of the victors.

Durazzo and Dibra still continue to hold out, although the Turkish army in Macedonia has ceased to exist as a fighting force.

It was reported to me also from a sure source that cholera had appeared in the Bulgarian army. Great secrecy has been, and still is, maintained on this matter, and it has not as yet leaked out in the press.

To-day I heard that the Greek and Servian conditions as to accepting an armistice had been received; that the latter required the evacuation of Durazzo and Dibra by Turkish troops, whereas the former had made conditions which M. Gueshof considered of an impossible description. One of these was the surrender of Constantinople and the establishment there of a European administration, in which, as the Greeks were numerically preponderant, they would have the most power. As the Greek demands appeared so preposterous, I concluded that negotiations respecting an armistice would be carried on regardless of the views of the Greek Government.

As I am concluding this despatch news has reached me that the King has just instructed the Prime Minister to inform the Grand Vizier that the Bulgarian generals at the front have been commanded to negotiate at once with the generals of the Ottoman forces respecting the conclusion of an armistice.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 716

The Grand Vizier to King Ferdinand.

Majesté,

DESIREUX de mettre fin aux calamités de la guerre, nous avons eu recours à la médiation des Grandes Puissances en vue d'amener un accord avec votre Majesté et ses alliés pour la conclusion de la paix. M'autorisant, cependant, des anciens rapports que j'avais eu l'honneur d'avoir avec votre Majesté, j'ai pensé que ce résultat serait plus facilement atteint en m'adressant directement à elle dans ces graves circonstances. Je viens donc prier votre Majesté, au nom du Gouvernement Impérial, de vouloir bien, en s'entremettant auprès de ses alliés, autoriser le commandant en chef de son armée à s'entendre avec le généralissime de l'armée Impériale en vue de la conclusion d'un armistice ainsi que des préliminaires de la paix.

Le Grand Vizir,
KIAMIL PACHA.

[50270]

No. 717.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 974.)

Sir,

Constantinople, November 20, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 957 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana, reporting on the state of affairs in the Adana vilayet.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 717.

Vice-Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 44.)

Sir,

Adana, November 12, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 43 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to report to your Excellency that on the 11th instant several battalions of Syrian redifs passed through here from Tarsus by rail to Toprak Kaleh and Osmanieh, whence it is stated they will proceed to their depôts. Several other redif battalions, also coming from Tarsus, have passed through Adana on foot. It would thus appear that the redifs quartered near Tarsus are being disbanded.

I am informed that a commission arrived here some days ago to enquire into the reported outbreak of cholera among the troops passing through this vilayet. It appears that the sanitary inspector, Eshref Bey, who is president of the local Committee of Union and Progress Club, made a report to Constantinople that an outbreak of cholera had occurred among the troops, and that their dispatch to the front was consequently suspended (my despatch No. 40 of the 1st instant). The Entente and Liberty Club, on learning what had taken place, telegraphed that Eshref Bey's report was false.

The situation at Hajin (my despatches Nos. 41 and 42 of the 2nd and 4th instant) remains practically unchanged. A detachment of gendarmes was sent there from Adana about the 6th instant. It is reported that Rejebian has been taken to Albistan by Aleppo Kurds, and that his relatives are in treaty with the Kurds respecting the sum to be paid for his release. The Armenians state that Rejebian was carried off at the instigation of certain Turkish officials at Hajin.

The local situation is unsatisfactory, but is not for the moment serious. Shops are open, and the inhabitants are pursuing their ordinary avocations. At the same time, there is much mutual distrust between Moslems and Christians, and a trifle is sufficient to cause a panic. Yesterday explosions made by a defective gas engine in a factory near the Armenian quarter alarmed the Armenians and brought some hundreds of fellahs into the town to see what was afoot. As previously reported, a few isolated outrages on Armenians have occurred, but there is no indication that anything in the nature of a massacre is meditated by the Moslems. A satisfactory feature in the

situation is that nothing is heard of Armenian secret societies. Mr. Keun informed me on the 10th instant that all was quiet at Mersina. So long as no general disturbance occurs Europeans are in no danger.

The German cruiser "Hertha" arrived at Mersina on the 9th instant. I was informed by His Majesty's ship "Barham" at Alexandretta that the "Hertha" had received orders for the protection of British lives and property. The British vice-consul at Mersina informed me to-day that the acting German consul and the commander of the "Hertha" are making arrangements at Mersina to house any German refugees who may come down from the Bagdad Railway construction camps should disorders occur. Mr. Keun thinks that if the news of these arrangements, for which he can see no necessity, gets about, it will have a most undesirable effect upon the native population. I need only add that I am of the same opinion as Mr. Keun.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[50271] No. 718.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 975.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November* 20, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 617 of the 12th instant I have the honour to forward to you, herewith, copy of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Jaffa, relative to the situation at Jaffa and to his application for the dispatch of a war-ship to that port.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 718.

Vice-Consul Hough to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Jaffa, November* 12, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith three copies of a despatch No. 88 of the 12th November, 1912, which I have addressed to His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem on the subject of anxiety felt at Jaffa owing to the anti-foreign feeling.

I also have the honour to confirm herewith my telegram in code of yesterday, reporting my telegraphing to Beirout for a war-ship, and asking for orders to be sent to the nearest at hand if none could be spared from Beirout.

I have, &c.
W. HOUGH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 718.

Vice-Consul Hough to Consul McGregor.

(No. 88.)
Sir, *Jaffa, November* 12, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that I am unable to maintain the confidence in the continuation of public security at Jaffa which I have expressed in previous despatches, as the ever recurring story of Turkish military disasters is producing an increasingly bitter feeling among Moslems against Christians, and especially foreigners. The change of front on the part of the Powers with regard to the question of the *status quo* is counted as a betrayal by Europe. Moslems whom one had been used to think of as the most enlightened now speak in a reckless and desperate way of all being lost and vengeance being the only thing left. Anxiety has been expressed to me by many British subjects who are not to be regarded as alarmists. I still think that the kaimakim will continue to do his best, but there is a danger of his being overwhelmed by the counter efforts of the misguided and fanatical.

In confirmation of my telegram of last night, I have the honour to report that I telegraphed to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout for a war-ship, having heard that

there were two under his orders. I also repeated this telegram to the embassy in case it should be impossible to spare one from Beirout. I think that the presence of a war-ship at Jaffa is a necessary precautionary measure, at least while the actual unsettled feeling lasts.

I have, &c.
W. HOUGH.

[50274] No. 719.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 978.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November* 20, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 971 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to transmit a copy of a note addressed to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador as the doyen by the Sublime Porte, requesting the re-embarkation of the naval detachments that have been landed.

A meeting was held of the Ambassadors and those Ministers whose countries are represented here by naval units, and after some discussion, in which the Austrian Ambassador was perhaps the only one who gave an opinion in favour of the withdrawal of the detachments, it was decided that for the moment it was unnecessary to reply to the note, the situation not having sufficiently changed since the 17th instant, when it was unanimously decided to land them.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 719.

Note addressed to Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Constantinople by Sublime Porte.

LE Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur d'exposer ce qui suit à leurs Excellences MM. les chefs des missions étrangères :—

Dans le but de couper court à toutes les craintes manifestées en Europe et dans certains cercles de la capitale au sujet de la sécurité des étrangers, et bien qu'il ait pris lui-même les dispositions de nature à garantir cette sécurité contre tout événement, le Gouvernement Impérial n'avait fait aucune opposition à la mesure proposée par les missions étrangères de faire entrer des forces navales de leurs nations dans le port de Constantinople.

La Sublime Porte s'était même prêtée, dans le même esprit, à examiner la forme dans laquelle ces forces pourraient être utilisées dans le cas (qu'elle jugeait improbable) où celles-ci seraient reconnues d'un commun accord absolument nécessaires pour protéger les abords des ambassades, consulats, établissements financiers et de bienfaisance étrangers.

Or, avant-hier, à la suite d'une attaque, d'ailleurs vigoureusement repoussée, de l'ennemi devant les forts de Tchataldja, à une grande distance de la ville, et lorsque rien dans l'attitude de la population et de nos troupes ne pouvait donner le moindre indice d'agitation quelconque, les missions étrangères, sur un simple avis adressé quelques heures avant, firent débarquer et répartir dans beaucoup de points de Galata et Péra des marins en armes avec mitrailleuses et canons. Quelques-uns de ces détachements et armes ont même été placés de façon à attirer les yeux des passants, provoquant ainsi dans la population une émotion d'autant plus justifiée que le public ne pouvait expliquer ces mesures extraordinaires que par l'imminence d'un péril d'une exceptionnelle gravité.

Le commandant militaire de la place de Constantinople ainsi que les autorités de la police, qui, les missions étrangères en sont témoins, ont su assurer un ordre et une sécurité parfait malgré le considérable mouvement de troupes survenu en tout sens dans la capitale, a cru de son devoir de prévenir le Gouvernement Impérial que la présence prolongée des détachements étrangers dans les quartiers de la ville, loin d'être d'une utilité en ce moment, peut, au contraire, être cause d'incidents dont les conséquences iraient à l'encontre du but proposé.

Il n'est pas en effet impossible que, profitant de l'état de crainte et d'émotion que cette mesure a provoqué dans une certaine partie de la population, des émissaires

ennemis ou de gens mal intentionnés à Péra et à Galata ne cherchent à faire naître un conflit dans lequel les détachements étrangers, dirigés naturellement par des chefs qui n'ont aucune idée de l'état moral du milieu où il se trouvent, pourraient être entraînés et compromis. Quelques coups de feu tirés à un certain moment suffiraient à amener ce résultat déplorable.

Les autorités militaires et policières de la capitale déclarent dès maintenant décliner toute responsabilité de ce chef.

Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères croit, en conséquence, devoir signaler ce qui précède à la sérieuse attention de leurs Excellences MM. les chefs des missions étrangères dont les détachements ont été débarqués dans la ville. Il est convaincu que, dans l'intérêt commun de l'ordre public et, par conséquent, de la sécurité même des étrangers qu'elles ont en vue de sauvegarder, elles voudront faire retirer sur leurs navires respectifs les détachements et les canons et mitrailleuses débarqués.

L'Europe entière est actuellement édifiée par de nombreux témoignages, aussi bien sur l'attitude des populations et des troupes ottomanes vis-à-vis des étrangers, même dans les moments de plus grande émotion, ainsi que sur l'efficacité des mesures prises par le Gouvernement Impérial.

Les missions étrangères, vu la distance du lieu du combat, auront toujours le temps dans le cas, absolument improbable d'après le Gouvernement Impérial, où il aurait lieu de faire débarquer les marins des navires, de les diriger immédiatement vers les édifices étrangers bien avant l'apparition d'un danger en prévision duquel l'adoption d'une pareille mesure serait reconnue nécessaire d'un commun accord.

Sublime Porte, le 19 novembre, 1912.

[50331] No. 720.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 87. Confidential.)

Belgrade, November 21, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of some notes confidentially handed to me by M. d'Ugron, my Austrian colleague, and which may be found interesting. M. d'Ugron is most anxious it should not be known that he has given me this information, as it would only further embitter Austro-Servian relations.

I have, &c.

RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 720.

Notes of Events in Old Servia since beginning of War.

A SWISS engineer by name of Fritz Walthard, overseer of the Oriental Railways, came here to-day from Uskub and called at our office with a letter of introduction from Herr von Heimroth, the consul at Uskub, and gave us some interesting details about the actual conditions in the districts occupied by Servian troops.

The demoralisation of the Turkish army was complete. During the three days' battle of Kumanovo, at which Herr Walthard was present, large numbers of Christians among the Turkish troops deserted. He saw artillery, with heaps of ammunition lying near it, from which not a shot had been fired. The position taken up by the Turkish troops was conspicuously unfavourable, and being without entrenchments or rifle pits, they offered to the enemy's fire a target they could not fail to hit.

The following incident proves how great was the panic among the Turkish troops:—

During the battle of Kumanovo long trains of artillery were standing in Uskub ready to start. One of the carriages reserved for the Russian Consul-General Kalnikof—in whose house the vali had taken refuge—happened to be driving by with the kavass of the Russian consul-general sitting in it. A Turkish officer demanded that the carriage should be placed at his disposal. When the coachman refused, the officer fired several shots from his revolver, killing the coachman and wounding the kavass.

On hearing the shots, the artillerymen in a body cut the traces of the horses harnessed to the guns and fled in wild panic out of the town over hedges and ditches.

At the retreat after the battle of Kumanovo extraordinary scenes of panic and excitement took place. The railway carriages were stormed. Panic-stricken men in flight pushed each other down from the roofs of the carriages.

The entry of the Servian army after the battle, and also the arrival of King Peter, were received without any signs of enthusiasm on the part of the inhabitants. The Bulgarians especially ostentatiously held themselves aloof from the reception of the King.

Among the Bulgarians, well-to-do circles included, much discontent is expressed at the occupation of Uskub and Köprülu by the Servians, a feeling which here and there has already led to open friction.

The behaviour of the Servians towards the Mahommedan population is cruel in every way, and seems to have for its object their complete extermination.

This is also admitted by the Russian Consul-General Kalnikof, at present in Belgrade. The Mahommedans in Albania were unremittingly shot. In Uskub the sound of volleys was heard from early until late. The treatment of prisoners, including officers, is bad in the extreme. Many prisoners of war were shot without formal proceedings of any kind. Our informer was himself present at the station of Kumanovo when a wounded Turkish soldier lying on the ground was kicked and beaten to death with the butt-ends of rifles.

A Servian officer boasted that wounded German instructors were shot.

With regard to further military operations of the Servians, Herr Walthard informs us that they have met with a reverse at Prilep. The number of Servian casualties was so high that three trains transporting the wounded passed through Uskub. On the Servian side the reverse is excused on the grounds that they were unable to bring up their artillery. The reverse is already being talked about in Belgrade, and the wounded have been forbidden to speak about the high figure of the casualties. In Monastir, where several well-known generals, among them Hassan Riza Pasha (?), have retired, a determined resistance is now being organised on the part of the Turks.

The general impression is that the Servians have derived very little advantage from this war.

The country itself, so far as the richly productive districts of Kossovo-polje are concerned, should, after a long period has elapsed, return a not inconsiderable revenue. But the Bulgarian and Mahommedan elements of the population are likely to prove a permanent element of trouble to their Servian conquerors.

The Catholic Albanian population, as reported, is also highly displeased at the Servian invasion. The disposition of Servian officers is, as our informer has had opportunities of personally observing, very hostile towards Austria-Hungary; and among the officers it is openly declared that the next step will be hostilities against Austria-Hungary.

Railway communication between Uskub and Mitrovitza has been opened again. On the other hand, postal and telegraphic communications, so far as the consular post between Mitrovitza, Uskub, and Prizrend is concerned, is entirely interrupted. Letters bearing an Austrian stamp are laid aside without exception, whereas letters with French or English stamps are mostly delivered without delay.

In conclusion, our informer thinks that the Albanians will successfully be able to oppose the advance of the Servians.

An order was issued to the soldiers in certain places to kill all Albanians from the age of 8 years upwards with a view to extermination. The Servians have ill-treated the sick, women, and children.

At Kumanovo forty Turkish wounded, for whom there was no room in the train, were clubbed and kicked to death.

Whole villages have been burnt and mosques have been destroyed.

The bodies of 500 Albanians were seen floating down the River Vardar.

The Albanians are said to be desperate.

[50332] No. 721.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 83.)

Sir, *Belgrade, November 21, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub, reporting upon the circumstances under which that town was occupied by the Servian troops.

Another despatch of Mr. Peckham's, copy likewise enclosed, gives a brief account of the situation at Uskub on the 14th instant.

I have, &c.

RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure 1 in No. 721.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 2.)

Sir, *Uskub, November 2, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency a short report of the circumstances under which the town of Uskub was occupied by Servian troops.

The news of Kumanovo, which I had the honour to report to His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople in my telegram No. 58 of the 24th October, reached me at about 3 P.M. that day. At 4·30 the first refugees came in to my consulate. They continued to arrive all that evening and night and during the 25th. On the night of the 25th–26th my consulate, which consists of seven rooms and four attics, was packed full, including the cellars, stable, and wood-shed; there were even refugees camped in the garden. I reserved only the bath-room for my own use. The refugees were almost without exception Mussulmans, the majority being women and children. Among them were the defterdar (chief finance officer of the vilayet), Hassan Bey, of Huchitrn, Nojib Bey Draga, Shaban Pasha, and two army officers in mufti. I disarmed all who came bearing arms. My colleagues also received refugees.

At 10 P.M. on the 24th I attended a meeting at the Russian consulate ("décanat"). Besides the consular corps (representatives of Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, and Russia), the vali and four Mussulman notables of Uskub were present. The notables, in an evident panic, as witnessed their frequent appeals to "humanity," were prepared to guarantee the safety of the Christian population if the consuls would guarantee the life, honour, and property of the Moslem population against the Christian inhabitants of the town and the Servian army. The Russian consul-general stated that he had already come to an agreement with the Patriarchist and Exarchist Metropolitans on this subject, and that the consuls would give the necessary guarantees; except in the case of franc-tireurs and of private property, which was liable to military requisitions.

The question of defending the town was also raised, the notables wishing the military authorities to abandon it at all costs. They approached Fethi Pasha, who had just returned to Uskub, on the subject, but without success, Fethi Pasha's orders leaving him no choice. They even proposed that the consuls should approach Fethi Pasha on the subject. This the consuls absolutely refused to do, as contrary to their neutrality. Finally, about midnight, the notables left for the telegraph office to communicate direct with the Grand Vizier, and the consuls went home.

On Friday (25th), about 10 A.M., while walking in the streets with my French colleague, I met the wreck of the army of Kumanovo. It was not a defeat, it was a rout—the rout of an empire; even at Uskub, 30 kilom. from Kumanovo, I saw very few attempts on the part of the officers and non-commissioned officers to re-form ranks and restore discipline. Though neutral, and though remembering every day since Kossovo Polye, I could not but be deeply moved by the sight of the downcast faces and the haggard eyes which had for three days beheld the hell-fire of Servian shell.

About noon an Albanian soldier shot at the vali, mistaking him for Fethi Pasha. He missed him, but killed his secretary and wounded the coachman who was driving them. The vali took refuge in the Russian consulate, and left for Salonica about 11 that evening.

The shot fired at the vali produced more disorder. Someone, who did not know its origin, shouted "The ginours are coming." A panic resulted, and some artillerymen cut the traces of their guns and fled on the horses, abandoning their guns in the streets of the town. It was not till some hours afterwards that an officer came to remove the breech-blocks.

This night (25th–26th), there being no longer any order in the town, the consuls posted their own sentries for the defence of their houses. Fortunately no untoward incident happened.

On Saturday (26th), about 8 A.M., a Turkish army doctor came and asked me to give an order on the military contractors to supply food for the wounded, who had nothing to eat. In view of the urgency of the situation, the four consuls had no hesitation in giving the required order, which was obeyed. I enclose herewith copy.

At dawn that morning the last troops left for Kyöprülü, and with their departure looting, principally of flour and rifles, began. For a moment I had a glimpse of the station, which reminded me of an ant-heap. Men were running in order to be in time to plunder; others were staggering under the weight of large sacks of flour; others, more greedy, were loading their booty on hand-carts; while small boys, their faces beaming with pleasure, were carrying off rifles and bayonets and occasionally firing in the air.

The bulk of the looting was done by Christians and gypsies (the latter are Moslems in name only); the gypsies even began to sack the Red Crescent hospital.

I have only a dim idea of what passed in the bazar, which lies at some distance from the consulates.

The consuls having left Uskub to surrender the town, the dragomans and cavasses made an attempt to stop the pillage, and were to a certain extent successful. I would note particularly M. Dobrovolski, dragoman of the French consulate, who, with a tricolour cockade in his hat and a rifle in his hands, with the help of some French citizens, recovered a certain amount of plunder. That night there were some 200 rifles in the French consulate. M. Dobrovolski also put out the fire which had been started by the Turkish officers before leaving in a depôt of munitions close to the consulates; had this exploded, it might have killed hundreds of refugees. My dragoman lives at some distance, and had 200 refugees in his house; he was therefore unable to help. I have only two cavasses (my colleagues all have three or four), and one of these was ill. Their duty was to save the lives of my refugees rather than to salvage property; nevertheless, they were able to collect some twenty rifles from passers-by.

Meanwhile, on the reiterated desire of the inhabitants, who refused to act without them, the consuls left Uskub at about 9 A.M. to surrender the town to the Servians. We were in uniform and carried rifles—a strange combination—and were accompanied by the mayor. There was a certain risk that some Moslem might shout "Those are the infidels who are betraying Uskub," and fire on us (hence our rifles); but luckily we were able to leave without incident.

About an hour out of the town we were overtaken by an Orthodox priest, sent by the Servian Metropolitan to meet the army, and about two hours out, as we advanced along the Kumanovo road, white flag and bugler in front, we met our first Servian patrol. We left our carriages, were disarmed, blindfolded, and led on foot to headquarters, where we surrendered the town to the Crown Prince. The army advanced and reached the outskirts of Uskub at about 5 P.M. I noted among the people who came out to meet us some Ottoman Christian soldiers who had set white crosses on their fezes; this seemed to be symbolic of the triumph of Cross over Crescent. Among the shouts of the population I noticed "Vive la Serbie!" "Vive l'Entente balkanique!" "A bas la Turquie!"

A squadron of cavalry sent in to reconnoitre the town returned with caps, accoutrements, and bridles covered with flowers. It was impossible to realise that I was present at the entry of a hostile army into a conquered town; it was rather the entry of an army of liberators into a town which had for long been occupied by the enemy.

I have, &c.

W. D. PECKHAM.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Enclosure 2 in No. 721.

Joint Note.

NOUS, les consuls soussignés d'Angleterre, d'Autriche-Hongrie, de France et de Russie à Uscub, étant donné que toute autorité ottomane a complètement disparu et qu'aucune autre autorité ne l'a encore remplacé, prenons en main l'autorité dans la ville d'Uscub et ordonnons d'urgence la remise aux docteurs militaires restés dans la ville de prendre tout le pain, viande, riz et autres comestibles nécessaires à tous les blessés, sans nourriture depuis plusieurs jours.

Ordonnons, en outre, que toute personne à qui cet ordre sera présenté, soit par un cavas des quatre consulats susindiqués, soit par un médecin militaire en uniforme, devra y obéir immédiatement.

En cas de refus d'obéissance à cet ordre, les contrevenants seront punis par les autorités aussitôt que l'ordre sera rétabli.

P. CARLIER.
W. D. PECKHAM.
DE HEIMROTH.
KALMIKOF.

Uscub, le 26 octobre, 1912.

(Accompanied by a Turkish translation.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 721.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Uskub, November 14*, 1912.

YOUR private letter.

Only Ottoman Servians want annexation; every other element would prefer autonomy. I have reason to believe that Servians are already beginning denationalisation of non-Servian Orthodox Christians.

Public notices are only in Servian, in spite of protest of Bulgarian members of municipality.

I have heard of cases of soldiers forcibly unveiling Moslem women, some converts of forty years' standing, others born in Islam.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

[50518] No. 722.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 979. Confidential.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 20*, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith a copy of a report on the strategical importance of the lines of Chatalja, which has been kindly furnished to me by Colonel Schaefer, who is well known in Egypt and is at present employed in the Turkish Intelligence Department.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 722.

Report by Colonel Schaefer on Chatalja Lines.

L'IMPORTANCE des positions de Tchataldja, desquelles dépend maintenant l'existence de l'Empire ottoman en Europe, avait été reconnue déjà pendant la guerre de Crimée par une mission d'officiers anglais du Génie. Les alliés ayant cependant réussi à transporter le théâtre de la guerre sur le sol russe, les précautions pour la défense de Constantinople contre une avance russe (une armée russe étant déjà sur le Danube) n'avaient plus leur raison d'être et la question fut oubliée. Pendant la guerre de 1877 on avait élevé à la hâte quelques ouvrages en terre sous la direction du Général Blum Pacha, un officier du Génie prussien au service ottoman. Mais ces ouvrages, très peu importants, n'étaient que des travaux de fortune et ne trouvèrent du reste aucune occasion d'être utilisées. Après le Traité de Berlin le Général Valentin Baker Pacha, anciennement colonel des Prince of Wales's Hussars (10th), un des militaires les plus en vue de l'armée anglaise à cette époque et qui avait pris service en Turquie pour la guerre turco-russe, pendant laquelle sur le Lom et dans les Balkans il avait rendu des services signalés, entreprit de doter la position de Tchataldja d'une chaine de fortifications destinées à être une barrière infranchissable à une armée ennemie marchant sur Constantinople.

La ville de Tchataldja prend son nom de la forme topographique des collines en face d'elles. Le mot "tchatal" veut dire fourchette. En effet, les éperons de la montagne en face de Tchataldja descendent vers la vallée comme les dents écartées d'une fourchette. Cependant, l'importance de la position n'est pas seulement dans cette formation topographique. La fourchette n'est que le centre de la position. Toute la ligne s'étend depuis la Marmara jusqu'à la Mer Noire sur environ 45 kilom. L'aile gauche se trouve protégé depuis la Marmara jusque près de Tchataldja, c'est-à-dire sur une distance de près de 15 kilom., d'abord par le lac du Grand Tchekmedjé et ensuite par un marécage. L'aile droit se trouve protégée sur une distance de 7 kilom. par le lac de Dercos. La distance sur laquelle l'ennemi pourrait donc développer une attaque est donc de 22 kilom. environ. Outre les forts, très bien situés et qui dominent le lac de Tchekmedjé et celui de Dercos, sur ces 22 kilom. il se trouve une série de forts en terrassement commandant tout le terrain. Le Général Baker Pacha qui, pendant deux ans, surveilla lui-même la construction de tous ces forts, dont il avait élaboré les plans après s'être rendu personnellement compte, jusque dans les menus détails, de toute la configuration du terrain se trouvant devant chaque fort, avait choisi soigneusement l'emplacement définitif, et l'observateur le plus subtil ne pourrait trouver sur les 45 kilom. le moindre angle mort. Il arriva ainsi à doter la capitale de l'Empire ottoman d'une enceinte de forts formidables qu'il sera impossible de franchir si les forts sont restés dans l'état où les a laissés le Général Baker.

L'état-major ottoman ne s'est jamais rendu compte de la valeur stratégique de Tchataldja. A un moment donné on enleva même l'artillerie de siège pour la placer à Andrinople, dont l'importance, comparée à Tchataldja, est cependant secondaire. Maintenant on a de nouveau armé les forts de pièces de siège, les dégâts causés par le manque d'entretien ont été facilement réparés, vu qu'il ne s'agit que d'ouvrages en terre, et si l'armée turque retrouve son moral, elle peut tenir en échec n'importe quelle armée qui tenterait de s'approcher de Constantinople.

C. SCHAEFER, *Colonel.*

Constantinople, le 10 novembre, 1912.

[50277] No. 723.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 982.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 21*, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that His Majesty's vice-consul at the Dardanelles informs me that on the 19th instant martial law was proclaimed in the whole district of the IInd Army Corps and the province of the Dardanelles.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[50278] No. 724

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 983.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 21, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith, for the information of the War Office, a diary reporting on various daily movements of troops in the Ottoman Empire, which has been furnished me from reports received here during the week—7th to 16th November.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 724.

Diary of Movements of Troops reported from 7th to 16th November, 1912.

Trebizond Division.

November 7–8.—Arrived Trebizond from Erzeroum: 786 men, 506 boxes of guns, 1,012 boxes of cartridges, 16 Q.F. guns on 8 mules, 16 mules with ammunition, 28 transport mules, caldrons, tents, military stores, &c.

November 9.—Arrived Trebizond from Erzeroum: 183 men, 520 small boxes of cartridges, 260 large boxes of guns, tents, military stores.

The "Gul-Jemal" left Trebizond for Constantinople with 3 battalions (1,450 men), 455 horses and mules, 16 Q.F. guns, 32 boxes of shells and other accessories. (Included are troops brought from Rizeh the day before.)

November 10 (11 P.M.)—The "Bezm Alem" left Trebizond with 2 Rizeh battalions (1,500 men)—1,000 soldiers, 400 gendarmes, 650 horses, sheep, provisions, ammunition, and military stores in large quantities.

Dardanelles.

November 16.—Arrival of the "Gul-Jemal" reported at Dardanelles with about 2,000 troops and several horses.

The Laabsaki and Kalé Sultanié redif battalions (1,500 men) arrived Dardanelles the same day; 700 men also arrived (presumably of Kalé Sultanié regiment), and the rest of the division is expected.

All these arrivals are destined to garrison Besika Bay, and the troops were landed at Kelia and Cham Burnu, where they are surrounded by two battalions of the Edremit Redif Divisions. The commander, Tewfik Pasha, being at Maitos.

The Mustafiz are being called up to "guard" the villages near the coast, where there is a preponderance of the Greek element, as a precaution in case of a landing.

Shevket Torgud Pasha is reported as having moved from Gallipoli to Keshan.

Salonica.

November 13.—Greeks are sending three divisions to Sorovitch, which fell again into the hands of Zekki Pasha, leaving two divisions at Salonica to act as counterpoise to Bulgarians, who keep on pouring into the town. Their present number is calculated there as being between 30,000 and 40,000.

The consul-general at Salonica reports great ill-feeling between the Greeks and the Bulgarians. The Bulgarians having the appearance of being determined to "oust" the Greeks. Both are behaving disgracefully in the town, ransacking and pillaging.

Greeks have been putting their Cretan gendarmes into action, 180 landed (13th November), 400 more expected. Mr. Lamb thinks they will have but little authority over the Bulgarian soldiery.

Hussan Tahsin's 23,000 men declare that they have been three days without food. By the terms of the capitulation the Greeks have to feed them, and they have made all the necessary arrangements; but there are no medical appliances or medicines to cope with the possible spread of disease.

[50279] No. 725.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 984.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 21, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout, relative to the situation in Syria, with special reference to pro-British agitation in Moslem and Christian circles.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 725.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 76. Confidential.)

Sir, *Beirout, November 14, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose copy of a message sent by me to your Excellency by wireless telegraphy (through His Majesty's ship "Barham" to His Majesty's ship "Hampshire") on the 13th instant.

The situation in this vilayet and, as far as I can learn, in the whole of Syria and Palestine is quiet at present, but, for the reasons stated in my despatch No. 74 of the 8th instant, it only needs a lead from Constantinople or any other important town in Asiatic Turkey to bring about an attack on Christians, and perhaps foreigners, which the local authorities, however well intentioned, will, in their present state of despondency and demoralisation, prove powerless to suppress.

There is also a possibility that, following precedents, the Christians, if not the Syrian Arabs, in some place or other may provoke excesses on the part of Moslems in the hopes of securing foreign intervention. It is currently reported in Beirout that to forward their ends, *i.e.*, foreign intervention, it had been decided in a secret conclave of Moslems at Beirout to make an attempt on the life of one of the foreign consular representatives, and that my name had been drawn by lot, thus following the example of the Armenian revolutionists at Erzeroum who fired at me in 1895.

Not only is the Moslem feeling bitter against their Government on account of their defeats in European Turkey, but they also see no hope of a betterment in the future administration of the country, and openly discuss the advisability of paving the way for a foreign tutelage, the possibility of which is vividly suggested by the rumoured designs in this direction of France, to which I have had occasion to call the attention of His Majesty's Embassy.

Before the war with Italy this question was merely discussed from time to time as a more or less distant possibility owing to Turkish misgovernment in general and the apparent failure of the new constitutional régime to bring about an improvement in the general situation.

The war with Italy and the facility with which the loss of Tripoli took place encouraged a greater freedom of speech on the subject of possible further dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and people in Syria, especially the Christians, began talking pretty openly about the possibility of foreign intervention in the affairs of Turkey, and it reached me from many sources that the general feeling both among Moslems and Christians alike was that, should circumstances necessitate a foreign occupation of Syria, whether to institute autonomy or a permanent foreign annexation, local preference was for England or Egypt under British auspices; and on the occasions when local events connected with the action of Italian war-ships at Beirout were seized by the French Government to dispatch war-ships to these waters for the protection of French citizens and, as given out at the time, of foreigners and Christians in general, this prompt action was generally looked upon as demonstrating a desire on the part of France to assert a prior right to interfere in Syria should events occur necessitating foreign intervention.

During the last few days the steady list of Turkish disasters and the expected collapse of the Sultan's Government have provoked a very acute feeling of distrust of French intentions and a fear that, owing to the friendship with England, His Majesty's Government may be inclined to acquiesce in the pretensions of the French Government

and give it a free hand as regards Syria, and that unless the inhabitants stirred themselves now and got their wishes known it would be too late.

Not only have I had this feeling confirmed from several well-informed sources, but I have been indirectly approached by leading Moslems of Beirout with the object of finding out the views of His Majesty's Government with regard to a possible extension of Egyptian rule to Syria, and how far they can rely upon its support of their wishes, which they declare are shared by all Moslems and by 60 per cent. of the Christians in Syria.

I have been very careful to avoid any expression of encouragement of their schemes, merely giving it as my personal opinion that the Ottoman Government will succeed in rallying from its present discomfiture and start with fresh life and energy if only as an Asiatic Power, should it be deprived of its European provinces as a result of the present war.

I am credibly informed that this agitation against a possible French occupation, and in favour of Egyptian rule under British auspices, is likely to increase in intensity with every move on the part of French agencies in the near future, whether political or naval, some people going as far as to say that they will resist such occupation by force should it take place.

It has been a somewhat difficult task for me to prevent public demonstrations here in favour of British intervention, and I have only so far succeeded by assuring my numerous interlocutors that His Majesty's Government was duly aware of the feeling of the public in the matter. I believe that a petition is being prepared, if not already sent, for presentation to the Khedive, whose intervention in his capacity of an Arab ruler is invoked by Moslems and by Christians and Moslems alike, as head of a British dependency, thus ensuring the extension to Syria of the benefits of British administration, which they feel has proved so beneficial to Egypt and to all other Eastern countries under British rule.

The only thing that keeps them back from the display of more practical proofs of their determination to resist French interference is the fear of incurring the displeasure of the Turkish authorities for prematurely anticipating the collapse of Ottoman rule on the one hand, and of that of the French Government for seeking the protection of another Power on the other hand, unless they can receive encouragement from His Majesty's Government that it is disposed to favourably consider their wishes.

I have, &c.

H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 725.

Copy of Wireless Telegram from Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther, November 13, 1912.

THINGS normal in Beirout, where, however, a very strong agitation is on foot among Moslems, supported by non-Catholic Christians, for appeal to Khedive to replace Ottoman Government in Syria in preference to any other foreign Government should Ottoman Government prove unable to recover from present deplorable state and necessitate foreign intervention to maintain order. Suspected designs of French assertion of right to intervene in Syria appear to be very unpopular in Moslem and non-Catholic circles. I am informed that Khedive has already been secretly approached.

[50335] No. 726.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 91.)

Sir, *Belgrade, November 21, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 85 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to enclose translation of a leading article which appeared in yesterday's "Samouprava," the Servian Government organ, and which expresses the views of the Servian Government upon the prospect of an autonomous Albania and the Adriatic port question.

I have, &c.

RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 726.

Extract from the "Samouprava" of November 7 (20), 1912.

PALLIATIVES.

(Translation.)

SURPRISED by events which it could neither foresee nor hinder, the diplomacy of some of the Great Powers, due partly to long-standing tradition and routine, and partly to a desire to consolidate definitely political conditions in the Balkans, is once more about to create a situation which cannot possibly afford any sure guarantees for peace in the future. The creation of an autonomous Albania at the expense of Servia —the Austro-Italian diplomatic conception—means, to far-seeing persons acquainted more or less with conditions in the Balkans, a state of affairs the contrary of peaceful. The foreign interests and influences which will penetrate into the new principality and clash with each other will give rise to complications the extent and importance of which it is for the present impossible to gauge.

When the inevitable results of this artificial creation will begin to become evident then it will be realised how great was the mistake to have set aside the natural solution of the question. Only then will it become clear that the combinations now being elaborated for the solution of the Balkan imbroglio are nothing but palliatives from which it is impossible to expect any good results whatever.

The same can be said of the combinations for giving Servia a port on the sea. Servia's requirements in this respect are generally recognised, but suggestions are put forward by which Servia's demands would be only formally satisfied. An outlet to the sea is necessary to Servia to protect her trade against the caprices of foreign States. This vital need of hers can only be satisfied and safeguarded if access to a sea-port and the port itself is permanently in her own hands. The road to the Ægean, even if it lay across Servian territory, would be unnatural for Servia both owing to its length and to the distance of the port from the centres where Servian products originate. An outlet on the Ægean would offend the interests of our allies, would include foreign territories, and would be considered only as provisional and clashing with the interests of all the Balkan States.

Consequently all the combinations put forward are in reality nothing more than obstacles thrust in the way of Servia's aspirations to reach her sea, for the offers made to her do not satisfy the need of free access to the sea for which she asks.

European diplomacy does no good in its endeavours to patch up peace, even for the time being, by granting concessions directed against Servia's vital requirements. It is not without truth that it has been said that palliative measures in politics are always the worst measures. The denial of Servia's legitimate rights and the attribution of undue value to pretensions, only because these are backed up by material force, are gestures which do not speak in favour of the foresight of European diplomacy. We have considered it necessary to say this, and the development of future events will prove that we were not wrong.

[50399] No. 727.

Vice-Consul Keyser to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantza, November 21, 1912.*

I AM taking advantage of the King's messenger passing through Constantza to-morrow morning on his way from Constantinople to London to furnish you with the following brief report on the use which the Turkish Government is making of this port during the present war:—

On the 10th November I was informed that during the past days large quantities of war material had been arriving here by rail in German and Austrian waggons, and was discharged at a wharf which is reserved for the loading of case oil and which is adjacent to the petroleum harbour. On the same day the Turkish steam-ship "Ghiuzal Giuret" arrived and berthed alongside the wharf in question. I was myself

able to observe that gun-carriages, small cases which obviously contained ammunition, and long cases which apparently contained cannon were being loaded on to this vessel, which sailed on the 13th instant with about 1,000 tons of the war material on board. I am informed that five or six waggons loaded with similar war materials have been arriving daily since that date. I have heard that some of the waggons come from Creusot. The fact that war materials were arriving and being shipped from here soon leaked out and became generally known in the town. The local port authorities, however, evidently wish to keep the matter as quiet as possible. They have taken measures to prevent unauthorised persons from having access to the wharf where the materials are lying, while the port captain has even vigorously denied that such materials have ever arrived or been shipped from here. The facts are, however, patent to any person whose business takes him to the harbour.

On the 14th instant a small two-funnelled Turkish cruiser, fitted with wireless telegraph apparatus, arrived here at sunset, but did not enter the harbour and sailed again during the night. On the 17th instant a Turkish cruiser again appeared off the port in the late evening. On both these dates a Roumanian mail-ship was to sail for Constantinople. The commander of one of these mail-ships informed me that they carried flour, and frequently also specie, and other goods for the Turkish Government, and were regularly escorted from here by a Turkish cruiser. I have also heard it mentioned that several aeroplanes and large quantities of military clothing have also been carried at different times to Constantinople by the Roumanian mail-ships.

On the 15th November the Turkish transport "Marmara" arrived and sailed again on the 16th with a cargo of 208 horses for the Turkish army. I am informed that the Turkish Government have purchased some 4,000 horses in Hungary which they intend to ship from Constantza.

Yesterday, the 20th November, two more Turkish transports arrived here. The one, the "Midhat Pasha," is loading war materials. The other, the "Ak Deniz," which is the former liner "Oldenburg," this name being still legible on her bows, is loading horses, to the number, it is said, of 500.

This afternoon the Turkish cruiser to which I have referred above again arrived and anchored off the port. I am unable to ascertain her name, as all knowledge of it is denied both at the port captain's and at the port medical officer's offices. She is presumably waiting to escort the Roumanian mail-ship which sails to-night. I have not yet learnt the sailing dates of the Turkish transports.

I have, &c.

LIONEL E. KEYSER.

[50321] No. 728.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 206.)

Sir, *Vienna, November 23, 1912.*

THE results of the victories of the Balkan League are already beginning to make themselves felt in the internal politics of the dual Monarchy, where a determination is being clearly shown among the non-Slav population to make common cause against their Slav opponents. The Germans of Austria and the Magyars of Hungary are forgetting their differences in the endeavour to form, in the words spoken a few days ago by Count Stephen Tisza at Arad, "A line of defence from the Adriatic to the Black Sea against the rising tide of Slavism."

This tendency was particularly noticeable during the recent session of the Delegations at Budapest, when Herr Dobernig, the vice-president of the Austrian Delegation, solemnly abjured his previous hostility to Hungary, and declared the importance of an understanding being arrived at between the Germans of Austria and the Magyars. At the same dinner at which this speech was made, Count Tisza spoke with enthusiasm of the necessity of upholding the Emperor's motto of *Viribus Unitis*, and of avoiding petty disputes which were prejudicial to both sides. Members of the Polish party (who have never been inclined to Pan-Slavism) were also present; and the hope was expressed that it would eventually be possible to arrive at a German-Polish-Hungarian understanding. Similar pro-Magyar speeches have been made here and at Budapest by German politicians of more Radical views than Herr Dobernig, and there

appears to have been in general a very cordial exchange of views between the representatives of the two nationalities, which is expected to lead to important results.

There can be no doubt that serious apprehensions are felt in Austria-Hungary in regard to the advance and expansion of the Slav nations which will inevitably result from the victories of the Balkan League. A recent symptom of this apprehension has been the refusal of the municipal authorities of Vienna to permit the establishment of a Czech public elementary school (even though maintained by Czech funds) in the capital. Vienna, it is declared, is the bulwark of Germanism, and can under no circumstances make the slightest surrender to Slav demands, which are looked upon as a systematic method of attack leading eventually to more far-reaching claims. Public opinion has been strongly roused on the subject, and enthusiastic anti-Czech demonstrations have been held in the streets. Every effort, it is declared by the German press of Vienna, must be made to combat the Slav ambition to make Austria-Hungary a predominantly Slav State, a danger which is regarded as particulary pressing at the present moment.

It must not, however, be forgotten that one deep cleft—that of religion—separates the Balkan Slavs from their brothers in Austria-Hungary. The former are as predominantly Orthodox as the latter are Catholic. This fact will, it is hoped, interpose a real barrier between the two groups of Slavs, and lead to the south Slavs of Austria-Hungary being content to remain under the rule of a Catholic Sovereign. The upholders of the trialistic theory, who have always reckoned upon a predominance of Catholicism in the third and Slav State of the Monarchy, would find their system shattered if sympathy for Orthodox Slavism were to find a firm footing in Austria-Hungary; so that both dualists and trialists are now at one in endeavouring to meet the changed situation brought about by events in the Balkans.

It appears certain that the Hungarian treatment of Croatia will have to become less drastic than hitherto if the Croats are to be prevented from looking beyond their borders for political freedom. Possibly a recent demonstration at Agram of affection to the ban of Croatia and of loyalty to the Emperor may be a signal of the beginning of a new era in this respect. It has been characterised in some quarters in Vienna as a purely artificial manifestation; but even if this is the case, it may possibly have been arranged by the authorities as an excuse for extending, without loss of dignity to the Magyars, more generous treatment to the Croatians.

From the despatch No. 4 addressed to you by His Majesty's consul at Sarajevo on the 19th November, it is clear that the sympathies of the Serb population of Bosnia-Herzegovina are very distinctly on the side of the Servian aspirations and against the restrictions which the Austro-Hungarian Government seek to impose on them. Reports are also published in the press here of a serious pro-Servian agitation in the Panesova district of Southern Hungary.

I have, &c.

FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[50292] No. 729.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 487.)

Sir, *Berlin, November 23, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Field-Marshal von Schemua, chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, arrived unostentatiously in Berlin yesterday morning an hour before the arrival of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. His Excellency had a long conference with his German colleague, General von Moltke, and left again for Vienna immediately afterwards as quietly as he came.

The "Vossische Zeitung" attributes great significance to this visit. It points out that, though the Archduke's visit was arranged before even the war in the Balkans had begun, the Austrian field-marshal came to Berlin on the spur of the moment. The incident, it thinks, must be taken as serious, but not alarming.

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

[50358] No. 730.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 495. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, November 23, 1912.*

I HAD the honour to inform you in my telegram No. 206 of yesterday, with reference to your conversation with the German Ambassador, recorded in your telegram No. 391 of the 20th instant to His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, that I learnt from M. Poincaré that the Ægean Islands were not mentioned by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs in his conversation with the French Ambassador on the subject of the war in the Balkans.

M. Poincaré told me yesterday that in a recent conversation with the Italian Ambassador on the matters which would have to be considered by the Powers on the termination of the war he mentioned the Ægean Islands, whereupon M. Tittoni enquired which of those islands M. Poincaré had in mind. Naturally to those occupied, or which may be occupied, by the Greeks, his Excellency replied, for the Italian Government had given assurances of which the French Government had taken note in regard to those occupied by Italy, and she had moreover bound herself by treaty with Turkey to give them up on Turkish demand. M. Tittoni admitted the treaty engagement, but said that there remained the question of the form of administration for the islands to be discussed. No doubt, observed M. Poincaré, but that would be a matter not for the consideration of the Italian Government in communication with the Porte, but for discussion and settlement between all the Great Powers, including Italy.

I mentioned to M. Poincaré that His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome had not detected any disposition on the part of the Italian Government to depart from their treaty engagements in regard to Rhodes, and he was inclined to think that the Italian Ambassador in London had started the question on his own initiative as a *ballon d'essai*, and the French Ambassador was, I understood, of the same opinion as Sir Rennell Rodd. M. Poincaré said that he was aware of the impressions of the British and French Ambassadors at Rome; his Excellency, however, very justly observed that had the question been raised by the Marquis Imperiali merely on his own initiative it would not have been brought to his (M. Poincaré's) notice by the Greek Minister in Paris as having been discussed at Berlin between the Italian and German Ministers for Foreign Affairs, of which fact M. Jules Cambon had sent confirmatory evidence to M. Poincaré.

From the conversation of a person in close connection with the Italian Embassy here, whom I met on the 20th instant, I have no doubt that the feeling there is that Rhodes ought to be possessed by Italy, and that the means of retaining it might be the inability of Turkey to reimburse Italy for the expenditure on works of various kinds since its occupation by Italian troops. The person in question stated that there had been a large outlay by the Italian Government.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[50322] No. 731.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 200.)
Sir, *Vienna, November 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Budapest, reporting on the recent visit of M. Danef, the President of the Bulgarian Sobranjé, to that city.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

Enclosure in No. 731.

Consul-General Grant-Duff to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 10. Confidential.)
Sir, *Budapest, November 19, 1912.*

I HAD a conversation this morning with my Roumanian colleague, M. Derussi, regarding the recent visit of M. Daneff to Budapest. He informs me that the substance of the article in the "Pester Lloyd" of Monday, the 11th November, entitled, "Die Mission Danef," was directly communicated to the editor, M. Sigmund Singer, by M. Danef himself. The Bulgarian consul-general has confirmed this. The following details, he states, were obtained from a sure source.

M. Danef was formerly strongly Russophile, and is known by the Roumanian Government to have been in Russian pay. Owing to the constant intrigues of Russia at Sophia he has, however, very much modified his political views, and the main object of his visit was to attempt to come to an understanding with Count Berchtold as to some of the more important Balkan questions. The Bulgarians, said M. Danef, were very good friends of Russia, but they were in the first instance patriots, and they were determined, while showing themselves reasonable and conciliatory, to be under the tutelage of no one. He expressed the hope that the Austro-Hungarian Government would not be too uncompromising in regard to Servian aspirations, but it would appear that Bulgaria has no intention of actively supporting that country in case of war with the Dual Monarchy. M. Danef said that Bulgaria was not by any means pleased to see Salonica in Greek hands, and hoped that that port would eventually be internationalised. As regards Roumania, M. Danef admitted that her claim to consideration was highly important, and he earnestly hoped that the Bulgarian Government might be able to come to an amicable settlement with her. If her demands were too extravagant, difficulties might arise with the military party in Bulgaria.

M. Danef expressed himself as extremely gratified at his reception in Budapest, especially at the opportunity afforded him of a conversation with the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which lasted over an hour. He was glad to find that His Imperial Highness was not so bellicose as he had been led to believe. M. Derussi stated that he had heard from a reliable source that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Constantinople had, during last summer, impressed on his Government that the state of the Turkish army was exceedingly bad, especially as regards commissariat, transport, and medical service. Marquis Pallavicini's despatches stating that view had annoyed the Ballplatz, whose policy was founded on the conviction of the victory of Turkey in a war against a Balkan coalition. The Roumanian Government have heard that the Bulgarian victories have excited jealousy in St. Petersburgh, and the Hungarian Prime Minister has received similar information.

As regards the feeling in this country, I may say that a war into which Hungary was dragged for the benefit of Austria would excite strong resentment, and would also be considered a grave national danger. As you are aware, there is a considerable Slav (about 5,000,000 according to the statistics of 1900) population living in the territories under the sacred Crown, and the Hungarians have never shown much disposition to conciliate smaller nationalities. Croatia, as I have had several times the honour to report, is in a discontented and unsatisfactory state, and the constitution was last summer suspended there for an indefinite period.

The Servian Government is no doubt counting on at least the sympathy of these Hungarian Slavs, and in case of a declaration of war it is not impossible that there might be a rising in Croatia. Hungarians have nothing to gain by war, and the prospect of Hungarian blood being shed for the honour and glory of Austria fills the ordinary native of this country with disgust. On the whole, the country is prosperous, money is being rapidly made, and land, in many districts, is advancing in value by leaps and bounds. It is small wonder that a war and its inevitable result—a general raking-up of the very delicate nationalities question—should fill all classes with apprehension. Probably no race in Europe cares less about external politics than do the Hungarians. Home affairs and the perennial struggle with Austria are the sole real questions of public interest, and unless attacked they have no wish to fight anyone.

I have, &c.
EVELYN GRANT DUFF.

[50422] No. 732.

Note communicated by M. Cambon November 26, 1912.

LES consuls de France dans les régions de la Turquie d'Europe occupées par les troupes bulgares, serbes ou grecques ont été invités à faire connaître aux autorités militaires de leurs résidences que les services de la Dette publique ottomane encaissent des sommes, qui sont le gage des créanciers de la Turquie, et qu'à ce titre ces services sont sous la protection des Grandes Puissances.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 25 novembre, 1912.

[50261] No. 733.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 26.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November 25, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 25th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 733.

Vice-Consul Palmer to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Dardanelles, November 25, 1912.*

"ADMIRAL SPAUN" left south.

Enclosure 2 in No. 733.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 25, 1912.*

VICE-CONSUL CHIOS reports panic amongst population as seven Greek men-of-war appeared off harbour.

[50471] No. 734.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 26.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November 26, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 25th instant, relative to movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 734.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 25, 1912.*

GENERAL at head of young Turks and large number of officers, including some gendarmerie, are reported by consul-general Salonica to have been arrested and deported to Greece, on grounds of alleged, and probably imaginary, intended rising of Mussulman population. The latter naturally resent greatly flagrant violation of surrender.

Enclosure 2 in No. 734.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 25, 1912.*

"JURIEN DE LA GRAVIÈRE" left Besika for Dedeagatch. "Inflexible" arrived, having passed at 10 P.M. yesterday. "Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand" and "Radetsky," with two destroyers, steering south in Cape Doro Channel. "Admiral Spaun" left Dardanelles south full speed 8 A.M. to-day.

Enclosure 3 in No. 734.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 25, 1912.*

"HAMPSHIRE" reports "Aspern" will leave Constantinople to-morrow.

Enclosure 4 in No. 734.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, November 25, 1912.*

SEND "Black Prince" Syrian coast, as proposed in your No. 371.

[50265] No. 735.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November 25, 1912.*

VIENNA telegram No. 161 of 24th November.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs again mentioned Professor Masaryk to me to-day in connection with unofficial overtures referred to in my telegram No. 80 of 23rd November.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[50432] No. 736.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 163. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 25, 1912.*

GREEK Minister came to see me this evening and told me that the Servian Minister had informed him confidentially that he had received indication that in influential circles in Belgrade it was beginning to be recognised that Servia would in the end have to give way to Austria and accept the autonomy of Albania. Greek Minister also informed me that reports he had received of the state of the Bulgarian army before Constantinople were very unsatisfactory, and that he had telegraphed urgently to his Government to advise them to press for rapid conclusion of peace.

[50479] No. 737.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 164.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November 26, 1912.*

FEELING is running very high in Vienna to-day on account of the unsatisfactory reports received as to the action of Servian authorities in impeding the Austrian agent from proceeding to Prisrend to enquire into the fate of Austrian consul. It is now generally believed that he has been murdered. I am informed that as yet Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has taken no definite decision as to what he will do, but the situation caused by consular question is so serious that fears are entertained that a popular demonstration may be made against the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs unless strong action is taken at Belgrade.

[50477] No. 738.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 165.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 26, 1912.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 678 of 25th November and my telegram No. 158 of 23rd November.

The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me on 23rd November that he ardently desired conclusion of peace between Turkey and the Balkan League.

From what he said, I gathered that he had advised the Turkish Ambassador at Berlin, whom he had seen that day, not to trouble so much about the conclusion of armistice, but to work for conclusion of a preliminary peace on the lines of Treaty of San Stefano. I think that this is probably all that Austria is doing at Constantinople at the present moment.

I learn confidentially report of a conversation between the Austrian Minister at Sophia and Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs has been received here, in which the latter positively assured the former that Bulgaria would on no account allow herself to be dragged into complications with Austria in defence of Servian pretensions.

[50489] No. 739.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 166. Most Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 26, 1912.*

AT the beginning of last week Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs told Austrian Minister at Athens that Greece would support Servian claim to an Adriatic port through thick and thin. Report of this conversation was telegraphed to Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and produced there worst impression. The day that the telegram was received the Greek Minister, not knowing what had passed at Athens, went to see Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to show him a telegram which he had just received from the King of Greece, in which His Majesty expressed his wish of maintaining the best relations with Austria-Hungary, with whom Greeks desired to live on terms of amity. Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs received the Greek Minister coldly and showed him the report of what had passed at Athens. Thereupon the Greek Minister telegraphed to his Government offering to resign. On the 23rd November he received a telegram from the Greek Prime Minister entirely repudiating personal private opinions of Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, and instructing him to assure Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Greece had no intention of entering into quarrel with this country over question of Adriatic port.

[50494] No. 740.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 167.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 26, 1912.*

I LEARN from a person who ought to be well informed that orders have been sent to authorities in Northern Galicia to make preparations for quartering German troops. According to this information, Cracow will receive two German hussar regiments, and Saxon troops will be quartered at Bodenbach. I am informed that these details were settled during the visit of the Austrian Chief of Staff to Berlin last week.

Pray inform Director of Military Operations.

[50501] No. 741.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 168.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 26, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"Calling out of three classes of reservists in following corps is established:—

"1st Cracow, 2nd Vienna, 3rd Graz, 6th Pressburg, 6th Kaschau, 10th Przemysl, 11th Lemberg, and 13th Agram. Following are probable: 7th Temesvar and 9th Leitmeritz.

"Following are probably untouched: 12th Hermannstadt and 14th Innsbruck.

"Following are the 'Jahrgangs': 1909, 1908, and 1907. It is expected that 1906 will be called soon. For purposes of calculation each 'Jahrgang' may be taken as 20 men, which with 70 recruits makes companies of normal battalion 170 strong, without allowing for drafts for Bosnia. Battalions on average may be taken as 600 strong.

"The railway regiment from Korneuburg has left for Cracow. Movements of drafts of dragoons from Vienna are reported. There is a large collection of bridging material near Esseg.

"'Times' correspondent states that Servians are fast collecting in sanjak near Bosnia. Bulgarian military attaché did not deny this report, and states that resources of the allies will be in any case sufficient to cause Austria-Hungary to detach sixteen divisions against Servia."

[50502] No. 742.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 169.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November 26, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 164 of 26th November.

I learn that a telegram has been received here to-day reporting the arrival at Uskub of the Austrian consul at Prisrend.

[50453] No. 743.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 680.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 25, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Salonica by wireless telegraphy to-day:—

"General leading the Young Turks and large number of officers, including some of the gendarmerie, arrested and deported to Greece for flagrant violation of surrender. The pretext given is alleged discovery of contemplated Turkish rising of Mussulman population, as to the reality of which I am somewhat doubtful. Mussulman resentment naturally great."

Do you wish these messages repeated, or do you get them from the Admiralty?

[50263] No. 744.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 681.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 25, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 675 of 24th November.

Court-martial has this evening issued statement with reference to recent arrests, to the effect that it has been proved by admissions and documentary proofs that committee adherents and officers in civilian clothes who organised and participated in pro-war demonstration at the Porte on Monday, 7th October, did so with the object of producing an internal revolution and overthrowing the Government, while they also made a seditious propaganda in the army, urging the men not to fight, "as Kiamil Pasha had sold the European provinces"; also that a member of the committee had enrolled fedais to assassinate by bombs, &c., Sultan, Minister of War, and other Ministers. Statement adds that there is no question of indiscriminate persecution of the committee, and that members with a clear conscience need not fear molestation.

[50264] No. 745.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 682.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 25, 1912.*

I HAVE been informed to-day by the Porte that Turkish and Bulgarian delegates were to meet to-day at a place two hours' ride from Turkish headquarters.

Porte's idea is that instead of now discussing the armistice proposals they should ask Bulgarian delegates for the permanent peace terms—possibly prompted by suggestion contained in last paragraph of your telegram No. 1003 of the 22nd. Centre of Bulgarian army reported to have fallen back on Cherkeskeui, and it is thought possible that half will join in attack on Adrianople and the other half proceed to Gallipoli. Grand Vizier stated to-day that latest statistics of deaths from all cases causes in lines was 142 in one day.

[50286] No. 746.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 683.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 26, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Smyrna to-day:—

"British vice-consul at Chios telegraphs that after fighting Turkish troops retired to hills and Greeks occupied the island."

[50493] No. 747.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 685.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 26, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 953 of 6th November.

Propose releasing "City of Chios," now laden with valuable cargo, and, if need be, later on to arrange for charter of a second Khedivial, or detain Ellerman liner "Bosnia," if you can arrange this with company.

[50492] No. 748.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 120.)
(Telegraphic.) *Code.* *Athens, November 26, 1912.*

IT is officially notified that Scio has been occupied.

[50497] No. 749.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 187.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 26, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 118 of 2nd November.

Thirty thousand recruits of 1913, after one month's training, proceeding to the front. These, with troops proceeding from Salonica by sea to Dedeagatch and thence by rail to Baba Eski, will increase the Bulgarian forces at the front by approximately 60,000 men.

Negotiations proceeding, but Bulgarians are not very desirous of pressing matters in view of pending arrival of reinforcements above mentioned.

[50498] No. 750.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 188.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, November 26, 1912.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 678 of 25th November.

Action of Triple Alliance at both Sophia and Belgrade which occurred prior to the activity now displayed at Constantinople confirms the conclusions arrived at in telegram above mentioned.

Triple Alliance and Roumania are now openly favouring Turkey. Latter country is being supplied with guns, horses, and some German artillerymen viâ Constanza.

If conditions of armistice are not agreed to, allies will continue war with all their forces (see my telegram No. 187 of to-day). They will gladly view forward [group undecypherable] on the part of Turkey. They have not yet decided in case of resumption of hostilities whether to keep quiet in front of Turkish lines or to risk [group undecypherable]. They anticipate Adrianople will not hold out much longer.

[50496] No. 751

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 452. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 26, 1912.*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Ambassador was received to-day by Emperor in an audience which had been specially arranged by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He conveyed to His Majesty messages from Emperor of Austria to the effect that it had afforded latter much pleasure that during last critical month two Governments had kept in friendly contact, and expressing hopes that this would always be the case.

Ambassador tells me that Emperor's reception of him was most cordial, and his Excellency is convinced that some pacific issue out of the present crisis will be found. Emperor, who retained him an hour in conversation, said that Russia was not committed to any one particular solution of the Servian port question. While object to be aimed at was economic emancipation of Servia, means by which that object was to be attained should, in His Majesty's opinion, form subject of friendly discussion between Powers.

[50016] No. 752.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.**

(No. 182.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 26, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 182 of 25th November: Turkish bondholders.

You need not wait for your Russian colleague.

[50249] No. 753.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1291.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 26, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 449 of 25th November.

If Minister for Foreign Affairs is prepared to accept the alternative of which he speaks I believe an agreement could be come to between the Great Powers on all points. In this event the sooner their Ambassadors at Paris receive instructions to discuss the questions contemplated by M. Sazonof the better. The alternative of which he speaks for Albania and Servia could not be refused by Austria, and would probably receive the support of Italy; there would probably be little difficulty as regards any other points. The Great Powers would then be able to declare that on certain specified points they found themselves in complete agreement, and that on all others the Balkan allies could make what settlement they pleased. All anxiety as to war between the Great Powers would then be at an end. It is important, if Minister for Foreign Affairs really means, as I hope he does, to propose or accept alternative of which he speaks, that consultation between the Powers, preferably by Ambassadors as suggested, should be begun without delay. An agreement on this once come to, the peace of Europe would no longer be at the mercy of some untoward incident between Austria and Servia.

You should tell Minister for Foreign Affairs my view.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 749.)

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* Also to Sir F. Elliot (No. 295), *mutatis mutandis*.

[49891] No. 754.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 571.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 26, 1912.*

M. CAMBON told Sir A. Nicolson on the 20th November that the Marquis di San Giuliano, in conversation with M. Barrère, related to him quite accurately the remarks which he, Sir A. Nicolson, recently made to the Marquis Imperiali in regard to the Ægean islands—to the effect that we were not in the least uneasy as to the islands at present occupied by Italy, as she had given us assurances that she would not retain any, and was also bound by treaty to restore them to Turkey. The Marquis di San Giuliano observed that Italy had occupied the islands as a belligerent, and that their future status would have to be settled in conference after the present war. M. Barrère thought he saw some *arrière-pensée* in these reflections, and M. Poincaré had replied ("d'un ton un peu vif," M. Cambon said) to the effect that Italy would have to fulfil her assurances as to evacuation whatever a conference might settle later.

M. Cambon said Bulgaria would claim Thasos as being in close proximity to her future coast.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[49894] No. 755.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 572.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 26, 1912.*

M. CAMBON told Sir A. Nicolson on the 21st November that he omitted to read to me (because he had not then read it himself) the reply of M. Poincaré to the two telegrams sent by M. Louis.

The substance of the reply is as follows:

Austria-Hungary would consider as illusory the concession which Russia was prepared to make if Albania were to be truncated as far south as Durazzo. After his conversation with the Austrian, German, and Italian representatives, M. Poincaré has no doubt whatever on that point. M. Tittoni had said that, notwithstanding all that had passed at Racconigi, Italy would have to stand firmly at the side of Austria-Hungary on that point. If Montenegro were to insist on retaining San Giovanni di Medua, access to the Adriatic could not be assured to Servia except at the price of a war with the Triple Alliance.

As all these difficulties arise M. Poincaré is more than ever convinced that they cannot be solved by conversations between Cabinets, and that the longer a conference is delayed the greater is the likelihood that misunderstandings will be aggravated.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[51018] No. 756.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 580.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 26, 1912.*

M. CAMBON spoke to me to-day of the rumours about Syria, with regard to which he had spoken to Sir Arthur Nicolson yesterday. It was reported in Cairo that Lord Kitchener was going to make a visit to Syria.

I said that Syria had not been mentioned between Lord Kitchener and me, nor had I discussed the question at all.

M. Cambon observed that they were no doubt just rumours without foundation; but they had attracted notice in the Paris press, because the French had considerable interests in Syria, and they naturally attached importance to them.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[51017] No. 757.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 581.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 26, 1912.

M. CAMBON informed me to-day that, as regards the proposed conference for a Balkan settlement, the German Government had expressed themselves not unfavourable to a conference if it could be confined to the Great Powers. The French Ambassador in Berlin had replied that the French view was that there should be a conference to which the Balkan States should be parties.

I said that this was not at all the sort of conference which I had in mind. What I was thinking of was a conference of the Ambassadors of the Great Powers in Paris to get rid of difficulties between the Great Powers.

M. Cambon said that this was his idea also.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[49892] No. 758.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 538.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 26, 1912.

THE Turkish Ambassador called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 21st November to say that Kiamil Pasha had proposed to the allies an armistice and the discussion of preliminaries of peace.

The allies had replied stipulating for an armistice and the conclusion of a definite treaty of peace.

This, Towfik Pasha remarked, was evidently proposed to exclude the Powers from having a word to say in the matter, and to avoid the assembly of a conference.

His Highness had telegraphed to Kiamil Pasha that if the conditions proposed by the allies were acceptable to Turkey, and would be acceptable to the Powers, some of whom had very great interests in South-Eastern Europe, there would be no harm in accepting them.

Sir A. Nicolson enquired whether the allies had laid down any conditions as to an armistice, and whether they had given any time limit. Towfik Pasha said no conditions had as yet been communicated, but as the plenipotentiaries were meeting on the 21st November, the allies would probably then lay down their conditions.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50807] No. 759.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 393.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 26, 1912.

COUNT BENCKENDORFF informed me to-day, with reference to the Austrian idea that there had been a change in the attitude of Russia, that there had been no change. M. Sazonof was still taking into account the views of both sides, i.e., Austria and Servia, and was looking for a solution which would be equitable and peaceful. He was continuing to counsel moderation in Belgrade.

Speaking personally, Count Benckendorff observed that Russia did not wish to have war, but, if there was a real question of interfering with the liberation of the Slavs, Russia would undoubtedly be forced to fight. He instanced the possibility of Turkey being urged on and gaining successes, or the possibility of an attempt to deprive the Balkan States of expansion.

I said that I understood this. On the other hand, the sole outstanding point was the question whether Servia was to have a Servian port on the Adriatic or access to a neutralised free port on that sea. This by itself, if it was a single outstanding point, was really not worth a European war.

Count Benckendorff cordially agreed to this.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50540] No. 760.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 185.)

Sir, *Athens, November* 18, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 93 of the 5th July, I have the honour to remark that the end of the year is approaching, and that 140,000 fr. will not be sufficient to cover M. Zaïmis's out-of-pocket expenses, if the interest on his debt to the banks is allowed to run on after that date.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[50541] No. 761.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 186.)

Sir, *Athens, November* 19, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which has been addressed to me by the British officer attached to the Greek field forces.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 761.

Major Cunliffe-Owen to Sir F. Elliot.

Sir, *Salonica, November* 14, 1912.

I HAVE to report, for the information of the War Office, that the military attachés arrived in Salonica yesterday and are ordered to leave to-day at 11 A.M. for the direction of Vodena and Monastir, whither the commander-in-chief is proceeding. Four divisions have already left Salonica to reinforce the 5th Division in the operations against the Turkish force around Sorovich and Monastir. Two divisions thus remain in Salonica (the 2nd and 7th), together with a Bulgarian division which arrived on the 11th from the direction of Serres.

I have, &c.
F. CUNLIFFE-OWEN.

[50520] No. 762.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 986.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 23, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation from the "Liberté" of the 19th November of a telegram which has been addressed by the Sheikh-ul-Islam to the authorities in all the vilayets of Arabia and Anatolia, enjoining the Moslem population to treat their non-Moslem brethren on terms of perfect equality, as enjoined by the Sheriat, and warning them that the authors of the slightest incident will be held responsible before God, and will be punished by the Government.

There have been signs of late that the events in Turkey in Europe had begun to have a reflex in the Eastern provinces of Asia Minor and the Adana and Aleppo vilayets. On the one hand, Armenian tendencies to agitate for reforms and betterment of the conditions there have been noticeable. The Armenian Tashnak organ, the "Azadamarh," has lately been suppressed for reproducing, from a cognate paper in the Caucasus, a series of articles based on the 61st article of the Treaty of Berlin, and advocating its being put into execution. On the other hand, the Moslems, smarting under defeats of Turkish arms, have shown an unpleasant feeling towards their Armenian neighbours. As a matter of fact, the several thousands of Armenian troops at the front have fought better than any of the other non-Turkish elements, and numbers

of them have been killed and wounded, while many have shown exceptional bravery. This message of the Sheikh-ul-Islam is both wise and well-timed, and, as reported in my telegram No. 662 of the 21st November, has gone a long way to stave off serious trouble in the Adana district.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[50521] No. 763.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 987.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 23, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 965 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica reporting further on the capitulation of that place to the Greek forces.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 763.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 151.)
Sir, *Salonica, November 12, 1912.*

IN continuation of my immediately preceding despatch of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report as follows:—

The vali and the president of the municipality made persistent efforts to induce me to intervene once more in the name of the consular body with a view to obtaining the consent of the Greek commander-in-chief to Hassan Tahsin Pasha's proposals, but I found myself quite unable to entertain the suggestion. My Austrian colleague, to whom a similar appeal was made, likewise declined to concern himself any further in the matter. Eventually Shefik Pasha, accompanied by one or two other representatives of the local government, went out again to Toptchin, where they arrived after many delays at about 3 P.M. They were not received by the Prince, but after being kept waiting some twenty minutes, were curtly informed by an aide-de-camp that all further negotiation was impossible, since the Greek army was already in movement.

In fact, the Greek troops commenced their last advance on Salonica at 3 o'clock, firing a few shots at the Turkish position, from which no reply was returned. Between 5 and 6 o'clock in the evening Hassan Tahsin Pasha sent word that he consented in principle to the Greek terms, and the desultory firing ceased.

The Greek advanced posts on the extreme right wing had by that time come up to within a few hundred yards of the town, the Turkish troops retiring before them without firing. The advance ceased at sunset, but small parties of Greek soldiers subsequently entered the town, where they were unmolested. Later on members of the Crown Prince's staff came in and proceeded to meet Hassan Tahsin Pasha at the Government House, where the protocol of surrender was drawn up. Their deliberations lasted all night, the protocol being definitely signed about 6 o'clock on the morning of the 9th.

The terms of capitulation were roughly as follows:—

The Turkish troops composing Hassin Tahsin Pasha's command to lay down their arms in depôts to be fixed by common accord, where they should then be kept under Greek guard until the conclusion of hostilities.

The troops thus disarmed to be interned at Zeitunlik, Kara-Bouroun, and other points, where they should be provisioned at the charge of the Greek authorities, the disarmament to be effected within forty-eight hours, unless this term should be further extended by mutual consent.

Officers to retain their swords and to be treated as prisoners on parole.

Civil employees, gendarmerie, and police to be free, and the two latter to keep their arms and continue in the discharge of their duties until further notice.

The forts of Kara-Bouroun to be rendered unserviceable, and to be handed over to the Greeks in that condition.

It will be seen that these terms are practically identical with those offered by the Crown Prince on the evening of the 7th, as described in my despatch No. 150 of the 11th instant, with the sole exception of the omission of the promised stipulation as regards the restoration of the surrendered arms at the expiration of the war. A copy of the protocol and its annex is enclosed herewith.

The Greek forces began to enter the town early on the morning of the 9th, and the Crown Prince Constantine made his official entry at 11 o'clock on the 10th. As a matter of fact His Royal Highness really came in unexpectedly at 4 A.M., the reason for which was understood to be the rapid approach of Bulgarian troops from the north and east, and the desire of the Greeks to establish their position as sole conquerors of the town. An advanced guard of the Bulgarian troops nevertheless made its appearance in the course of the morning, and three Bulgarian officers were received by the Crown Prince at the Government House after the march past of the occupying troops, which took place at midday.

Early in the morning the foreign consulates received official communication of the occupation of the city by the Greek forces, together with a notice, signed by His Royal Highness Prince Constantine as commander-in-chief of the Greek army, appointing M. P. A. Argyropoulos, ex-Prefect of Larissa, to the Governor (Prefect) of Salonica. I also received for communication to the corps consulaire an invitation to attend an official reception to be held by the commander-in-chief at 1 P.M.

Copies of these documents will be sent to your Excellency in due course.

Order in the town was maintained during Saturday by the Turkish police and gendarmes, who remained at their posts, but no measures having been taken to supplement or support them it was evident that this arrangement could not last. In the evening of that day the situation, in the opinion of careful observers, was already becoming a source of anxiety. The Greeks, both civil and military, filled the cafés, and devoted themselves to drinking, merrymaking, and the indiscriminate firing of *feux de joie*. When the gendarmes endeavoured to intervene they were insulted, overpowered, and disarmed, and by Sunday morning had almost unanimously declared their intention of withdrawing. With difficulty they were persuaded to remain at their posts during the day, but by Monday morning both gendarmes and police had almost entirely disappeared; and though Greek soldiers were picketed at various places throughout the town no system of patrols appears to have been introduced, and the pickets, which did little or nothing for the maintenance of order, were very shortly withdrawn. It is, in my opinion, very largely due to the exceptionally heavy downpour which prevailed during the greater part of the time and which rendered circulation difficult, and could not but damp the spirits and restrain the activity of even the most irrepressible, that very serious disorders were avoided.

Proclamations were issued in the name of the commander-in-chief prohibiting the use of firearms and any other act tending to disturb the public peace, but no measures being taken to enforce this prohibition it remained an absolutely dead letter.

In spite of the repeated protestations of myself and other colleagues a continuous fusillade was maintained during the whole of Monday, Tuesday, and the intervening night. Only two fatal accidents have been so far reported to me, but narrow escapes were numerous. A stoker of His Majesty's ship "Medea" was wounded on board the ship's pinnace moored alongside, a hail of bullets fell on the decks of the foreign men-of-war in the harbour, a Turkish soldier had his hand fractured by a revolver bullet, and no doubt there were many accidents of which I have not heard.

The fact that all this happened in defiance of article 3 of the Crown Prince's proclamation, which reads: "Défense de tirer des coups de feu," sufficed to demonstrate the laxity of discipline and the absence of all effort to enforce the law. In response to innumerable complaints as to this indiscriminate firing orders were given to disarm the population, but this measure was only partially applied, none but those who were in fact being molested; and it speedily became a pretext for plunder, the Greek soldiers, under the plea of searching for hidden arms, arresting every Ottoman subject and relieving him of every object of value that he had about him, in plain daylight and in the open street.

With the arrival of the Bulgars on the 11th things rapidly became worse. Not content with larceny by day, the troops of both nationalities resorted to organised house-breaking by night. Under the pretext of instituting a search for arms, which was not even justified by any article of the proclamation, parties of men introduced themselves

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into the houses of citizens of all nationalities and carried off all the valuables they could find. For instance, a Greek and three Bulgarians of the 26th regiment endeavoured to enter the house of Hassan Tahsin Pasha himself, and emptied the pockets of his son and nephew. Bulgarian soldiers forced their way into the dwelling of an ex-mayor of the city, and compelled him at the point of the bayonet to hand over his wife's brilliants and all the money that he had in the house. His successor in office had a valuable mare carried off from his house in broad daylight by soldiers, who declared that "General Petroff wanted to go for a ride." A few doors from this consulate the residence of an Italian subject actually absent from Salonica was forced open by Bulgarian soldiers, who broke open all his furniture, including an iron safe, and carried off everything of value that they could lay hold of. Greek soldiers broke open and pillaged the goods depôt at the Uskub railway station. The house of one of my cavasses was broken into and £ T. 10 worth of his property carried off. A Turkish officer presented himself to me on the 12th, bareheaded and covered with mud from head to foot, declaring that his watch and a sum of £ T. 50 of his company's money had been stolen from him by Greek soldiers in one of the main streets of the town. Hundreds of similar instances came to my knowledge in the space of two days.

On the 12th a detachment of 180 Cretan gendarmes was landed in Salonica, and the first serious effort made to establish a semblance of order. To-day, when Her Majesty the Queen landed, after a lengthy detention outside the Big Cape, the indiscriminate firing in the streets came to a sudden end, and some appearance of order began to be established.

The result, however, of the events of the past three days has been to excite Mussulman feeling in this town to the highest degree. Adding to this the obviously increasing mutual jealousy of the Greeks and Bulgarians, who are to all appearances determined, the former to maintain, and the latter to dispute, the priority of their claim to its possession, we arrive at a condition of affairs which is fraught with the most serious perils.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 763.

Protocol and Annex of November 8 and 9 concerning the Terms of the Capitulation of the VIIIth Army Corps and the Surrender of Salonica to the Greek Forces.

(1.)

Protocole du 26 octobre, 1912 (o.s.).

ENTRE Son Altesse Royale le commandant général de l'armée hellénique et son Excellence le commandant général de l'armée ottomane il a été arrêté et conclu ce qui suit :—

Article 1er. Les armes des soldats ottomans seront prises et mises en dépôt et gardées sous la responsabilité de l'armée hellénique ; on dressera à ce sujet un procès-verbal.

Art. 2. Les soldats ottomans seront logés, partie à Karabouroun, partie à la caserne d'artillerie dite [Topdji] ; ils seront nourris par les autorités de Salonique.

Art. 3. La ville de Salonique est rendue à l'armée hellénique jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix.

Art. 4. Tous les hauts fonctionnaires militaires et officiers seront autorisés à garder leurs épées, et seront libres à Salonique ; ceux-ci donneront leur parole de ne plus prendre arme contre l'armée hellénique et ses alliés pendant la durée de cette guerre.

Art. 5. Tous les hauts fonctionnaires civiles et les employés du vilayet seront libres.

Art. 6. Les gendarmes et les agents de police porteront leurs armes.

Art. 7. Karabouroun servira comme logement des soldats ottomans désarmés. Les canons et les engins de guerre de Karabouroun seront mis hors de service par l'armée ottomane et remis à la force hellène.

Art. 8. Le contenu de l'article 1er sera exécuté dans l'espace de deux jours à partir de samedi (27 octobre, 1912) ; ce délai peut être encore prolongé avec l'assentiment du commandant général de l'armée hellenique.

Art. 9. Cette situation sera maintenue jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix.

Art. 10. Les gendarmes et la police ottomane continueront leur service jusqu'à nouvelle décision.

Les délégués de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Royal de Grèce :
DOUSMANI.
JEAN P. MÉTAXAS.

Le commandant en chef de l'armée ottomane :
HASSAN TAHSIN.

Salonique, le 26 octobre, 1912 (o.s.).

(2.)

Protocole-Annexe du 27 octobre, 1912 (o.s.).

Article 1er. Deux bataillons de l'armée hellénique entreront cet après-midi en ville et seront logés dans la caserne d'infanterie.

Art. 2. Les nourritures des soldats ottomans, des chevaux, des bêtes de somme seront fournies avec le concours de la municipalité par l'autorité locale hellénique. Les frais nécessaires à cet effet seront à la charge du Gouvernement hellénique. On commencera à fournir des nourritures à partir d'une demande formelle.

Art. 3. Trois milles soldats ottomans seront laissés armés pour effectuer le désarmement des autres. Une fois ceux-ci désarmés, ils déposeront eux-mêmes leurs armes. Le nettoyage des armes déposés sera fait par les soins de la troupe hellénique. Le désarmement s'effectuera en présence de deux délégués de l'armée hellénique.

Art. 4. Le commandant général de l'armée hellénique donnera l'ordre strict afin que tous les villageois ainsi que les soldats désarmés, leurs propriétés, leurs biens ne soient pas attaqués par des bandes quelconques et soient respectés par les troupes alliées.

Art. 5. On donnera l'ordre strict de prendre grand soin pour respecter les traditions, les mœurs et les religions des habitants, les tribunaux religieux de toute religion continueront à fonctionner.

Art. 6. Le service de la douane pourra jusqu'à nouvelle décision continuer à fonctionner sous le contrôle de l'autorité hellénique. De même pour la Dette publique et la Régie des Tabacs.

Fait à Salonique, le 27 octobre, 1912 (o.s.).

Les délégués de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Royal de Grèce :
DOUSMANI.
JEAN P. MÉTAXAS.

Le commandant en chef de l'armée ottomane :
HASSAN TAHSIN.

[50523] No. 764.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 989.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 23*, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, reporting the explosion of a dynamite depôt in that town.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 764.

Consul-General Lambert to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 153.)

Sir, *Salonica, November* 14, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum prepared for me by Mr. Acting Vice-Consul Fox-Strangways on the explosion which occurred last night in one of the powder magazines adjoining the artillery barracks at Zeitounlik.

The investigation into this terrible outrage is not yet completed, but I personally have little hesitation in attributing it to Bulgarian comitadjis belonging to the faction of Yani Sandanski, who is himself actually in the town, and who has already marked his presence by numerous exploits, such as driving the Mussulman muhadjirs out of the mosques of St. Sophia, St. Dimitri, and St. George, and hoisting the sign of the Cross, together with the Bulgarian flag, upon these buildings in defiance of the decision of the Greek authorities that they were for the present to be left *in statu quo*. The treatment meted out by Sandanski's myrmidons to these wretched muhadjirs excited the pity even of Christian spectators, and the object of all these acts is undoubtedly to create difficulties for the Greeks, inflame the passions of both sides, and thereby lead to a state of things which Bulgarians hope to be able to turn to their own advantage.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 764.

Memorandum by Acting Vice-Consul Fox-Strangways on explosion of Dynamite Depôt at Zeitounlik.

ONE of the powder magazines in the neighbourhood of the artillery barracks at Zeitounlik, in and around which are encamped a large number of the Turkish troops, disarmed in accordance with the convention of the 8th-9th instant, blew up last night at about 8 o'clock. The magazine contained a large quantity of dynamite destined for Servia, for which transit facilities have been withheld by the Ottoman authorities, together with a little sporting powder and a number of confiscated arms.

Eighty-five of the Turkish soldiers were killed and about 250 injured, several of whom subsequently succumbed. There were also some casualties amongst the Greek troops forming the camp guard. A neighbouring magazine was almost entirely demolished by the explosion, though the powder contained in it was not ignited. On the other hand, a stable situated a short distance to the south was set on fire and some 120 mules which were tethered in it were burned to death. The noise of the explosion was heard all over the city, and plate-glass windows were burst in at a distance of over 2 miles. It appears to have been effected by means of an electric battery, the piles of which were picked up about 300 yards from the site of the magazine, but there is apparently no clue whatever to the perpetrators of the outrage.

The greatest excitement was aroused in the lower quarters of the town, where the Mussulman population was already exasperated by the overbearing attitude of, and the innumerable acts of pillage committed by, the Greek and Bulgarian soldiery, and shots were fired at some of the former, who were not slow to retaliate. Volleys were poured into the crowded cafés, causing an indescribable panic. Those who were only wounded were finished off with the bayonet, and the soldiery got completely out of hand. It is not yet known what the actual losses were, but a British subject himself saw two Greek and seventeen Turkish corpses, without penetrating far into the affected area. There is, therefore, every probability that the casualties were considerably more numerous than the above figures. The noise of the firing also caused a stampede of horses, which charged down a narrow street near the Régie des Tabacs and alarmed the Greek soldiers, who, thinking they were Turkish cavalry, poured a volley into them.

[50524] No. 765.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 990.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 21, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of a memorial presented to all the embassies here by Khalil Pasha, ex-Vali of Van, Broussa, &c., on behalf of all Albanians—Moslem, Orthodox, and Roman Catholic.

As Albania is now cut off from Constantinople it is difficult to say if the signatories are thoroughly representative of all Albania, with its 2,000,000 odd inhabitants; but, as Khalil Pasha remarked to me, it would appear that all Albanians are united in the desire, if not determination, to prevent their country from being "mutilated."

I have also the honour to enclose memorandum by Mr. Fitzmaurice embodying the substance of a long conversation with Sureya Bey Flora, who, with his relatives, ex-Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha and Ismail Kemal Bey, has been one of the most intelligent and stoutest champions in the Ottoman Parliament and outside of the Albanian cause. He is a descendant on the mother's side of the famous Ali Pasha Tepeline, "the Lion of Yanina," whose exploits in the reign of Sultan Mahmoud constitute one of the most interesting phases of Ottoman history.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 765.

Albanian Appeal to Great Powers.

Excellence,

LES conséquences possibles de la guerre qui vient de mettre aux prises les quatre États balkaniques avec l'Empire ottoman préoccupent à juste titre le peuple albanais. Il s'inquiète du but politique visé par les coalisés, tel qu'il ressort de leurs déclarations officielles ou officieuses et de leurs actes diplomatiques, et il appréhende pour lui les suites d'un remaniement de la carte balkanique. Il se rend parfaitement compte, en effet, qu'il ne s'agit de rien moins que de régler définitivement le problème séculaire de la question d'Orient, mais certains indices lui donnent lieu de craindre que ses droits et son avenir ne se trouvent méconnus et peut-être sacrifiés par la solution qui sera proposée.

En présence de cette éventualité redoutable pour une race qui constitue le groupement ethnique le plus compact et le plus important de la Turquie d'Europe, les soussignés, au nom du peuple albanais tout entier, ont l'honneur de soumettre aux honorables chancelleries des Grandes Puissances européennes le point de vue albanais et de leur faire part de leurs revendications.

L'occupation depuis la plus haute antiquité d'une portion considérable du territoire balkanique par le peuple albanais est un fait historique et géographique dont il est impossible de ne pas tenir compte si on veut que la question d'Orient reçoive, au point de vue politique, une solution raisonnable et durable.

Il est évident que les Grandes Puissances, qui sont liées entre elles par des conventions et des traités en ce qui touche l'Orient et qui possèdent là de grands intérêts, ont le droit et même le devoir d'intervenir dans le règlement du conflit actuel, d'autant plus qu'il soulève des points de droit international dont nulle d'entre elles ne peut négliger l'examen. Enfin, le côté humanitaire de la question ne saurait non plus les laisser indifférents.

S'il est juste que le succès des armes confère au vainqueur certaines prérogatives, le droit de conquête à lui seul ne prescrit pas cependant tous les autres. Or, tous les peuples qui résident sur le sol de la péninsule balkanique ont également droit à l'existence, et il faut faire à chacun des conditions d'existence équitables. Le peuple albanais, connu par les luttes qu'il a soutenues de tout temps, dans le présent et dans le passé, pour son indépendance et pour la sauvegarde de son intégrité, a la conviction qu'il est digne de l'estime des Gouvernements européens et qu'il mérite de vivre.

C'est pourquoi nous déclarons que le peuple albanais n'admettra aucun changement du *statu quo* territorial en Turquie d'Europe qui serait de nature à apporter préjudice à ses droits.

Il n'admettra aucune immixtion de la part des États balkaniques dans l'administration du pays qui lui appartient à titre d'héritage légué par ses ancêtres.

Il tient à conserver ses mœurs propres, à se développer dans le sens de ses conceptions sociales et politiques et à demeurer le maître de ses destinés.

Désireux de collaborer, lui aussi, au progrès universel et de tenir sa place dans le concert des peuples civilisés, il demande instamment aux Grandes Puissances de lui garantir son existence ethnique et politique.

(Suivent une trentaine de signatures.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 765.

Memorandum by Mr. Fitzmaurice.

SUREYA BEY, brother of Ferid Pasha, ex-Grand Vizier and cousin of Ismail Kemal Bey, called on me to-day by appointment. I have known him for some fifteen years. He has just returned from Vienna, where, with Ismail Kemal Bey, he saw Count Berchtold, and discussed the various bearings of the Albanian question. He is quite aware that Austria is indifferent to Ottoman interests in the matter, as also as to whether Serbs or Greeks take slices of the hinterland of Albania, and that they are solicitous of preventing the Serbs getting a territorial or naval footing on the Adriatic coast; but, he says, as the Triple *Entente* is committed to the support of the Balkanic Powers, Albanians are more likely to get assistance, however selfish, from the Triple Alliance.

I pointed out to him that, if in the discussion of the peace preliminaries, the Balkan States admitted separate mention of Albania, Turkey might have a certain say in the matter, but that the Balkan States might insist on Turkey ceding territory occupied by them, within certain limits, without going into details, that in this case Albanians might have to choose between leaving their ultimate fate to the decisions of a conference or dealing direct with the Balkan States, as Turkey was doing, and that, in the latter eventuality, they might get better terms, especially from the Bulgarians, who were practical-minded and nearer in character to the Albanians than Serbs or Greeks. He replied that, according to the arrangement for dividing up the territorial spoils, Bulgaria would not be the neighbour of Albania, which, after mutilation by Servia and Greece, would be left as a small enclave between the newly acquired territory of those two States. He added that Austria-Germany was indifferent to the fate of Macedonia, and would not object to Greece taking Salonica, and Bulgaria Constantinople, provided that they could keep Preveza and Durazzo from remaining in the hands of the Greeks and Servians, and that Austria was now bent on being most complacent to Bulgaria with hope of splitting the Balkan allies—a direction in which Albania might find a certain measure of salvation.

Sureya Bey stated that Count Berchtold had remarked, in discussing the question of an "independent Albania," that German princes had succeeded very well in Roumania and Greece, to which Sureya Bey had replied that he would prefer an English prince, like Prince Arthur of Connaught.

Count Berchtold thereupon said that if Albania would not have a Triple Alliance prince, it was difficult to see how she could have one from the Triple *Entente*, to which Sureya had replied that, in that case, perhaps a Swedish or Norwegian prince might be found.

In discussing the matter with Kiamil Pasha, the latter had suggested an Ottoman prince, *e.g.*, Mejid Effendi, the second son of Sultan Abdulaziz, and fourth in the line of Ottoman succession. Sureya Bey replied that a younger man like Burhaneddin Effendi, the favourite son of Abdul Hamid, would be more suitable, and that in no case could an Egyptian prince, such as Prince Fuad, be a success in Albania, for, despite the Albanian origin of the Khedivate, princes born and bred in Cairo intrigue could not, he said, rule Albanian highlanders. Sureya Bey remarked that no small State like Albania could be started without direct foreign support and tutelage, and the Albanians, however reluctantly, might be obliged to lean for a time on some selfish foreign State, presumably Austria. Like other Albanians, he seemed to recognise that Albanians, in being identified with the Turks, whom he characterised as "Asiatic uncivilisable barbarians," had put their money on the wrong horse, and seemed destined, in consequence, to pay the penalty by suffering a perhaps temporary amputation.

G. H. FITZMAURICE.

November 21, 1912.

[50525]

No. 766.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 991.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 23, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, reporting the appointment of M. Rahtivan, Greek Minister of Justice, as administrator of the districts occupied by the Greek forces in Macedonia.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER

Enclosure in No. 766.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 154.)

Sir, *Salonica, November* 15, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 152 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to subjoin copy of a Royal decree, published to-day, by which M. Rahtivan, the Minister of Justice, is appointed to the post of administrator of the districts occupied by the Greek forces in Macedonia:—

"*Décret Royal.*

"Georges Ier, Roi des Hellènes,

"Vu le besoin d'organiser provisoirement l'administration dans les régions de Macédoine occupées par l'armée hellénique;

"Sur la proposition de notre Conseil des Ministres, nous décidons et nous ordonnons:

"A notre Ministre de la Justice, M. Rahtivan, nommé commissaire du Gouvernement hellénique en Macédoine, de régler tout ce qui regarde l'administration provisoire dans les pays occupés.

"Le Président de notre Conseil des Ministres est chargé de publier et de mettre en exécution le présent décret.

"GEORGES.

"Le Président du Conseil:

"VENIZÉLOS.

"Le Conseil des Ministres:

"CORONILAS.
"RAHTIVAN.
"MICHALACOPOULOS.
"REPOULIS.
"KOURAMOCO.
"STRATOS
"DIOMIDES.

"*Salonique, le 31 octobre*, 1912 (v.s.)."

The following further appointments have been made:—

Secretary-General ... M. Dimaras.
Conseiller politique ... M. J. Dragoumis.
Chefs de Section ... MM. Mavroudis, Condogouros, Steriades, and Tambros.

The Crown Prince Constantine, Prince Andrew, and the whole of the general staff left yesterday with three divisions to reinforce the troops facing Zekki Pasha's army corps at Sorovitch, Prince Nicolas being left as military governor *ad interim* of Salonica.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

[50526] No. 767.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 992.)

Constantinople, November 23, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, reporting on the growing jealousy between Greeks and Bulgarians.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 767.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther

(No. 155. Confidential.)

Salonica, November 15, 1912.

Sir,

THE most disquieting feature in the present situation is the growing ill-feeling between the Greeks and Bulgarians, who are now practically in joint occupation of this city and its environs.

The Greeks declare officially that there is nothing in it, and that, as the delimitation of the respective spheres of influence of the four allies was carefully elaborated by mutual consent before the commencement of hostilities, the friction, which they cannot help admitting to have arisen, between the two armies here possesses merely a local and ephemeral interest. There are, however, a considerable number of established facts which tend to make it difficult to share this official optimism.

It is, for instance, admitted that on the 26th October (8th November), the day on which the Greek commander-in-chief and Hassan Tahsin Pasha were negotiating the surrender of this town, the Bulgarian General Petroff, who was then somewhat to the east of Langhazu, received telegraphic instructions from Sophia to force an entrance into Salonica at all costs—instructions which could be justified by no considerations of military necessity. On the morning of the 10th, when the Greek head-quarters were already established in Salonica, and General Petroff was in possession of a copy of the terms of capitulation, the Bulgarian advanced guard came into contact with and fired upon a portion of the Turkish troops, that had not yet deposited its arms, between Langhaza and Aivatli. The Turks withdrawing before them, these Bulgars pushed on towards Salonica, which they were only prevented from entering by the bayonets of two regiments of Evzones. The Bulgars state that, in consequence of this action on the part of their allies, the two Princes Boris and Cyril were compelled to spend the night of the 10th under the shelter of a bridge under the road near Aivatli. After some bargaining, the Greek Crown Prince consented to the entry of two battalions on the 11th, but, once these were in, no attention whatever was paid to the limitation of numbers, and the Bulgarian troops entered the town as fast as they could be brought up, until their strength approximately equalled that of the Greeks.

Although nominally subject to the Greek general command, the Bulgarians at once proceeded to act as if they were masters of the place, whilst troops and irregulars alike set to work systematically to pillage those portions of the town in which they were quartered, without the slightest attempt on the part of the Greeks to interfere with them.

On the 14th, the two parties twice nearly came to blows over the possession of the Mosque of St. Sophia, over which the Bulgarians have hoisted their national flag. In various other cases also they have endeavoured to substitute their own guards for those of the Greeks.

Two battalions of Greek troops having been dispatched from here to Serres, which had previously been occupied by the Bulgarians, instructions were telegraphed to the commander there to admit them only if they laid down their arms.

A Bulgarian force having similarly marched from here into the Chalcidic Peninsula, with the presumed object of occupying Mount Athos, a corresponding Greek force was yesterday dispatched by sea to the same destination.

Persons who are in close touch with the Bulgarians assure me that they make no secret of their determination to accept no partition of Macedonia, which they declare belongs to them alone, nor of their conviction that, if it becomes necessary to do so, they are quite strong enough to turn out the Greeks.

Unless, therefore, this question can be diplomatically settled, there seems every probability that Salonica, after escaping the perils which it feared from being taken by assault from the Turks, may yet be exposed to the danger of destruction through becoming a bone of contention between the two allies.

In view of the accounts which reach it of the acts of ruthless savagery committed (whether as "reprisals" or otherwise) by the Bulgarians in the interior, the population is already beginning to regard the prospect before it with serious apprehension.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

P.S.—Copies of this despatch are being sent privately to Sophia and Athens.

[50527] No. 768.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 993.)

Constantinople, November 23, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul General at Salonica reporting the occupation of Mount Athos by Greek troops.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 768.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 157.)

Salonica, November 18, 1912.

Sir,

AN official communication published in to-day's papers announces the occupation of the peninsula of Mount Athos by Greek troops. According to this communication the cruiser "Averoff," accompanied by three destroyers, sailed from Lemnos on the 15th instant with an expeditionary force of 10,000 men, one-half of which was landed at Dafni and marched to Xeropotamo and Karies, whilst the other landed in the Gulf of Hierisso and occupied the neck of the peninsula.

The Bulgarian force, which was understood to have left here for the same destination by land on the 14th, is now believed not to have proceeded beyond Vassilika and Zagliveri, some 20 miles to the eastward of Salonica.

It was to-day reported that the Servian forces occupied Monastir on the 16th, but I am without positive confirmation of the report.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

[50618] No. 769.

National Bank of Turkey to Mr. Maxwell.—(Received November 27.)

Dear Mr. Maxwell, *50, Cornhill, London, November 25, 1912.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 6th November, I have now received the *procès-verbal* of the meeting in Paris on the 28th October, which was drawn up by the Ottoman Bank.

It will probably be convenient to you to have a copy of the *procès-verbal*, and I therefore forward one herewith. You will no doubt be so good as to treat it as confidential.

Yours sincerely,

H. BABINGTON SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 769

Procès-verbal of Meeting held October 28, 1912.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Deutsche Bank	... ...	M. Helfferich.
Pour la Banque nationale de Turquie	...	Sir H. Babington Smith.
Pour la Banque de Salonique	...	MM. Bénac, Spitzer, d'Adler.
Pour la Banque Impériale ottomane	...	M. le Baron Hottinguer, Hon. A. Lawrence, M. Barry, M. le Baron de Neuflize, M. Henry, M. de Cerjat.

M. le Baron Hottinguer préside.

M. le Baron Hottinguer remercie les personnes présentes de s'être rendues à sa convocation et expose que l'objet de la réunion est d'examiner dans quelles conditions il serait possible de prêter un concours financier à la Turquie. Il rappelle les conversations qui ont eu lieu jusqu'à ce jour entre les établissements qui assistent à la réunion et au cours desquelles les représentants de la Deutsche Bank et de la Banque de Salonique ont été mis au courant, par la Banque Impériale ottomane, des projets de combinaison financière dont elle a été saisie par le Ministre des Finances de Turquie. Il est donné lecture d'une note résumant cette combinaison, qui aurait pour objet de liquider la dette flottante représentée par les bons du Trésor émis en 1912 et de procurer au Gouvernement turc l'argent nouveau dont il a un pressant besoin.

Après échange de vues, les membres présents reconnaissent à l'unanimité qu'il serait urgent de fournir des ressources au Gouvernement ottoman et d'éviter, dans la mesure du possible, qu'il soit porté atteinte aux importants intérêts français, anglais et allemands engagés en Turquie.

On pourrait, à cet effet, envisager une combinaison dans laquelle chaque groupe se chargerait du remboursement de ses bons et avances et participerait dans le montant d'argent nouveau à trouver, à raison de 50 pour cent pour le groupe français, 25 pour cent pour le groupe anglais et 25 pour cent pour le groupe allemand. Les gages affectés actuellement au remboursement des bons du Trésor et avances seraient appliqués à la garantie de la nouvelle opération.

La réunion estime toutefois que les récents événements ont rendu ces gages précaires et qu'il serait imprudent de mettre des capitaux à la disposition du Trésor turc sans être certain de l'approbation des trois Gouvernements français, anglais et allemand. Leur appui seul peut donner tout apaisement en ce qui concerne le maintien dans l'avenir des gages affectés à la combinaison envisagée.

Il sera donné connaissance de cette situation aux Ambassadeurs des trois Puissances à Constantinople, qui pourront attirer la très sérieuse attention de leurs Gouvernements sur les dangers que peut faire courir aux importants intérêts engagés en Turquie le refus de tout concours au Gouvernement ottoman.

Il est entendu que dans le cas où la combinaison précitée serait mise à exécution, le contrat à passer avec le Gouvernement turc serait signé par les représentants des trois groupes.

Pour la National Bank of Turkey,
H. BABINGTON SMITH.
Pour la Deutsche Bank,
HELFFERICH, and another.

[50505] No. 770.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 27.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 26, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams, dated the 26th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 770

H.M.S. "Barham" to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 26, 1912.*

"BRESLAU" left Alexandretta for Port Said, and will return on the 29th.

Enclosure 2 in No. 770.

H.M.S. "Hampshire" to Admiralty

(Telegraphic.) *November 26, 1912.*

"RHONE" (French transport) arrived Constantinople.

[50655] No. 771.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 27.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 27, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams dated the 26th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 771.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 26, 1912.*

"BLACK PRINCE" left Smyrna.

Enclosure 2 in No. 771.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 26, 1912.*

"TALBOT" sailed for Gibraltar.

Enclosure 3 in No. 771.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 26, 1912.*

"GOOD HOPE" left Besika 3·40 P.M. for Malta, flag having been transferred to "Inflexible."

[50661] No. 772

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 27.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November 27, 1912*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 27th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 772.

H.M.S. "Prometheus" to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 27, 1912.*

"PROMETHEUS" leaves Beirout to-day for Alexandretta, arriving the 28th November, calling *en route* Tripoli and Latakiya. "Montcalm" sailed southwards to-day.

[50664] No. 773.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 27.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November 27, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated 27 instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 773.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 27, 1912.*

"TENNESSEE" (Rear-Admiral Knight) arrived Malta.

Enclosure 2 in No. 773.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 27, 1912.*

I WISH to witness disembarkation of Bulgarian troops at Dedeagatch. Request permission to proceed there.

[50508] No. 774.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 26, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 71 of 20th November.
Austro-Hungarian consul at Prisrend has arrived safely at Uskub.
(Sent to Vienna.)

[50509] No. 775.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 87.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 26, 1912.*

FOLLOWING information was given to me at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to-day:—

Twelve truck-loads of ammunition have been distributed to Austrian troops on Drina and Save.

Two hundred trucks for transport of troops are being held in reserve at Brod.

There are 80,000 men in Bosnia; 18,000 on frontier of the sanjak.

Two battalions of infantry arrived at Semlin to-day.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[50511] No. 776.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 209.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 26, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs told me this evening that you had impressed on French Ambassador the advisability of the French Government renewing their proposal for a conference.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs says that he would be willing to do so, but that he does not think that in the existing circumstances Austria-Hungary would accept, and he fears, from information which he has, that Germany would wish to exclude therefrom the Balkan States, which he considers would make the situation very difficult.

[50551] No. 777.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 210. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 26, 1912.*

I ASKED the President of the Council this evening whether he thought Russian Government would go to war in order to place Servia territorially on the Adriatic. I said that I felt sure that public opinion in England would be against a war for such a purpose, for it would be insensate. Would French public opinion support Russia in such a case?

President of the Council said that public opinion in France would be against such a war, that the Russian Government had counselled moderation at Belgrade. Danger was that, if Austria took any action against Servia, public opinion in Russia might force the hand of the Russian Government. I asked his Excellency what meaning he attached to withdrawal from Constantinople of the Austrian ship. He replied that it was no doubt for the concentration of the Austrian fleet for a demonstration on the coast of Albania, and what confirmed this supposition was a remark made to M. Isvolsky by the Italian Ambassador, viz., that a local demonstration, as regarded a separate treatment for Albania, would be better than representations by Austria and Italy at Belgrade. I suggested that if the Servians arrived at Durazzo before an Austro-Italian naval demonstration it would not have much effect. Did he think that the Austrians would land troops at Durazzo? President of the Council said that it was possible, and that the effect of such a measure might be very bad on public opinion in Russia. To my enquiry as to whether he thought it possible, if war broke out between Russia and Austria, that Germany might suggest that France and Germany, and also England, should take no part in it, he replied that German Government had given notice at St. Petersburgh that Germany would support Austria in the question with Servia.

[50510] No. 778.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 189.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, November 26, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 184 of 25th November: Armistice.

Delegates met to-day.

Turkish representatives asked the Bulgarians if they were authorised to discuss peace conditions as well.

They replied in the negative, only for the conclusion of an armistice.

For peace negotiations other delegates would be appointed. Armistice conditions were not discussed to-day, and it was decided to wait for the arrival of the Turkish Ambassador at Berlin and the Greek Minister at Sophia (see my telegram No. 176 of 23rd November).

To-morrow matters will be regularly discussed.

Turkish delegates made no reference to conditions proposed being impossible. On the contrary, they showed a disposition to agree to them.

[50670] No. 779.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 190. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, November 27, 1912.*

THE Bulgarian representative at Berlin, who is a cousin of the Prime Minister, informed his Excellency yesterday that he had been approached with an offer of mediation from the German Government.

In case of publicity the German Government would disavow their action if the offer were refused. The allies intend under no circumstances to accept German mediation.

[50674] No. 780.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 191.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 27, 1912.*

BALKAN war.

An acquaintance of mine has interviewed an Armenian doctor who allowed himself to be taken prisoner after a Turkish sortie from Adrianople on 22nd November.

This doctor states that provisions are running very short in the town; that constant fires occurred, work of incendiaries; and that in his opinion the garrison cannot hold out for a fortnight.

[50685] No. 781.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 170.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 27, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"Movements of [group omitted: ? troops] to Bosnia and Herzegovina still continue. From a sure source I learn that there are now there 110 battalions, with a total strength of all arms of 125,000 to 150,000 men. From an excellent source I learn also that the military preparations will be completed in eight days.

"Against Servia 300,000 men will be employed; including fourteen mountain brigades in Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the command of General Potiorek. My informant, who knows more than he will say, speaks highly of the arrangements made by staff, which he describes as accomplished in secrecy, without confusion or friction. Number of Servians estimated by Austrian direction is 150,000 men.

"Reservists called by the corps, who are partially mobilised, include 'Ersatz' reservists for train."

[50679] No. 782.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 453.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 27, 1912.*

I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon in terms of your telegram No. 1294 of 26th November, but did not find him very disposed to act as he had suggested. He said that the question was a very important one, and asked me to send him an *aide-mémoire* embodying your views. I replied that you were but asking him to lose no time in giving effect to suggestions reported in my telegram No. 449 of 25th November, and in order to prevent any misunderstanding I read to him last two paragraphs of that telegram.

His Excellency then said he did not know whether the alternative solution of which he had spoken would be accepted by Servians. They were still quite determined to have a port, and the Bulgarians were behaving very badly, as, though perfectly aware that they would never be able to afford the Servians the least assistance, they refused to tell them so. Position of Bulgarians was anything but satisfactory, as they were not strong enough to force the Tchataldja lines, while Adrianople might hold out for another fortnight or more. Question of delimitation of Albania would be most difficult to settle, and it might, after all, be best to await conclusion of war before convoking a meeting of the Ambassadors.

I replied that he had acquiesced in view expressed to you by the German Ambassador that the time had arrived for the Powers to come to an agreement on the lines of general settlement, but that nothing was being done to advance such an agreement. His suggestion that the Ambassadors should meet and discuss such questions as those dealing with Albania and Servian port might eliminate the danger of war to which we were at present exposed.

His Excellency expressed doubts as to whether Austria and Germany would accept this proposal, and asked whether you would be disposed to sound them. I replied that I could not answer for you, but I thought that, after what German Ambassador had said to you, you might possibly consent to do so.

Finally his Excellency said that if I would send him an *aide-mémoire* he would think it over and see me again to-morrow and give me his answer.

I am accordingly sending him one.

On my telling him that Austrian Ambassador had been very pleased with his audience, his Excellency said that he was rather surprised to hear this. I could not get him to explain this remark, while he confirmed account given in my immediately preceding telegram of 26th November of what passed at that audience.

[50656] No. 783.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 687.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 27, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Smyrna, dated 26th November:—

"Annexation of Samos to Greece proclaimed on 24th November."

[50657] No. 784.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 688.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 27, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 676 of 24th November.

At meeting of the heads of missions last night it was decided in principle to maintain the detachments on shore, but gradually to reduce them, keeping on fifty. Also that no communication should be made to Porte.

I propose to re-embark greater part of British contingent, which at this embassy alone amounts to about 350. French and Russians will maintain their detachments ashore. They are both less than ours.

Men could be landed at short notice if necessity should arise.

[50668] No. 785.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 165.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, November 27, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 25th November.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in speaking to me yesterday, held very different language from that of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He saw no special cause for anxiety so long as the Governments kept their heads. The papers had been full of unfounded reports, and one news-sheet had not only published unwarranted statements as to change of attitude on the part of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and mobilisations in Russia and Austria, but had forwarded specially prepared copies to the Bourse. It was in consequence of this outrageous proceeding that he had published communiqué denying these rumours.

He gave me to understand, though not very clearly, that there was no truth in the report that Prince Henry was going to London and Russian military plenipotentiary to St. Petersburgh with missions from the Emperor.

[50672] No. 786.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 25)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, November 27, 1912.*

MY despatch No. 87 of 16th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that approaching visit of M. Danef to Bucharest was very welcome to the Roumanian Government, as they hoped that it would lead to a friendly agreement on the questions of the Kutzo-Vlachs and of frontier. His Excellency said that Roumania had not taken the initiative, and that idea which had got about that Roumania had asked for compensation or reward for her neutrality in the Balkan war was false.

(Very Confidential.)

I gather from the Russian Minister that the decision to send Danef to Bucharest was due to Russian prompting.

(Repeated to Sophia.)

[50684] No. 787.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 211.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 27, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 750 of yesterday.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs has not yet received, either from Russian Ambassador, whom he saw this afternoon, or from the French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, a proposal for the neutralisation of all Albanian ports under an international guarantee, but the Italian Ambassador spoke to his Excellency to-day of such an idea as likely to be acceptable to Austria.

With regard to conversations between Ambassadors in Paris and French Minister for Foreign Affairs, President of Council does not consider that it would be fitting that he should take initiative in the matter. His Excellency thinks that the initiative in proposing such conversations should be taken by Russia or England, and preferably by England, as such a proposal by Russia might be regarded with suspicion at Vienna.

[50688] No. 788.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Odessa, November 27, 1912.*

FOLLOWING telegram sent to St. Petersburgh and Constantinople:—

"Fifteenth rifle regiment is ready to leave in immediate future for Constantinople."

[50676] No. 789.

Consul Baldwin to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Galatz, November 27, 1912.*

FOUR Turkish transports are at Constanza loading horses and war material.

[50687] No. 790.

Vice-Consul de Garston to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Dubrovnik, November 27, 1912.*

SIXTEENTH Army Corps now mobilising: "Ersatz" reserve called up to-day. Reported that classes of 1889, 1890, and 1891 will be incorporated 1st December.

[50493] No. 791.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1081.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 27, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 685.

I concur with your proposal to release "City of Chios." If you consider that later on it would be desirable to charter a second Khedivial liner you could do so, and perhaps it would for the present be unnecessary to detain Ellerman liner.

[50511] No. 792.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 756.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 27, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 209 of 26th November.

What I suggested was not a formal conference, but that the six Ambassadors at some capital—Paris if preferred—should receive instructions to deal with what German Minister for Foreign Affairs had proposed to French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[49930] No. 793.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 273.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 27, 1912.*

THE Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 21st November that the Spanish Ambassador had sounded the Marquis di San Giuliano whether Spain, as a Mediterranean Power, could not be invited to take part in a conference when one was held, or should one be held.

The Marquis di San Giuliano had replied that personally he would be very happy to do anything that would be pleasing to Spain, but that he did not know whether a conference would be held, or, if so, when; nor had he any knowledge what would be the scope and programme of the conference, or as to who would be invited to attend it. If a conference did take place, and only the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin were convoked, Spain, he was sure, would in those circumstances understand that no slight whatever was intended towards her.

The Spanish Ambassador called on the 21st November on the same question. From Paris and St. Petersburgh they had received favourable replies; from Rome as stated by the Marquis Imperiali; from Vienna none as yet, as Count Berchtold was at Budapest. They did not actually ask Berlin, as they considered that if they asked a favour of Berlin it would be put into the account and they would have to pay for it in some way or another, so they had said that if a conference were held they supposed they would be invited. They had received no reply as yet.

Señor de Villa Urrutia said that as the situation in the Mediterranean would be altered Spain hoped she would be consulted. Sir A. Nicolson said he had better speak to me. Sir A. Nicolson was sure we would give the friendliest consideration possible to any wish of Spain, but that at present the question of a conference was still *en l'air*.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50992] No. 794.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 276.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 27, 1912.*

IN the course of general conversation to-day, I spoke to the Italian Ambassador on the lines, though more briefly, on which I had previously spoken to the German Ambassador, as recorded in my despatch No. 300 of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.

The Italian Ambassador remarked that before the Ambassadors met it would be desirable to find something which would be accepted by Austria and Russia as a solution of the question of Servian access to the Adriatic, and he spoke of the possibility of a "corridor" for Servia leading to an Adriatic port.

I said that a "corridor" of neutralised territory, not dividing Albania, but running between Montenegro and Albania to San Giovanni di Medua, and so leading to a port which would also be neutralised under the guarantee of the Powers, though under Servian sovereignty, was a possible solution which had been mentioned.

The Ambassador suggested that he should ask the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs privately whether he could ascertain if Austria would accept such a proposition.

I said that I should be very glad if he would do so, but I ought to warn him that the ground was delicate, for I had already mentioned the matter as a suggestion to Count Mensdorff, who had told me that he did not think that his Government could accept it, and, though it had been mentioned elsewhere and not always unfavourably received by Austrian diplomats, whenever Vienna had been sounded the Austrian Government had refused to entertain the suggestion. It would, however, be interesting to know the view of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Ambassador took down what I had said about a neutralised "corridor" and port.

He then spoke of the Greek ambitions, and said that what happened on the coast of Albania was really more important for Italy than for Austria, and that the idea of Greece having Vallona would be most objectionable to Italy. In fact, I understood him to regard this as almost more objectionable than anything else.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50991] No. 795.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 579.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 27, 1912.*

M. CAMBON showed me to-day a proposal which M. Sazonof had made to the French Government for a conference of the six Ambassadors in Paris to consider the questions which arose out of the events in the Balkans, and to draw up a project thereon, which should at once be submitted to the consideration of the Powers. M. Poincaré felt that it was difficult for him to propose a conference in Paris, and he asked me whether I would propose it.

I said that my idea was that the conference should take up Herr von Kiderlen's point, and decide first of all what was to be left absolutely to the Balkan States to be settled as they pleased, and secondly, the few points on which the Powers must have a say. I thought that, if they could succeed in declaring that on these points the Powers found themselves in complete agreement, the whole anxiety would be at an end. My view was that the consultation of the Ambassadors need not even be called a conference. They might receive instructions just as the Ambassadors in Constantinople used to receive instructions, without a conference being called, to discuss Macedonian reforms. No doubt this was a larger question, but at this stage the meeting need not be made more formal. My impression was that, in the end, either Austria would accept a neutralised "corridor" to a neutralised port under Servian sovereignty, or that Russia would accept a neutralised railway to a neutralised Albanian port for Servia, who would be represented on the board of the railway. It was most important to know whether M. Sazonof, who had already talked of this alternative, would really accept it; and that was why I had telegraphed yesterday to St. Petersburgh.

M. Cambon agreed that this was most important. He asked whether, if I received a favourable reply from M. Sazonof, I would make the proposal.

I replied that I would do so.

M. Cambon suggested that the Ambassadors might be instructed to discuss the question of the Ottoman Debt. It was not necessary to discuss it now, but it might be a useful and harmless excuse for their consultations.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50993] No. 796.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 300.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 27, 1912.*

THE German Ambassador said to me to-day that his Government wished me to know that the mistrust which appeared to exist as regards Austrian preparations was not well-founded. Austria had no intention of interfering with the military operations of Servia, and the German Government asked me to believe that Austria had deferred the ultimate settlement of difficult points until the definite peace-arrangements were made.

The Ambassador then told me confidentially that German public opinion was much exercised about the Russian precautions. The Russian mobilisation coincided with a visit paid by the Grand Duke Nicholas to the French fortifications on the German frontier near Metz. Russia was keeping reservists with the colours. There had been alterations in her disposition on her frontier. It was not believed that these were aggressive, but Austria of course took corresponding steps. Germany had not taken any military steps, because she did not wish to make the situation more uneasy. There was a danger that the tension might be made even sharper by further measures, and that it might lead to an explosion, although on both sides there were no serious interests involved that could not be arranged. No question had been asked about the Russian movements, as it was not desired to pour oil on the fire. But it was thought that perhaps I might explain in St. Petersburgh the difficulty which arose from the

Russian preparations, because it would be lamentable if precautionary measures begun in Russia were to lead to a menace to peace.

I said to the Ambassador that I did not believe that the preparations in either Austria or Russia were aggressive; but of course they afforded matter for comment on both sides, and each would point to something done by the other as the reason for its own action. I pointed out that though, on the one hand, the Grand Duke Nicholas had been near the French side of the German frontier, there was, on the other hand, the visit of the Austrian Chief of the Staff to Berlin, of which there had been notices in the newspapers. I could assure the Ambassador that we would do everything we could to keep the peace. He had told me before that Germany was indifferent as to who held Constantinople, or as to whether there was a Servian port on the Adriatic. We were in the same position. As to a Servian port on the Adriatic, it was no interest of ours either to promote it or to prevent it, and we did not think that it should be made a cause of war. But we realised that if Russia and Austria did go to war about it, in fact if any two Great Powers went to war, there was not one of us who could be sure that we should not be drawn into it; for the original cause of war between two Great Powers might be merged in other issues which would arise from the complications. That was why we were so anxious to keep the peace.

I also told the Ambassador that my news from St. Petersburgh to-day was favourable. M. Sazonof had said that there was no change in his attitude, and that he continued to take account of the views of both sides, *i.e.*, of both Austria and Servia, to seek for an equitable and peaceful solution, and to counsel moderation in Belgrade. I had heard that the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburgh had had a most friendly audience of the Emperor of Russia. The Russian view seemed to be that there was more than one method of finding a solution for Servian economic desires, and that at the proper time the solution might be the subject of friendly discussion between the Powers.

It had occurred to me that we were approaching the time when it might be worth while for the six Ambassadors in some capital to receive instructions to discuss the whole question. It might then be announced, as Herr von Kiderlen had suggested, that on the greater part of the field the Balkan States would be left free to make what terms they could and were pleased to make with Turkey, and to divide the territory as they liked; but that there were certain points on which the Powers must have their say. Assuming that Constantinople and the Straits were not claimed by the allies, the points of importance which occurred to me were: Servian access to the Adriatic, Albania, and the Ægean islands. If the Powers could say this, and add that on these points they were in complete agreement, the whole cloud of anxiety would be dispelled.

I thought that a regular conference, with a formal opening and the admission of the Balkan States, would probably be premature; but an informal discussion by six Ambassadors might facilitate matters.

Meanwhile, I hoped that no definite proposition would be made one way or the other that might put the press in a position to say that, if this particular solution was accepted, Austria was humiliated; or, if that other solution was accepted, Russia was humiliated.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50835] No. 797.

Admiralty to Foreign Office—(*Received November* 28.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, November, 28, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated the 27th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 797.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 27, 1912.

"YARMOUTH" is leaving Smyrna for Besika. Request permission for "Inflexible" and "Yarmouth" to go to Smyrna for a few days whilst truce lasts outside Constantinople between Bulgarians and Turks.

[50728] No. 798.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.—(*Communicated to Foreign Office, November* 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, November* 27, 1912.

YOUR No. 679 approved.
You should go in a destroyer.

[50695] No. 799.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, November* 27, 1912.

REPORTS from interior continue to speak of nothing but pillage, violence, and murder, local authority being largely left in the hands of notorious bandits.

Mussulman population urge dispatch of international commission to enquire and report. I am doubtful as to spontaneous origin of this suggestion, but some action certainly appears called for if this country is to be saved from complete devastation.

[50904] No. 800.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 28.)

(No. 689.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, November* 28, 1912.

FOLLOWING from consul, Adrianople:—

"Les autorités locales ayant fait savoir par télégraphie sans fils au Grand Vizir que les Bulgares bombardent intentionnellement la ville depuis six jours, le corps consulaire croit de son devoir d'attester l'exactitude absolue de cette information. Les colonies étrangères sont toujours jusqu'à ce jour saines et sauves."

[50866] No. 801.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 28.)

(No. 457.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, November* 28, 1912.

SERVIAN communication in the "Times."

I regret that owing to a mistake your telegram No. 1284 of 25th November was decyphered as being a "repeater" to Rome. As Minister for Foreign Affairs could not see me to-day I cannot act on it till to-morrow.

[50865] No. 802.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 192.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, November 28, 1912.*

SEE my telegram No. 178.
The following is secret :—

The Ministers of War and Finance were yesterday summoned to the house of the Prime Minister, where the action of the Austro-Hungarian Government in endeavouring by means of military preparations during the progress of the war to coerce Servia was discussed.

With the knowledge of the Bulgarian Government the Servian Government have decided to make representations in this connection to the Triple *Entente*. The great anxiety of the Prime Minister is to adjourn until the conclusion of the war the question of Servian access to the sea, but a different situation will arise if Austria continues to coerce the allies.

As you are aware from previous telegrams of mine I have been categorically assured by both the Minister of Finance and the Prime Minister that they will give their ally their support.

The latter part of telegram No. 165 from Sir Fairfax Cartwright does not, therefore, tally with my information.

The words of the Prime Minister, in whose statements I have every confidence, can, I scarcely think, have been correctly reported by the Russian Minister here, unreliable as he is.

[50849] No. 803.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 193.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 28, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 187 of 26th November.

Recruits for 1914 have been ordered to report for service on 3rd December. These troops, amounting to 30,000 men between the ages of 19 and 20, will receive one month's training and then be sent to the front in case of necessity.

[50868] No. 804.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 194. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, November 28, 1912.*

ARMISTICE.

At yesterday's meeting of delegates, at which M. Danef presided, Nazim Pasha stated that his Government found the conditions of the allies rather stiff.

He added that Turks would present their terms to-day. Ottoman delegates telegraphed to Constantinople asking for exact conditions which Ottoman Government require for a preliminary peace. Prime Minister will discuss question with the Bulgarian Government to-night, and afterwards will telegraph to the allies asking their opinion and views.

Prime Minister believes that most important condition for a preliminary peace is to define new frontier between the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea in the face [*sic*] of Constantinople, and the rest of Turkey in Europe being lost to Ottoman Empire.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[50855] No. 805.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 171.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 28, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from the military attaché for the Director of Military Operations :—

"Following is the situation in Slavonia and in the south of Hungary :—

"Esseg is the head-quarters of General von Frank, commanding all forces along Save and Danube lines. Round Esseg and along Save from Brodtomikovic are from twelve to fifteen battalions detached from 2nd, 4th, 8th, and 13th corps. Posts are located at Brodtomikovic, Vancovce, Mitrovic. Seventh corps at Temesvar is also reinforced by battalions detached from other corps, and it continues the line to the Roumanian frontier. Principal posts are Semlin, Paneso, and Bazias (south of Weisskirchen). In Bosnian head-quarters mobile groups are Tuzla, Kladanz, Vizegrad, and Foill, with reserves at Sarajevo. Mountain brigades are apparently from five to six battalions. Other strong groups are collecting at Mostar and Ragusa.

"Possibility of a force being embarked for expeditionary purposes by sea from Ragusa should be borne in mind.

"Ammunition factories at Hirtenberg, Rott, and Weiss are working till midnight. 100,000,000 small-arm cartridges have been ordered. All remount commissions are purchasing horses.

"Rumours of the Emperor's illness are false. His Imperial Majesty interviewed Chief of Staff, Minister of War, Honved Minister, and Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday.

"Calling of three classes of reservists to the 14th corps is established.

"His Majesty's consul at Savajovo reports to-day 16,000 troops at Bjelina and 6,000 at Breka, in Bosnia, near junction of Save and Drin."

[50870] No. 806.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 166.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Berlin, November 28, 1912.*

IN order to allay slight panic at Königsberg, Imperial Chancellor has sent telegram to Ober-Präsident of East Prussia requesting him to issue statement to effect that rumours of preparations for war on either side of Prusso-Russian frontier are devoid of all foundation, that no special military measures have been taken by Germany, and that no information has been received in regard to Russian military measures calling for German counter-measures.

[50951] No. 807.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 121.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, November 28, 1912.*

I HAVE spoken to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of your telegram No. 282 of 16th November : Turkish bondholders.

He said that the subject was complicated, but the Greek Government would not wish to indispose financiers.

[50876] No. 808.

Vice-Consul de Garston to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Ragusa, November 28, 1912.*

MOBILISATION of the 16th Army Corps continues. I am informed that classes of the year 1887 and of 1888 have been called up and have joined the colours, and that a general requisition of quadrupeds has been made.

[50867] No. 809.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 89.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November 28, 1912.*

SERVIAN charge d'affaires has reported that during a recent interview with him (I presume on the 21st November) you recognised necessity for Servia of possessing a commercial port, and thought that this would be obtained if Servia's aim was a purely commercial, not a fortified, port. He added that you were not averse to an autonomous Albania within limits.

Prime Minister requests me to thank you for this language, and states that Servia will use every effort to avoid separate discussions with Austria.

Russian Minister came to see me yesterday evening. He dwelt persistently on the evident anxiety of the *entente* Powers that Servia should not come to terms with Austria separately. I said that I had not exactly understood that to be the effect of advice we had given to Servia, but rather that it would be undesirable for her to persist in provoking Austria-Hungary by challenging her right to have a voice in events affecting regions where she is closely concerned.

[50875] No. 810.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Odessa, November 28, 1912.*

MOVEMENTS of troops westward in Kieff military district are spoken of, but I know nothing definite. If it is thought well, I could send Waite to Kieff for enquiry.

(Sent to St. Petersburgh.)

[50679] No. 811.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1305.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 28, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 453 of 27th November.

Russian Ambassador has urged me to take initiative in proposing a conference. I prefer to call it a consultation of six Ambassadors, and am sounding the German Government in first instance.

I wish Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs could see his way to propose at such consultation that, on condition of Servia and Montenegro acquiring the sanjak and Servia getting the other territory except Albania that the allies' terms of peace may give her, the question of Servian access to Adriatic should be settled as suggested by Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs in your telegram No. 449 of 25th November.

It must be remembered that in 1909 the desire of Servia and Montenegro was the sanjak in return for Austrian annexation of Bosnia. If there was any humiliation then it was solely that Servia and Montenegro were kept out of the sanjak. Russian public opinion should surely regard it as some success if the main thing desired by Servia in 1909, which till a few weeks ago it was thought that Austria would never concede, is

gained now. And if, as regards access to an Adriatic port, Servia gets commercial terms at least as good as Austria gets respecting Salonica, there will be no real humiliation in such a settlement. I have urged this on Russian Ambassador, who received it favourably. I can only put it to Minister for Foreign Affairs as a suggestion, for Russian interest is so much more directly concerned than ours; but I think it is worth considering. If Russia made this proposal, my expectation is that she would get the credit of having made the settlement that preserved the peace of Europe and secured the Balkan allies their other gains, which may all be endangered if there is European war about a Servian port.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 758, with the following addition: "I have spoken in this sense to French Ambassador.")

[51184] No. 812.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 410.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 28, 1912.*

GERMAN Ambassador has impressed upon me the wish of German Government for peace and the hope that we will co-operate to preserve it, and I believe both German and British Governments have the same feeling. Neither Government is directly interested in promoting or preventing a Servian port in the Adriatic; neither of us considers this question to be a sufficient reason for war between Great Powers; but if any two of the Great Powers go to war there is not one of the others who can be sure of not being drawn into it, for the original cause of war may be merged and lost in other issues arising out of the complications that would ensue. This must redouble our anxiety to preserve peace.

Communications between all the Powers are still friendly, but they are very vague, and military precautions in Austria and Russia are becoming an increasing source of anxiety.

How would German Government view a proposal that instructions should be sent to the six Ambassadors at one of the capitals—I suggest Paris, if that would be generally agreeable—to consult together and to submit to their Governments propositions on three points:

1. To what extent are the allies free to change the map of Europe without any stipulations being made by Great Powers?
2. On what points must Great Powers reserve their right to have some say in the settlement? Albanian and Servian access to Adriatic and Ægean islands are the points of most importance that occur to me, assuming that the allies do not attempt to claim Constantinople and Straits.
3. What settlement on each of these points would secure the assent and support of the six Powers?

I do not desire to make any proposal that would not be acceptable, and you should therefore first ascertain the view of German Minister for Foreign Affairs confidentially on this suggestion, and, if he shares the same view, ask whether he will sound Austrian Government. I think the other three would then all accept.

The risk is that a conference might bring out an irreconcilable divergence between Austrian and Russian views, but this risk would be minimised if the consultation of representatives of Powers were to be as informal as possible, and without some such consultation Austrian and Russian views cannot be reconciled or even definitely ascertained, and there is danger that they may drift through mobilisation into an irreconcilable attitude.

You should let German Minister for Foreign Affairs know the whole substance of this telegram.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 1306; also to Paris, No. 759, with the following addition: "I have informed French Ambassador of substance of this telegram.")

[50628] No. 813.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 575.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 28, 1912.*

M. CAMBON told Sir A. Nicolson on the 23rd November that M. Poincaré was ready to give, if asked, the same advice as to the future Servian replies to Austria-Hungary, as had been done by M. Sazonof. M. Cambon enquired whether we would do the same. Sir A. Nicolson told him that he would refer to me, but that it seemed to him that it was going a little far to draw up the text of Servian replies, as it would practically be completely identifying ourselves with the Servian case, and setting one group up against the other. This, to Sir A. Nicolson's mind, would be unfortunate, as it would, firstly, throw upon us great responsibility, and, secondly, split up Europe into two distinct camps. There was no harm in giving general advice to Servia to be reasonable and prudent; and if Russia wished to dictate Servian replies, that was her affair, and if the replies were of the same nature as those communicated to us from St. Petersburgh there would be no objection to our telling M. Sazonof that they were reasonable and moderate proposals. But, personally, Sir A. Nicolson hoped that we should not put our hands too deeply into this Austro-Servian difficulty, and not undertake the entire charge of the Servian case. M. Cambon agreed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50769] No. 814.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 576.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 28, 1912.*

SIR A. NICOLSON noticed in conversation on the 25th November with the Italian, Russian, and French Ambassadors considerable uneasiness in respect to the immediate future, and grave doubts whether we were not marching towards a most serious situation. The Russian Ambassador feared that there was a possibility that Austria-Hungary and Germany would be prepared to face a conflict, and he considered that if Germany felt more or less assured that we should stand aside, she would consider a serious, and possibly dangerous, factor—our Navy—could be written off, and that her hands were free. Count Benckendorff argued that so long as uncertainty existed as to whether we should or should not range ourselves alongside of France and Russia, Germany was, to a certain extent, held in check. Once she considered that we should not take part she would be relieved of anxiety.

Count Benckendorff also said that it would be impossible to restrain Russian public opinion if it were thought that Austria and Germany were thinking of preventing the Balkan allies from keeping what they had won.

M. Cambon had news from Rome, the source being the Italian Minister of Marine, that Austria-Hungary was making mobilisation preparations both by sea and land, and from Berlin that the visit of Field-Marshal Schemua was to complete details as to military co-operation.

Ferid Pasha, Albanian ex-Grand Vizier, is reported to have arranged with the Khedive (whose daughter married his son) that he should be head of an autonomous Albania, that he should arrange this with the Porte, and at the same time propose that Syria should be united to Egypt. This latter transaction, if seriously meant, would hardly be acceptable to the Porte.

All the Ambassadors, for one reason or another, deplored M. Pasitch's manifesto, which they consider most inopportune and most foolish and dangerous.

Sir A. Nicolson gathered an impression is existing that Germany and Austria-Hungary are encouraging Turkey to resist.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50979] No. 815.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 275.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 28, 1912.*

THE Italian Ambassador informed me to-day that since the conclusion of peace between Turkey and Italy, Egypt had suspended her survey of contraband. This was proving an obstacle to the pacification of Cyrenaica. Enver Bey's proceedings with hostile tribes were ambiguous and suspicious. It was believed that he was trying to get an understanding with the Senussi. If it was clearly understood that there could be no bond between Egypt and the rebellious tribes of Cyrenaica, and that the state of insurrection there would receive no encouragement from Egypt, the moral effect would be very good. The Ambassador was instructed to tell me this, and to say that Italy's engagement was to evacuate the islands in the Ægean only when all Ottoman troops had left Libya. If this departure of Ottoman troops was prevented, directly or indirectly—I understood him to mean by proceedings such as those of Enver Bey—the occupation of the islands by Italy would be prolonged much beyond what had been contemplated. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs counted on our friendly disposition with regard to the traffic in arms in North Africa.

I said that I would refer the matter to Lord Kitchener. We desired to fulfil all the obligations of good neighbours.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50627] No. 816.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 390.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 28, 1912.*

M. DE ETTER called on the 22nd November and told Sir A. Nicolson that the Servian Government had enquired what reply they should give, supposing the Austro-Hungarian Government were not satisfied with the answers already sent and of which M. Grouitch had spoken to me on the day before. M. Sazonof had informed M. Pasitch that, if Austria-Hungary asked for a more definite statement, the Servian Government should answer that the object of Servia was to obtain an outlet to the sea in order to develop her economic and national interests. In case Austria-Hungary were not even then satisfied, Servia should reply that the question might be submitted to the deliberation of the Powers.

M. Sazonof enquired if we had been approached by Servia. Sir A. Nicolson said we had been informed of the Servian reply already sent, and that I had told M. Grouitch that it was a proper reply if it implied that everything done during the war should be regarded as provisional. Servia had not consulted us as to the nature of future replies which she might have to give. M. de Etter said that M. Sazonof hoped that if she did we would give the same advice as he had done.

Count Mensdorff mentioned to Sir A. Nicolson on the same afternoon that it was all very well for Servia to say that the question should be discussed when the war was over, but in the meantime she was effecting accomplished facts, which it might require serious measures to rectify later. Sir A. Nicolson observed that he understood that all that was being done was provisional and in the nature of military acts during the course of a war. Count Mensdorff remarked that he was unaware that Servia had definitely stated that occupation of Alessio, &c., was provisional.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[51446] No. 817.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 395.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 28, 1912.

THE Russian Ambassador was instructed to inform me to-day that M. Sazonof believed it to be possible and desirable that the representatives of the six Powers should meet in a European capital to study the questions concerning the crisis in the Balkans. M. Sazonof indicated Paris as a desirable capital, and said that in his opinion it was important that the Powers should take in hand at the present moment the study of a solution of the difficulties. It seemed to him very desirable to agree to the wish of M. Poincaré that England should take the initiative with regard to this.

I said that I would sound the German Government first, and ask them to ascertain whether Austria would agree. But it was extremely important that M. Sazonof should be clear as to what the Russian Ambassador was to say in such a consultation. I then told Count Benckendorff of your telegram No. 449 of the 25th November, my telegram No. 1294 of the 26th November, and your telegram No. 453 of the 27th November. I spoke to him very strongly in the sense in which I afterwards communicated with you in my telegram No. 1305 of the 28th November. I pointed out that it was open to any Russian to say that, after the line which Austria took with Servia and Montenegro in 1909, the acquisition of the sanjak by these States was a great surrender by Austria, and that, if Count Aehrenthal had been alive, it would have been a complete reversal of his policy. This seemed to be overlooked in Russia, and I thought that, if due prominence was given to all that was being gained for Servia now, a moderate settlement of the question of a commercial outlet on the Adriatic could be agreed to. If this was done on the proposal of Russia at a conference, it could not possibly be represented as a humiliation for Russia; on the contrary, it was a humiliation, if at all, for Austria.

Count Benckendorff appeared quite to appreciate the point about the sanjak.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[51423] No. 818.

Minute by Sir A. Nicolson.

M. DMOWSKI, who was leader of the Polish party in Russia and an exceedingly able and intelligent man, called upon me this morning. He told me that since 1909 Austria had been making not only military preparations for war with Russia, which I may add, in parenthesis, he informed me was foretold by Count Aehrenthal in conversation with M. Dimbinski, a leader of the Austrian Polish party, as being quite inevitable within the next four or five years, but has also been preparing an agitation in the Kingdom of Poland for an uprising against Russia should hostilities break out. This agitation has been chiefly engineered through the Socialist party, who have been the agents of what he termed the "Espionage Bureau" of the Austrian Ministry of War.

An intimate friend of M. Dmowski recently enquired directly of Count Berchtold whether the Austrian Government were really encouraging and promoting this agitation. Count Berchtold had replied that the Austrian Government were taking no steps in the matter, but that possibly subordinate Austrian agents were doing so. M. Dmowski said that this agitation was much deprecated by all serious Poles, and, indeed, he would go so far as to say by the average sensible Polish opinion. Nevertheless, there was no doubt that should war break out and if Austria were in a position to furnish material means, some serious, though sporadic, outbreaks might occur.

Turning from this question, he said that great forces, moral and racial, must inevitably sooner or later bring Austria and Russia into collision, and from all that he had heard and from all that he had witnessed himself he felt pretty sure that this collision was now impending. It was not a mere question of a Servian port on the Adriatic, though he perfectly understood and quite sympathised with the Austrian determination to bar Servian access to the Adriatic. It was clear that the great Serb idea had become now a vital and active force. Even the Croatians, who, though of Servian origin, were of a different civilisation and religion from the Serb proper,

had now sunk their contempt of, and dislike of, the ordinary Serb and were ready to promote as far as they could the old idea of Great Servia which would take in Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, and the Banat. It was therefore essential for Austria that she should not permit Servia, if she could possibly help it, from obtaining a foothold on the Adriatic Sea and thereby completely blocking Austria on the south. But, apart from that question, he thought that the war which was predicted by Count Aehrenthal would in all probability shortly ensue. He naturally regretted this war from a Polish and patriotic point of view, as he said that he feared that, whatever might be the results, the Kingdom of Poland would be the loser rather than the gainer. If Russia were to be beaten, he anticipated, from all that he heard from his countrymen who resided and held positions of importance both in Germany and in Austria, that there would be another partition of Poland, a portion, probably one-third, going to Austria, and two-thirds to Germany. If, on the other hand, Russia were to be the victor, she would probably endeavour to annex those portions of Galicia where the Ruthenians chiefly resided. Neither of these solutions would be to the advantage of Poland, as they would not like to have strong efforts made to russify portions of Galicia, nor, on the other hand, would they desire to be handed over to Germany. Poland, therefore—and he spoke the opinions of the serious and more rational of his countrymen—was strongly in favour of peace, although he considered that peace was at the present moment in considerable peril.

I have summarised as much as possible the somewhat lengthy conversation which I had with M. Dmowski, whom I knew very well when he was a member of the Duma in St. Petersburgh, as I think that his remarks are not without interest.

I should add that he told me that the Pan-Slav feeling was running exceedingly high in Russia and that friends of his had been much surprised to hear from the Russian Minister of Agriculture, M. Krivochin, that several of his colleagues in the Russian Government were enthusiastic at the prospect of a great Slav Confederation under the protectorship of Russia, and that even M. Kokovtsof, who recently scouted the idea of a war, seemed himself to be much impressed by the strength of the Slav feeling and to be in a great measure carried away by it himself.

A. N.

Foreign Office, November 28, 1912.

[50881] No. 819.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 187.)

Sir, *Athens, November* 23, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 183 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a continuation of the diary of the war, taken from the official bulletins, up to the 22nd instant.

The first report of the fall of Monastir which reached Athens announced that the Turkish army, to the number of 40,000 men, had surrendered with it. Judging by the Crown Prince's telegram of the 19th (which was not published here until the 21st), the same information reached His Royal Highness; but his telegram of the 20th shows that he then knew that the enemy in front of him were part of the defeated army of Monastir, and not an independent command.

Troops continue to be shipped in various directions daily, and the physique of the men shows no falling off.

Sick as well as wounded are, however, now being brought down from the front. They are, I am told, mostly suffering from dysentery; cases of enteric are not frequent.

Several thousand prisoners have been brought from Salonica and sent to Nauplia, Tripolitsa, and other towns.

The two most recently ordered torpedo-boat destroyers from the Vulcan Works arrived during the week. They are named "Keravnós" ("Thunderbolt") and "Nea Genea" ("New Generation"). The latter was paid for out of the proceeds of a subscription raised among the Greeks of America, and her name symbolises the hoped-for renaissance of Greece. They are powerful vessels of about 1,000 tons, carrying 21-inch torpedo tubes and 4-inch guns.

Lieutenant-General the Crown Prince has been promoted to be general.

I have, &c.

F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 819.

Diary of the War for November 16 to 22, 1912.

November 18.—Official announcement by the Ministry of Marine of the occupation of the island of Icaria.

November 19.—Official announcement by the Ministry of War that a leader (apparently of irregulars) named Zakhos telegraphed from Valta on the 11th, stating that on the 6th he had landed from the steam-ship "Helen" and abolished the Turkish authorities on the Kassandra Peninsula, hoisting the Greek flag in twelve villages, including Polygios, Vavdos, and Perikhora.

Also that General Sapountsakis reports by telegraph that Major Spiromillios has occupied Khimara.

November 19.—The army under my command, which, on the 15th November, commenced a simultaneous advance viâ Vodena, Grammatiko, and Kozani, rain falling heavily until to-day, overcame the resistance of the enemy on the 16th and 17th November at Komano, Katrinitsa, and Ostrovo, and to-day at Sorovitch and the defiles of Gornitsovo and Ostrovo. To-morrow I shall continue my advance towards Florina. The enemy continues to offer resistance although the Monastir army has surrendered. Probably it is a section of the enemy under Niazi, the well-known Young Turk o. Resna.

Dated from Ostrovo. CONSTANTINE.

November 20.—The army under n y command, after passing through the defile of Gornitsovo and Gerli Derven, drew up on the Tamberdani–Florina line and occupied the latter town. The Turkish army of Monastir, being attacked by the Servians and its communications with Resna having been cut, had retired in disorder through Florina. To-day I cut off those who had not yet retired [? from Florina]. A large number of prisoners and a quantity of matériel fell into our hands. The Turks, who retreated through Florina, numbered 30,000.

Dated from Banitsa. CONSTANTINE.

November 22.—Official announcement by the Ministry of Marine:—

"Yesterday morning a division of the Ægean fleet appeared before Mitylene, the capital of the island of Lesbos, and at once demanded the surrender of the town. In consequence of this demand the consuls and the Vali of the Ægean requested the commander-in-chief, in order to avoid bloodshed in the town, to grant a delay within which the Turkish troops in the town, if they would not surrender, might withdraw into the interior. The commander-in-chief granted until 12·30. The delay having elapsed, landing parties took possession of the town and hoisted the Greek flag, amid the indescribable enthusiasm of the inhabitants. The Turkish troops abandoned the town and withdrew into the interior of the island. Greek troops and seamen are following close on their heels. When the landing was finished the squadron sailed for Lemnos."

November 22.—My cavalry, pursuing the enemy after the battle of the day before yesterday, captured twenty guns and a great quantity of matériel in the Pisodori Pass. Violent and continuous rain and snow prevail. The pursuit of the fleeing enemy continues.

Dated from Florina. CONSTANTINE.

[50882] No. 820.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 188. Confidential.)

Sir, *Athens, November* 23, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 181 of the 15th instant, and to Mr. Lamb's despatch No. 155 of the same date, of which he has been so good as to send me a copy, I have the honour to state that there is not the slightest doubt in the mind of

anyone here as to the retention of Salonica by the Greeks after the war, whatever the Bulgarians may say or do. It has even been stated in the press that the King intends to have a palace built there for himself. In the meantime the cue here is to make light of the friction apparent between the two nationalities and the jealousy of the two armies. The newspapers report convivial meetings between Bulgarian, Servian, and Greek officers at Salonica, and a dinner given by the King to the Bulgarian princes. One or two papers which, on the report of disorders at Serres, in the repression of which the Bulgarians found it necessary to shoot down 500 of the Turkish population, expressed doubts whether by "Turkish" "Greek" was not really meant, have been severely taken to task by the rest.

On the other hand, the "Athinai" has made itself ridiculous by suggesting that the Servians, who have taken the eminently Greek town of Monastir, will no doubt have the greatest pleasure in handing it over to the Crown Prince Constantine, and in remaining there as his honoured guests.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[50984] No. 821.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 29.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November* 29, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams, dated the 27th instant, relative to movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 821.

Consul-General Block to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Port Said, November* 27, 1912.

"BRESLAU" left here to-day. Destination Alexandretta.

Enclosure 2 in No. 821.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 27, 1912.

"GOOD HOPE" arrived Malta.

Enclosure 3 in No. 821.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 27, 1912.

"BLACK PRINCE" arrived Beirout.

[50952] No. 822.

President of the Albanian Provisional Government to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vallona, November* 29, 1912.

L'ASSEMBLÉE nationale, composée des délégués de toutes les contrées albanaises sans distinction de religion réunis aujourd'hui dans la ville de Vallona, vient de proclamer l'indépendance politique de l'Albanie et constituer un Gouvernement provisoire chargé de défendre les droits d'existence du peuple albanais menacé

d'extermination par les armées serbes et de délivrer le sol national envahi par les armées des États alliés. En portant à la connaissance de votre Excellence ce qui précède, j'ai l'honneur de prier le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de vouloir bien reconnaître ce changement de vie politique de la nation albanaise. Les Albanais, entrés dans la famille des peuples de l'Europe orientale, dont ils se flattent d'être les aînés, ne poursuivant qu'un seul et unique but—de vivre en paix avec tous les États balkaniques et en devenir un élément d'équilibre—sont convaincus que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, ainsi que tout le monde civilisé, leur accorderont un bienveillant accueil en les protégeant contre toute atteinte à leur existence nationale et contre tout démembrement de leur territoire.—YSMAÏL KEMAL BEY.

[50888] No. 823.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 690.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 28, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 687 of 27th November.

Annexation of Samos to Greece was officially proclaimed by newly elected deputies and four senators on 24th November. Commission left on 25th November to submit decision of senators to Greek Government. Island is meanwhile governed for King of Greece by M. Sofoulis and four senators.

[50925] No. 824.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 691.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 28, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 607 of 14th November.

In a circular note to the foreign missions the Porte states that further floating mines have been observed in the neighbourhood of Kara Burun, and protest against use of these engines by Bulgaria as contrary to the Fifth Hague Convention.

[50926] No. 825.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 692.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 28, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 689 of 28th November.

This was evidently sent at request of the Ottoman authorities, and possibly with a view to latter's entering protest against bombardment of town.

[50989] No. 826.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 173.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November 29, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"Laws concerning requisitioning of horses, impressment of carriages, and billeting and provision for families of men called out on mobilisation were introduced yesterday, and will be passed at once. General Conrad, bearing autograph letter from the Emperor, has proceeded to Bucharest to interview the King of Roumania. General von Frank, commander-designate of the forces against Servia, left for Esseg yesterday.

"Vice-consul at Ragusa reports no large body of troops has been landed in Dalmatia since 17th November, but that a continuous stream of small contingents, bound both for the interior and for Cattaro, is maintained by usual mail-boats; also that 400 men on board Hungarian-Croatian steam-ship 'Pannonia' passed Ragusa for Cattaro on 28th November."

[51003] No. 827.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 174.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, November 29, 1912.*

I AM informed that at a meeting held yesterday under the presidency of the Minister of Finance, to which leading bankers were summoned, it was decided to issue 21,000,000*l.* in Treasury bonds next week. This is probably due to the requirements of military situation.

[51022] No. 828.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 175. Most Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 29, 1912.*

I LEARN that recent visit of the Austrian Chief of Staff to Berlin was undertaken apparently on his own decision or perhaps under instructions received from the Heir Apparent, but not known to the Austro-Hungarian Government; neither was his arrival expected by the German Government. I understand German Ambassador here has made some observations to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs with regard to this visit.

The German Government, it appears, disapproved of the visit, as, in their opinion, it might be interpreted in Russia as a menace to that country. I am informed that the German Ambassador said at the same time that Germany wished to remain in the background in the present crisis and in Austro-Hungarian dispute with Servia, but that if Austria-Hungary declared to Germany that one of her vital interests was at stake, and if she were attacked by Russia while defending that interest, she could count absolutely on Germany standing by her.

[51023] No. 829.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 176.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 29, 1912.*

I LEARN that report received with regard to the audience of the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh with the Emperor of Russia has given satisfaction here. I understand that Russia, while advocating Servian demands for commercial facilities on the Adriatic, will not make the rejection of this by Austria-Hungary a *casus belli*. As the Austro-Hungarian Government are disposed to give all kinds of economic facilities to Servia, there seems to be now no reason for the outbreak of war between Russia and Austria-Hungary.

Situation created here, however, by the consular incident is, I regret, not improving. Public opinion throughout the monarchy is running very high against Servia. For two days the Ministry for Foreign Affairs have been trying to decypher report from their consul, which has reached Vienna in a form so deliberately mutilated that only fragments are intelligible. From these I understand that the case against Servia is bad. It is expected that Austria will be compelled to demand very ample apology from Servia, and probably punishment of the military authorities held responsible. It is difficult to obtain this in the present excited feeling against Austria-Hungary which prevails at Belgrade. In the event of procrastination on the part of the Servian Government in giving satisfaction, Austria may be compelled to send an ultimatum which may eventually lead to the opening of hostilities between the two countries.

[51013] No. 830.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 195.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, November 29, 1912.*

ARMISTICE.

My immediately preceding telegram of 28th November.

As result of yesterday's deliberations Bulgarian Government are inclined to believe that Grand Vizier is anxious to conclude peace in order to save Constantinople, and they consider that this is one of the chief reasons for more recent arrests of certain members of Young Turk party, who by their agitations were stimulating the war party in the hope of creating European complications from which Turkey might have profited. Bulgarian Government are now convinced that both Germany and Austria are aiding Turkey in dispatching guns, ammunition, money, and in case of the former country even artillerymen, via Roumania.

Austrian military movements are specially alarming the allies, and they consider them as a direct encouragement to Ottoman Government to continue their resistance.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[51015] No. 831.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 196.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, November 29, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 185 of 25th November.

Roumanian Minister told me yesterday that the King of Roumania and the Roumanian Government had both urged the Turkish Ambassador at Berlin to use his best efforts in Constantinople to conclude peace. Roumanian Minister added that he had been instructed to acquaint the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs with the above.

Austrian Minister also told Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday that the Turkish Ambassador had received the same advice both from Berlin and Vienna. To this, Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that his information from several sources did not tally with the above. Austrian Minister seemed somewhat embarrassed, but eventually remarked that he had heard that the French Government had spread untrue reports as to advice that the Triple Alliance were giving to the combatants. Minister for Foreign Affairs did not continue the discussion.

(Sent to Constantinople and Bucharest.)

[51034] No. 832.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 197. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, November 29, 1912.*

ARMISTICE.

My telegram No. 195 of to-day.

M. Daneff has just telegraphed to the Prime Minister to the effect that the Turkish commissioners have shown themselves really anxious that peace pourparlers be commenced at once. It is proposed that the troops remain in their present positions, and that the armistice last until the peace is concluded.

Prime Minister has replied that he has no objection. He has informed the allied Governments that, in his opinion, peace terms should now be proposed; that this has become more easy as Durazzo has already been captured, and Adrianople cannot, in the opinion of his military advisers, hold out much longer.

Allies are now discussing peace conditions amongst each other by telegraph.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[51011] No. 833.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 198.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 29, 1912.*

BALKAN war.

My telegram No. 193 of 28th November.

A telegram from head-quarters to the War Office announces the surrender of 1st and 2nd redif divisions under Yaver Pasha with 252 officers, 8,879 men, 8 mountain and 2 machine guns, 2,000 horses, and also other war material.

Surrender took place near Merhamli, between Demotica and Dedeagatch, and is reported as having been preceded by severe engagement.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[51035] No. 834.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 199. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, November 29, 1912.*

MY Secret telegram No. 192 of the 28th instant.

In a long conversation with the Prime Minister, from which I have just returned, his Excellency asked me to tell you that he considers the granting to Servia of access to the Adriatic a *sine quâ non*; Durazzo need not necessarily be the port chosen. Both the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Ministers have been informed in the same sense, and also that Bulgaria and her ally would remain solid on the point. The King of Bulgaria, his Excellency informed me, is himself of the opinion that there is no other solution of this question. It was owing to the threatening situation that he decided to speak to my Austrian and Russian colleagues, although he has done his best to avoid discussing this question.

The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has, I hear, informed the Servian Minister at Vienna that Austria will await the declaration of peace before expecting a reply from Servia regarding the question of her access to the Adriatic.

[51036] No. 835.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 200.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, November 29, 1912.*

ISMAIL KEMAL BEY has addressed communication from Vallona to Bulgarian Government notifying to them declaration of Albanian independence and expressing a wish for their friendship and hearty co-operation in cause of civilisation.

Prime Minister read me original telegram and stated that he believed that communication in a similar sense had been addressed to the other Balkan States.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[51037] No. 836.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 168.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, November 29, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 410 of 28th November acted upon.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that he will sound Austro-Hungarian Government, and give me an answer as soon as possible. Personally, he quite appreciates the utility of your proposal, but, for reasons already known to you, he would prefer London to Paris.

[51038] No. 837

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 169.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, November 29, 1912.*

IN course of conversation to-day, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who had just seen Turkish chargé d'affaires, said that he feared that Ottoman Government were going to be unreasonable with regard to conditions of peace. He had gathered that they would not agree to armistice on basis of evacuation of Adrianople, but that they would be ready to discuss conditions of peace while hostilities were still in progress. Conditions which Ottoman Government seemed disposed to propose were some rectifications of frontiers and reforms in Macedonia. In view of their present position such conditions appeared to be ridiculous, and he begged me to sound you as to whether it would not be advantageous if the Powers were to instruct their representatives to advise the Ottoman Government not to make matters worse by demanding the impossible, but to confine themselves to proposals which could at all events offer a basis for discussion such as even the retention of Adrianople and a more extended line of frontier than that contemplated by Bulgaria.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had heard that Russia had already given advice to this effect, but the Turks were at present rather suspicious of her, and he thought a word from other Powers, especially England, more effectual. He added that his suggestion did not imply a collective step, but that each representative should take an early opportunity to speak in the above sense.

He would be glad of your opinion.

[51028] No. 838.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 459.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 29, 1912.*

OWING to the meeting of Duma and of Cabinet Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs had been unable to see me, so I read and left with Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs an *aide-mémoire* embodying substance of your telegram No. 1305 of 28th November.

His Excellency said that the Russian Government would probably first have to consult Servians before putting forward proposal in question, so as to try and make it as acceptable as possible. In view of fact that the Austrian Government had virtually renounced all idea of opposing division of sanjak between Servia and Montenegro, he thought that it would be preferable to leave question of sanjak out of the discussion and to treat it as already settled. On the other hand, we should try to obtain some other compensation that might reconcile Servia to the non-acquisition of a port on the Adriatic. In speaking a fortnight ago of Austria's readiness to facilitate Servian access to a port on the Dalmatian coast, Austrian Ambassador had hinted that his Government might admit some sort of Servian administration at the port eventually selected. His Excellency therefore thought that Austria could hardly object were Servia to be charged with administration of a port on the Albanian coast without, however, acquiring any sovereign rights over it.

I remarked that, though Austria might consent to such an arrangement at a port which was under her direct sovereignty, I doubted whether she would do so with regard to one on the Albanian coast, over which she would not be entitled to exercise any control whatever, and which would virtually become a Servian port.

His Excellency said that if we could not obtain compensation in this direction we should have to seek it in Albania when the question of delimitation came up for discussion.

I hope to see Minister for Foreign Affairs to-morrow.

[51027] No. 839.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 460.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 29, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1284 of 25th November.

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Russian Government have called attention of Servian Prime Minister to the inopportuneness of his statement published in the "Times," and have told him that he ought to correct bad impression which it was making by expressing views in a more moderate form. Though his Excellency has so far received no reply to this communication, he hears that Servians are no longer insisting on their extreme claims, including Durazzo, and he regards this as a step in the right direction.

His Excellency said that it would certainly do no harm were you to speak at Belgrade in sense suggested, but he did not press the matter.

[51184] No. 840.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 403.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 29, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 410 of 28th November to Berlin.

A report having appeared in the newspapers that I had formally proposed a conference, and Austrian Ambassador having asked me about it, I told him verbally substance of my telegram No. 410 to Sir E. Goschen, except first two paragraphs and the paragraph beginning "The risk is that" to the end.

[51184] No. 841.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 404.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 29, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 410 of 28th November to Berlin.

A report having appeared in the newspapers that I had formally proposed a conference, and Austrian Ambassador having asked me about it, I told him verbally substance of my telegram No. 410 to Sir E. Goschen, except first two paragraphs and the paragraph beginning "The risk is that" to the end.

[50867] No. 842.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 126.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 29, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 89 of 28th November.

I have always recognised necessity for Servia to have a commercial outlet on Adriatic; I have never said that a Servian port was the only way of obtaining it. On the contrary, there is more than one method of securing in substance the commercial advantages that Servia wants, and I am strongly of opinion that the door should not be shut upon discussion of possible alternative methods of securing these. This is one reason why I regarded M. Pasitch's communication to the "Times" as unfortunate. Servia seems to overlook the fact that Austria is now raising no objection to acquisition of the sanjak, which was denied to her and Montenegro by Count d'Aehrenthal in 1909, that she will presumably get other territory such as Uskub without opposition, and that if she is irreconcilable about Albania and the Adriatic she may provoke a European war, at the end of which the sanjak and other gains, which are now presumably secure to her, may be lost. You should inform Prime Minister, saying that I reciprocate his friendly feeling, but think it the part of a friend at this moment to give a candid opinion.

[50220] No. 843

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 578.)
Foreign Office, November 29, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 568 of the 21st instant, I have to request your Excellency to enter into communication with the French Government in the manner desired on the subject of the interests of the Ottoman bondholders.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[51447] No. 844.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 302.)
Foreign Office, November 29, 1912.

Sir,

THE German Ambassador came to-day to inform me that his Government had made a communication in Paris, to say that the reports which had appeared in the French press, even in newspapers which were supposed to be in touch with the French Government, to the effect that Germany was encouraging Turkey to resist, and was supplying her with officers and arms, were quite untrue. These reports ought, indeed, to have been disposed of by the fact that Germany had allowed Creuzot guns to go through for the Balkan States, because she did not wish to be accused of obstructing French industry.

I said that I had not seen much of these reports. I then informed the Ambassador of my telegram, No. 410 of yesterday, to your Excellency.

He observed that it was on the lines on which he had telegraphed to his Government after his last conversation with me. He thought my suggestion a good one. The fact that our position was outside groups and of a neutral character was advantageous to our influence.

I said that we were, of course, closely in touch with Paris and St. Petersburgh; but, like Germany, and indeed like France too, it did not matter to us whether Servia had or had not a port on the Adriatic. I thought that Germany, France, and England must all have the same feeling; that it would be intolerable if they were drawn into a war about something which did not matter to any of them. In the course of the conversation, which became informal, I said that I thought Russia had not yet made up her mind on the Servian question. She was not intransigeant, but, on the other hand, I was not able to say that she had indicated that her views could be reconciled to those of Austria.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[51448] No. 845.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 43.)
Foreign Office, November 29, 1912.

Sir,

THE Bulgarian Minister asked me to-day about the report in the press that I had proposed a conference.

I said that I had not proposed a conference. The question whether there should be a conference had been discussed in more than one capital; and I had contributed a suggestion that, as exchanges of views were taking place between all the Powers, this might be facilitated by instructing the Ambassadors in some capital to consult together, as used to be done in Constantinople in the case of Macedonian reforms.

The Minister expressed the hope that we should all adhere to the line of settling things at the conclusion of the war.

I said that I thought this was the general view; but mobilisations were taking place, and it was desirable to keep the Powers in touch diplomatically.

I then observed to him what a great advance it was upon 1909 that Servia and Montenegro should get the sanjak, which had then been denied to them; and what a pity it would be if Servia forced the question of a port on the Adriatic to the point of war with Austria, at the end of which it might not be certain that Servia would get the sanjak, and all the rest she had won might even be endangered, instead of being, as now, assured to her so far as Austria was concerned. An outlet for her commerce she must have; but there was more than one way in which this might be obtained.

The Bulgarian Minister was fully alive to the importance of this.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[51106] No. 846.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 904.)
Constantinople, November 23, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul-General Barnham reporting on the provisions of the proclamation of martial law which has been issued at Smyrna.

The disarmament of the Cretan Moslems in that town, who are most devoted adherents of the Committee of Union and Progress, is the healthiest of measures from the point of view of public security.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 846.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 137.)
Smyrna, November 19, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that a modified form of martial law was proclaimed at Smyrna on the 16th instant.

The following are its provisions:—

(*a.*) Prohibition of the introduction of newspapers and printed publications from the enemy's country.

(*b.*) Prohibition of political meetings and the use of seditious language in public places.

(*c.*) Restrictions imposed upon local newspapers and prohibition to publish supplements.

(*d.*) Disarmament of population. Arms to be delivered up at the barracks within one week of date of proclamation.

(*e.*) Perquisitions in private houses during day or night.

(*f.*) Deportation of vagabonds.

(*g.*) Cafés on Smyrna Quay to be closed at midnight. Cafés attached to hotels and those in the bazaars where no liquor is sold to be closed at 10 o'clock. All drinking shops to be closed at 8 o'clock.

(*h.*) Persons found in the street after midnight without a permit to be arrested.

In connection with article (*d*), I know that the authorities are disarming the Cretans, as a party of ten were arrested and disarmed two days ago.

The town is quiet.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[51091] No. 847.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 366.)
Sir, *Rome, November 23, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the "Tribuna," the organ generally used by the Italian Foreign Office for the semi-official instruction of public opinion, contains in its edition of this evening a signed article by an independent writer, who announces that he is only exposing his own personal views on the Servian difficulty and the Adriatic port question, and that he is quite aware his views do not always agree with those of the Government or of the editor of the paper, who has given him hospitality.

He argues that Italy is no doubt in alliance with Austria and must hold to the letter and spirit of her obligations. But, he asks, did these obligations, established before the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the renunciation by Austria of the sanjak of Novi-Bazar, contemplate the consequences which would follow from such action? If not, and if the Balkan confederation and the practical disappearance of Turkey from Europe constitute an entirely new situation, a *fait nouveau*, is it not incumbent on Italy to regulate her action henceforth solely in accordance with her own permanent interests, without having regard to the manner in which the Powers may happen to group themselves?

In an editorial comment on this article, which may be taken as representing the view which the Italian Foreign Office seeks to establish, the following paragraph occurs:—

"In any case we have in this matter agreements with Austria which were formulated with clearness and precision; and we may anticipate that our diplomacy will act with due vigilance and without hesitation to ensure that the spirit of these agreements be maintained in their entirety with such appropriate application as the changed conditions necessitate."

This paragraph appears to afford additional evidence that an effort is being made in certain quarters to convince the public in this country that a particular line of conduct is definitely prescribed for Italy by an understanding which was in itself only negative in character.

The understanding in question was negotiated and signed by the Marquis Visconti Venosta as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and when that statesman was recently asked by the French Ambassador whether he had any objection to informing him what its actual conditions were, he replied at once that he had none whatever. It only dealt with two points. Establishing, firstly, that Italy and Austria mutually disinterested themselves territorially in Albania; and, secondly, that, in the event of a break-up of the Turkish Empire, they agreed to give their support to the creation of an autonomous Albania. The Marquis Visconti Venosta deprecated any wider extension being given to the agreement, and would not admit that it involved an obligation towards Austria beyond the general support of the principle of autonomy.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[51119] No. 848.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 92.)
Sir, *Belgrade, November 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that King Peter returned to Belgrade from the front yesterday. His Majesty was received at the railway station by the members of the Government, the local authorities, and various deputations. A loyal address of welcome was presented by the mayor, in the course of which he declared that Durazzo must come under Servian dominion and that the Servian people were prepared to make far greater sacrifices than they had hitherto done if the possession of the territories they had gained with their blood were questioned—expressions which were applauded by the Ministers who were present with cries of "So it is! So it is!" To this the King made no allusion in his reply. Besides those already mentioned above,

the Bulgarian and Greek representatives were present at the station, as well as the Russian Minister and the staff of his legation in uniform, though no other foreign representatives attended.

King Peter first drove to a church, and, after a short thanksgiving service, drove to the palace, where he appeared on a balcony in reponse to the crowds cheering him from below.

In the evening the street in front of the palace was illuminated and a large demonstration took place, His Majesty addressing the people from the windows of the palace. Subsequently a torchlight procession paraded the streets, halting in front of the legations of the allies and those of the Triple *Entente*, where a band played the respective national anthems.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[51120] No. 849.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 93.)
Sir, *Belgrade, November 24, 1912.*

M. YOVANOVITCH, the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, told me yesterday overtures from Austria for a settlement of the Adriatic port difficulty are reaching the Servian Government through unofficial channels.

In my telegram No. 49 of the 5th instant I reported that a Professor Redlich, of the Technical High School in Vienna, had sounded the Servian Government as to their willingness to enter a customs union with Austria. This suggestion, however, was not only rejected by Servia, but also met with opposition on the part of the agrarians in Hungary.

The supposed emissaries of the Austrian Government on the present occasion are Professor Masaryk and another deputy, whose name I was unable to ascertain. The former is of course known for his pro-Servian sympathies and his defence of Servian interests in connection with the Friedjung trial, and would therefore, conciliation being apparently the object of the Austro-Hungarian Government, seem a very fitting intermediary.

One proposal submitted for the consideration of the Servian Government is on the following lines:—

That Austria and the Balkan States should form an economic federation, in which Austria would have the principal voice;
That Salonica should be constituted a free port, only, however, for Austria and the Balkan States;
That it should be under joint management, and should be enclosed in a neutral area extending as far as the junction of the line running from Uskub to Salonica with the line from Constantinople and the projected line from Monastir—a point, M. Yovanovitch informs me, about 100 kilom. north of Salonica (but which I am unable to determine on the map); and
That the Servian frontier should be brought down to meet the neutral area at that point.

It has been intimated that if Servia agrees, and will assist in putting this proposal before her allies, no opposition will be raised to her acquisition of a port on the Adriatic so long as her claims regarding Northern Albania are not excessive.

The proposal would seem in some respects an advantageous one for Servia, but the Servian Government fear that it may involve them in differences with their allies, and that it would eventually entail dependency upon Austria. M. Yovanovitch, however, said that if Servia found herself abandoned by the Great Powers over the Adriatic port question, she would drive the best bargain possible, and for the future throw in her lot with the Dual Monarchy.

For the moment the attitude of the Servian Government seems to be that they do not wish to discuss any question separately with Austria-Hungary until the termination of hostilities with Turkey. Until then they claim to pursue their military operations unrestricted. When the proper time arrives they will judge whether it is more to their

advantage to negotiate directly with the Austrian Government or to place their interests in the hands of the *entente* Powers. As regards the occupation of certain localities by Servian troops, if an autonomous Albania be established by the Powers and a rectification of frontiers generally be made, it will of necessity be found that the occupation has in some cases been merely provisional, but the Servian Government are naturally reluctant at present to make any statement upon this point.

Against this attitude the Austro-Hungarian Government have as yet raised no objection, and as a consequence during the last few days a decided diminution of tension in Austro-Servian relations has been apparent. It is under the circumstances somewhat remarkable that the relations between Austria and Russia should, according to the press, be growing increasingly strained. If the fact be referable to Servia, it would appear to indicate anxiety on the part of Russia lest failure to wholeheartedly support Servian aspirations should be tending to impel Servia towards Austria, with disastrous results to Russian prestige in the Balkans in future. Not improbably to cause such anxiety is at present Servia's object.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[51108] No. 850.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 996.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 26, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 681 of yesterday, I have the honour to enclose translation of the official communiqué of the court-martial explaining the reasons for the recent arrests of members of the Committee of Union and Progress.*

There seems no doubt that the committee was more anxious to recapture power and continue its destructive work than to defeat the Bulgarians or other enemies of Turkey. There have been many rumours, some accompanied by circumstantial details, of treachery during the campaign, and it seems certain that attempts were made to suborn the army at Chatalja, and lead them back on the capital as in April 1909. The court-martial is silent on the subject of the establishment of a republic, but it appears that apart from the general republican tendencies and doctrines of the committee, as evidenced by its policy during the last four years, its inner circle has been recently working to bring off a *coup d'État* and establish an Ottoman Republic, the Caliphate to be dealt with on the lines of the arrangements made regarding the spiritual attributes of the Emperor of China.

The action of the committee delegate, who had been enrolling fedais to assassinate His Majesty the Sultan, the Minister of War, and some of the other Ministers, recalls the incident at the time of the Russo-Turkish war, when the Circassian Hassan entered the Council of Ministers and succeeded in dispatching the Minister of War and two of his colleagues.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[51112] No. 851.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 1000. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 26, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a memorandum from the chief dragoman to this embassy, reporting on steps taken by him to bring about direct negotiations between the Ottoman Government and the Balkan League.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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* Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 851.

Memorandum by Mr. Fitzmaurice.

(Confidential.)

I HAVE the honour to put on record the steps which, under your Excellency's instructions, I took to bring about direct negotiations for an armistice and peace between the Porte and the Balkan League, with the result reported in your telegram No. 611 of the 11th November to the Foreign Office.

After the complete rout of the Ottoman forces at Lule Burgas, and their disorderly retreat on Chorlou and the Chatalja lines, I called on M. Popof, the Bulgarian first dragoman, who had remained here attached to the Russian consulate-general in charge of Bulgarian consular business. M. Popof was one of the Bulgarian delegates for the negotiations arising out of the annexation of Eastern Roumelia and the declaration of Bulgarian independence in 1908.

After discussing matters with him in their general bearings, he gave me to understand that, in his private opinion, it would be desirable, if possible, to obviate any question of, or any necessity for, the entry of the Balkan forces into Constantinople by bringing about direct negotiations for an armistice and peace, a course which would prevent an enormous amount of bloodshed and misery, besides avoiding raising the number of delicate and complicated questions connected with Constantinople and its environs. He hinted that, as Kiamil Pasha was Anglophil, I might perhaps find the *trait d'union*, but remarked that as the Balkan forces had so far been victorious, the initiative should properly come from the Turks.

I subsequently saw M. de Giers, the Russian Ambassador, who said that, in the general interest, it would be best that the belligerents should, by direct negotiations, conclude peace as soon as possible. To my remark that he had been strongly in favour of Kiamil Pasha becoming Grand Vizier, and that as his Highness was, rightly or wrongly, labelled "Anglophil," a slightly ambiguous situation would arise should Kiamil Pasha make the first advances and conclude peace, only to be hurled from power as in January 1909 by the agitation of chauvinists. M. de Giers replied that, although Kiamil Pasha might not have a very prolonged term of office, he trusted he would not fall immediately after the conclusion of peace. I suggested that as recent events were producing similar results to those of 1877, the Turkish mind might expect "San Stephano" to be followed by a "Berlin." His Excellency replied that if the Turks concluded "un grand San-Stefano" quickly, it might have to be followed by "un petit Berlin."

I thereupon drove out to the house of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, at Courouchesmé, on the Bosphorus, but found that his Highness was not visible, as he was laid up with an acute attack of rheumatism, aggravated by the recent prolonged ministerial councils and general worry. I was received by Jemil Pasha (his son-in-law), Prefect and Vali of Constantinople. The latter was evidently suffering from nervous strain as a result of recent and anticipated military disasters and their likely consequences to the capital and the rest of the Empire. Speaking apparently in the name of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, he appealed for help from England, coupled with the stereotyped remarks about our position in India and Egypt, and went on to state that if England would conclude an alliance with, and help Turkey in her present straits, he would, within twenty-four hours, procure an Imperial firman ceding Egypt to Great Britain, apparently in the same order of ideas as led to the Cyprus Convention. I told him that in moments like the present it was more essential than ever to be practical and look facts in the face; neither England nor any other combination of Powers could "help Turkey" to repair the numerous and colossal blunders of the last four years of committee government in the short interval likely to elapse between the capture of Chorlou and the arrival of the Balkan forces before the gates of the capital; that personally I had, talking as a friend to the ostensible committee leaders, deprecated the closing of the Bulgarian clubs, the illegal application of the "bands laws" and the cruel accompaniments of disarmament, the ill-treatment of, and the alienation of, the Albanians, and the anti-Hellenic boycott, &c., but the rulers of Turkey during the last four years had followed the opposite advice, with the present results; that thirty-five years ago the Roumelian provinces had been practically signed away at San Stephano, and that if Turkey laid aside her pride and faced the present situation in a business-like spirit, she would probably find that the Balkan States would be content with San Stephano "plus compound interest"; that if the Roumelian arm of the Turkish body

had been semi-amputated in 1877 and now suffered a further amputation, there was no reason why the head—Constantinople—the seat of the Sultanate and Caliphate, the Asia Minor trunk, and the other members should commit suicide; that Turkey had now apparently three courses open to her:—

1. Resistance *à outrance*, which, with an empty treasury, might mean that she would bleed to death at the lines of Chatalja, or resistance up to the point of saving her military honour.

On the last point I remarked that for those who like myself had been in close contact with the last few years' events Turkish military reputation had not been compromised, as one had noticed the screws and other vital parts of the Turkish military machine being removed by political agitators, and one was not surprised to see it fall to pieces when Nazim Pasha tried to work it, while foreign military experts in Europe, who, owing to the conspiracy of silence in the European press regarding the real truth of Turkish affairs had not foreseen the recent collapse of the Ottoman forces, were now searching for and discovering the truth.

2. Mediation of the Great Powers or "Europe."

Here I pointed out to him that in her recent application for such mediation Turkey had realised no gain, but had met with a loss of several days at a moment when perhaps hours had the value of months, and that "Europe," in the old Turkish acceptation of the term, was as dead as the Balkan *status quo*.

3. Direct negotiation for an armistice and peace.

As regards this course I remarked that many of the clauses of the Treaty of Berlin in Turkey's favour had never been executed; that the Bosnian difficulty had been settled satisfactorily by direct negotiation, as also the Tripoli war; and that had the decision to treat direct with Italy been come to months before the close of that war the conditions might have been correspondingly better, so that many reasons pointed to the expediency and advantage of opening up direct pourparlers with the Balkan States with a view, from the negative standpoint, to cutting present losses, and, from the positive point of view, to securing, perhaps sincerely, solid relations with Turkey's new European neighbours. I drew his attention to the facts that Turkey's weakness in recent years had come from the aspirations of the Balkan States to win back what they imagined they had been unfairly robbed of some thirty-five years ago; that once their objects had been realised Bulgaria, Servia, and to a great extent Greece would have no aspirations running counter to Ottoman interests, *e.g.*, in Asia Minor; that there would exist, on the contrary, a community of interests that their agressive and expansive tendencies, instead of being directed south, would probably be directed north, and give Roumania and Austro-Hungary food for reflection and anxiety, especially in Slavo-Croatia; and that Turkey, no longer worried by a Macedonian question, and Albanian question, and Salonican Jacobinism, nor obliged to keep up and pay for a standing force of close on 300,000 men in the European provinces, would be stronger financially and organically.

I further pointed out the necessity of realising that the confederated Balkan States really constituted a new Great Power in the Near East, a fact which Austria seemed to be taking into account, and impressed on him the necessity, if the Porte decided to deal direct with the Balkan States, of the Government being strong enough internally against all comers, not only to arrange an armistice, but to conclude peace and tide over the period of readjustment which must follow recent events, a period during which an outburst of Jacobinism would certainly imperil the very existence of the Ottoman and Islamic State.

Jemil Pasha declared himself receptive to the foregoing, and said he would speak at length to his father-in-law, Jemaleddin Effendi, the Sheikh-ul-Islam. When I saw the latter for over two hours two days later I found him alive to all the points mentioned, and reminded him that a prolongation of the present acute crisis might give an unpleasant shape to unrest in the Arab world, thus endangering the principle of the kaliphate, and also in the provinces inhabited by Kurds and Armenians. Jemaleddin Effendi, as your Excellency is aware, is a distinctly progressive, liberal-minded, and enlightened member of the ulema, and has considerable experience of affairs of State, as he held his present office for sixteen years during the late Sultan's reign.

After seeing Jemil Pasha I called on Damad Ferid Pasha, senator, whom I found discussing the situation with some of his fellow-senators. In a private conversation, and more by question and suggestion, I conveyed to him the same arguments as I had used with Jemil Pasha, being careful to remind him that I was talking absolutely in a private capacity. I told him it was a moment for pocketing national pride and sentiment and being guided by reason, and that it seemed essential that the initiative should come from the Porte. Ferid Pasha said that he would go at once to see the Grand Vizier, Kiamil Pasha, at the Porte, and asked my permission to repeat to him the substance of our conversation. I told him there was no objection provided that he made it quite clear that we had been speaking entirely as man to man. In the evening he called to give me the result of his interview with Kiamil Pasha, and on the following day, when I accompanied your Excellency to call on the Grand Vizier, the latter expressed the desire to find some means of communicating direct with King Ferdinand with a view to arranging an armistice and peace preliminaries. I then reminded his Highness of the presence at Constantinople, in a private capacity, of M. Popof, whom he had known at the time of the Eastern Roumelian negotiations. M. Popof called on Kiamil Pasha on the following day at the Porte, and, as reported in your telegram No. 621 of the 12th November, it was decided that the Grand Vizier should send a telegram direct to King Ferdinand, the *trait d'union* being thus established without any official intervention of this embassy. The result has been to ease the nervous strain in the capital—an effect which has been for the present intensified by the Government's action in arresting some of the principal ostensible members of the committee.

The news of direct negotiations between Turkey and the Balkan League has contributed to a complete cessation for the time being of the alarmist rumours, which, percolating in great part through the Austrian Embassy, as in 1877, have recently fluttered the nerves of Constantinopolitans; and it may be hoped that it has also had a good calming effect in Moslem circles in Egypt and India, thus lessening the anxieties of those responsible for the administration of those countries.

GERALD H. FITZMAURICE.

P.S.—As already reported verbally to your Excellency, I have also spoken privately to the Ministers of Finance and Interior, Evkaf, Public Works, and Justice, and, rather by question and answer than by direct advocacy, conveyed to them the distinct impression that by promptly cutting their losses and looking to future good relations with Turkey's Balkan neighbours they would avoid jeopardising, and probably strengthen, the remaining vast tracts of the Ottoman Empire.

G. H. F.

[51045] No. 852.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 30.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 29, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams, dated th 29th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 852.

Admiral Superintendent, Malta, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *November 29, 1912.*

"TENNESSEE" left Malta.

Enclosure 2 in No. 852.

H.M.S. "Barham" to Admiralty

(Telegraphic.) *November* 29, 1912.

AM leaving Alexandretta for Beirout. "Prometheus" arrived here.

[51029] No. 853.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November* 29, 1912.

SERVIAN Government are somewhat perturbed by statement in the "Times" of 25th November having appeared under the signature of the Prime Minister, and at effect which it has produced. Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informs me that Prime Minister never authorised Mr. Stead to use his signature, but at the same time he admits that statement quite correctly represents the views of Servian Government.

[51030] No. 854.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, November* 29, 1912.

PRINCE GEORGE of Servia has been brought back from the front very ill with typhoid fever.

[51031] No. 855.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30)

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November* 29, 1912.

AUSTRIAN Minister told me to-day that Servian civil authorities are being appointed in Durazzo and other localities in Albania occupied by Servian troops, and remarked, with considerable irritation, that this did not look like provisional occupation.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw subsequently, said he was not sure about Durazzo, but admitted that there were already Servian authorities at Alessio and other places. He contended that it was natural and did not influence the question of ultimate possession one way or another. I observed that it was not likely to conciliate Austrian public opinion.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[51212] No. 856.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, November* 30, 1912.

UNDER-SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs tells me confidentially that Servian delegates are leaving for Chatalja to negotiate conditions of peace.

[51216] No. 857

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 202.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, November* 30, 1912.

MY telegram No. 197 of 29th November.

Minister of Finance has left for head-quarter staff. He will discuss with the King all questions of finance, including the indemnity to be demanded from Turkey.

He will also explain fully to His Majesty views of Cabinet on question of peace.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[51217] No. 858.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 203. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, November* 30, 1912.

ARMISTICE.

My telegram No. 197 of 29th November.

Further meeting took place yesterday. Bulgaria demands that Turkey should raise blockade of Black Sea ports. Ottoman delegates replied that they demand that Greeks should also raise their blockade. Greek delegates refused, whereupon Ottoman delegates telegraphed for instructions to Constantinople.

Ottoman Government consent that Bulgaria may pass trains by Adrianople station in order to revictual troops at Chatalja; Turks will not have the same rights. Prime Minister considers this concession of great importance as affecting capitulation of Adrianople. Next meeting fixed for 1st December. Bulgarian Government consider the general tendency of negotiations in favour of peace.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[51221] No. 859.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 177.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November* 30, 1912.

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations :—

"From reports of consuls and other sources. At Ragusa and Cattaro 15,000, at Mostar and Trebinje 31,000, in Bosnia, round Vizegrad and Sarajevo, 60,000. Units are to be brought up to war strength throughout. Total effective in Bosnia and Herzegovina to reach 200,000 end of next week. Along River Drin and both banks of the Save are in all 40,000 men. Preparations elsewhere reported complete. In Galicia only three classes of the reservists are called up, and some men, such as supports of families, are being sent back owing to want of accommodation.

"I feel convinced that Bulgaria will join Servia in any case, and the Bulgarian military attaché told me that to the best of his belief alliance between the Balkan States would compel them all to join whether peace was made with Turkey or not. Servian Secretary made a similar statement.

"Russian military attaché told me that he thought that the roads in Poland must be frozen by now, but that it would make no difference to the Russian plans.

"General opinion here is that divisions at Bozen and Laibach only will be left opposite Italy. Some of the units in them, however, have been sent to Galicia, and must be replaced by others."

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[51222] No. 860.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 178.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna November 30, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 176 of 29th November.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that the full report of consular incident had at last reached him. He had only read it hastily, but the impression left on him was that if Servia were reasonable and apologised the incident could be closed. He evidently means to act with the greatest moderation, and I think that it would be well if the Great Powers used their influence at Belgrade to advise Servian Government to be reasonable in according satisfaction to Austria.

[51223] No. 861.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 179.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 30, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 410 of 28th November to Berlin.

I saw Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day and mentioned that you had talked to Count Mensdorff in the sense of the above-mentioned telegram. He said that he had just received the account of conversation, from which he gathered that you suggested no formal conference, as asserted by yesterday's newspapers, but merely informal meeting of Ambassadors in some capital for the discussion of certain points connected with results of the war. He said that if meeting of Ambassadors were informal and intended merely to facilitate agreement of the Powers on certain incontrovertible points he was inclined to view your proposal sympathetically, though he could not express definite decision with regard to it for the moment. He would study it carefully and give you a reply through Count Mensdorff. Minister for Foreign Affairs enquired what capital you had in view for the proposed meeting. I replied that I thought Paris. His Excellency evidently did not like this, and said that he would prefer London. England, he said, had behaved with laudable impartiality during present crisis, and had not taken sides like nearly every other Power. Atmosphere there was serene, and it was therefore proper country for the proposed meeting. I think that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs does not like the idea of M. Isvolsky representing Russia.

With regard to the three points mentioned by you as proper subjects for discussion, his Excellency observed that, according to his view, the Powers, especially Russia and Austria-Hungary, having at the outbreak of war intimated to the Balkan States that they would allow no territorial alteration of Ottoman dominions, their hands were free, and no territorial alteration could be held valid if made by Balkan States alone. Treaty of Berlin gave signatory Powers the right to revise any treaty of peace now concluded by Turkey, and for that reason Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs was in favour of the Balkan States concluding a preliminary peace, and not attempting to force upon Europe the acceptance of new order of things arranged by themselves alone.

[51200] No. 862.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 694.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 30, 1912.*

GRAND VIZIER this morning, before going into the council, professed himself very optimistic as regards negotiations and the attitude of the Balkan delegates. He seemed to expect early conclusion of an armistice affecting Adrianople and the whole theatre of war, and spoke of reprovisioning Adrianople. He said that delay had occurred owing to the fact that Greek delegates were awaiting fresh instructions from Athens, and evidently counts upon discord between Greeks and Bulgarians.

(Repeated to Sophia and Athens.)

[51201] No. 863.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 695.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, November 30, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1081 of 27th November.

"Abbasia" has been released. Do not propose detaining any ship for the present. "Bosnia" still in these waters and available at short time in case of need. A Khedivial steamer is in the port most days.

[51208] No. 864.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 464. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November 30, 1912.*

ODESSA telegram of 28th November.

I have requested consulate-general to send Mr. Waite to Kieff for enquiry as to movements of troops.

[51166] No. 865.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, November 30, 1912.*

GENERAL HOETZENDORF, inspector-general of the Austro-Hungarian army, arrived yesterday, and is staying at the palace. He is bearer of an autograph letter from the Emperor of Austria to the King of Roumania.

[51214] No. 866.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, November 30, 1912.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 196 of 29th November.

When I alluded to the visit of Turkish Ambassador, I found Minister for Foreign Affairs reticent, but I have since been informed from a reliable source that the Ambassador was much pleased with his audience of the King.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[51673] No. 867.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 299.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 30, 1912.*

BOTH Italian and German Ambassadors have enquired what view His Majesty's Government take of a communication made to representatives at Athens that foreign vessels should not remain near entrance of the Dardanelles during the night in order to avoid the possibility of any deplorable errors occurring.

We have received no notification of such a communication. Pray reply by telegraph.

[49972] No. 868.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1084.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 30, 1912.

OTTOMAN Bank have asked for consular protection whenever necessary in consequence of infringement of shareholders' rights and interests.

You should concert such steps as you may think desirable with your French colleague, and issue instructions to our consuls if you think necessary.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 760; Sophia, No. 184; Athens, No. 298; Belgrade, No. 127; and Cettinjé, No. 137.)

[50875] No. 869.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Smith.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 30, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 28th November.

It is unnecessary to send Mr. Waite.

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